§ 26.71 - Control.

§ 26.71 What rules govern determinations concerning control?

Cross Reference

Link to an amendment published at 89 FR 24973, Apr. 9, 2024.

(a) In determining whether socially and economically disadvantaged owners control a firm, you must consider all the facts in the record, viewed as a whole.

(b) Only an independent business may be certified as a DBE. An independent business is one the viability of which does not depend on its relationship with another firm or firms.

(1) In determining whether a potential DBE is an independent business, you must scrutinize relationships with non-DBE firms, in such areas as personnel, facilities, equipment, financial and/or bonding support, and other resources.

(2) You must consider whether present or recent employer/employee relationships between the disadvantaged owner(s) of the potential DBE and non-DBE firms or persons associated with non-DBE firms compromise the independence of the potential DBE firm.

(3) You must examine the firm's relationships with prime contractors to determine whether a pattern of exclusive or primary dealings with a prime contractor compromises the independence of the potential DBE firm.

(4) In considering factors related to the independence of a potential DBE firm, you must consider the consistency of relationships between the potential DBE and non-DBE firms with normal industry practice.

(c) A DBE firm must not be subject to any formal or informal restrictions which limit the customary discretion of the socially and economically disadvantaged owners. There can be no restrictions through corporate charter provisions, by-law provisions, contracts or any other formal or informal devices (e.g., cumulative voting rights, voting powers attached to different classes of stock, employment contracts, requirements for concurrence by non-disadvantaged partners, conditions precedent or subsequent, executory agreements, voting trusts, restrictions on or assignments of voting rights) that prevent the socially and economically disadvantaged owners, without the cooperation or vote of any non-disadvantaged individual, from making any business decision of the firm. This paragraph does not preclude a spousal co-signature on documents as provided for in § 26.69(j)(2).

(d) The socially and economically disadvantaged owners must possess the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of the firm and to make day-to-day as well as long-term decisions on matters of management, policy and operations.

(1) A disadvantaged owner

Control.

(a) General rules.

(1) One or more SEDOs of the firm must control it.

(2) Control determinations must consider all pertinent facts, viewed together and in context.

(3) A firm must have operations in the business for which it seeks certification at the time it applies. Certifiers do not certify plans or intentions, or issue contingent or conditional certifications.

(b) SEDO as final decision maker. A SEDO must be the ultimate decision maker in fact, regardless of operational, policy, or delegation arrangements.

(c) Governance. Governance provisions may not require that any SEDO obtain concurrence or consent from a non-SEDO to transact business on behalf of the firm.

(1) Highest officer position. A SEDO must hold the highest officer position in the company (e.g., chief executive officer or president).

(2)

In a corporation, disadvantaged owners must control the board of directors.(3) In a partnership, one or more disadvantaged owners must serve as general partners

Board of directors. Except as detailed in paragraph (c)(4) of this section, a SEDO must have present control of the firm's board of directors, or other governing body, through the number of eligible votes.

(i) Quorum requirements. Provisions for the establishment of a quorum must not block the SEDO from calling a meeting to vote and transact business on behalf of the firm.

(ii) Shareholder actions. A SEDO's authority to change the firm's composition via shareholder action does not prove control within the meaning of paragraph (c) of this section.

(3) Partnerships. In a partnership, at least one SEDO must serve as a general partner, with control over all partnership decisions.

(

e) Individuals who are not socially and economically disadvantaged or immediate family members may be involved in a DBE firm as owners, managers, employees, stockholders, officers, and/or directors. Such individuals must not, however possess or exercise the power to control the firm, or be disproportionately responsible for the operation of the firm.

(f) The socially and economically disadvantaged owners of the firm may delegate various areas of the management, policymaking, or daily operations of the firm to other participants in the firm, regardless of whether these participants are socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Such delegations of authority must be revocable, and the socially and economically disadvantaged owners must retain the power to hire and fire any person to whom such authority is delegated. The managerial role of the socially and economically disadvantaged owners in the firm's overall affairs must be such that the recipient can reasonably conclude that the socially and economically disadvantaged owners actually exercise control over the firm's operations, management, and policy.

(g) The socially and economically disadvantaged owners must have an overall understanding of, and managerial and technical competence and experience directly related to, the type of business in which the firm is engaged and the firm's operations. The socially and economically disadvantaged owners are not required to have experience or expertise in every critical area of the firm's operations, or to have greater experience or expertise in a given field than managers or key employees. The socially and economically disadvantaged owners must have the ability to intelligently and critically evaluate information presented by other participants in the firm's activities and to use this information to make independent decisions concerning the firm's daily operations, management, and policymaking. Generally, expertise limited to office management, administration, or bookkeeping functions unrelated to the principal business activities of the firm is insufficient to demonstrate control.

(h) If state or local law requires the persons to have a particular license or other credential in order to own and/or control a certain type of firm, then the socially and economically disadvantaged persons who own and control a potential DBE firm of that type must possess the required license or credential. If state or local law does not require such a person to have such a license or credential to own and/or control a firm, you must not deny certification solely on the ground that the person lacks the license or credential. However, you may take into account the absence of the license or credential as one factor in determining whether the socially and economically disadvantaged owners actually control the firm.

(i)

(1) You may consider differences in remuneration between the socially and economically disadvantaged owners and other participants in the firm in determining whether to certify a firm as a DBE. Such consideration shall be in the context of the duties of the persons involved, normal industry practices, the firm's policy and practice concerning reinvestment of income, and any other explanations for the differences proffered by the firm. You may determine that a firm is controlled by its socially and economically disadvantaged owner although that owner's remuneration is lower than that of some other participants in the firm.

(2) In a case where a non-disadvantaged individual formerly controlled the firm, and a socially and economically disadvantaged individual now controls it, you may consider a difference between the remuneration of the former and current controller of the firm as a factor in determining who controls the firm, particularly when the non-disadvantaged individual remains involved with the firm and continues to receive greater compensation than the disadvantaged individual.

(j) In order to be viewed as controlling a firm, a socially and economically disadvantaged owner cannot engage in outside employment or other business interests that conflict with the management of the firm or prevent the individual from devoting sufficient time and attention to the affairs of the firm to control its activities. For example, absentee ownership of a business and part-time work in a full-time firm are not viewed as constituting control. However, an individual could be viewed as controlling a part-time business that operates only on evenings and/or weekends, if the individual controls it all the time it is operating.

(k)

(1) A socially and economically disadvantaged individual may control a firm even though one or more of the individual's immediate family members (who themselves are not socially and economically disadvantaged individuals) participate in the firm as a manager, employee, owner, or in another capacity. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, you must make a judgment about the control the socially and economically disadvantaged owner exercises vis-a-vis other persons involved in the business as you do in other situations, without regard to whether or not the other persons are immediate family members.

(2) If you cannot determine that the socially and economically disadvantaged owners—as distinct from the family as a whole—control the firm, then the socially and economically disadvantaged owners have failed to carry their burden of proof concerning control, even though they may participate significantly in the firm's activities.

(l) Where a firm was formerly owned and/or controlled by a non-disadvantaged individual (whether or not an immediate family member), ownership and/or control were transferred to a socially and economically disadvantaged individual, and the nondisadvantaged individual remains involved with the firm in any capacity, there is a rebuttable presumption of control by the non-disadvantaged individual unless the disadvantaged individual now owning the firm demonstrates to you, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

(1) The transfer of ownership and/or control to the disadvantaged individual was made for reasons other than obtaining certification as a DBE; and

(2) The disadvantaged individual actually controls the management, policy, and operations of the firm, notwithstanding the continuing participation of a nondisadvantaged individual who formerly owned and/or controlled the firm.

(m) In determining whether a firm is controlled by its socially and economically disadvantaged owners, you may consider whether the firm owns equipment necessary to perform its work. However, you must not determine that a firm is not controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals solely because the firm leases, rather than owns, such equipment, where leasing equipment is a normal industry practice and the lease does not involve a relationship with a prime contractor or other party that compromises the independence of the firm.

(n) You must grant certification to a firm only for specific types of work in which the socially and economically disadvantaged owners have the ability to control the firm. To become certified in an additional type of work, the firm need demonstrate to you only that its socially and economically disadvantaged owners are able to control the firm with respect to that type of work. You must not require that the firm be recertified or submit a new application for certification, but you must verify the disadvantaged owner's control of the firm in the additional type of work.

(1) The types of work a firm can perform (whether on initial certification or when a new type of work is added) must be described in terms of the most specific available NAICS code for that type of work. If you choose, you may also, in addition to applying the appropriate NAICS code, apply a descriptor from a classification scheme of equivalent detail and specificity. A correct NAICS code is one that describes, as specifically as possible, the principal goods or services which the firm would provide to DOT recipients. Multiple NAICS codes may be assigned where appropriate. Program participants must rely on, and not depart from, the plain meaning of NAICS code descriptions in determining the scope of a firm's certification. If your Directory does not list types of work for any firm in a manner consistent with this paragraph (a)(1), you must update the Directory entry for that firm to meet the requirements of this paragraph (a)(1) by August 28, 2011.

(2) Firms and recipients must check carefully to make sure that the NAICS codes cited in a certification are kept up-to-date and accurately reflect work which the UCP has determined the firm's owners can control. The firm bears the burden of providing detailed company information the certifying agency needs to make an appropriate NAICS code designation.

(3) If a firm believes that there is not a NAICS code that fully or clearly describes the type(s) of work in which it is seeking to be certified as a DBE, the firm may request that the certifying agency, in its certification documentation, supplement the assigned NAICS code(s) with a clear, specific, and detailed narrative description of the type of work in which the firm is certified. A vague, general, or confusing description is not sufficient for this purpose, and recipients should not rely on such a description in determining whether a firm's participation can be counted toward DBE goals.

(4) A certifier is not precluded from changing a certification classification or description if there is a factual basis in the record. However, certifiers must not make after-the-fact statements about the scope of a certification, not supported by evidence in the record of the certification action.

(o)

4) Exception. Bylaws or other governing provisions that require non-SEDO consent for extraordinary actions generally do not contravene the rules in paragraph (c) of this section. Non-exclusive examples are a sale of the company or substantially all of its assets, mergers, and a sudden, wholesale change of type of business.

(d) Expertise. At least one SEDO must have an overall understanding of the business and its essential operations sufficient to make sound managerial decisions not primarily of an administrative nature. The requirements of this paragraph (d) vary with type of business, degree of technological complexity, and scale.

(e) SEDO decisions. The firm must show that the SEDO critically analyzes information provided by non-SEDOs and uses that analysis to make independent decisions.

(f) Delegation. A SEDO may delegate administrative activities or operational oversight to a non-SED individual as long as at least one SEDO retains unilateral power to fire the delegate(s), and the chain of command is evident to all participants in the company and to all persons and entities with whom the firm conducts business.

(1) No non-SED participant may have power equal to or greater than that of a SEDO, considering all the circumstances. Aggregate magnitude and significance govern; a numerical tally does not.

(2) Non-SED participants may not make non-routine purchases or disbursements, enter into substantial contracts, or make decisions that affect company viability without the SEDO's consent.

(3) Written provisions or policies that specify the terms under which non-SED participants may sign or act on the SEDO's behalf with respect to recurring matters generally do not violate this paragraph (f), as long as they are consistent with the SEDO having ultimate responsibility for the action.

(g) Independent business.

(1) If the firm receives from or shares personnel, facilities, equipment, financial support, or other essential resources, with another business (whether a DBE or non-DBE firm) or individual on other than commercially reasonable terms, the firm must prove that it would be viable as a going concern without the arrangement.

(2) The firm must not regularly use another firm's business-critical vehicles, equipment, machinery, or facilities to provide a product or service under contract to the same firm or one in a substantially similar business.

(i) Exception 1. Paragraphs (g)(1) and (2) of this section do not preclude the firm from providing services to a single customer or to a small number of them, provided that the firm is not merely a conduit, captive, or unnecessary third party acting on behalf of another firm or individual. Similarly, providing a volume discount to such a customer does not impair viability unless the firm repeatedly provides the service at a significant and unsustainable loss.

(ii) Exception 2. A firm may share essential resources and deal exclusively with another firm that a SEDO controls and of which the SEDO owns at least 51 percent ownership.

(h) Franchise and license agreements. A business operating under a franchise or license agreement may be certified if it meets the standards in this subpart and the franchiser or licenser is not affiliated with the franchisee or licensee. In determining whether affiliation exists,

you

the certifier should generally not consider the restraints relating to standardized quality, advertising, accounting format, and other provisions imposed on the franchisee or licensee by the franchise agreement or license,

provided that

if the franchisee or licensee has the right to profit from its efforts and bears the risk of loss commensurate with ownership. Alternatively, even though a franchisee or licensee may not be controlled by virtue of such provisions in the franchise agreement or license, affiliation could arise through other means, such as common management or excessive restrictions on the sale or transfer of the franchise interest or license.

(p) In order for a partnership to be controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, any non-disadvantaged partners must not have the power, without the specific written concurrence of the socially and economically disadvantaged partner(s), to contractually bind the partnership or subject the partnership to contract or tort liability.

(q) The socially and economically disadvantaged individuals controlling a firm may use an employee leasing company. The use of such a company does not preclude the socially and economically disadvantaged individuals from controlling their firm if they continue to maintain an employer-employee relationship with the leased employees. This includes being responsible for hiring, firing, training, assigning, and otherwise controlling the on-the-job activities of the employees, as well as ultimate responsibility for wage and tax obligations related to the employees.

[64 FR 5126, Feb. 2, 1999, as amended at 76 FR 5099, Jan. 28, 2011; 79 FR 59597, Oct. 2, 2014[89 FR 24973, Apr. 9, 2024]