§ 159a.38 - Custodial precautions.

(a) Responsibilities of Custodians. (1) Custodians of classified information shall be responsible for providing protection and accountability for such information at all times and for locking classified information in appropriate security equipment whenever it is not in use or under direct supervision of authorized persons. Custodians shall follow procedures that ensure that unauthorized persons do not gain access to classified information.

(2) Only the head of a DoD Component, or single designee at the headquarters and major command levels, may authorize removal of classified information from designated working areas in off-duty hours, for work at home or otherwise, provided that a GSA-approved security container is furnished and appropriate regulations otherwise provide for the maximum protection possible under the circumstances. (See also § 159a.55.) Any such arrangements approved before the effective date of this part shall be reevaluated and, if continued approval is warranted, compliance with this paragraph is necessary.

(b) Care During Working Hours. DoD personnel shall take precaution to prevent unauthorized access to classified information.

(1) Classified documents removed from storage shall be kept under constant surveillance and face down or covered when not in use. Cover sheets shall be Standard Forms 703, 704, and 705 for, respectively, Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential documents. (Use of these Standard Forms is required when existing supplies of similar purpose forms are exhausted or by September 30, 1986, whichever occurs earlier).

(2) Preliminary drafts, carbon sheets, plates, stencils, stenographic notes, worksheets, typewriter ribbons, and other items containing classified information shall be either destroyed immediately after they have served their purpose; or shall be given the same classification and secure handling as the classified information they contain.

(3) Destruction of typewriter ribbons from which classified information can be obtained shall be accomplished in the manner prescribed for classified working papers of the same classification. After the upper and lower sections have been cycled through and overprinted five times in all ribbon or typing positions, fabric ribbons may be treated as unclassified regardless of their classified use thereafter. Carbon and plastic typewriter ribbons and carbon paper that have been used in the production of classified information shall be destroyed in the manner prescribed for working papers of the same classification after initial usage. However, any ribbon in a typewriter that uses technology which enables the ribbon to be struck several times in the same area before it moves to the next position may be treated as unclassified.

(c) End-of-Day Security Checks. Heads of activities that process or store classified information shall establish a system of security checks at the close of each working day to ensure that the area is secure; Standard Form 701, “Activity Security Checklist” shall be used to record such checks. An integral part of the security check system shall be the securing of all vaults, secure rooms, and containers used for the storage of classified material; Standard Form 702, “Security Container Check Sheet” shall be used to record such actions. In addition, Standard Forms 701 and 702 shall be annotated to reflect after-hours, weekend, and holiday activity. (Use of these Standard Forms is required when existing supplies of similar purpose forms are exhausted or by September 30, 1986, whichever occurs earlier).

(d) Emergency Planning. (1) Plans shall be developed for the protection, removal, or destruction of classified material in case of fire, natural disaster, civil disturbance, terrorist activities, or enemy action. Such plans shall establish detailed procedures and responsibilities for the protection of classified material to ensure that the material does not come into the possession of unauthorized persons. These plans shall include the treatment of classified information located in foreign countries.

(2) These emergency planning procedures do not apply to material related to COMSEC. Planning for the emergency protection including emergency destruction under no-notice conditions of classified COMSEC material shall be developed in accordance with the requirements of NSA KAG I-D.

(3) Emergency plans shall provide for the protection of classified material in a manner that will minimize the risk of injury or loss of life to personnel. In the case of fire or natural disaster, the immediate placement of authorized personnel around the affected area, preinstructed and trained to prevent the removal of classified material by unauthorized personnel, is an acceptable means of protecting classified material and reducing casualty risk. Such plans shall provide for emergency destruction to preclude capture of classified material when determined to be required. This determination shall be based on an overall commonsense evaluation of the following factors:

(i) Level and sensitivity of classified material held by the activity;

(ii) Proximity of land-based commands to hostile or potentially hostile forces or to communist-controlled countries;

(iii) Flight schedules or ship deployments in the proximity of hostile or potentially hostile forces or near communist-controlled countries;

(iv) Size and armament of land-based commands and ships;

(v) Sensitivity of operational assignment; and

(vi) Potential for aggressive action of hostile forces.

(4) When preparing emergency destruction plans, consideration shall be given to the following:

(i) Reduction of the amount of classified material held by a command as the initial step toward planning for emergency destruction;

(ii) Storage of less frequently used classified material at more secure commands in the same geographical area (if available);

(iii) Transfer of as much retained classified material to microforms as possible, thereby reducing the bulk that needs to be evacuated or destroyed;

(iv) Emphasis on the priorities for destruction, designation of personnel responsible for destruction, and the designation of places and methods of destruction. Additionally, if any destruction site or any particular piece of destruction equipment is to be used by more than one activity or entity, the order or priority for use of the site or equipment must be clearly delineated;

(v) Identification of the individual who is authorized to make the final determination when emergency destruction is to begin and the means by which this determination is to be communicated to all subordinate elements maintaining classified information;

(vi) Authorization for the senior individual present in an assigned space containing classified material to deviate from established plans when circumstances warrant; and

(vii) Emphasis on the importance of beginning destruction sufficiently early to preclude loss of material. The effect of premature destruction is considered inconsequential when measured against the possibility of compromise.

(5) The emergency plan shall require that classified material holdings be assigned a priority for emergency evacuation or destruction. Priorities should be based upon the potential effect on national security should such holdings fall into hostile hands, in accordance with the following general guidelines:

(i) Priority One. Exceptionally grave damage (Top Secret material);

(ii) Priority Two. Serious damage (Secret material); and

(iii) Priority Three. Damage (Confidential material).

(6) If, as determined by appropriate threat analysis, Priority One material cannot otherwise be afforded a reasonable degree of protection from hostile elements in a no-notice emergency situation, provisions shall be made for installation of Anticompromise Emergency Destruct (ACED) equipment to ensure timely initiation and positive destruction of such material a in accordance with the following standard: “With due regard for personnel and structural safety, the ACED system shall reach a stage in destruction sequences at which positive destruction is irreversible within 60 minutes at shore installations, 30 minutes in ships, and 3 minutes in aircraft following activation of the ACED system.” b

(7) An ACED requirement is presumed to exist and provisions shall be made for an ACED system to protect Priority One material in the following environments:

(i) Shore-based activities located in or within 50 miles of potentially hostile countries, or located within or adjacent to countries with unstable governments;

(ii) Reconnaissance aircraft, both manned and unmanned, that operate within JCS-designated reconnaissance reporting areas (see Memorandum by the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff (SM) 701-76, Volume II, “Peacetime Reconnaissance and Certain Sensitive Operations”; c

(iii) Naval surface noncombatant vessels operating in hostile areas when not accompanied by a combatant vessel;

(iv) Naval subsurface vessels operating in hostile areas; and

(v) U.S. Navy Special Project ships (Military Sealift Command-operated) operating in hostile areas.

(8) Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, ACED is not applicable to commands and activities located within the United States. Should there be reason to believe that an ACED requirement exists in environments other than in those listed in paragraph (d)(7) of this section, a threat and vulnerability study should be prepared and submitted to the head of the DoD Component concerned or his designee for approval. The threat and vulnerability study should include, at a minimum, the following data, classified if appropriate:

(i) Volume and type of Priority One material held by the activity, that is, paper products, microforms, magnetic tape, and circuit boards.

(ii) A statement certifying that the amount of Priority One material held by the activity has been reduced to the lowest possible level;

(iii) An estimate of the time, beyond the time frames cited above, required to initiate irreversible destruction of Priority One material held by the activity, and the methods by which destruction of that material would be attempted in the absence of an ACED system;

(iv) Size and composition of the activity;

(v) Location of the activity and the degree of control it, or other United States authority, exercises over security; and

(vi) Proximity to potentially hostile forces and potential for aggressive action by such forces.

(9) When a requirement is believed to exist for ACED equipment not in the GSA or DoD inventories, the potential requirement shall be submitted to the DUSD(P) for validation in accordance with subsection V. B. of DoD Directive 3224.3 19,d.

(10) In determining the method of destruction of other than Priority One material, any method specified for routine destruction or any other means that will ensure positive destruction of the material may be used. Ideally, any destruction method should provide for early attainment of a point at which the destruction process is irreversible. Additionally, classified material may be jettisoned at sea to prevent its easy capture. It should be recognized that such disposal may not prevent recovery of the material. Where none of the methods previously mentioned can be employed, the use of other means, such as dousing the classified material with a flammable liquid and igniting it, or putting to use the facility garbage grinders, sewage treatment plants, and boilers should be considered.

(11) Under emergency destruction conditions, destruction equipment may be operated at maximum capacity and without regard to pollution, preventive maintenance, and other constraints that might otherwise be observed.

(12) Commands and activities that are required to maintain an ACED system pursuant to paragraph (d)(7) of this section, shall conduct drills periodically to ensure that responsible personnel are familiar with the emergency plan. Such drills should be used to evaluate the anticipated effectiveness of the plan and the prescribed equipment and should be the basis for improvements in planning and equipment use. Actual destruction should not be initiated during drills.

(e) Telecommunications Conversations. Classified information shall not be discussed in telephone conversations except as authorized over approved secure communications circuits, that is, cryptographically protected circuits or protected distribution systems installed in accordance with National COMSEC Instruction 4009.

(f) Security of Meetings and Conferences. Security requirements and procedures governing disclosure of classified information at conferences, symposia, conventions, and similar meetings, and those governing the sponsorship and attendance of U.S. and foreign personnel at such meetings, are set forth in DoD Directive 5200.1220, DoD Instruction 5230.2021, DoD 5220.22-R, and DoD 5220.22-M.

(g) Safeguarding of U.S. Classified Information Located in Foreign Countries. Except for classified information that has been authorized for release to a foreign government or international organization pursuant to DoD Directive 5230.1122, and is under the security control of such government or organization, the retention of U.S. classified material in foreign countries may be authorized only when that material is necessary to satisfy specific U.S. Government requirements. This includes classified material temporarily transferred into a foreign country via U.S. Government personnel authorized to escort or handcarry such material pursuant to § 159a.59, as applicable. Whether permanently or temporarily retained, the classified materials shall be stored under U.S. Government control as follows:

(1) At a U.S. military installation, or a location where the United States enjoys extraterritorial status, such as an embassy or consulate.

(2) At a U.S. Government activity located in a building used exclusively by U.S. Government tenants, provided the building is under 24-hour control by U.S. Government personnel.

(3) At a U.S. Government activity located in a building not used exclusively by U.S. Government tenants nor under host government control, provided the classified material is stored in security containers approved by the GSA and is placed under 24-hour control by U.S. Government personnel.

(4) At a U.S. Government activity located in a building not used exclusively by U.S. Government tenants but which is under host government control, provided the classified material is stored in GSA-approved security containers which are further secured in a locked room or area to which only U.S. personnel have access.

(5) When host government and U.S. personnel are co-located, U.S. classified material that has not been authorized for release to the host government pursuant to DoD Directive 5230.11, shall, to the extent possible, be segregated from releasable classified material to facilitate physical control and prevent inadvertent compromise. However, U.S. classified material that is releasable to the host country need not be subject to the 24-hour U.S. control requirement provided the host government exercises its own control measures over the pertinent areas or containers during non-duty hours.

(6) Foreign nationals shall be escorted while in areas where nonreleasable U.S. classified material is handled or stored. However, when required by operational necessity, foreign nationals may be permitted, during duty hours, unescorted entry to such areas provided the nonreleasable information is properly stored or is under the direct personal supervision and control of cleared U.S. personnel who can prevent unauthorized access.