[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 48 (Wednesday, March 12, 1997)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 11589-11614]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-6231]
[[Page 11587]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part IV
The President
_______________________________________________________________________
Presidential Determination No. 97-18--Certification for Major Narcotics
Producing and Transit Countries
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 48 / Wednesday, March 12, 1997 /
Presidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3--
The President
[[Page 11589]]
Presidential Determination No. 97-18 of February 28,
1997
Certification for Major Narcotics Producing and
Transit Countries
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section
490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, (``the Act''), I hereby determine and certify
that the following major drug producing and/or major
drug transit countries/dependent territories have
cooperated fully with the United States, or taken
adequate steps on their own, to achieve full compliance
with the goals and objectives of the 1988 United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:
Aruba, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, China,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong
Kong, India, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, and
Vietnam.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section
490(b)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby determine that it is
in the vital national interests of the United States to
certify the following major illicit drug producing and/
or transit countries:
Belize, Lebanon, and Pakistan.
Analysis of the relevant U.S. vital national interests,
as required under section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is
attached. I have determined that the following major
illicit drug producing and/or major transit countries
do not meet the standards set forth in section 490(b)
for certification:
Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, and
Syria.
In making these determinations, I have considered the
factors set forth in section 490 of the Act, based on
the information contained in the International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 1997. Because the
performance of each of these countries/dependent
territories has differed, I have attached an
explanatory statement for each of the countries/
dependent territories subject to this determination.
You are hereby authorized and directed to report this
determination to the Congress immediately and to
publish it in the Federal Register.
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 28, 1997.
[[Page 11590]]
STATEMENTS OF EXPLANATION
Aruba
Aruba is a major trafficking and staging point for
international narcotics trafficking organizations which
transship cocaine and heroin from Colombia, Venezuela
and Suriname to the United States and Europe. Its key
position near the Venezuelan coast with air and sea
links to South America, Europe, Puerto Rico and other
Caribbean locations makes it a prime transshipment
point. Drug shipments are made primarily via
containerized cargo, but commercial airlines and cruise
ships are also used. Although USG law enforcement
agencies estimate that about 155 mt of cocaine are
transshipped through the Caribbean to the United States
annually, and that more than 100 international
trafficking organizations operate in that region, Aruba
seized only about 170 kg of cocaine and about 2\1/2\ kg
of heroin in 1996.
Money laundering organizations use legitimate
companies as fronts to invest in land development and
other construction projects. The Government of Aruba's
(GOA) Free Trade Zone (FTZ), casinos and resort
complexes are reported to be attractive venues for
money laundering and smuggling. A joint Dutch-Aruban
Commission in 1996 issued recommendations to improve
regulation of the FTZ, and invited a U.S. Customs
technical expert to help implement those
recommendations. Legislation on the FTZ, casinos and
off-shore corporations is pending.
Aruba is a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
(GON), and has independent decision-making ability in
many drug policy areas. The Kingdom of the Netherlands
(GON), a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, has not
yet extended it to Aruba. The Aruban legislature is in
the final stages of considering comprehensive criminal
law reform, expected to be adopted in 1997. The law
would create a basis for the Kingdom's extension of the
1988 UN Drug Convention, for expanded investigative
powers for local law enforcement, as well as for
extradition of nationals subject to service of
sentences in Aruba.
The GOA participated with the Netherlands, the
Netherlands Antilles in the establishment of a joint
Kingdom-Caribbean Coast Guard, designed to patrol the
Kingdom's Caribbean coastal waters to interdict drug
shipments. The GOA established money transaction
monitoring entities to review unusual transactions in
the banking sector. Aruban law enforcement officials
participated in USG-sponsored training courses for drug
enforcement during 1996. The GOA has taken limited
steps to punish corrupt officials, and replaced senior
police and justice officials in Aruba.
Corruption is a problem that hinders effective
efforts against international narcotics traffickers. A
joint Netherlands Antilles and Aruba court denied a USG
extradition request for a Colombian narcotics
trafficker in 1996. Despite these problems, Aruba
generally cooperated with the USG to meet the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
The Bahamas
Over the past ten years, successful combined U.S./
Bahamian counternarcotics efforts have dramatically
reduced the amount of cocaine and marijuana transiting
The Bahamas en route to the United States. This
downward trend has continued over the last several
years. Nevertheless, significant quantities of illicit
drugs continue to pass through The Bahamas. The Bahamas
is also a dynamic financial services center and a tax
haven with bank secrecy laws, which are both factors
conducive to money laundering. Some marijuana is grown
in The Bahamas, but the country is not a major drug
producer.
The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas
(GCOB) vigorously strives to combat drug trafficking
and is extraordinarily cooperative with USG counterdrug
efforts. The first country to ratify the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, The Bahamas took further steps during 1996
to implement
[[Page 11591]]
it. Strong anti-money laundering legislation and
implementing regulations entered into force in 1996.
During the year, the GCOB continued its successful
efforts to strengthen its justice system, with
assistance from the USG. U.S. and Bahamian law
enforcement officials continued to work closely
together to apprehend drug traffickers. Domestic drug
abuse remains a problem, but the number of new drug
users has declined notably since the mid-1980s. Over
the past several years, The Bahamas has prosecuted and
convicted some middle and low-level officials on
charges of narcotics corruption. The GCOB is also
making some headway in its efforts to forfeit and
dispose of trafficker assets.
Although enormous progress has been made, more can
be done. In coming years, The Bahamas should continue
to improve the effectiveness with which its justice
system handles drug cases, further emphasize forfeiture
of trafficker assets and effectively enforce its new
anti-money laundering controls.
Bolivia
The Government of Bolivia sustained an intense
counternarcotics effort again in 1996, cooperating
fully with the USG, and took adequate steps toward full
compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN
Drug Convention.
Bolivia's coca crop is the third largest in the
world, behind Peru and Colombia, but the high yield of
Bolivian coca makes Bolivia second only to Peru in
terms of the production of cocaine alkaloid. The vast
majority of the coca for cocaine production is
cultivated in Bolivia's Chapare region. Coca growers
produce cocaine base in rudimentary laboratories, then
sell it to more sophisticated organizations which
convert cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride.
Bolivia is believed to be the world's second leading
producer of refined cocaine hydrochloride.
During 1996, the Government of Bolivia (GOB)
eradicated over 7,500 hectares of coca in the Chapare--
the highest level of eradication since 1990. Despite
the GOB's commitment to this program, eradication
reduced Bolivia's coca crop by only one percent, as new
coca cultivation, both within and outside of the
Chapare, almost offset eradication. Total potential
cocaine production in 1996 declined by an estimated 10
percent, however, from 240 metric tons in 1995 to some
215 metric tons of cocaine HCl. New coca does not
become harvestable--and capable of producing the
cocaine alkaloid--for two years.
In order to confront the problem of new planting,
the government launched late in 1996 an expanded
campaign to detect and destroy new coca and seedbeds.
For the first time, the GOB also fully applied the
letter of its own law, arresting several peasants for
planting new coca.
The Minister of Justice produced a package of
legislative reforms, designed to modernize Bolivia's
criminal justice sector. Among the reforms were strong
anti-money laundering provisions. The government
presented the package to the Bolivian Congress in
January 1997, and is seeking passage before the June
1997 presidential elections. In addition, a new
extradition treaty between the United States and
Bolivia, which allows for the extradition of Bolivian
nationals, entered into force in November 1996.
Overall cocaine base and HCl seizures increased in
1996 compared to 1995, and HCl seizures in the second
half of the year increased dramatically. The government
established a Chemical Control Directorate. Meanwhile,
an expanded and increasingly effective Chemical Police
Unit, aided by counterdrug forces in the Chapare, made
chemical seizures well above 1995 levels. The
government's Seized Asset Directorate, created in
December 1995, began operations, while asset seizures
increased by some 36 percent over 1995.
In the coming year, the GOB must work to eliminate
and prevent new coca cultivation, fully applying the
Law 1008 prohibition on new planting, and reduce coca
cultivation in the Chapare by at least 10 percent. The
[[Page 11592]]
GOB should press for the passage and rapid
implementation of a money laundering law along with a
revised Code of Criminal Procedures. Faced with an
increasingly sophisticated group of Bolivian
trafficking organizations, the GOB's enforcement
strategy must more effectively target cocaine HCl
processing and trafficking organizations, as well as
Chapare-based cocaine base laboratories. In addition,
we expect the GOB to ensure that the Blue Devils
Riverine Task Force can fully exercise its drug
enforcement authority and product results consistent
with its resources.
Brazil
International narcotics traffickers use Brazil to
transship cocaine primarily from Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia to the United States and Europe. Brazil serves
as an increasingly significant transit route for air
shipments of cocaine base from Peru to cocaine labs in
Colombia. Cocaine also transits the country by river
and overland routes. Law enforcement agencies estimate
that ten to twenty mt of cocaine transit Brazil
annually, of which Brazilian authorities seized about
three mt of cocaine in 1996, a decline from last year's
almost six mt. Despite the decline, Brazil fully
cooperated with the USG to advance the goals of
bilateral agreements and the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
In 1996, the area of Brazil bordering Peru was
heavily used as a staging area for air shipments of
cocaine destined for the United States. Brazilian
trafficking organizations reportedly provided fuel and
airstrips for illicit trafficking purposes.
To address this threat, Brazilian authorities
destroyed several airstrips, and commendably repeated
operations when traffickers rebuilt those cratered
airstrips. In a strong commitment to regional
cooperation, Brazilian police cooperated with Peruvian
and Colombian police to deter trafficking in the tri-
border area between their respective countries.
Focussing on the maritime trafficking problems in
Brazil's major seaports, which function as conduits for
cocaine shipped to the United States, Brazil
participated in one U.S. Customs port assessment visit
to the major ports of Rio de Janeiro and nearby Santos.
Brazil also tightened enforcement over its chemical
companies.
Brazil entered into an agreement with the USG to
train police-prosecutor-judge task forces to bolster
the Government of Brazil's (GOB) counternarcotics
effort and to enhance coordination between judges,
prosecutors and police. Corruption is a problem in mid
and lower levels of the DPF that hinders effective
enforcement efforts to control drug trafficking through
Brazil.
Authorities disrupted the Saavedra-Shapiama
Organization, which trafficked cocaine from the Amazon
region to the United States. With USG assistance,
Brazilian authorities in good faith continue to
investigate this and other narcotics trafficking
organizations in the Amazon region. In May 1996, the
Brazilian Senate approved the Amazon Surveillance
System (SIVAM). SIVAM is a detection and monitoring
system that will be used to protect the Amazon region,
in part against illicit narcotics trafficking.
Although the Brazilian government did not sign a
Letter of Agreement (LOA) that would have renewed
counternarcotics cooperation with the USG in 1996, the
GOB has demonstrated a strong interest in continuing
its counternarcotics relationship with the USG. The
almost $1 million of 1996 counternarcotics funding
meant for Brazil instead funded the Organization of
American States Anti-Drug Abuse Control Commission
(OAS/CICAD). In addition to demonstrating a commitment
to cooperate further with the USG on counternarcotics,
Brazil participated in important multilateral
counternarcotics initiatives, including an OAS/CICAD
meeting in Uruguay.
Other efforts point of Brazil's achievements in
1996. It proposed a National Drug Enforcement Plan in
1996. It also hosted several meetings of the of the
mini-Dublin Group in Brasilia to coordinate
counternarcotics assistance from major donors,
primarily European nations. Demand reduction and other
multilateral efforts have successfully raised the
profile of the danger of
[[Page 11593]]
drug trafficking and abuse in Brazil. Although bank
secrecy remained a formidable obstacle in the battle
against money laundering, and money laundering occurred
in Brazil's banks and exchange houses, in 1996 the
congress initiated debate on a bill to counter money
laundering.
Cambodia
In 1996, Cambodia made significant efforts toward
addressing drug trafficking and transit problems, which
the Royal Government of Cambodia has acknowledged.
There is a significant flow of heroin transiting
Cambodia which affects the U.S. and other countries.
The National Assembly passed a comprehensive
counternarcotics law on December 3, 1996. The statute,
drafted with UNDCP assistance and advice, includes
tough anti-money laundering provisions and commits the
government to becoming a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention.
Other measures taken by the RGC, either separately
or in cooperation with the U.S. and other governments
and international organizations, include reorganizing
its ill-trained and equipped 900-person National Anti-
Narcotics Unit into a more effective 40-person National
Anti-Drug Unit, participating in UNDCP conferences, and
seeking other avenues to broaden cooperation with
surrounding countries and the international community.
Cambodian drug interdiction efforts resulted in the
seizure of 40 kilograms of heroin and the arrest of 12
heroin couriers working for Nigerian trafficking
organizations. The RGC also continued a program of
marijuana eradication.
The skeletal nature of Cambodia's law enforcement
infrastructure, coupled with an impoverished economy,
continues to impede efforts as assembling comprehensive
information about the drug trade in and through the
country. These weaknesses have also made the task of
providing appropriate assistance more critical and, at
the same time, more difficult. The single most
important issue Cambodia faces with regard to its drug
trafficking problem, however, is the issue of drug-
related corruption. After the publication in 1995 of
allegations tying key political and business figures to
the drug trade, the RGC publicly called for information
which would aid in the prosecution of any such person.
There have, however, been no results yet reported in
connection with these charges. The U.S. will be looking
for efforts to deal vigorously with drug-related
corruption, which would otherwise eventually undermine
Cambodia's credibility on the issue of narcotics
control. USG efforts to assist Cambodia in building
stronger law enforcement and judicial institutions are
based on the premise that the upper levels of the RGC
will thus have available the appropriate means for
dealing with the issue.
China
China continues to play a key role as a major
transit route for Southeast Asian heroin destined for
the U.S. and other Western markets. Addiction and
violent crime associated with China's proximity to the
Golden Triangle and its flow of narcotics continue to
engage the attention of Chinese authorities. In April
1996, China's Ministry of Public Security began a
nationwide anti-crime campaign called ``Strike Hard,''
which placed special emphasis on drug interdiction
efforts: opium seizures in the first ten months of 1996
were up 26 percent over all of 1995, and heroin
seizures in the first ten months of 1996 were up 47
percent over the entire amount seized in 1995. China
continues to be an active participant in the United
Nations Drug Control Program and in 1996 signed mutual
legal assistance treaties, with specific attention to
narcotics trafficking, with Russia, Mexico and
Pakistan. It is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention.
Counternarcotics and law enforcement cooperation
with the United States continues to be uneven, although
senior U.S. and Chinese officials have publicly
recognized the common interest in enhanced cooperation.
Lower level officials continue to express a desire to
expand cooperation, and working-level dialogue and
information sharing have improved and expanded in some
respects. Chinese officials participated in a two-week
regional co
[[Page 11594]]
operation seminar in Bangkok conducted by DEA and in a
program to help law enforcement officials detect and
prevent illegal transshipments of precursor chemicals.
U.S. Customs representatives also taught interdiction
techniques to Chinese officials in Sichuan Province.
But China in 1996 also denied, ``for now,'' a USG
request to be allowed to open a joint DEA/FBI office at
the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.
China's continued strong stand against crime and
official corruption has been widely publicized. Chinese
leaders and law enforcement authorities have recognized
that rapid economic growth has contributed to the
spread of corruption, including among lower level
officials. Penalties for such transgressions are severe
and include execution.
China is a major chemical producer. The interest
PRC officials have shown in techniques for controlling
sales and shipments of chemical precursors indicates
growing recognition of China's role as a target for
criminals seeking to illegally procure or divert such
chemicals. China's recognition of its susceptibility to
money laundering also appears to be growing, but
domestic mechanisms for assessing and addressing the
problem are only beginning to catch up to the
challenge.
Dominican Republic
In 1996, the Dominican Republic's attention was
focused on election year politics. As a result,
although the out-going government cooperated with
counternarcotics operations, it has left the new
administration with unresolved, long-term narcotics-
related issues and an environment of public concern
about corruption. Despite the absence of a master plan,
the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) remains
deeply committed to the war against narcotics
trafficking and consumption.
Following its installation in August 1996, the
Fernandez administration made an anti-corruption agenda
and judicial reform high priorities of the GODR.
However, the GODR lacks effective enforcement
mechanisms to eliminate the corruption which undermines
the country's fragile democratic institutions.
Additionally, the country's largely unpatrolled coast,
its porous border with Haiti, and poorly paid and
under-equipped police and military make it attractive
to Dominican and Colombian drug transshipment
organizations and domestic drug traffickers. The
majority of Dominicans condemn the use of illegal drugs
and support GODR efforts to combat narcotics
trafficking; drug consumption levels are considered
low.
The Government of the Dominican Republic cooperated
fully with the United States Government on
counternarcotics objectives and goals. Among the GODR's
accomplishments was the arrest of the Cali cartel's
Rolando Florian-Feliz, the DR's most wanted narcotics
trafficker.
Due to the absence of effective government
supervision of exchange houses or remittance operations
and the presence of large cash flows which could hide
money laundering activity, it is believed that
narcotics money continues to be laundered in the
Dominican Republic. Money laundering is not likely to
diminish until the GODR aggressively implements the
money laundering legislation. Many Dominicans who have
committed serious crimes in the United States continue
to find refuge in the Dominican Republic, since local
law bars extradition of nationals. While 1996
negotiations for a new extradition treaty with the
former government did not reach a successful
conclusion, the USG is currently assessing a resumption
of talks with the Fernandez administration.
Neither the GODR itself nor senior government
officials encourage, facilitate, or engage in drug
trafficking or money laundering as a matter of
government policy. No evidence exists that senior
government officials are involved in drug distribution
or money laundering. No senior government official has
been indicted for drug-related corruption in 1996.
[[Page 11595]]
Ecuador
International narcotics traffickers from Colombia
and Peru intensified their efforts to transship cocaine
and coca base through Ecuador. Trafficking
organizations ship about 20-40 metric tons (mt) of coca
base from Peru through Ecuador to Colombia for refining
into finished cocaine, and about 30-50 mt of cocaine
through Ecuador to the United States and Europe.
Ecuador seized almost nine mt of cocaine in 1996.
Traffickers continued to transship cocaine overland
and by river, and to smuggle chemicals into Ecuador via
the Pan American Highway and Ecuador's extensive river
network, sometimes committing armed robberies of truck
drivers transporting chemicals from petroleum companies
in Ecuador's jungle region.
Ecuadoran authorities responded commendably to
counter traffickers, placing emphasis on Guayaquil as a
favored cocaine transshipment point. Authorities made a
nearly seven mt seizure of cocaine from a fishing
vessel, the Don Celso, and had it returned from
international waters to search it in Guayaquil.
Traffickers had loaded the cocaine into the fuel tanks
of the 150-ft. fishing vessel.
The Ecuador National Policy (ENP), with USG
assistance, identified a major cocaine processing
facility just west of Quito in a town called Santo
Domingo de los Colorados. Authorities dismantled the
lab, but many said it demonstrated a shift in
trafficker activity from neighboring countries to
Ecuador.
The Government of Ecuador (GOE) demonstrated its
commitment to regional counternarcotics cooperation
efforts. In an unprecedented law enforcement
cooperation effort with Peru, Ecuadoran police deported
to Peru Willer Alvarado Linares, a.k.a. ``Champa,'' a
Peruvian drug kingpin with close ties to the Cali
Cartel. With USG assistance, the ENP dismantled a major
drug trafficking organization in Ecuador reportedly run
by a Cali-connected trafficker, Jose Castrillon Henao.
Ecuadoran authorities continued the prosecution of
Jorge Hugo Reyes Torres, a jailed drug kingpin, also
tied to Cali.
Although police-military cooperation, maritime
cooperation, and inadequate money laundering
legislation remained problems, GOE officials made a
good faith effort to resolve these issues. The GOE
participated in drug enforcement and customs training
courses, continued some information-sharing efforts,
and attended a money laundering seminar.
The Ecuadoran Supreme Court entered into an
agreement with the USG on administration of justice.
The USG bought five computers and a laser printer in
support of Ecuador's ambitious judicial reform effort.
Allegations of corruption in the judiciary and in other
branches of the government plagued the former Bacaram
administration, and now plague the current
administration of interim President Alarcon, hindering
effective counternarcotics efforts.
Despite these problems, Ecuadoran government
officials demonstrate continued interest in working
with the USG to address more effectively narcotics
trafficking problems that threaten to erode democratic
institutions. Ecuador is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention and has bilateral agreements with the USG.
Ecuador has fully cooperated with the USG to advance
the goals and objectives of these agreements.
Guatemala
Despite the political distractions of the ongoing
peace process, Guatemala continued to cooperate fully
with U.S. counternarcotics goals and objectives. Law
enforcement cooperation between Guatemala and the
United States has been excellent. With USG support,
Guatemalan government (GOG) counternarcotics officials
seized almost four metric tons of cocaine, a
significant increase over previous years.
[[Page 11596]]
GOG experts estimate that at least one out of four
Guatemalan adults suffers from some sort of chemical
dependency, principally alcohol abuse. Illicit drug use
has not been effectively documented, but GOG officials
believe it has increased steadily since 1990 and
contributes to the extremely high level of violence in
the country, especially in the capital city.
The Department of Anti-Narcotics Operations (DOAN),
the country's principal counternarcotics organization,
fully cooperated with USG agencies on information-
sharing, joint operations, and special investigations
targeting international drug trafficking networks. Also
in 1996, a major corruption ring centered on customs
tax evasion and extortion was uncovered, giving the GOG
further impetus to criminalize money laundering and
develop the capability to investigate suspect financial
transactions.
Recent information indicates that significant
quantities of precursor chemicals, mostly ephedrine,
are being diverted through Guatemala to Mexico and the
United States. The government has not yet taken steps
to halt that traffic, which is not currently illegal in
Guatemala. The GOG has, however, requested and will
receive USG technical assistance on how to combat this
illicit trafficking. In early 1997, Guatemala hosted a
regional seminar to address the problem of the control
and regulation of precursor chemicals.
The GOG does not, as a matter of government policy,
encourage or facilitate illicit production or
distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or
controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds
from illegal drug transactions. In addition, no senior
government official facilitates or encourages the
illicit production or distribution of such drugs or
substances or the laundering of proceeds from illegal
drug transactions.
Haiti
Haiti continues to cooperate with U.S.
counternarcotics goals and objectives. The Government
of Haiti (GOH) confronts a staggering array of issues
that compete for the attention of its already stretched
professional and managerial talent and consequently
impedes rapid progress on counternarcotics issues.
Despite these obstacles, the GOH made definite progress
in counternarcotics issues in 1996.
The GOH began to reform its existing narcotics laws
and to develop a national narcotics plan and money
laundering legislation. With USG support, a Haitian
Coast Guard (HCG) unit was established; a
Counternarcotics Unit (CNU) was trained; and new chiefs
for both units were installed. The changeover in
leadership of the CNU proved particularly time-
consuming and, despite sincere efforts, the CNU was not
functioning in its permanent quarters at the airport by
the end of 1996. Nevertheless, the commitment of the
Haitian National Police (HNP) leadership to maintain
high standards of performance within these two units is
notable.
The HCG began operating in August 1996 and scored
two major cocaine seizures amounting to 938 kgs. in its
first two months of operation. The interdiction and
maritime boarding experience in these two operations
represented a training opportunity that contributed to
the HCG's ability to eventually conduct independent
operations.
The USG has made a strong commitment to assist
Haiti in establishing stable democratic institutions.
As a part of this effort, the USG intends to work with
the GOH towards conclusion of a bilateral maritime
agreement, and to continue its efforts to assist the
GOH with its narcotics-related agenda and legal reform
programs. The USG will also assist the HNP in
establishing regional law enforcement contacts and
continue to provide support for both the HCG and the
CNU.
In 1996, the GOH continued to give USG officials
high-level assurances of its commitment to drug
control, and those assurances have been supported by
concrete progress in establishing Haitian counter-drug
institutions. How
[[Page 11597]]
ever, Haiti still has a number of major goals to
achieve before it will be able to take significant,
independent action in counternarcotics.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong's role as a money laundering base for the
international drug trade continues to grow, while its
role as a transit point for drugs appears to have
lessened. There were no drug seizures in the United
States in the first 10 months of 1996 unequivocally
linking Hong Kong to the U.S. as a transit point for
drugs. The overall pattern of drug trafficking in the
region, however, continues to point to Hong Kong as a
key transshipment point for drugs destined for the U.S.
and other Western markets.
Hong Kong authorities continued to strengthen the
legislative framework for combatting narcotics
trafficking. They extended licensing controls to an
additional 21 precursor chemicals, introduced
implementing legislation for bilateral extradition
agreements and proposed legislation establishing
heavier sentences for drug traffickers who target the
young. On December 20, 1996, the U.S. and Hong Kong
signed an agreement for the surrender of fugitive
offenders (an extradition agreement) and the two sides
have initialled a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement
that will expand the basis for mutual legal assistance
over a wide range of criminal activity, including that
currently covered by a Bilateral Narcotics Agreement,
which will be terminated by its terms on June 30, 1997.
Hong Kong's mature and experienced law enforcement
structure is characterized by dedication and no
reported narcotics-related corruption among senior
officials. Cooperation between the United States and
Hong Kong on matters relating to drug trafficking and
money laundering continues to be excellent.
India
India is the sole producer of licit opium gum for
the pharmaceutical industry, a significant cultivator
of opium poppies in remote regions of northwest and
northeast India and a transit country for opiates from
both Southwest and Southeast Asia. Controls over the
licit opium industry have been continuously tightened
for the past five years but, due to the method of
production, some diversion probably continues. The
well-developed transportation infrastructure in India,
combined with porous borders from neighboring source
countries, has made India an attractive transit country
for traffickers.
As a licit producer of opium, India must meet an
additional certification requirement. In accordance
with Section 490(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act, it
must maintain licit production and stockpiles at levels
no higher than those consistent with licit market
demand and take adequate steps to prevent significant
diversion of its licit cultivation and production into
illicit markets and to prevent illicit cultivation and
production.
In 1996, India continued to take steps to curtail
diversion of licit opium, which remains a concern. The
minimum qualifying yield (MQY) for relicensing to
cultivate opium poppy was raised from 46 to 48
kilograms per hectare in most growing areas, and
offenses related to cultivation and embezzlement of
opium are now on par with other trafficking crimes.
Sentences of up to 20 years' imprisonment can be
imposed.
Although the Government of India (GOI) did not
agree to direct USG participation in the 1996 opium
yield survey, it did allow U.S. scientists to observe
the survey and to work with Indian scientists to
include new parameters in future opium yield surveys. A
comprehensive opium yield survey verifies data on crop
yields, establishes practicable levels of MQY, and
better quantifies diversion.
Indian opium gum, a principal source of the baine
and other alkaloids essential to certain
pharmaceuticals, is in demand by U.S. and other
pharmaceutical firms. India once again increased opium
poppy cultivation because of the pharmaceutical demand
and a desire to establish once again a stockpile
[[Page 11598]]
against a crop disaster. Opium production rose to 849
mt in 1996 from 833 mt in 1995 (all measures at ten
percent moisture).
India has illicit opium poppy cultivation,
primarily in areas such as Jammu and Kashmir, where GOI
control is challenged by insurgent groups. USG remote
sensing in 1996 indicated illicit cultivation on 3,400
hectares, with a theoretical yield of 47 metric tons of
opium, a decrease from the previous year's estimate.
However, despite efforts by the GOI based on suspect
coordinates provided by the USG, it was able to find
only small areas of poppy cultivation.
The GOI continues to make progress in controlling
the production and export of precursor chemicals. The
GOI has a cooperative relationship with the DEA,
especially on precursor chemical issues, and has agreed
not to allow any shipment unless DEA issues a letter of
non-objection. Trafficking in illegally produced
methaqualone (mandrax), a popular drug in Africa, is
still believed to be a major problem, although seizures
fell in 1996.
Authorities have had limited success in prosecuting
major narcotics trafficking organizations because of
the lack of enforcement funding and weaknesses in the
investigations infrastructure. The GOI stresses
cooperation among law enforcement entities. India
cooperates in ``controlled deliveries'' that have
resulted in arrests in six countries.
The USG receives reports of narcotics-linked
corruption, but cannot independently verify the extent.
No senior-level politician or bureaucrat has been
accused of narcotics-related corruption.
India is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and
Indian officials state that it is drafting legislation
needed on asset seizures and money laundering. In the
meantime, its law enforcement agencies are without the
tools to achieve fully the Convention's goals and
objectives.
India fulfilled the requirements of FAA Section
490(c) to maintain licit production and stockpiles at
levels no higher than consistent with market demand. It
also continued to take steps to reduce diversion from
the licit crop, although not agreeing to use a crop
yield survey as the basis for setting the minimum
qualifying yield for license renewal. The GOI, upon
receipt of information on suspected illicit crops,
acted promptly to seek out and destroy the plots. For
1996, India's efforts meet the additional certification
requirements of FAA Section 490(c). The United States
continues to work with the GOI in the following areas:
taking effective action against major narcotics
trafficking syndicates and kingpins; implementing
effective measures on money laundering and asset
seizure; permitting U.S. participation in opium crop
surveys; and eradicating illicit poppy cultivation.
Jamaica
Jamaica produces marijuana and is a significant
cocaine transit country. The Government of Jamaica
(GOJ) made some progress during 1996 to achieve the
goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, to
which it became a party in December 1995. In December
1996, the Jamaican parliament passed a money laundering
law, which, although somewhat limited in scope in that
it criminalizes only the laundering of the proceeds of
drug-related crime, is the beginning of a money
laundering control regime. Although the GOJ has yet to
prosecute asset forfeiture cases under the relevant
1994 act, it did establish a special unit which is
currently investigating two such cases. Action on
drafting a precursor chemical bill was deferred to
1997. GOJ-USG negotiations on a maritime
counternarcotics cooperation agreement, which commenced
in 1996, had been impeded by Jamaica's declaration of
exclusive law enforcement authority in its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). In December 1996, the GOJ withdrew
its EEZ declaration, and negotiations resumed in
February 1997, in a spirit of cooperation and
willingness to conclude an agreement. Although the rate
of extraditions declined markedly, from six in 1995 to
one (under a waiver of extradition) in 1996, partly
attributable to new Jamaican legal procedures regarding
appeals, the GOJ expelled or deported to the U.S. eight
U.S.-citizen fugitives during
[[Page 11599]]
1996. However, a sizeable number of extradition
requests to the GOJ remain open.
According to DEA, Jamaican police counternarcotics
cooperation in 1996 remained at the high levels of
1995, but drug arrests, cocaine seizures, and cannabis
eradication fell somewhat below the goals and
objectives of our bilateral letter of agreement (LOA).
Signed by the GOJ and USG, the 1996 LOA set an
objective of significantly increasing drug arrests and
cocaine and heroin seizures. Drug-related arrests in
1996 (3,263) were down slightly from the 1995 level
(3,705). Cocaine seizures in 1996 (236 kg) were also
reduced from the 1995 level (571 kg). Heroin seizures
increased slightly in 1996 (1 kg) compared to 1995
(zero kg). Marijuana seizures, on the other hand,
increased significantly (52.99 mt in 1996, compared to
37.20 mt in 1995), bolstered by one very large seizure
late in 1996. The 1996 LOA set an eradication goal of
800 hectares of cannabis. During 1996, 473 hectares
were eradicated, compared to 695 hectares in 1995, with
the area under cultivation estimated to be the same
both years. U.S.-provided helicopters used to assist
eradication efforts were grounded for safety reasons
for part of the year.
Jamaica's National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA)
continued its demand reduction efforts, becoming
increasingly self-reliant and prominent. Jamaica's
national drug control strategy has been drafted and is
awaiting government approval for implementation. The
GOJ has not formally charged any senior government
official with drug-related activity, but several
Jamaican policemen and court employees have been
arrested and charged on drug and drug-related charges.
The Jamaican media continues to report allegations of
drug-related corruption among public officials
including the police.
In 1997, in order to fully carry out the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the GOJ
needs to strengthen its money laundering control law,
pass a chemical control law, and continue to modernize
its full range of drug control laws and penalties.
Jamaica's greatest challenge will be decisive
implementation of such laws. The GOJ also needs to
conclude a maritime cooperation agreement, intensify
its effort to respond to U.S. extradition requests,
prosecute asset forfeiture cases, and increases the
conviction rate of those arrested for drug-related
crimes. On the bilateral level, in order to make better
use of U.S. counter-drug and anti-crime assistance,
Jamaica needs to intensify its drug law enforcement and
marijuana eradication efforts, tighten the security of
its export shipments to keep drugs out of them, and
participate fully in combined maritime counterdrug
operations. In addition, the GOJ needs to formally
approve its national drug control strategy and
systematically implement it. The GOJ should take
decisive measures to root out drug-related corruption
among public officials which undermines drug control
efforts.
Laos
Laos is still a distant third, after Burma and
Afghanistan, in world production of illicit opium. The
1995/96 growing cycle saw an estimated increase of 11%
in opium production over the 1994/95 level; this was a
little over 50% of the record level set in 1989.
Regions of Laos covered by USG- and UNDCP-funded crop
substitution projects, however, saw only low levels of
poppy cultivation. In May, the Lao Government passed an
amendment to its existing drug control law which banned
opium production and increased penalties for
trafficking. It believes, however, that rigorous
enforcement of the provision outlawing opium production
requires adequate programs to provide alternative
sources of income to farmers and continues to press its
case for adequate assistance from the international
community to enable it to fully implement its anti-
narcotics action plan.
Reservations about its ability to enforce the
legislation banning opium production notwithstanding,
the Government of Laos continued to participate
actively in regional counternarcotics efforts. It
signed a UNDCP-sponsored project document on regional
law enforcement cooperation and hosted a regional
working level conference on the trafficking of
precursor chemicals
[[Page 11600]]
and the involvement of West African drug traffickers in
Southeast Asia. Bilateral cooperation with the United
States, however, remained at the center of Laos'
counternarcotics endeavors. USG funding of the Houaphan
crop control project continued, and the Lao formed two
additional Special Counternarcotics Units, one in
Savannakhet and one in Bokeo, with USG assistance. In
November, the Lao Government approved the assignment of
a DEA representative to the American Embassy in
Vientiane. Overall Lao cooperation with the USG on
counternarcotics matters remains excellent; while low-
level corruption is assumed to exist, there is little
to indicate high-level or systematic drug-related
corruption in the Lao government. Laos' vigorous
enforcement over the coming year of its newly enacted
laws outlawing opium production and increasing the
penalties for drug trafficking will be an important
signal of its long-term commitment to controlling its
drug problem.
Malaysia
Malaysia is a transit country for heroin bound for
the U.S., Europe and other destinations. Malaysia's
anti-trafficking laws include a mandatory death
sentence for convicted traffickers. Law enforcement
authorities are pressing for enactment of a conspiracy
law to enable prosecution of traffickers who escape
prosecution under existing criminal statutes. In
addition, the Government of Malaysia has instituted a
number of bureaucratic measures, including the
establishment of a new interagency group headed by the
Prime Minister, to bolster enforcement and demand
reduction activities. Malaysia is also a party to the
1988 UN Drug Convention.
Cooperation between Malaysian law enforcement
officials and DEA continued to expand in 1996.
Negotiation of a bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty between Malaysia and the U.S. is proceeding
smoothly. Both governments hope to conclude the treaty
in 1997. Malaysia and the United States also cooperated
on drug abuse prevention (demand reduction) programs,
many of them directed at rehabilitation center inmates.
These programs are of particular concern to the
Malaysian Government in view of rising addiction rates.
Existing rehabilitation centers have also been a focal
point of the lower-level narcotics-related corruption
which is known to exist: guard and treatment center
employees have sold narcotics to inmates. The Malaysian
Government has proposed an amendment to the Dangerous
Drugs Act to strengthen the penalty for such
activities.
Malaysia is also beginning to look toward money
laundering as a vulnerable point in its overall legal
and institutional structure. Senior government
officials have publicly expressed concern about
possible misuse of Malaysia's offshore financial
center, Labuan, to launder money. Malaysia has now
endorsed the Commonwealth Secretariat's efforts to
produce model anti-money laundering legislation.
Mexico
The Government of Mexico's (GOM) 1996 counter-drug
effort produced encouraging results and notable
progress in bilateral cooperation. President Zedillo
has declared the major drug trafficking organizations,
and the corruption they foster within governmental
structures, to be Mexico's principal national security
threat. He has intensified the country's counter-drug
effort, in keeping with international human rights
norms, both through legal reforms and operationally,
through the expanded participation of the nation's
military services.
Drug seizures and arrests increased in 1996.
Mexican authorities seized 23.8 mt of cocaine, 383 kgs
of heroin, 1015 mt of marijuana, 171.7 kgs of
methamphetamine and 6.7 mt of ephedrine (its chemical
precursor), and destroyed 20 drug labs. Police arrested
11,283 suspects on drug-related charges. Authorities
arrested a several major traffickers: Juan Garcia
Abrego, Gulf cartel leader and one of the FBI's ``Ten
Most Wanted'' fugitive; Jose Luis Pereira Salas, linked
to the Cali and Juarez cartels; and Manuel Rodriguez
Lopez, linked to the Castrillon maritime smuggling
organization.
[[Page 11601]]
The Mexican Congress passed two critical pieces of
legislation which have armed the GOM with a whole new
arsenal of weapons to use to combat money laundering,
chemical diversion and organized crime. The GOM
established organized crime task forces in key
locations in northern and western Mexico in cooperation
with U.S. law enforcement. In an effort to confront
widespread corruption within the nation's law
enforcement agencies, former Attorney General Lozano
dismissed over 1250 federal police officers and
technical personnel for corruption or incompetence,
although some have been rehired, and the GOM indicted
two former senior GOM officials and a current
Undersecretary of Tourism. He also sought to expand
cooperation with the United States and other
governments.
The United States and Mexico established the High-
Level Contact Group on Narcotics Control (HLCG) to
explore joint solutions to the shared drug threat and
to coordinate bilateral anti-drug efforts. The HLCG met
three times during 1996 and its technical working
groups met throughout the year. Under the aegis of the
HLCG, the two governments developed a joint assessment
of the narcotics threat posed to both countries which
will be used as the basis for a joint counter-drug
strategy.
U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation on drug law
enforcement continued to improve in 1996, particularly
in the areas of money laundering, mutual legal
assistance, and criminal investigations. The USG
provided training, technical, and material support to
personnel of the Office of the Mexican Attorney General
(PGR), the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD),
the Mexican Treasury, and the Mexican armed forces. The
Government of Mexico established the important
precedent of extraditing Mexican nationals to the
United States under the provision of Mexico's
extradition law permitting this in ``exceptional
circumstances.'' This paves the way for further
advances in bringing fugitives to justice. Both
governments returned record numbers of fugitives in
1996.
Even with positive results, and good cooperation
with the U.S. and other governments, the problems which
Mexico faces remain daunting. The Zedillo
Administration has taken important beginning steps
against the major drug cartels in Mexico, and towards
more effective cooperation with the United States and
other international partners, but the strongest groups,
such as the Juarez and Tijuana cartels, have yet to be
effectively confronted. The level of narcotics
corruption is very serious, reaching into the very
senior levels of Mexico's drug law enforcement forces,
as witnessed by the February 1997 arrest of the
recently-appointed national counternarcotics
coordinator. President Zedillo acted courageously to
remove him as soon as the internal Mexican
investigation revealed the problem, but this has been a
set-back for Mexico's anti-drug effort, and for
bilateral cooperation.
Mexican police, military personnel, prosecutors,
and the courts need additional resources, training and
other support to perform the important and dangerous
tasks ahead of them. Progress in establishing controls
on money laundering and chemical diversion must be
further enhanced and implemented. New capabilities need
to be institutionalized. Above all, the GOM will have
to take system-wide action against corruption and other
abuses of official authority through enhanced screening
personnel in sensitive positions and putting into place
ongoing integrity controls.
While there are still serious problems, and a
number of areas in which the USG would like to see
further progress, the two governments have agreed on
the parameters of a joint approach to combat the
narcotics threat, and are at work on developing this
strategy. The drug issue will remain one of the top
issues in the bilateral agenda and will be one of the
main issues discussed during President Clinton's
planned visit to Mexico in April.
Panama
Panama continued to cooperate with the United
States to achieve our counternarcotics goals and
objectives in 1996. The Government of Panama's (GOP)
achievements in 1996 included an eradication campaign
which re
[[Page 11602]]
sulted in the elimination of the country's fledgling
coca cultivation and significant damage to marijuana
cultivation, aggressive and effective prevention and
education campaigns, and the first-ever conviction of a
major money launderer from the Colon Free Zone. In one
of the region's most significant arrests, the GOP
captured the Cali cartel's primary maritime smuggler,
Jose Castrillon Henao, who is scheduled for trial in
1997. The USG provided six helicopters to the GOP in
late 1996, for the express purpose of combatting
narcotics.
Following up on full congressional certification
for the past two years, and spurred on by last year's
legislation tightening money laundering regulations,
the Government of Panama made Latin America's first
financial analysis unit operational, resulting in the
presentation of patterns of money laundering to the
GOP's National Security Council for eventual
prosecution.
Panama continues to be a major financial and
commercial center ideally positioned for narcotics
smuggling and illicit financial transactions. Money
laundering remains the primary problem in Panama. Local
factors facilitating money laundering include bank
secrecy, the Colon Free Zone, inadequate controls on
cash and commodity imports/exports, lax incorporation
regulations, and a dollar-based economy. The GOP has
taken definite steps to address these problems,
including the start-up of a financial analysis unit and
the establishment of computerized data bases for
tracking financial movements in the Colon Free Zone.
The GOP also established a financial investigative unit
which will prepare cases of money laundering for
prosecution. Armed with more effective legal, policy,
and institutional underpinnings, the GOP expects to
counter money laundering activities more successfully
in 1997.
The GOP needs to continue to crack down on both
money laundering and drug trafficking, follow through
on reports of suspicious transactions by arresting and
convicting major money launderers, improve interdiction
capabilities, and make effective use of the financial
analysis unit.
Paraguay
The government of Juan Carlos Wasmosy cooperated
fully with the United States in 1996. Government of
Paraguay (GOP) anti-drug efforts improved
substantially, and the government took adequate
measures to further its compliance with the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Scarce
resources, public corruption, and an only partially-
reformed legal system remain obstacles to more
effective counternarcotics action, but the GOP has
demonstrated its commitment to combatting the drug
trade.
President Wasmosy appointed an activist Director to
the National Anti-drug Executive Secretariat (SENAD) in
June, who immediately sought a closer, more productive
relationship with the United States and with Paraguay's
neighbors. Assuming the post with a reputation for
honesty, Carlos Ayala made cocaine trafficking groups
the SENAD's top priority. He has removed anti-drug
officers implicated in corrupt practices, and focused
Paraguay's investigative resources on Paraguay's top
traffickers. Under Ayala's leadership, SENAD developed
a comprehensive national anti-drug strategy, which
President Wasmosy presented to the nation in late fall.
Ayala also launched a new approach to combat drug
abuse.
The Paraguayan Congress, with strong support from
the executive branch, in December enacted an anti-money
laundering law consistent with international standards.
SENAD Chief Ayala initiated a revision of Paraguay's
anti-narcotics statute which would explicitly authorize
undercover operations and controlled deliveries. The
GOP is pushing for congressional approval of the
amendment early in 1997.
The SENAD continued large-scale marijuana
eradication operations, worked closely with DEA on
training and equipping the Anti-narcotics Police
(DINAR) Special Intelligence and Investigative Unit,
and assessed the threat of precursor chemical
trafficking and diversion in Paraguay. Meanwhile, on
the international front, the GOP signed agreements with
Brazil and Argen
[[Page 11603]]
tina to cooperate in combatting trans-border criminal
activity, including drug trafficking, and Paraguayan
officials initiated working-level coordination meetings
with counterparts in these countries. The SENAD also
agreed with Bolivian counterparts to share intelligence
and to conduct joint operations.
In 1997, the GOP should secure passage of a
strengthened anti-drug law and begin to forcefully
implement its new money laundering statute. The USG
will assist the GOP in creating an interagency
financial crimes investigative unit. Paraguay also must
improve its ability to investigate drug and other
organized crime groups in the tri-border area,
particularly in the cities of Pedro Juan Caballero and
Ciudad del Este, and we expect the GOP to pursue key
drug trafficking and corruption cases in the coming
year.
Peru
Peru is the world's largest coca producer. The USG
has consistently urged the Government of Peru (GOP) to
fulfill its signatory obligations under the 1961 Single
Convention and the 1988 UN Drug Convention,
particularly with regard to reducing its coca
production. In 1996, the GOP cooperated fully with the
United States in efforts to achieve the goals and
objectives of the UN drug conventions. Last year, total
coca cultivation decreased by 18 percent, from 115,300
hectares in 1995 to 94,400 hectares in 1996. The level
of cultivation in Peru was the lowest since 1986.
Contributing to the reduction was widespread
abandonment of coca fields by farmers due to depressed
cocaine base prices. Cocaine base prices were held
below the break-even point by Peruvian National Police
and Peruvian Air Force actions against the narcotics
trafficking transportation infrastructure. During 1996,
the joint USG-GOP alternative development program
established a foothold to begin economic restructuring
in coca cultivating areas. Some 226 communities signed
agreements to reduce illicit coca cultivation by
approximately 15,000 hectares over the next five years,
in exchange for assistance to increase productivity and
income from licit alternative crops.
Peruvian National Police operations seized greater
amounts of cocaine base and coca leaf, but less cocaine
hydrochloride (HCl) than in 1995. Efforts to arrest and
prosecute major Peruvian traffickers maintained the
GOP's stiff narcotics policy, and contributed to
disarray among major trafficking organizations. Still,
there was strong evidence that Peruvian traffickers
continued to refine cocaine hydrochloride and ship it
directly to Mexico for distribution in the United
States. President Fujimori continued to take a tough
public stance against narcotics corruption, and in 1996
created a special drug court system to handle drug
offenses. The U.S. Embassy reported that incidents of
military and police drug corruption were quickly
addressed by the GOP.
In April 1996, the GOP passed Law 824, which
established a civilian drug council (CONTRADROGAS).
CONTRADROGAS was created to coordinate the efforts of
the various GOP agencies involved in counternarcotics
efforts, and to implement the Peruvian National Drug
Strategy announced in 1994.
In 1997, the GOP must mount an aggressive effort to
attract additional donor funding to expand alternative
development efforts while coca farmers are still
receptive to licit economic alternatives. The GOP must
also ensure that the narcotics law enforcement effort
which has suppressed cocaine base prices is intensified
to address riverborne narcotics traffic and sustain the
existing aerial intercept effort.
Taiwan
Taiwan's geographical location relative to the
Golden Triangle and its importance as an advanced
regional transportation and shipping center make it a
major transit point for drugs destined for the U.S. and
other markets. Taiwan authorities dispute this
assessment, citing reduced seizures and arrests as a
signal of the deterrent effect of their considerable
counternarcotics
[[Page 11604]]
efforts. The pattern of trafficking in the region,
however, suggests that because of its geographic
location and its ports, Taiwan will remain a target for
drug traffickers. Taiwan law enforcement authorities,
in fact, recently expressed concern that Hong Kong-
based drug traffickers may be collaborating with Taiwan
organized crime groups to transfer their base of
operations to Taiwan before Hong Kong reverts to
Chinese sovereignty in July of 1997, and their
cooperation with the U.S. on counternarcotics efforts
continues to be good.
Taiwan's law enforcement cooperation with DEA
(under the auspices of the American Institute in
Taiwan) and other U.S. agencies expanded in 1996.
Taiwan is setting up a new National Drug Intelligence
Center; we envisage increased cooperation with U.S. law
enforcement agencies resulting from this. The American
Institute in Taiwan and the Taiwan Economic and
Cultural Representative Office continue to negotiate a
Memorandum of Understanding to provide a framework for
even broader counternarcotics cooperation. Taiwan has
been conducting an aggressive anti-crime campaign on
other fronts, as well, including prosecuting cases of
public corruption. There are, however, no known cases
of official involvement in narcotics trafficking.
In 1996, Taiwan also passed money laundering
legislation meant to bring it into closer conformity
with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug
Convention. While the law enhances the ability of law
enforcement officials to deal with the problem, it
requires a number of revisions to enable Taiwan to meet
international standards.
Thailand
Thailand remains a major transit route for drugs
destined for the U.S. and other markets and produces
about one per cent of Southeast Asia's opiates. It
continues to serve as a model for the region as a
result of its successful efforts to control opium
production and its commitment to prosecuting drug
producers and traffickers. Opium production in the
1995/96 growing season increased from an estimated 25
metric tons in the previous season to 30 metric tons.
The upsurge in opium and heroin prices shortly after
the destabilization of Khun Sa's trafficking operations
in Burma was largely responsible for more widespread
opium cultivation. Thailand's actions to close off
sections of the Thai border with Burma, however, had
helped create the conditions leading to Khun Sa's
decision to reach a settlement with the SLORC.
In January of 1996, Thailand extradited a former
Member of Parliament to the United States for
prosecution on drug trafficking charges. Two
``Operation Tiger Trap'' defendants (part of drug lord
Khun Sa's trafficking operation) were also extradited
to the U.S. later in the year. Thirteen individuals
have been arrested thus far in connection with this
major ``sweep.''
Thai cooperation with U.S. law enforcement
officials remains excellent. Thailand's Office of the
Narcotics Control Board and the Police Narcotics
Suppression Bureau continue to exhibit a high degree of
professionalism. Corruption continues to be a problem
in the Police Department, which lacks an effective
internal security apparatus to hold officers
accountable for wrongdoing. Elements of the Royal Thai
Army and Thai Customs have also been publicly accused
of corruption. The Royal Thai Government as a whole,
however, supports a policy of active measures against
drug production and trafficking.
Thailand is vulnerable to money laundering. A bill
to enact legislation has been stalled for a number of
years. In late November, the newly-elected Prime
Minister promised the President that the legislation
would be given special handling to hasten its passage.
Passage of appropriate anti-money laundering
legislation would enable Thailand to become a party to
the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Like other countries in the region, Thailand may
find itself becoming an even larger market for the
region's opium, heroin and amphetamine
[[Page 11605]]
production as the region's economic expansion
continues. We will be urging Thailand to enact a
conspiracy law to further enhance its ability to mount
effective counternarcotics efforts and to establish an
amplified crop control program.
Venezuela
Venezuela continued to be a major transit country
for cocaine shipped from Colombia to the United States,
and for chemicals transhipped through Venezuelan ports,
as well as a money laundering center. Law enforcement
agencies estimate that between 100-200 metric tons (mt)
of cocaine are shipped through Venezuela to the United
States and Europe. The Government of Venezuela (GOV)
seized only about six mt of cocaine, almost identical
to the amount it seized in 1995. Heroin seizures
declined by 27 percent, from 96 kilograms (kg) in 1995
to 70 kg in 1996.
A significant decision this year was President
Caldera's appointment of a politically powerful drug
czar and elevation of this position to a cabinet rank.
However, the GOV must produce more concrete
counternarcotics results to match this demonstration of
political will during the next year.
Venezuela's main port, Puerto Cabello, is a favored
point for illicit smuggling by narcotics trafficking
syndicates. The same is true of other ports along
Venezuela's long coastline. Venezuela's airspace offers
further opportunities for trafficking. Traffickers
transport cocaine by small aircraft primarily to
Venezuela's border states of Tachira and Apure.
Traffickers risk little by transporting cocaine through
Venezuela due to weak and ineffectual law enforcement
interdiction efforts.
The United States designated Venezuela as a
recipient of more than $12 million worth of USG
drawdown defense equipment. The Venezuelan Armed Forces
adopted a counterdrug strategy, which defines its role
as supporting the National Guard (GN) and police
forces. The GOV is working with the United States to
create a Joint Police/Military Counternarcotics
Intelligence Center. However, much more needs to be
done to improve communication and coordination between
the GN and the Navy, Air Force and Army to implement
the strategy.
Maritime cooperation was disrupted by GOV denials
of four USG requests from United States Coast Guard Law
Enforcement Detachments from third country vessels to
board suspected Venezuelan narcotics trafficking
vessels in international waters. However, USG and GOV
authorities are currently seeking to broker a maritime
agreement.
Although the GOV lacks effective controls over
certain precursor chemicals, it made significant
seizures of chemicals at Puerto Cabello. The GOV also
continued to make significant progress against illicit
cultivation. Venezuelan authorities identified
replantings of about 500 hectares (ha) of coca and
opium poppy fields in the Sierra de Perija region on
the border with Colombia. With USG assistance, those
replantings were eradicated. Since 1994, joint efforts
have reduced estimated illicit plantings from 1,000 ha
to 200 ha.
The GOV permitted the basing of United States
military assets and personnel in Venezuela in an effort
to cooperate on Operation Laser Strike, a United States
Southern Command regional air interdiction operation.
Money laundering in Venezuela continued in its
financial network of banks and non-bank institutions
because of weak banking supervision and regulatory
authority. Although Venezuela passed a drug law in 1993
that included provisions on money laundering, key
provisions are lacking, including one on conspiracy.
Allegations of corruption plague the judicial
branch and some elements of the GN. Law enforcement
agencies believe that corruption in the GN is a
problem, hobbling the effectiveness of counternarcotics
efforts. These shortfalls have raised the USG's concern
about trafficking through Venezuela to the United
States. Venezuela must move swiftly to reform its
judicial
[[Page 11606]]
branch, whose corruption threatens to prevent Venezuela
from combatting its drug problem and from protecting
its democratic institutions and national territory from
international drug traffickers.
Despite such problems, eradication efforts, the
elevated rank of the drug czar, Venezuela's first
national epidemiological survey, and other
counternarcotics efforts reflect the GOV's spirit of
cooperation to advance the goals and objectives of the
1988 UN Drug Convention and bilateral agreements with
the United States. However, the USG will scrutinize
Venezuela's efforts in the coming year and will expect
the GOV to be vigorously engaged in increased
cooperation on drug interdiction, money laundering,
chemical control, anti-corruption efforts and
conclusion of a comprehensive bilateral maritime
cooperation agreement.
Vietnam
Vietnam's increased trade and tourism have opened
new routes for Southeast Asian heroin shipments to such
consumer markets as Australia, North America and
Europe. The SRV continues to battle against narcotics
trafficking but has yet to overcome problems of
corruption within the military and police. The SRV
does, nonetheless, appear to be actively engaged on the
counternarcotics issue, conducting a demand reduction
media campaign as well as police operations and crop
eradication programs. SRV statistics reflect
cultivation of 1800 hectares of opium poppy during
1995/96. USG estimates, however, place the cultivation
level at 3,150 hectares.
Vietnam created a Drug Control Master Plan in 1995
which calls for the eradication of opium cultivation by
the year 2000. In October of 1996, the SRV promulgated
implementing regulations for articles of the criminal
code related to narcotics. The new regulations permit
asset seizures in narcotics cases. Vietnam joined the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Drug Control
Cooperation Program in 1996. Vietnam has also stated
that it expects to ratify the 1988 UN Drug Convention
in 1997. It is currently drafting a comprehensive
narcotics control law, based on the tenets of the 1988
Convention, which is expected to go before the National
Assembly in 1997. The law will include statutes related
to the control of chemical precursors and provide for
controlled shipments as an investigative technique.
SRV interdiction efforts resulted in 6,000
narcotics-related arrests in 1996, twice as many as in
1995. SRV law enforcement agencies are working with the
UNDCP to create special counternarcotics squads across
the country. U.S.-SRV cooperation on narcotics issues
expanded throughout 1996. Training initiatives included
DEA training for Ministry of Interior narcotics control
teams in Hanoi and U.S. Customs Service training for
Vietnamese customs officers in Ho Chi Minh City.
Several senior Vietnamese narcotics officers also
traveled to the United States for consultations with
U.S. counterparts. The U.S. hopes to increase the level
of its assistance to Vietnam. To that end, it plans to
engage the SRV in drafting a Memorandum of
Understanding on counternarcotics cooperation; a
successful outcome, however, will depend to a great
extent on the SRV's coming to grips with the
conditionality involved in any expanded U.S.
assistance.
VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS JUSTIFICATIONS
Belize
Because of a significant increase in the detected
activities of Colombian drug trafficking organizations
in Belize in 1995, Belize was added to the list of
major drug producing and transit countries for 1996.
Belizean traffickers are also working with Mexican
groups to move the Colombian cocaine north to the
United States. These criminal activities continued
throughout 1996, but the ability of the Government of
Belize (GOB) to combat them was severely undermined by
deeply-entrenched corruption, which reaches into senior
levels of government.
[[Page 11607]]
The GOB's accomplishments weighed against those
areas where progress was lacking have led to a decision
to consider denial of certification of Belize. The
GOB's accomplishments in 1996, such as its recent
accession to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and passage of
money laundering legislation, were achieved only after
the United States and other countries exerted intense,
coordinated pressure. Belizean cocaine seizures were
down 36 percent and marijuana eradication decreased by
4 percent from 1995. Finally, the record of arrests and
convictions of major drug dealers was, likewise,
disappointing. During 1996, the GOB took no meaningful
steps to uncover or punish official corruption.
Bungled investigations, along with several high-
profile trials ending in acquittal, including the
prosecution of the Home Minister's son-in-law for
running an illegal airstrip and two immigration
officials fired from their jobs and accused of
corruption in an alien smuggling case, have, at a
minimum, demonstrated the GOB's deficiencies in its
efforts.
The USG urged the GOB to demonstrate its
willingness to cooperate with the United States in
achieving reasonable counternarcotics goals and
objectives. The GOB, however, is not fully cooperating
or taking adequate steps to meet the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, especially
promises made by the GOB toward the end of the year to
complete a new extradition treaty and a mutual legal
assistance treaty. The GOB has been operating under a
US-UK extradition treaty.
Denial of certification would be contrary to U.S.
vital national interests because it would require the
U.S. to vote against multilateral development bank
funding for Belize, an important element in supporting
our long-term democracy and economic development goals
for the country. Such multilateral support reinforces
U.S. counternarcotics assistance which is designed to
help Belize develop strong, independent and credible
institutions capable of bringing traffickers to
justice, stemming the flow of narcotics through the
country and better guarding its own borders.
Although Belize's counternarcotics efforts fell
short of full cooperation during 1996, the GOB did take
steps which demonstrated an effort to work with the
USG. It is in the vital national interests of the
United States to improve the GOB's counternarcotics
efforts and ensure that they are given the attention
required.
Lebanon
Lebanon appears to have succeeded in the struggle
against illicit crop cultivation due to the joint
Lebanese-Syrian eradication efforts since 1992. There
appears to be no cultivation of opium and the cannabis
cultivation (for hashish production) also has all but
disappeared. There are some small farms in the Baalbek-
Hermel region which are still engaged in illicit
cultivation, but they appear to be few in number. When
such farms are discovered, arrests are made immediately
and the crops are eradicated. Lebanese Internal
Security Forces (LISF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF), with assistance from the Syrian Army, reported
eradication of approximately 70,000 square meters of
cannabis in the Baalbek-Hermel region of the Bekaa
Valley during June and July. There were no other
reported eradication efforts during the year.
However, Lebanon remains a significant transit
country for the purposes of re-export of cocaine, and
many small ``home''-type labs for processing opium into
heroin are still reported to operate in the Bekaa
Valley. Several areas of the Bekaa Valley are not under
the effective control the Government of Lebanon (GOL),
and these areas are vulnerable to the establishment of
illegal labs.
Although local authorities deny money laundering is
a serious problem, Lebanon still presents itself to
narcotics traffickers as a venue for money laundering
due to bank secrecy laws, which do not allow for
official discovery. Corruption remains endemic through
all levels of Lebanese society, reportedly including
law enforcement bodies.
[[Page 11608]]
In March 1996, the GOL acceded to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, but with formal reservations regarding
certain provisions of the Convention, including those
which relate to bank secrecy. The United States has
already indicated its intention to formally object to
these reservations if Lebanon does not withdraw them.
Parliament is studying a draft anti-drug code, which
would make money laundering a crime.
The GOL has displayed a willingness to cooperate
with USG agencies during 1996. Unfortunately, Lebanon's
reservations to some of the provisions of the 1988 UN
Drug Convention suggest that the political will is not
yet sufficient to comply fully with world standards.
Lebanese trafficking continues to pose a threat to
U.S. citizens and interests. On the other hand, the
United States considers the provision of assistance
which encourages the continued development of Lebanon's
economy and infrastructure as critical to peace and
stability in the Middle East, which is also of vital
importance to U.S. interests and stability. These
factors, combined with Lebanon's sustained positive
performance in eradication and other anti-narcotics
efforts, outweigh the threat posed by drug trafficking
through Lebanon to the United States.
Pakistan
Pakistan is an important transit country for
opiates from Afghanistan, a source country for
approximately 75 metric tons of opium, and a processing
country for domestic opium and opium from Afghanistan.
Most opium poppy cultivation and most laboratory
production of morphine base and heroin in Pakistan
takes place in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP),
which borders Afghanistan. Pakistan has a bilateral
agreement with the United States that provides funding
for law enforcement, roads and crop substitution in the
NWFP, and demand reduction activities.
Under the government of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's
counternarcotics efforts from January through October
1996 were seriously deficient. However, the interim
government of Meraj Khalid, which replaced the Bhutto
government in November, took a number of significant
counternarcotics actions in accordance with the U.S.-
Pakistani bilateral agreement and the 1988 UN Drug
Convention.
The primary counternarcotics achievement of the
Bhutto government was a reduction in the cultivation of
opium poppy. USG estimates of land used for opium poppy
decreased 51 percent to 3,400 hectares and the estimate
of production decreased 52 percent to 75 metric tons
from the previous year. The Bhutto government also
extradited Sialek Jan, wanted by the USG on narcotics
trafficking charges in March. However, under Bhutto,
Pakistani authorities failed to act on DEA information
on specific cases of trafficking, severely cut the
budget of the Pakistani Anti Narcotics Force (ANF),
failed to act on recommendations of the UN Drug Control
Programs (UNDCP) for improvements to the Narcotics
Substances Act, and failed to interdict trafficking
caravans in Baluchistan Province. During Bhutto's
tenure, corruption was a significant problem, with ANF
officials suspected of perpetrating a hoax seizure of
opium base in June, and subsequently covering up their
actions.
Pakistani President Leghari November 5 dismissed
the Bhutto government for corruption and mismanagement,
an act subsequently upheld by the Pakistani Supreme
Court. Corruption is a severe and chronic problem in
the Pakistani government, including the ANF, which has
no bureaucratic system, such as an internal affairs
section for identifying, investigating and recommending
action against corrupt officers. No one in a policy-
making position in either the Bhutto or interim
government has been accused of narcotics-related
corruption. Sufficient legislation exists to control
and punish public corruption but it is seldom enforced.
The interim government in November initiated a
comprehensive process for holding public officials
accountable for corrupt practices.
[[Page 11609]]
The interim government in November and December
1996 promulgated changes to the Narcotics Substances
Act as suggested by UNDCP, restored some funds to the
ANF, conducted two major raids on heroin laboratories
in NWFP, extradited to the United States accused
trafficker Nasrullah Henjrah, and arrested another
individual on the U.S. extradition request list, Nasir
Ali Khan.
During the course of the year, the Government of
Pakistan froze $3.5 million in assets from 21
traffickers and seized 5.4 metric tons of opium and 2.0
metric tons of heroin. These figures represent declines
from those of 1995.
Pakistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention,
which it ratified in October 1991, but implementing
legislation on money laundering has not yet been
drafted. The revisions to the Narcotic Substances Act
approved by the interim government bring asset seizure
and controlled delivery standards to the levels
demanded by the Convention.
Vital U.S. national interests could be damaged if
Pakistan, under the newly-elected government of Nawaz
Sharif, were to be denied certification. Pakistan is a
moderate Islamic state with a nuclear weapons
capability. Pakistan is the largest contributor of
troops for UN peacekeeping operations and has provided
key cooperation in the international fight against
terrorism. Denial of certification would be viewed in
Pakistan as abandonment of a loyal ally and would
endanger U.S.-Pakistani dialogue on vital issues.
Denial of certification could also bring to a halt the
counternarcotics momentum started in November by the
caretaker government, and could negatively prejudice
the newly elected government against counternarcotics
cooperation with the United States.
Denial of certification would further endanger U.S.
interests by requiring the United States to vote
against Pakistan in multilateral development banks
(MDBs). The United States has an interest in seeing
that the MDBs continue their support of activities such
as the GOP's Social Action Program and its Financial
Sector Reform Project, which are essential to
Pakistan's human and economic development. Pakistan is
one of the largest beneficiaries of World Bank and
Asian Development Bank programs.
These risks to vital U.S. interests outweigh any
potential gain from denying certification to Pakistan.
Pakistan is a primary conduit for opium and morphine
base from Afghanistan, the second largest opium
producer in the world. With continuing conflict and no
central government in Afghanistan, Pakistan's
cooperation is particularly important in stopping
Southwest Asian drugs.
During the period of vital national interests
certification, the United States will strive to work
with senior officials of the new government to achieve
the goals of the UN Drug Convention.
STATEMENTS OF EXPLANATION
Afghanistan
Afghanistan is second only to Burma as a producer
of illicit opium, producing approximately 30 percent of
the world illicit supply. Production flattened in 1996,
after steep annual increases earlier in the decade.
U.S. satellite surveys indicated a very small decrease
in both cultivation and production, to 37,950 hectares
and 1230 metric tons, respectively.
Civil war not only continued but intensified in
Afghanistan during 1996. Between September and
December, the Taliban, a movement started by religious
students, expanded the territory it controls. The
Taliban now control 90 percent of the land on which
opium poppy is cultivated. The Taliban have now
controlled the province producing the greatest quantity
of opium for over two years. Both USG and UN Drug
Control Program (UNDCP) surveys indicate that there
were no concerted eradication efforts in 1996.
[[Page 11610]]
Law enforcement actions were virtually non-
existent. None of the factions controlling territory
made a serious attempt to disrupt narcotics
trafficking. Granted that none of the factions has an
effective law enforcement bureaucracy, the ease with
which narcotics caravans and refineries continued open
operations was nevertheless remarkable. In the few
instances the USG knows of where arrests were made,
most suspects were released upon payment of a bribe.
Taliban leaders, in particular, expressed a desire
to cooperate on counternarcotics with U.S. and UNDCP
officials. However, the major opium refining operations
are located in Taliban-controlled territory, and the
Taliban appear to have done nothing to date to
discourage cultivation of opium poppy. The leaders
state they cannot do so until international donors
provide crop substitution and other assistance.
Many sources have reported that all major factions
require farmers to pay a tax on their opium production.
Some reports also indicate that deeper involvement in
trafficking is also common among Afghan leaders.
The USG strongly promotes the UN Special Mission to
Afghanistan's efforts to develop a broad-based national
government that can address the problems of narcotics,
terrorism and humanitarian concerns. We assist the
peoples of Afghanistan, subject to resource
availability, primarily through UN programs aimed at
humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and
counternarcotics.
Inasmuch as legislation makes special allowance for
continuation of such assistance generally and of
assistance for Afghanistan specifically,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, denying
certification to Afghanistan would have minimal effect
in terms of implementation of this policy.
The continued large-scale cultivation and
trafficking in Afghanistan, combined with the failure
to initiate law enforcement actions, preclude a
determination that Afghanistan has taken adequate
counternarcotics steps on its own or that it has
sufficiently cooperated with the USG in
counternarcotics efforts, although Afghanistan is a
party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Accordingly,
denial of certification is appropriate.
Burma
Burma produced 84% of the opium cultivated in Asia
in 1996 and remains the world's largest producer of
opium and heroin. Continuing lack of resources and
commitment to effective drug control policies led to
near record levels of opium cultivation, totaling
163,000 hectares with a potential yield of 2,560 metric
tons of opium gum, or enough to produce 250 tons of
heroin. While the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) claimed an improvement in its record
with regard to drug and precursor chemical seizures,
these efforts were marginal, both in terms of results
and in view of the overall level of opium production
and trafficking in Burma. The drug lord Khun Sa
continues to be exempt from prosecution or extradition.
Ethnic drug trafficking armies such as the United Wa
State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA), having negotiated ceasefires
with the SLORC which permit them limited autonomy,
remain armed and heavily involved in the heroin trade.
Their leaders have used their relationship with Rangoon
to increase their wealth, but prosperity has not
filtered down to the ordinary people in the areas they
control. Lack of enforcement against money laundering
and an underdeveloped banking system have created an
economic environment increasingly conducive to the use
of drug profits in legitimate commerce. While there is
no evidence that the government per se encourages or is
involved in the drug trade, drug money is beginning to
permeate the economy.
The SLORC announced no new drug control policy
initiatives in 1996. It did conduct some
counternarcotics activities in areas controlled by the
Kachin Defense Army, the Kokang Army, the MNDAA and the
UWSA,
[[Page 11611]]
seizing a total of 493 kilos of heroin, over three tons
of ephedrine, 5,677,525 amphetamine tablets and 2668.4
gallons of acetic anhydride. These actions did not
seriously threaten the drug trafficking activities of
the organizations in question. The unprecedented
chemical precursor and amphetamine seizures, however,
have alarmed Burmese authorities because they signal a
possible future stimulants problem for the Burmese.
Negotiations involving the Burmese Government,
UNDCP, and Wa leaders on the ``Drug Control and
Development in the Wa Region of Shan State'' project
concluded in November. The goal is to bring about a
gradual reduction of opium cultivation in the Wa area.
The Burmese Cabinet has not yet formally approved the
project. While the project is designed to incorporate a
monitoring and evaluation component, donors have
concerns about implementation.
USG engagement of the Burmese government on
counternarcotics issues remains limited. DEA maintains
a liaison operation with Burmese police and military
units involved in drug enforcement activities. The
Burmese have also invited USG participation in a third
joint opium yield survey in the Shan State. The U.S.
will consider further assistance only upon the Burmese
Government's demonstration of a strong commitment to
narcotics control, the rule of law and significant
political reform.
Colombia
In 1996, as in previous years, Colombia remained
the world's leading producer and distributor of cocaine
and an important supplier of heroin and marijuana. In
the same year, coca cultivation in the country
increased by approximately 30 percent.
As in 1995, the Colombian Government made only
limited progress in 1996 against the pervasive,
narcotics-related corruption from which it suffers. In
a process which can only be described as flawed,
President Samper was exonerated of charges of
corruption by the Colombian Congress. Moreover, Samper
remained unwilling to confront fully the drug interests
that contributed heavily to his Presidential campaign.
President Samper pledged to push for stricter
sentencing laws in 1994, but there was only limited
progress in 1996 to advance Congressional passage of
legislation which would increase sentences for
traffickers and money launderers. As an apparent
consequence, the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers--the
notorious Cali drug leaders--received very light prison
sentences which were not commensurate with their
crimes. The Colombian government did not respond to the
USG's request for extradition of four major drug
traffickers and for most of the year it took no action
in response to reliable USG information that narcotics
traffickers continue to run their operations from
prison. Troubling also was Samper's promotion and
public praise for a drug-tainted military general--
behavior which reinforces USG concern about the
credibility of his stated commitment to serious
narcotics control for Colombia.
On the eradication front, the Colombian
Government's strong opposition to testing more than one
granular herbicide--in an effort to replace less
effective liquid herbicides--is especially problematic
in light of the significant expansion in coca
cultivation.
On the positive side, the serious work on the part
of the Colombian National Police (CNP) as well as
select elements of the military to confront drug
trafficking must be highlighted. Government agreement
to expand coca and opium eradication was taken on with
determination by the CNP despite significant challenges
including physical threats and lack of proper
resources. In this regard, the USG was encouraged by
evidence of increased cooperation from the Colombian
military for the CNP in support of illegal crop
eradication. The CNP and military also worked closely
to counter narco- and guerrilla-sponsored public
demonstrations against eradication.
[[Page 11612]]
There were signs that newly appointed members of
the cabinet are determined and committed to advance
important counternarcotics objectives. A noteworthy
achievement--pushed also by private Colombian
citizens--was pressure on the Congress which resulted
in passage, with retroactivity, of an asset forfeiture
law. However, its constitutionality is already being
challenged by those who would be affected by its
implementation. In November, bilateral agreement was
reached to expedite shipboarding procedures and a
maritime agreement was signed in February 1997. The CNP
and the Prosecutor General continued their efforts
against corruption by firing corrupt police and
prosecutors and by continuing investigations targetted
against official corruption. However, without
determined and committed leadership, much-needed legal
reform and a supportive political environment, real
drug control successes by the CNP and other entities
will be thwarted.
Progress observed in some areas holds promise for
serious drug control efforts in Colombia in the future.
Nevertheless, because of high-level corruption, the
privileged treatment accorded to major traffickers
currently in jail, light sentencing of traffickers and
the government's continued stand against extradition,
the USG cannot certify Columbia as fully cooperating
with the United States on drug control, or as having
taken adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Iran
Iran remains an important transit country for
opiates from Afghanistan and Pakistan destined
primarily for processing in Turkey. The USG has no
recent surveys of opium poppy cultivation in Iran, but
other sources believe cultivation has decreased,
possibly as a result of the influx of cheap Afghan
opium.
The Government of Iran (GOI) has ratified the 1988
UN Drug Convention, but the USG remains unaware of the
passage of implementing legislation that would bring
Iran into compliance with the requirements of the
Convention. According to UN Drug Control Program
(UNDCP) and International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB) missions that have visited the country, and
reports received from countries with embassies in Iran,
the GOI is attempting to meet at least some of the
goals and objectives of the Convention. The USG cannot
evaluate Iranian claims as we do not have diplomatic
relations. There is no bilateral narcotics agreement or
cooperation and Iran's performance is measured solely
against the standards of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
The GOI has, according to reports by other nations,
begun reaching out to Western countries in a very
tentative fashion, seeking to establish a working
counternarcotics relationship. There are, however,
countervailing pressures and we know of no working law
enforcement relationship. The GOI, Pakistan and UNDCP
participate in a tripartite UNDCP law enforcement
project, to which Iran contributes important resources
according to UNDCP. In 1995, the latest year on which
Iran reported, it claims to have seized 126 mt of
opium, 2 mt of heroin and 11 mt of morphine, as well as
lost 133 citizens in battles against traffickers. The
USG cannot verify these claims. The level of narcotics
arriving in Turkey does not appear to have diminished
according to USG sources.
Credible reports have been received that corruption
remains a problem. There have been accusations of
corruption against individuals with access to very high
levels of power. Low-level corruption remains a problem
judging by the number of caravans that successfully
evade massive physical barriers at Iran's eastern
border. We do not know how extensively or how equitably
Iran administers its anti-corruption program.
Sentences imposed for narcotics trafficking are
very harsh and 1,000 people have been executed for
trafficking since 1989.
[[Page 11613]]
Nigeria
Nigeria is the focal point of West African
narcotics trafficking. Narcotics producing and
trafficking organizations in Asia, South America and,
increasingly, Nigeria itself either use Nigeria as a
transshipment point or rely on Nigerian courier
networks to transport Asian heroin and South American
cocaine destined for U.S. or European markets. Nigerian
trafficking organizations are among the leading
carriers of Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin into
the United States. In addition, Nigerian traffickers
ship cannabis--the only illicit drug produced in
Nigeria--to Europe and other West African countries.
The Government of Nigeria (GON) has failed to address
corruption adequately among law enforcement and other
government agencies, hindering counternarcotics
efforts.
Although the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency
(NDLEA), the one positive internal agency working
against drug trafficking in Nigeria, has attempted to
combat trafficking and corruption, the GON has left it
woefully underfunded. Lack of coordination among
police, intelligence and other law enforcement agencies
also prevents effective progress against narco-
traffickers.
Nigerian trafficking organizations operate
sophisticated money laundering operations in addition
to controlling courier networks. These organizations
have been quick to adapt in response to vigorous
international law enforcement, as well as to efforts
made by the NDLEA within Nigeria. They have found new
ways to evade detection and to alter and expand their
narcotics smuggling routes and markets; as GON
counternarcotics efforts have effectively reduced the
amount of drugs shipped through international airports
within Nigeria, courier networks have increasingly
relied on overland shipments to transport narcotics.
Nigerian trafficking organizations actively recruit
couriers of diverse nationalities, backgrounds and
ages.
Perhaps the most glaring omission by the GON is its
failure to provide funding for its law enforcement
employees, thus making them ever more vulnerable to
bribery and related forms of corruption, and to provide
funding for implementation of its laws and strategies.
Most law enforcement employees are paid far less than
is sufficient to feed, clothe and house their families.
In addition, the GON has taken no meaningful steps
towards cooperation with the United States on
extraditions, information sharing or prosecution of
arrested fraud suspects; nor has it moved significantly
towards meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN
Drug Convention.
Syria
For several years, Syria has been an important
transit country for drugs flowing into and out of
Lebanon and, in many cases, on to Europe and the United
States. The increase in seizures in 1996 over 1995
(especially of hashish) points to increased vigilance
by Syrian authorities, but could imply as well that the
total flow of drugs across Syria is increasing.
Additionally, the presence of approximately 25,000
Syrian troops in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley makes Syrian
cooperation with Lebanese officials a substantial
element in the fight against drug production and
trafficking there. Allegations of corruption against
Syrian military officials stationed in Lebanon
continued in 1996.
The Government of Syria (SARG) restructured its
Syrian National Police force in 1996, thus creating a
separate and independent Counter-Narcotics Division.
The SARG continued to assist anti-narcotics efforts in
Lebanon during 1996, donating more than a million fruit
trees for the Lebanese crop substitution program.
Though widespread reports claim that Syrian military
and security personnel continue to profit from the drug
trade, the SARG neither initiated corruption
investigations nor brought anti-narcotics charges
against any of these individuals in 1996.
Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Though Syria made significant progress in some anti-
narcotics efforts in 1996, including more aggressive
seizures of hashish and various types of amphetamines,
it did
[[Page 11614]]
not meet some of the other goals and objectives of the
1988 UN Drug Convention; specifically, the SARG did not
move aggressively enough against narcotics transiting
Syrian territory, especially to and from Lebanon, it
did not take sufficient action towards locating and
dismantling drug laboratories in Syrian-controlled
areas of Lebanon, and it ignored serious allegations
against Syrian officials of involvement with drug
traffickers. Syria does not have a bilateral narcotics
agreement with the United States.
[FR Doc. 97-6231
Filed 3-11-97; 8:45 am]
Billing code 4710-10-M
