[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 108 (Friday, June 5, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30808-30809]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-14975]
[[Page 30808]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Notice of Safety Advisory
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 98-2 addressing safety
practices to reduce the risk of casualties caused by failure to
activate the available two-way end-of-train telemetry device (two-way
EOT) to initiate an emergency brake application beginning at the rear
of the train when circumstances require an emergency application of the
train airbrakes.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices
Specialist, Office of Safety Enforcement, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3370),
or Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, SW., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC. 20590
(telephone 202-632-3178).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Several recent freight train incidents
potentially involving the improper use of a train's airbrakes have
caused FRA to focus on railroad airbrake and train handling procedures
related to the initiation of an emergency airbrake application,
particularly as they pertain to the activation of the two-way EOT from
the locomotive. FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
are currently investigating four incidents in which a train was placed
into emergency braking by use of the normal emergency brake valve
handles on the locomotive, and although the train in each instance was
equipped with an armed and operable two-way EOT, the device was not
activated by the locomotive engineer. These incidents include:
A March 30, 1997, incident occurring near Ridgecrest,
North Carolina, involving Norfolk Southern train No. P32, resulting in
42 cars derailed and two crewmembers injured;
An October 25, 1997, incident occurring in Houston, Texas,
involving Union Pacific train Nos. IHOLB-25 and MTUHO-21, resulting in
five locomotives derailed and totally destroyed and two crewmembers
injured;
A November 3, 1997, incident occurring near Alvord, Texas,
involving Burlington Northern Santa Fe train Nos. HALTBAR 1-03 and
ESLPCAM 3-11, resulting in three locomotives and seven cars derailed
and two crewmembers injured;
A March 23, 1998, incident occurring near Herington,
Kansas, involving Union Pacific train Nos. MKSTUX-23 and IESLB-21,
resulting in one locomotive and six cars derailed and one crewmember
injured.
The facts and findings developed in the investigations currently
being conducted by FRA and the NTSB will be published when the
individual investigations are complete.
FRA's preliminary findings indicate that in all of the incidents
noted above, there was evidence of an obstruction somewhere in the
train line, caused by either a closed or partially closed angle cock or
a kinked air hose. This obstruction prevented an emergency brake
application from being propagated throughout the entire train, front to
rear, after such an application was initiated from the locomotive using
either the engineer's automatic brake valve handle or the conductor's
emergency brake valve. Furthermore, the locomotive engineers in each of
the incidents stated that they did not think to use the two-way EOT,
when asked why they failed to activate the device.
Two-Way End-of-Train Device Regulation
On January 2, 1997, FRA published a final rule amending the
regulations governing train and locomotive power braking systems
contained at 49 CFR part 232 by adding provisions pertaining to the use
and design of two-way EOTs. See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide
locomotive engineers with the capability of initiating an emergency
brake application that commences at the rear of the train. The purpose
of the new provisions was to improve the safety of railroad operations
by requiring the use of two-way EOTs on a variety of trains pursuant to
1992 legislation, and by establishing minimum performance and
operational standards related to the use and design of the devices.
Furthermore, the regulatory provisions related to two-way EOTs are
intended to ensure that trains operating at a speed over 30 mph or in
heavy grade territory are equipped with the technology to effectuate an
emergency application of the train's airbrakes starting from both the
front and rear of the train. The specific exceptions contained in the
regulation are aimed at trains that: (i) Do not operate within the
express parameters; or (ii) are equipped or operated in a fashion that
provides the ability to effectuate an emergency brake application that
commences at or near the rear of the train without the use of a two-way
EOT. See 49 CFR 232.25(e)(1)-(e)(9).
Based on FRA's review of the above incidents, and its awareness of
other incidents involving non-use of two-way EOTs under similar
circumstances, it appears that further guidance regarding the use of
the devices may be of assistance to our nation's railroads. This
advisory may be especially beneficial to individuals responsible for
train operations that do not have a thorough understanding of two-way
EOTs and their function. Accordingly, FRA believes that the following
recommended procedure for activating the two-way EOT should be taken to
reduce the likelihood of future incidents caused by an inability to
stop a moving train that encounters a train line obstruction.
Recommended Action
FRA recommends that each railroad adopt and implement a procedure
that requires the locomotive engineer or other train crewmember to
activate the two-way EOT, on trains equipped with the device, using the
manual toggle switch, whenever it becomes necessary to place the train
airbrakes in emergency using either the automatic brake valve handle or
the conductor's emergency brake valve. FRA also recommends that the
two-way EOT be activated whenever an undesired emergency application of
the train airbrakes occurs. FRA believes that the likelihood of future
incidents, such as the ones described above, would be greatly reduced
if, besides following existing procedures regarding emergency train
braking, railroads require additional action to be taken by a member of
the train crew. FRA believes that this additional procedure would not
only ensure that an emergency brake application is commenced from both
the front and rear of the train, but that it will help familiarize the
engineer with the activation of the device and will educate the
engineer to react in the safest possible manner whenever circumstances
require an emergency brake application. FRA further recommends that
railroads have an operating supervisor personally conduct a face-to-
face meeting with each locomotive engineer and conductor to explain the
contents of this advisory, preferably during a mock demonstration in
order to reinforce employee familiarization with the operation of the
two-way EOT, and to ensure that each individual has a thorough
understanding of how and under what circumstances to activate the two-
way EOT. In issuing this safety advisory, FRA acknowledges the
following
[[Page 30809]]
railroads that have already taken the lead on this issue by having in
effect a similar or comparable requirement: Burlington Northern Santa
Fe, Conrail, CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific.
FRA may modify Safety Advisory 98-2, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC, on June 1, 1998.
George Gavalla,
Acting Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. 98-14975 Filed 6-4-98; 8:45 am]
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