[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 7 (Tuesday, January 11, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1608-1620]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-594]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final
Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: In November 1999, the Department of Energy (DOE or the
Department), in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), issued the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental
Impact Statement (SPD EIS)(DOE/EIS-0283). The SPD EIS was the
culmination of a process started on May 22, 1997, when DOE published a
Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 FR 28009) announcing
its decision to prepare an EIS that would tier from the analysis and
decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and
Disposition PEIS)(DOE/EIS-0229). Accordingly, the Surplus Plutonium
Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Draft EIS) (DOE/
EIS-0283-D) was prepared and issued in July 1998. It identified the
potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the
proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for
the disposition of up to 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium, as well
as a No Action Alternative. These three facilities would accomplish pit
1 disassembly and conversion, plutonium conversion and
immobilization, and mixed oxide (MOX) 2 fuel fabrication.
The SPD Draft EIS also analyzed the potential impacts of fabricating a
limited number of MOX fuel assemblies, referred to as lead assemblies,
for testing in a reactor before starting full production of MOX fuel,
and the potential impacts of examining the lead assemblies after
irradiation.
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\1\ A nuclear weapon component.
\2\ A physical blend of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide.
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For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the SPD
Draft EIS described the potential environmental impacts of using from
three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The
potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis included in
the Storage and Disposition PEIS that used actual reactor data and a
range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DOE initiated a
procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor
irradiation services. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke
Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and Stone & Webster (known as DCS)
to provide the requested services. Full implementation of the base
contract was contingent upon the successful completion of the NEPA
process. A Supplement to the SPD Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0283-S) was issued
in April 1999, which analyzed the potential environmental impacts of
using MOX fuel in six specific reactors named in the DCS proposal.
Those reactors are: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in South
Carolina, McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in North Carolina, and
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia. The SPD Final EIS
addresses the comments received during the public review process for
the SPD Draft EIS and the Supplement to the draft.
The Department has decided to implement a program to provide for
the safe and secure disposition of up to 50 metric tons of surplus
plutonium as specified in the Preferred Alternative in the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement. The
fundamental purpose of the program is to ensure that plutonium produced
for nuclear weapons and declared excess to national security needs (now
and in the future) is never again used for nuclear weapons.
Specifically, the Department has decided to use a hybrid approach for
the disposition of surplus plutonium. This approach allows for the
immobilization of approximately 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium and
the use of up to 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium as MOX fuel. The
Department has selected the Savannah River Site in South Carolina as
the location for all three disposition facilities. Based upon this
selection, the Department will authorize DCS to fully implement the
base contract. In addition, the Department has selected the Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico as the location for lead assembly
fabrication and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee as the site
for post-irradiation examination of lead assemblies.
As previously stated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS Record of
Decision (62 FR 3014, January 21, 1997), the use of MOX fuel in
existing reactors will be undertaken in a manner that is consistent
with the United States' policy objective on the irreversibility of the
[[Page 1609]]
nuclear disarmament process and the United States' policy discouraging
the civilian use of plutonium. To this end, implementing the MOX
alternative will include government ownership and control of the MOX
fuel fabrication facility at a DOE site, and use of the facility only
for the surplus plutonium disposition program. There will be no
reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent MOX fuel. The MOX fuel will
be used in a once-through fuel cycle in existing reactors, with
appropriate arrangements, including contractual or licensing
provisions, limiting use of MOX fuel to surplus plutonium disposition.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The decisions set forth in this Record of Decision are
effective upon publication of this document, in accordance with DOE's
National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures and
Guidelines (10 CFR Part 1021) and the Council on Environmental Quality
regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508).
ADDRESSES: Copies of the SPD EIS and this Record of Decision may be
obtained by placing a call to an answering machine or facsimile machine
at a toll free number (1-800-820-5156), or by mailing a request to:
Bert Stevenson, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition, U.S. Department of Energy, Post Office Box 23786,
Washington, DC 20026-3786.
The full SPD EIS, including the 54-page Summary, and this Record of
Decision are available on the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition's
web site. The address is http://www.doe-md.com. The full SPD EIS is
also available on DOE's NEPA web site at http://tis.ch.doe.gov/nepa.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Questions concerning the plutonium
disposition program can be submitted by calling or faxing them to the
same toll free number (1-800-820-5156), or by mailing them to Mr. Bert
Stevenson at the above address. Comments may also be submitted
electronically by using the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition's
web site. The address is http://www.doe-md.com.
For general information on the DOE NEPA process, please contact:
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC
20585, 202-586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The United States and Russia are working together to reduce the
threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by disposing of
surplus plutonium in a safe, secure, environmentally acceptable and
timely manner. Comprehensive disposition actions are needed to ensure
that surplus plutonium is converted to proliferation-resistant forms.
In September 1993, President Clinton issued the Non-proliferation and
Export Control Policy in response to the growing threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation. Further, in January 1994, President Clinton and
Russia's President Yeltsin issued a Joint Statement Between the United
States and Russia on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and the Means of Their Delivery. In accordance with these policies and
statements, the focus of U.S. non-proliferation efforts is to ensure
the safe, secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus weapons-
usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). In July 1998, the
United States and Russia signed a 5-year agreement to provide the
scientific and technical basis for decisions concerning how surplus
plutonium will be managed and a statement of principles with the
intention of removing approximately 50 metric tons 3 of
plutonium from each country's stockpile. The Department is pursuing
both the immobilization and mixed oxide (MOX) fuel approaches to
surplus plutonium disposition, which include the siting, construction,
operation, and deactivation of three facilities at one or two of four
DOE candidate sites:
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\3\ Some materials are already in a final disposition form
(i.e., irradiated fuel) and will not require further action before
disposal.
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1. A facility for disassembling pits (a weapons component) and
converting the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from
other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition.
Candidate sites for this facility are the Hanford Site (Hanford) near
Richland, Washington; Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory (INEEL) near Idaho Falls, Idaho; the Pantex Plant (Pantex)
near Amarillo, Texas; and the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken,
South Carolina.
2. A facility for immobilizing surplus plutonium for eventual
disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act. This facility would include a collocated capability for converting
non-pit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for
immobilization. The immobilization facility would be located at either
Hanford or SRS.
3. A MOX fuel fabrication facility for fabricating plutonium
dioxide into MOX fuel. Candidate sites for this facility are Hanford,
INEEL, Pantex, and SRS. Also part of the proposed action are MOX lead
assembly 4 activities at five candidate DOE sites: Argonne
National Laboratory--West (ANL-W) at INEEL; Hanford; Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California; Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) near Los Alamos, New Mexico; and SRS. The
Department would fabricate a limited number of MOX fuel lead assemblies
for testing in reactors before starting full production of MOX fuel
under the proposed MOX fuel program. Post-irradiation examination
activities would be performed at one of two sites, ANL-W or Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
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\4\ A MOX lead assembly is a prototype reactor fuel assembly
that contains MOX fuel.
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In March 1999, DOE awarded a multi-phase contract to Duke
Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and Stone & Webster (collectively
known as DCS) for the design, licensing, construction, operation, and
eventual deactivation of the MOX fuel fabrication facility and for
irradiating the MOX fuel. Full implementation of the base contract was
contingent upon the successful completion of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) process. The contract includes future provisions to
use MOX fuel in six specific reactors: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1
and 2 in South Carolina, McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in North
Carolina, and North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia.
DOE is aware that a decision to use surplus plutonium in MOX fuel
could be perceived as a change in U.S. civilian fuel cycle policy. In
fact, however, such a decision would not represent a change in policy.
The United States does not encourage the civilian use of plutonium, and
does not itself engage in reprocessing for the purposes of either
nuclear explosives or nuclear power generation. Disposition of excess
plutonium, regardless of the specific option chosen, will not change
this basic fuel cycle policy.
NEPA Process
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft EIS
In December 1996, the Department published the Storage and
Disposition PEIS. That PEIS analyzes the potential environmental
consequences of alternative strategies for the long-term storage of
weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium and the
disposition of weapons-usable
[[Page 1610]]
plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to national security
needs.5 The Record of Decision (ROD) for the Storage and
Disposition PEIS, issued on January 14, 1997, outlines DOE's decision
to pursue an approach to plutonium disposition that would make surplus
weapons-usable plutonium inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use.
DOE's disposition strategy, consistent with the Preferred Alternative
analyzed in the Storage and Disposition PEIS, allows for both the
immobilization of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium,
and use of some of the surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in existing
domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium
would also involve disposal of both the immobilized plutonium and the
MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a potential geologic
repository.6
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\5\ DOE addressed the disposition of surplus highly enriched
uranium in a separate environmental impact statement, the
Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental
Impact Statement, issued in June 1996, with the Record of Decision
issued in July 1996.
\6\ The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reviewed DOE's plans
to phase immobilized material into the potential geologic
repository, and has agreed that with adequate canister and package
design features, the immobilized plutonium waste forms can be made
acceptable for disposal in the repository.
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On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the
Federal Register (FR) announcing its decision to prepare an EIS that
would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with
the PEIS discussed above. The follow-on EIS, the Surplus Plutonium
Disposition Environmental Impact Statement, addresses the extent to
which each of the two plutonium disposition approaches (immobilization
and MOX) would be implemented, and analyzes candidate sites for
plutonium disposition facilities, as well as alternative technologies
for immobilization.7 In July 1998, DOE issued the SPD Draft
EIS. That draft included a description of the potential environmental
impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to
irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic
reactor analysis presented in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. In
March 1999, DOE awarded a contract, contingent on completion of the
NEPA process, for MOX fuel fabrication and irradiation services, that
identified the specific reactors that would be used to irradiate the
MOX fuel. After this contract award, DOE issued a Supplement to the SPD
Draft EIS (Supplement) (April 1999) that describes the potential
environmental impacts of using MOX fuel at the three proposed reactor
sites. These site-specific analyses have been incorporated into the SPD
Final EIS.
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\7\ The SPD EIS also analyzes a No Action Alternative, i.e., the
possibility of disposition not occurring but, instead, continuing to
store surplus plutonium in accordance with the Storage and
Disposition PEIS ROD.
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Alternatives Considered
The SPD EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated
with implementing pit disassembly and conversion of the recovered
plutonium and clean plutonium metal at four candidate sites; conversion
and immobilization of plutonium from non-pit sources at two candidate
sites, and MOX fuel fabrication activities at four candidate sites. The
SPD EIS also evaluates immobilizing plutonium in ceramic or glass
forms, and compares the can-in-canister approach with the homogenous
ceramic immobilization and vitrification approaches that were evaluated
in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. As part of the MOX option, the SPD
EIS also evaluates the potential impacts of fabricating MOX fuel lead
assemblies (for test irradiation in domestic, commercial nuclear power
reactors) at five candidate DOE sites, the impacts of subsequent post-
irradiation examination of the lead assemblies at two candidate DOE
sites, and the impacts of irradiating MOX fuel in domestic, commercial
reactors.
Fifteen surplus plutonium disposition alternatives and the No
Action Alternative are evaluated in the SPD EIS. These action
alternatives are organized into 11 sets of alternatives, reflecting
various combinations of facilities and candidate sites, as well as the
use of new or existing buildings.
Each of the 15 alternatives includes a pit conversion facility, but
the need for additional facilities in each alternative varies depending
on the amount of plutonium to be immobilized. Eleven alternatives
involve the hybrid approach of immobilizing 17 metric tons of surplus
plutonium and using 33 metric tons for MOX fuel, and therefore require
all three facilities. Four alternatives involve immobilizing all 50
metric tons, and therefore include only a pit conversion facility and
an immobilization facility. The No Action Alternative does not involve
disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, but instead addresses
continued storage of the plutonium in accordance with the Storage and
Disposition PEIS Record of Decision (ROD), with the exception that DOE
is now considering leaving the repackaged surplus pits in Zone 4 at
Pantex for long-term storage in lieu of Zone 12 as originally planned.
Immobilization Technology Alternatives
The Storage and Disposition PEIS discusses several immobilization
technologies, including the homogenous ceramic and vitrification
alternatives that were evaluated in detail, as well as variants of
those alternatives, which include the ceramic and glass can-in-canister
approaches and a homogenous approach using an adjunct melter. The ROD
for the Storage and Disposition PEIS states that DOE would make a
determination on the specific technology on the basis of ``the follow-
on EIS.'' The SPD EIS is that follow-on EIS, and it identifies the
ceramic can-in-canister approach as the preferred immobilization
technology.
In order to bound the estimate of potential environmental impacts
associated with ceramic and glass immobilization technologies, the
Storage and Disposition PEIS analyzes the construction and operation of
vitrification and ceramic immobilization facilities that employ a
homogenous approach. These facilities are based on generic designs that
do not involve the use of existing facilities or specific site
locations. These generic designs allow for surplus plutonium to be
immobilized in a homogenous form, either within a ceramic matrix and
formed into disks, or vitrified as borosilicate glass logs.
In order to support a decision on the immobilization technology and
form, the SPD EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of the
ceramic and glass can-in-canister technologies, and compares those
impacts with the impacts of the homogenous facilities evaluated in the
Storage and Disposition PEIS. Hanford and SRS are the candidate sites
for immobilization based on their existing plans for a high-level waste
vitrification facility.
MOX Fuel Fabrication Alternatives
Alternatives that involve the fabrication of MOX fuel include the
use of the fuel in existing domestic, commercial nuclear power
reactors. The environmental impacts of using MOX fuel in these reactors
are evaluated generically in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. When the
SPD Draft EIS was published, the specific reactors were not known;
therefore, the generic analysis from the Storage and Disposition PEIS
was incorporated by reference in the SPD Draft EIS.
In May 1998, DOE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel
fabrication and irradiation services. In compliance with its NEPA
regulations in 10 CFR 1021.216, DOE requested that each offeror
provide, as
[[Page 1611]]
part of its proposal, environmental information specific to its
proposed MOX facility design and the domestic, commercial reactors
proposed to be used for irradiation of the fuel. That information was
analyzed by the Department to identify potential environmental impacts
of the proposals, and DOE's analysis was documented in an Environmental
Critique prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 1021.216(g). That analysis was
considered by the selection official as part of the award decision. DOE
awarded a contract (contingent on completion of the NEPA process) to
the team of Duke Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and Stone &
Webster (DCS) in March 1999 to provide the requested services. These
services include design, licensing, construction, operation, and
eventual deactivation of the MOX fuel fabrication facility, as well as
irradiation of the MOX fuel in six domestic, commercial reactors. The
reactors proposed by DCS are Duke Power Company's Catawba Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2; and McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; and
Virginia Power Company's North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. Under
the contract, no construction, fabrication, or irradiation of MOX fuel
is authorized until the SPD EIS ROD is issued. Such site-specific
activities, and DOE's exercise of contract options to allow those
activities, would be contingent on decisions in this ROD.
Because the Environmental Critique contains proprietary
information, it was not made available to the public. However, as
provided in 10 CFR 1021.216(h), an Environmental Synopsis of the
Environmental Critique was provided to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, made available to the public, and incorporated into
the SPD EIS. Sections of the SPD EIS were revised or added to include
reactor-specific information and were issued as a Supplement to the SPD
Draft EIS. A Notice of Availability was published in the Federal
Register on May 14, 1999 (64 FR 264019), providing a 45-day public
comment period on the Supplement.8 This Supplement was
distributed to the local reactor communities, to stakeholders who
received the SPD Draft EIS, and others as requested.
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\8\ On June 15, 1999, DOE held a public meeting in Washington,
D.C., to receive comments on the Supplement to the SPD Draft EIS.
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Under the hybrid alternatives, DOE could produce up to 10 MOX fuel
assemblies for testing in domestic, commercial reactors before
commencement of full-scale MOX fuel fabrication, although it is likely
that only two lead assemblies would be needed.9 These lead
assemblies would be available for irradiation to support NRC licensing
and fuel qualification efforts. Potential impacts of MOX fuel lead
assembly fabrication are analyzed for three of the candidate sites for
MOX fuel fabrication (Hanford, ANL--W at INEEL, and SRS), and two
additional sites, LANL and LLNL. Pantex was not considered for lead
assembly fabrication because it does not currently have any facilities
capable of MOX fuel fabrication. Post-irradiation examination of the
lead assemblies would be conducted, if required, to support NRC
licensing activities. Two potential sites for this activity are
analyzed in the SPD EIS: ANL--W and Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL). As discussed previously, DOE's preferred locations for lead
assembly fabrication and post-irradiation examination are LANL and
ORNL, respectively.
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\9\ The potential impacts of fabricating 10 lead assemblies and
irradiating 8 of them were analyzed in the SPD EIS. Should fewer
lead assemblies than analyzed be fabricated or irradiated, the
potential impacts would be less than those described in the SPD EIS.
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The Department also considered a No Action Alternative, as required
by NEPA. In the No Action Alternative, surplus weapons-usable plutonium
in storage at various DOE sites would remain at those locations. The
vast majority of pits would continue to be stored at Pantex, and the
remaining plutonium in various forms would continue to be stored at
Hanford, INEEL, LLNL, LANL, Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
(RFETS), and SRS.
Materials Analyzed
There are eight general categories used to describe the 50 metric
tons of surplus plutonium analyzed in the SPD EIS, which represent the
physical and chemical nature of the plutonium. Two of the categories--
clean metal (including pits) and clean oxide--could either be
fabricated into MOX fuel or immobilized. The remaining six categories
of material--impure metals, plutonium alloys, impure oxides, uranium/
plutonium oxides, alloy reactor fuel, and oxide reactor fuel--would be
immobilized.
Preferred Alternative
As previously noted, DOE's Preferred Alternative for the
disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium is analyzed as
Alternative 3 in the SPD Final EIS. The Preferred Alternative
encompasses the following:
Pit Disassembly and Conversion at SRS (new construction)
Construct and operate a new pit conversion facility at SRS to
disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium metal to a
declassified oxide form suitable for international inspection and
disposition using either the immobilization or the MOX/reactor
approach. SRS is preferred for the pit conversion facility because the
site has extensive experience with plutonium processing, and the pit
conversion facility would complement existing missions and take
advantage of existing infrastructure.
Immobilization at SRS (new construction and the Defense Waste
Processing Facility) 10
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\10\ The Savannah River Site was previously designated to be
part of DOE's preferred alternative for immobilization in the Notice
of Intent issued in May 1997.
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Construct and operate a new immobilization facility at SRS using
the ceramic can-in-canister technology. This technology would
immobilize plutonium in a ceramic form, seal it in cans, and place the
cans in canisters filled with borosilicate glass containing intensely
radioactive high-level waste at the existing Defense Waste Processing
Facility (DWPF). This preferred can-in-canister approach at SRS would
complement existing missions, take advantage of existing infrastructure
and staff expertise, and enable DOE to use an existing facility (i.e.,
DWPF).
Implementation of the can-in-canister approach would require the
availability of sufficient quantities of high-activity radionuclides
from SRS high-level waste to DWPF. Due to problems experienced with the
In-Tank Precipitation process for separating high-activity
radionuclides from liquid high-level waste, DWPF is currently operating
with sludge feed, not liquid high-level waste. A thorough search for
alternatives to the In-Tank Precipitation process has identified two
viable processes (ion exchange and small tank precipitation) for
separating the high-activity fraction from the liquid high-level waste
and sending this fraction to DWPF. Extensive laboratory and bench scale
testing has been conducted on both of these processes. Test results
indicate that either process is capable of separating the high-activity
radionuclides from the high-level waste and feeding those radionuclides
to DWPF, although further research and development is
necessary.11 DOE is
[[Page 1612]]
preparing a supplemental EIS on the proposed replacement of the In-Tank
Precipitation process at SRS (NOI at 64 FR 8558, February 22, 1999).
Designation of a preferred process and construction of a pilot scale
plant for scale-up of the preferred process are the next steps planned
to resolve this issue.
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\11\ The National Research Council (the Council) is also
evaluating a replacement technology for the In-Tank Precipitation
process. The Council's study committee issued an interim report in
October 1999. This committee recommends further research and
development for the ion exchange and small tank precipitation
alternatives, and for caustic side solvent extraction, a third
process that would separate high-activity radionuclides that could
be sent to DWPF.
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In addition to these alternatives, the Department is analyzing the
potential environmental impacts of another action alternative, direct
grout, in light of technical and cost considerations. Under the direct
grout alternative, the cesium component of the high-activity
radionuclides would be entombed in grout rather than remain in the
high-activity fraction provided to DWPF for vitrification and eventual
disposal in a geologic repository. Therefore, the direct grout
alternative would not provide the radiation barrier needed for surplus
plutonium disposition using the can-in-canister technology at SRS.
However, a DOE waste management requirement (DOE Manual 435.1,
Radioactive Waste Management, Section II.B.2) provides that, for direct
grout material to be disposed of as now being analyzed, ``key
radionuclides would have to be removed to the maximum extent that is
technically and economically practical.'' This criterion would not be
met in the event that any other action alternative is determined to be
viable after further evaluation. Therefore, DOE regards the direct
grout alternative as reasonable only if all of the other action
alternatives analyzed in the supplemental EIS prove not to be viable.
In summary, although a specific method for providing the high-level
waste needed for the can-in-canister immobilization alternatives for
surplus plutonium disposition has not been determined, DOE is confident
that an acceptable technical solution will be available at SRS. The
ceramic can-in-canister approach would involve slightly lower
environmental impacts than the homogenous approach. The ceramic can-in-
canister approach would involve better performance in a potential
geologic repository and provide greater proliferation resistance than
the glass can-in-canister approach.
MOX Fuel Fabrication at SRS (new construction)
Construct and operate a new MOX facility at SRS and produce MOX
fuel containing surplus weapons-usable plutonium for irradiation in
existing domestic, commercial reactors. SRS is preferred for the MOX
facility because this activity would complement existing missions and
take advantage of existing infrastructure and staff expertise.
Lead Assembly Fabrication at LANL
Based on consideration of the capabilities of the candidate sites
and input from the contractor team chosen for the MOX approach, DOE
prefers LANL for lead assembly fabrication. LANL is preferred because
it already has fuel fabrication facilities that would not require major
modifications, and has existing site infrastructure and staff
experience. Additionally, the surplus plutonium dioxide needed to
fabricate the lead assemblies would already be on site (no
transportation required).
Post-Irradiation Examination at ORNL
If post-irradiation examination is necessary for the purpose of
qualifying the MOX fuel for commercial reactor use, DOE prefers to
perform that task at ORNL. ORNL has the existing facilities and staff
expertise needed to perform post-irradiation examination as a matter of
its routine activities; no major modifications to facilities or
processing capabilities would be required. In addition, ORNL is about
500 kilometers (km) from the reactor site that would irradiate the fuel
(one of the reactors located at the McGuire Nuclear Station in North
Carolina).
Environmental Impacts of Preferred Alternative
Chapter 4 and certain appendices of the SPD Final EIS analyze the
potential environmental impacts of the surplus plutonium disposition
alternatives in detail. The SPD Final EIS also evaluates the maximum
impacts that would result at each of the potential disposition sites.
Based on the analyses in the SPD Final EIS, including public comments
on the SPD Draft EIS, the areas with impacts of most interest are as
follows:
Disposition Facilities During Construction
Socioeconomics At its peak in 2003, construction of the three new
surplus plutonium disposition facilities at SRS under this alternative
would require 1,968 construction workers and should generate another
1,580 indirect jobs in the region. As the total employment increase of
3,548 direct and indirect jobs represents only 1.3 percent of the
projected regional economic area (REA) workforce, it should have no
major impact on the REA. Moreover, construction under the Preferred
Alternative should have little impact on the community services
currently offered in the region of influence. In fact, it should help
offset the 20 percent reduction in SRS's total workforce otherwise
projected for the years 1997-2005.
Facility Accidents. The construction of new surplus plutonium
disposition facilities at SRS could result in worker injuries or
fatalities. DOE-required industrial safety programs would be in place
to control the risks. Given the estimated 6,166 person-years of
construction labor and standard industrial accident rates,
approximately 610 cases of nonfatal occupational injury or illness and
less than one fatality could be expected. As all construction would be
in non-radiological areas, no radiological accidents should occur.
Cultural Resources. During conduct of the cultural resources
impacts analysis for the Preferred Alternative, it was determined that
construction of surplus plutonium disposition facilities at SRS could
produce impacts on archaeological resources requiring mitigation.
Archaeological investigations performed for the surplus plutonium
disposition program discovered five archaeological sites in the
proposed construction area. At least two of these sites have been
recommended by DOE to the South Carolina State Historic Preservation
Officer (SHPO) as eligible for nomination to the National Register of
Historic Places. It appears that these sites were occupied during
several different prehistoric periods, including the Late Woodland
(A.D. 800-1000) and Mississippian (A.D. 1000-1600) Periods. These
periods are poorly understood in the Central Savannah River Area.
Therefore, these sites could contribute significantly to a better
understanding of the Late Woodland and Mississippian Periods in this
part of North America. Potential adverse impacts on these sites could
be mitigated through either avoidance or data recovery. DOE currently
plans to mitigate impacts by avoiding these sites.
Disposition Facilities During Operations
Socioeconomics. After construction, startup, and testing of the new
SRS facilities in 2007, an estimated 1,120 new workers would be
required to operate them. This level of employment should generate an
additional 2,003 indirect jobs in the region. As the total employment
requirement of 3,123 direct and indirect jobs represents 1 percent of
the projected REA, it should have no major impact on the REA. Moreover,
these jobs would have little impact on community services currently
offered in
[[Page 1613]]
the region of influence. In fact, they should help offset the reduction
in SRS's total workforce otherwise projected for the years 1997-2010 of
33 percent.
Facility Accidents (Impact to the public and workers). The most
severe consequences of a design basis accident for the pit conversion
facility would be associated with a tritium release; the most severe
consequences for the immobilization and MOX facilities would be from a
nuclear criticality. Bounding radiological consequences for the
Maximally Exposed Individual (MEI) 12 are from the tritium
release, which would result in a dose of 0.028 rem, corresponding to a
latent cancer fatality (LCF) probability of 1.4 x 10-5. A
nuclear criticality of 10 19 fissions would result in an MEI
dose of 0.0016 rem from an accident at the immobilization facility and
0.016 rem from an accident at the MOX facility. Consequences of the
tritium release accident for the general population in the environs of
SRS would include an estimated 0.050 LCF. The frequency of either a
tritium release or a criticality accident is estimated to be between 1
in 10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000 per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The MEI is the hypothetical off-site person who has the
highest exposure. This individual is assumed to be located at the
point of maximum concentration of contaminants 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, for the period of operations under analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The combined radiological effects from total collapse of all three
facilities in the beyond-design-basis earthquake would be approximately
18 LCFs. It should be emphasized that a seismic event of sufficient
magnitude to collapse these facilities would likely cause the collapse
of other DOE facilities, and would almost certainly cause widespread
failure of homes, office buildings, and other structures in the
surrounding area. The overall impact of such an event must therefore be
seen in the context not only of the potential radiological impacts of
these other facilities, but of hundreds, possibly thousands, of
immediate fatalities from falling debris. The frequency of such an
earthquake is estimated to be between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 10,000,000
per year.
Surplus plutonium disposition operations at SRS could result in
worker injuries and fatalities. DOE-required industrial safety programs
would be in place to control the risks. Given the estimated employment
of 11,535 person-years of labor and the standard DOE occupational
accident rates, approximately 420 cases of nonfatal occupational injury
or illness and 0.31 fatality could be expected for the duration of
operations. If a criticality occurred, workers within tens of meters
could receive very high to fatal radiation exposures from the initial
burst. The dose would strongly depend on the magnitude of the
criticality, the distance from the criticality, and the amount of
shielding provided by the structures and equipment between the workers
and the accident.
Transportation. In all, approximately 2,500 shipments of
radioactive materials would be carried out by DOE under the Preferred
Alternative. The total distance traveled on public roads by trucks
carrying radioactive materials would be 4.3 million kilometers.
The maximum foreseeable offsite transportation accident under this
alternative (probability of occurrence: greater than 1 in 10 million
per year) is a shipment of plutonium pits from one of DOE's storage
locations to the pit conversion facility with a most severe (severity
category VIII) accident in a rural population zone under neutral
(average) weather conditions. If this accident were to occur, it could
result in a dose of 87 person-rem to the public for an LCF risk of
0.044 and 96 rem to the hypothetical MEI for an LCF risk of 0.096. (The
MEI, a hypothetical member of the general public, receives a larger
dose than the public as a whole because it is unlikely that a person
would be in position, and remain in position, to receive this
hypothetical maximum dose.) No fatalities would be expected to occur.
The probability of more severe accidents--e.g., less favorable weather
conditions at the time of accident, or occurrence in a more densely
populated area'was also evaluated, and estimated as lower than 1 chance
in 10 million per year.
The total transportation accident risk was estimated by summing the
risks (which takes account of both the probability and consequence of
each type of accident) to the affected population from all hypothetical
accidents. For the Preferred Alternative, that risk is as follows: a
radiological dose to the population of 7 person-rem, resulting in a
total population risk of 0.004 LCF; and traffic accidents resulting in
0.053 traffic fatality.
Irradiating MOX Fuel at Reactor Sites 13
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The operators of the proposed reactors have indicated that
little or no new construction would be needed to support the
irradiation of MOX fuel at the sites. As a result, land use; visual,
cultural, and paleontological resources; geology and soils; and site
infrastructure would not be affected by any new construction or
other activities related to MOX fuel use. Nor would there be any
effect on air quality and noise, ecological and water resources, or
socioeconomics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The environmental impacts described below are based on using a
partial MOX core (i.e., up to 40 percent MOX fuel) instead of a low
enriched uranium (LEU) core at the Catawba Nuclear Station near York,
South Carolina; the McGuire Nuclear Station near Huntersville, North
Carolina; and the North Anna Power Station near Mineral, Virginia.
Reactor Accidents. There are differences in the expected risk of
reactor accidents from the use of MOX fuel compared to the use of low
enriched uranium fuel. The change in consequences to the surrounding
population due to the use of MOX fuel is estimated to range from
9.0 x 10-4 fewer to 6.0 x 10-2 additional LCFs
for design basis accidents, and from 7.0 fewer to 1,300 additional LCFs
for beyond-design-basis accidents (16,900 versus 15,600 LCFs in the
worst accident analyzed). Also, some of the beyond-design-basis
accidents could result in prompt fatalities should they occur. The
estimated increase in prompt fatalities due to MOX fuel being used
during one of these accidents would range from no change to 28
additional fatalities (843 versus 815 prompt fatalities). As a result
of these changes in projected consequences, there would be a change in
the risk to the public associated with these accidents. The change in
risk (in terms of an LCF or prompt fatality) to the surrounding
population within 80 km (50 mi) of the proposed reactors is projected
to range from a decrease of 6 percent to an increase of 3 percent in
the risk of additional LCFs from design basis accidents, and from a
decrease of 4 percent to an increase of 14 percent in the risk of
additional prompt fatalities and LCFs from beyond-design-basis
accidents.
The risk to the MEI would also change with the use of MOX fuel.
Using MOX fuel during one of the design basis accidents evaluated is
expected to change the MEI's chance of incurring an LCF from a decrease
of 10 percent to an increase of 3 percent. The change in risk to the
MEI of a prompt fatality or LCF as a result of using MOX fuel during
one of the beyond-design-basis accidents evaluated is expected to range
from a 1 percent increase to a 22 percent increase. In the most severe
accident evaluated, an interfacing systems loss-of-coolant accident
(ISLOCA), it is projected that the MEI would receive a fatal dose of
radiation regardless of whether the reactor was using MOX fuel or LEU
fuel at all of the proposed sites.
Beyond-design-basis accidents, if they were to occur, would be
expected to result in major impacts to the reactors and the surrounding
communities and environment, regardless of whether the
[[Page 1614]]
reactor were using an LEU or partial MOX core. However, there is less
than one chance in a million per year that a beyond-design-basis
accident would actually happen, so the risk from these accidents is
estimated to be low.
Lead Assembly and Post-Irradiation Examination Activities
The analysis of the potential impacts of conducting the lead
assembly activities and post-irradiation examination indicates that
little or no new construction or operational changes would be needed to
support these activities. As a result, land use; visual, cultural, and
paleontological resources; geology and soils; and site infrastructure
would not be affected by any new construction or other activities
related to lead assembly fabrication or post-irradiation examination.
Nor would there be any effect on air quality and noise, ecological and
water resources, or socioeconomics.
Avoidance and Minimization of Environmental Harm
For the Preferred Alternative, at SRS, storm water management and
erosion control measures will be employed during construction of the
disposition facilities. Cultural resources impacts will be mitigated
either by avoidance or data recovery. Initial indications are the
disposition facilities can be located in an area that will avoid
disturbing known cultural resource areas.
During operation of the disposition facilities, radiation doses to
individual workers will be kept at a minimum by maintaining
comprehensive badged monitoring and ``as low as reasonably achievable''
(ALARA) programs during worker rotations. The storage facilities in the
disposition buildings will be designed and operated in accordance with
contemporary DOE orders and/or NRC regulations to reduce risks to
workers and the public.
From a non-proliferation standpoint, the highest standards for
safeguards and security will be employed during transportation, storage
(i.e., the stored weapons standard 14) and disposition. DOE
will coordinate the transport of surplus plutonium and fresh MOX fuel
with State officials, consistent with contemporary policy. Although the
actual routes will be classified, they will be selected to circumvent
populated areas where ever possible, maximize the use of interstate
highways, and avoid bad weather. DOE will coordinate emergency
preparedness plans and responses with involved states through liaison
programs. The packaging, vehicles, and transport procedures being used
are specifically designed and tested to prevent radiological release
under all credible accident scenarios. The NRC regulates safeguards and
security at facilities it licenses commensurate with the type of
facility and type and amount of fissile or radioactive material
present. Commercial nuclear power reactors have stringent regulations
to prevent sabotage or diversion of special nuclear materials. Physical
protection and safeguards and security will be ensured at the reactor
sites by continued implementation of NRC requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The ``Stored Weapons Standard'' for weapons-usable fissile
materials storage was initially defined in Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy of
Sciences, 1994. DOE defines the Stored Weapons Standard as follows:
The high standards of security and accounting for the storage of
intact nuclear weapons should be maintained, to the extent
practical, for weapons-usable fissile materials throughout
dismantlement, storage, and disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmentally Preferable Alternatives
The environmentally preferable alternative is the No Action
Alternative. Under this alternative, surplus weapons-usable plutonium
materials in storage at various DOE sites would remain at those
locations. The vast majority of pits would continue to be stored at
Pantex, and the remaining plutonium in various forms would continue to
be stored at Hanford, INEEL, LLNL, LANL, RFETS, and SRS. The No Action
Alternative would not satisfy the purpose and need for the proposed
action because DOE's disposition decisions in the Storage and
Disposition PEIS ROD would not be implemented. That ROD announced that,
consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and
Disposition PEIS, DOE had decided to reduce, over time, the number of
locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored, through a
combination of storage and disposition alternatives. Implementation of
much of this decision requires the movement of surplus materials to
disposition facility locations. Without disposition facilities, only
pits that have been moved from RFETS to Pantex would be relocated in
accordance with the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD. All other surplus
materials would continue to be stored indefinitely at their current
locations, with the exception that DOE is considering leaving the
repackaged surplus pits in Zone 4 at Pantex for long-term storage
instead of zone 12 as originally planned. An appropriate environmental
review will be conducted when the specific proposal for this change has
been determined (e.g., whether additional magazines need to be air-
conditioned). The analysis in the SPD EIS assumes that the surplus pits
are stored in Zone 12 in accordance with the ROD for the Storage and
Disposition PEIS.
Among the ``action'' alternatives analyzed in the SPD EIS, the
environmentally preferable action alternative is the 50-Metric-Ton
Immobilization Alternative with the Immobilization and Pit Conversion
facilities located at SRS. This alternative would involve immobilizing
all 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium at SRS. Under this alternative,
only two facilities, the pit conversion facility and the immobilization
facility, would be needed to accomplish the surplus plutonium
disposition mission. Both the pit conversion and immobilization
facilities would be new construction near the area currently designated
for the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility in F-Area. In addition,
the canister receipt area at DWPF in S-Area would be modified to
accommodate receipt and processing of the canisters transferred from
the immobilization facility for filling with vitrified high-level
waste. The pit conversion and immobilization facilities would be the
same as those described for the Preferred Alternative, except that all
the plutonium dioxide produced in the pit conversion facility would be
transferred to the immobilization facility. To accommodate the
additional 33 metric tons of plutonium that would be received from the
pit conversion facility, the immobilization facility would be operated
at a higher throughput (5 metric tons per year rather than 1.7 metric
tons per year), and the operating workforce at the immobilization
facility would be increased.
Comparison of Preferred Alternative to Other Alternatives
The Preferred Alternative requires the construction and operation
of three new facilities; some minor modifications to, and work at, two
existing DOE facilities; and use of existing domestic, commercial
nuclear reactors for MOX fuel irradiation. The other hybrid
alternatives would require the same facilities and activities; the
immobilization-only alternatives would require the construction and
operation of only two facilities. The environmentally preferable
alternative, which is the No Action Alternative, does not involve
construction or operation of any facilities, or use of new or existing
facilities, other than those currently in use for the continued storage
of the surplus plutonium. Furthermore, no transportation would be
involved for the No Action
[[Page 1615]]
Alternative, and continued storage under this alternative would not
affect any key environmental resource area at any of the seven storage
locations. However, there would be doses to workers and the general
population (and associated health effects) throughout the storage
period at all of these locations. At SRS, the health effects from 50
years of storage under the No Action Alternative would be lower than
those associated with implementation of the Preferred Alternative.
Nonetheless, the Preferred Alternative would still contribute to the
dose and associated health effects at locations where supporting
activities like lead assembly fabrication and post-irradiation
examination would occur.
The environmentally preferable action alternative, which is an
immobilization-only alternative, would require the construction and
operation of two, rather than three, facilities. For all of the key
environmental resource areas except transportation and worker dose, the
potential impacts of the Preferred Alternative are greater than for the
environmentally preferable action alternative, although for most of the
resource areas, the difference is less than 20 percent. The estimated
LCFs and traffic fatalities are higher for the environmentally
preferable action alternative, although both are well below one LCF.
Worker dose is the same for both the preferred and the environmentally
preferable action alternatives.
Relative ranking of the Preferred Alternative to other action
alternatives varies by resource area. For all alternatives evaluated in
the SPD EIS, the incremental concentrations of criteria air pollutant
concentrations would be less than 2 percent of the applicable
regulatory standard. The relative ranking of Preferred Alternative to
the other action alternatives varies with the specific pollutant; for
some, the Preferred Alternative ranks higher, for others, lower. The
Preferred Alternative produces more, by approximately 5 to 25 percent,
regulated waste than any of the other action alternatives.
All of the action alternatives would generate employment
opportunities at each of the proposed facilities. In general, the
Preferred Alternative requires the greatest number of construction and
operation workers of all the action alternatives. However, for one
alternative, approximately 5 percent more construction workers would be
needed. The amount of land that would be disturbed for implementing any
of the alternatives is relatively small. The Preferred Alternative
requires the most land disturbance, and could potentially affect
cultural resource areas at SRS. However, as previously discussed in
this ROD, DOE currently plans to mitigate impacts by avoiding sites
that are eligible or potentially eligible for the National Register of
Historic Places. SRS is the only candidate site at which cultural
resource issues involving the proposed action have been identified. The
action alternative with the least amount of land disturbance uses
existing facilities at Hanford.
Because of the location of the proposed facilities relative to
other activities at the sites, radiation doses would be received by
construction workers at both INEEL and SRS. Doses to workers from
construction and operation activities for each of the action
alternatives could result in approximately 2.0 LCFs, with essentially
no difference among any of the alternatives. There will be no dose (and
therefore, no LCFs) to the general population for any of the action
alternatives during construction of the proposed facilities. Although
there is a small population dose associated with each of the action
alternatives, no LCFs are expected to occur in the general population
from routine operations for any of the alternatives. The most severe
nonreactor design basis accident postulated for the Preferred
Alternative, and all but one other action alternative, is a design
basis fire in the pit conversion facility resulting in a tritium
release. The resulting dose is highest for the Preferred Alternative,
however, the associated dose would not be expected to result in any
LCFs in the general population. None of the action alternatives is
expected to result in traffic fatalities from nonradiological accidents
or LCFs from radiological exposures or vehicle emissions. Impacts
estimated for routine operations and postulated accidents at the
reactor sites would be identical for all the hybrid alternatives.
Comments on Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final EIS
After issuing the SPD Final EIS, the Department received two
letters. All of the issues raised in these letters have been covered in
the body of the SPD Final EIS and in the Comment Response Document. The
first letter contained a single comment requesting that the decision on
a location for the lead assembly work retain the flexibility to allow
doing the work at SRS. Based on consideration of the capabilities of
the candidate sites and input from the team chosen for the MOX
approach, the Department has decided to use LANL for fabrication of MOX
fuel rods for use in fabrication of lead assemblies. LANL was selected
because it already has facilities that will not require major
modifications for fuel rod fabrication, and takes advantage of existing
infrastructure and staff experience. Additionally, the surplus
plutonium dioxide needed to fabricate the MOX fuel rods for lead
assemblies will already be on site.
The second letter contained numerous comments that opposed the use
of MOX fuel in commercial power reactors. The commentor believes that
the selection process of DCS and the commercial reactors was not opened
to sufficient public scrutiny. The commentor repeated an earlier
request that the Department hold additional public meetings in the
vicinity of the three reactor sites before closing the public comment
period, and that all information on the MOX project, including data
submitted by DCS, DOE's Environmental Critique, and ORNL's data on
expected radionuclide activities in MOX fuel, be made available to the
public. During the public comment period on the Supplement to the SPD
Draft EIS, which included specific reactor analyses, DOE held a public
hearing in Washington, D.C., on June 15, 1999, and invited comments.
While no additional hearings were held on the Supplement, other means
were provided for the public to express their concerns and provide
comments: mail; a toll-free telephone and fax line; and the Office of
Fissile Materials Disposition Web-site. Also, at the invitation of
South Carolina State Senator Phil Leventis, DOE attended and
participated in a public hearing held on June 24, 1999, in Columbia,
South Carolina.
Most of the information in DOE's Environmental Critique was
included in the Environmental Synopsis released for public review; only
proprietary and business-sensitive information was removed. The Duke,
COGEMA, and Stone & Webster (DCS) team provided DOE with analyses of
the environmental and computer modeling data, and population
projections, but not the input data. The ratio of low-enriched uranium
fuel to MOX fuel, provided by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, is
contained in the SPD Final EIS. Because the accident calculations are
voluminous, they are not included in the SPD EIS. The calculations
contain all of the input parameters including the MACCS2 computer
files. Principal input parameters, such as accident source terms and
population distributions, are included in the EIS.
The same commentor expressed concern that experience with the use
of MOX fuel in the United States, as well
[[Page 1616]]
as internationally, is limited. The fabrication of MOX fuel and its use
in commercial reactors has been accomplished in Western Europe. DOE
would draw upon this experience in its disposition of the U.S. surplus
plutonium. Electricite de France reactors in France have seen little or
no impact from the use of MOX fuel on radionuclide releases in
effluents. No change would be expected from normal operations, given
that MOX fuel performs as well as LEU fuel and the fission products are
retained within the fuel cladding. FRAGEMA's (a subsidiary of COGEMA
and FRAMATOME) experience with fabricating MOX fuel indicates a fuel
rod fission product leak rate of less than one-tenth of 1 percent.
FRAGEMA has provided 1,253 MOX fuel assemblies, containing more than
300,000 fuel rods, for commercial reactor use. There have been no
failures and leaks have occurred in only 3 assemblies (a total of 4
rods). All leaks occurred as a result of debris in the reactor coolant
system and occurred in 1997 or earlier. French requirements for debris
removal were changed in 1997 to alleviate these concerns. Since that
time, there have been no leaks in MOX fuel rods. Further, as discussed
in response DCR009-1 of the Comment Response Document, NRC would
evaluate license applications and monitor the operations of the
commercial reactors to ensure adequate margins of safety.
The commentor was also concerned that human and technical errors
may lead to safety hazards at the reactors if MOX fuel is used.
Particular safety issues were identified at McGuire, North Anna and
Catawba (e.g., ice condenser problems and corrosion of service water
pipes and auxiliary feedwater pipes). While the Department acknowledges
that there are differences in the use of MOX fuel compared to LEU fuel,
these differences are not expected to decrease the safety of the
reactors. NRC has not considered it necessary to restrict operation of
any of the other reactors in the United States that use ice condenser
containments. All of the factors discussed by the commentor were
evaluated by the proposed reactor licensees to ensure that the
reactors, including those with ice condensers, can continue to operate
safely using MOX fuel, and these factors will continue to be evaluated.
Before any MOX fuel is used in the United States, NRC would have to
perform a comprehensive safety review that would include information
prepared by the reactor plant operators as part of their license
amendment applications.
Another issue raised by the same comentor concerned the stability
of plutonium compared to uranium and the alleged reduction in the
ability to control the chain reaction when plutonium is added to the
reactor in the form of MOX fuel. Differences between MOX fuel and
uranium fuel are well characterized and can be accommodated through
fuel and core design. All of the factors discussed by the commentor
were evaluated by the proposed reactor licensees to ensure that the
reactors can continue to operate safely using MOX fuel and will
continue to be evaluated. Initial evaluations indicate that partial MOX
fuel cores have a more negative fuel Doppler coefficient at hot zero
power and hot full power, relative to LEU fuel cores for all times
during the full cycle. These evaluations also indicate that partial MOX
cores have a more negative moderator coefficient at hot zero power and
hot full power, relative to LEU fuel cores for all times during the
full cycle. These more negative temperature coefficients would act to
shut the reactor down more rapidly during a heatup transient.
The commentor expressed concern that higher energy neutrons from
plutonium are more likely to strike reactor parts such as the stainless
steel containment vessel and degrade the metal parts of the reactor,
resulting in embrittlement problems. Reactor vessel embrittlement is a
condition in which the fast neutron fluence from the reactor core
reduces the toughness (fracture resistance) of the reactor vessel
metal. Analyses performed for the Department indicate that the core
average fast flux in a partial MOX fuel core is comparable, within 3
percent, to the core average fast flux for a uranium fuel core. All of
the reactors identified for the MOX mission have a comprehensive
program of reactor vessel analysis and surveillance in place to ensure
that NRC reactor vessel safety limits are not exceeded.
The commentor was also concerned that the use of MOX fuel would
result in additional harmful radiation exposure to the public during a
failure of the reactor containment structure. The commentor noted a
study by the Nuclear Control Institute estimating that the risk to the
public near McGuire or Catawba of contracting a deadly cancer following
a severe accident will increase by nearly 40 percent when the plants
start using plutonium fuel. DOE believes NCI's analysis overestimates
the risk of using MOX fuel for two reasons. NCI's analysis did not
account for the plutonium polishing step which has been added to the
MOX fuel fabrication process. This step eliminates nearly all of the
americium from fresh MOX fuel, which significantly reduces the actinide
inventory. In addition, NCI performed a generic reactor analysis while
DOE performed plant specific analyses.
Analyses of a 40 percent weapons-grade MOX core indicate there
would be approximately two times more americium-241 and plutonium-239,
and slightly less than one and a half times the curium-242 than a
reactor using LEU fuel. There are differences in the expected risk of
reactor accidents from the use of MOX fuel. Some accidents would be
expected to result in lower consequences to the surrounding population,
and lower risks, while others would be expected to result in higher
consequences and higher risks. There is an increase in risk, about 3
percent, for the large-break loss-of-coolant accident (the bounding
design basis accident). The largest increase in risk for beyond-design-
basis accidents is approximately 14 percent for an interfacing systems
loss-of-coolant accident at North Anna. In the unlikely event that this
beyond-design-basis accident were to occur, the expected number of LCFs
would increase from 2,980 to 3,390 with a partial MOX core and prompt
fatalities would increase from 54 to 60. Both of these accidents have
an extremely low probability of occurrence. At North Anna, the
likelihood of a large-break loss-of-coolant accident occurring is
estimated at 1 chance in 48,000 per year and the likelihood of an
interfacing systems loss-of-coolant accident occurring is estimated at
1 chance in 4.2 million per year.
Another issue raised by the commentor concerned timely and adequate
emergency response to a MOX fuel accident due to limited resources of
volunteer first responders. The subject of emergency response and
subsequent cleanup of an accident that involves the release of nuclear
materials is a topic of continuing discussion and planning between DOE
and State, local, and tribal officials. Prior to any shipment of
hazardous material, a transportation plan will be developed which
includes details of emergency preparedness, security, and coordination
of DOE with local emergency response authorities. Any additional
training or equipment needed would be provided as part of the planning
process. In addition, DOE maintains eight regional coordinating offices
across the country, staffed 24 hours per day, 365 days per year to
offer advice and assistance. Radiological Assistance Program teams are
available to provide field monitoring, sampling, decontamination,
communication, and other services.
[[Page 1617]]
As described in Appendix L of the SPD EIS, DOE anticipates that
transportation required for the disposition of surplus plutonium would
be done through DOE's Safe Secure Transport system. Since the
establishment of the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division in 1975,
the Safe Secure Transport system has transported DOE-owned cargo over
more than 151 million kilometers (91 million miles) with no accidents
causing a fatality or release of radioactive material.
Other Considerations
Cost Reports
To assist in the preparation of this ROD, DOE's Office of Fissile
Materials Disposition prepared two cost reports. The first is Cost
Analysis in Support of Site Selection for Surplus Weapons-Usable
Plutonium Disposition (DOE/MD-0009; July 1998). This report provides
site-specific cost information and analyses to support the selection of
a preferred siting alternative for the alternatives considered in the
SPD EIS. The second report is Plutonium Disposition Life Cycle Costs
and Cost-Related Comment Resolution Document (DOE/MD-0013; November
1999). This report provides full life cycle costs for the Preferred
Alternative as stated in the SPD EIS. It also contains the Department's
responses to cost related comments submitted during the public review
of the SPD Draft EIS.
Cost Analysis in Support of Site Selection
The summary costs listed below do not include the costs that would
be the same, independent of where the facility is sited. Therefore, the
costs are not full life cycle costs. The costs are presented in
constant year 1997 dollars. Cost estimates for each of the required
disposition facilities (Pit Disassembly and Conversion; MOX Fuel
Fabrication; and Immobilization), including the additional supporting
infrastructure, were created for each candidate site and were
aggregated into two cost categories (1) design and construction and (2)
operational. The cost estimates are considered to have an accuracy of
plus or minus 40 percent for design, construction, and decommissioning,
and an accuracy of plus or minus 20 percent for operations.
Hybrid Alternatives (Alternatives 2 through 10 in the SPD EIS). The
estimated costs to design and construct the required facilities range
from $1.21 billion to $1.40 billion, and estimated operational costs
range from $1.40 billion to $1.58 billion. The total costs for the
hybrid alternatives range from $2.67 billion to $2.93 billion. The
total cost of the hybrid alternatives would be reduced by the value of
the MOX fuel provided to the participating reactors; at the time of
this estimate the total cost after credit for the ``fuel offset'' was
$1.71 billion to $2.01 billion.15
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\15\ The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility would produce nuclear
fuel that will displace LEU fuel that utilities would otherwise
purchase. The value of this fuel, deemed the MOX fuel offset, is
estimated to be $920 million.
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Immobilization-Only Alternatives (Alternatives 11 and 12 in the SPD
EIS). The estimated costs to design and construct the required
facilities range from $0.73 billion to $0.89 billion and the
operational costs range from $0.97 billion to $1.0 billion. The
Immobilization Only Alternatives range from $1.71 billion to $1.90
billion. The cost of the alternatives differ by approximately ten
percent, well within the uncertainty of the cost estimates.
Life Cycle Cost for the Preferred Alternative
The summary cost listed below is the cost for the Preferred
Alternative. The cost includes the cost of siting, construction, and
operation of plutonium disposition facilities at DOE's Savannah River
Site, as well as the cost associated with the irradiation of the MOX
fuel in commercial reactors. In addition, the cost includes such costs
as sunk (already spent) funds, and costs for developing and
demonstrating the plutonium disposition technologies, transporting the
plutonium and plutonium disposition products, start-up and deactivation
and decommissioning of the three facilities. The costs are based upon
the Cost Analysis in Support of Site Selection for Surplus Weapons-
Usable Plutonium Disposition, DOE/MD-0009, July 22, 1998.
The total cost of implementing the Preferred Alternative is
estimated to be $4.07 billion in constant year 2000 dollars. The
increase in cost over the 1998 estimate is primarily attributable to
addition of life cycle costs specifically omitted from the 1998 cost
report, technical program changes, specifically the increased size of
the immobilization facility and the addition of the polishing step to
the MOX fuel fabrication process, plus other cost changes (e.g.,
inflation).
Nonproliferation Assessment
To assist in the development of this ROD, DOE's Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation, with support from the Office of Fissile
Materials Disposition, prepared a report, Nonproliferation and Arms
Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and
Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (DOE/NN-0007, January 1997). The
report was issued in draft form in October 1996, and following a public
comment period, was issued in final form in January 1997. It analyzes
the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the
alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of
excess plutonium. It is based in part on a Proliferation Vulnerability
Red Team Report (SAND97-8203. UC-700, October 1996) prepared for the
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition by Sandia National Laboratory.
The assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each
option. Some of the ``options'' and ``alternatives'' discussed in the
Nonproliferation Assessment are listed as ``variants'' (such as can-in-
canister) in the Storage and Disposition Final PEIS. The following
paragraphs discuss key conclusions of the report, as modified to meet
current conditions.
Disposition of U.S. Excess Plutonium
Each of the alternatives for disposition of excess weapons
plutonium that meets the Spent Fuel Standard 16 would, if
implemented appropriately, offer major nonproliferation and arms
reduction benefits compared to leaving the material in storage in
directly weapons-usable form. Taking into account the likely impact on
Russian disposition activities, the no-action alternative appears to be
by far the least desirable of the plutonium disposition options from a
non-proliferation and arms reduction perspective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ ``Spent Fuel Standard'' is a term coined by the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS, 1994, Management and Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pg 12)
and modified by DOE (glossary from Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition web site at http://www.doe-md.com) denoting the main
objective of alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium:
that such plutonium be made roughly as inaccessible and unattractive
for weapons use as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium in
civilian spent fuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carrying out disposition of excess U.S. weapons plutonium, using
alternatives that ensured effective non-proliferation controls and
resulted in forms meeting the Spent Fuel Standard, would:
Reduce the likelihood that current arms reductions would
be reversed, by significantly increasing the difficulty, cost, and
observability of returning this plutonium to weapons;
Increase international confidence in the arms reduction
process,
[[Page 1618]]
strengthening political support for the non-proliferation regime and
providing a base for additional arms reductions, if desired;
Reduce long-term proliferation risks posed by this
material by further helping to ensure that weapons-usable material does
not fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups; and
Lay the essential foundation for parallel disposition of
excess Russian plutonium, reducing the risks that Russia might threaten
U.S. security by rebuilding its Cold War nuclear weapons arsenal, or
that this material might be stolen for use by potential proliferators.
Choosing the ``no-action alternative'' of leaving U.S. excess
plutonium in storage in weapons-usable form indefinitely, rather than
carrying out disposition:
Would represent a clear reversal of the U.S. position
seeking to reduce excess stockpiles of weapons-usable materials
worldwide;
Would make it impossible to achieve disposition of Russian
excess plutonium;
Could undermine international political support for non-
proliferation efforts by leaving open the question of whether the
United States was maintaining an option for rapid reversal of current
arms reductions; and
Could undermine progress in nuclear arms reductions.
The benefits of placing U.S. excess plutonium under international
monitoring and then transforming it into forms that met the Spent Fuel
Standard would be greatly increased, and the risks of these steps
significantly decreased, if Russia took comparable steps with its own
excess plutonium on a parallel track. The two countries need not use
the same plutonium disposition technologies. However, as the 1994 NAS
committee report concluded, options for disposition of U.S. excess
weapons plutonium will provide maximum nonproliferation and arms
control benefits if they:
Minimize the time during which the excess plutonium is
stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons;
Preserve material safeguards and security during the
disposition process, seeking to maintain to the extent possible the
same high standards of security and accounting applied to stored
nuclear weapons (the Stored Weapons Standard);
Result in a form in which the plutonium would be as
inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as the larger and growing
quantity of plutonium in commercial spent fuel (the Spent Fuel
Standard).
In order to achieve the benefits of plutonium disposition as
rapidly as possible, and to minimize the risks and negative signals
resulting from leaving the excess plutonium in storage, it is important
for disposition options to begin, and to complete the mission as soon
as practicable, taking into account non-proliferation, environment,
safety, and health, and economic constraints. Timing should be a key
criterion in judging disposition alternatives. Beginning the
disposition quickly is particularly important to establishing the
credibility of the process, domestically and internationally.
Each of the alternatives under consideration for plutonium
disposition:
Has its own advantages and disadvantages with respect to
non-proliferation and arms control, but none is clearly superior to the
others;
Can potentially provide high levels of security and
safeguards for nuclear materials during the disposition process,
mitigating the risk of theft of nuclear materials; and
Can potentially provide for effective international
monitoring of the disposition process.
Plutonium disposition can only reduce, not eliminate, the security
risks posed by the existence of excess plutonium, and will involve some
risks of its own. Because all plutonium disposition alternatives would
take decades to complete, disposition is not a near-term solution to
the problem of nuclear theft and smuggling. While disposition will make
a long-term contribution, the near-term problem must be addressed
through programs to improve security and safeguarding for nuclear
materials, and to ensure adequate police, customs, and intelligence
capabilities to interdict nuclear smuggling. All plutonium disposition
alternatives under consideration would involve processing and transport
of plutonium, which will involve more risk of theft in the short term
than if the material had remained in heavily guarded storage, in return
for the long-term benefit of converting the material to more
proliferation-resistant forms.
Both the United States and Russia will still retain substantial
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials
after disposition of the fissile materials currently considered excess
is complete. These weapons and materials will continue to pose a
security challenge regardless of what is done with excess plutonium.
None of the disposition alternatives under consideration would make it
impossible to recover the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, or make
it impossible to use other plutonium to rebuild a nuclear arsenal.
Therefore, disposition will only reduce, not eliminate, the risk of
reversal of current nuclear arms reductions. A United States decision
to choose reactor alternatives for plutonium disposition could offer
additional arguments and justifications to those advocating plutonium
reprocessing and recycle in other countries. This could increase the
proliferation risk if it in fact led to significant additional
separation and handling of weapons-usable plutonium. On the other hand,
if appropriately implemented, plutonium disposition might also offer an
opportunity to develop improved procedures and technologies for
protecting and safeguarding plutonium, which could reduce proliferation
risks and would strengthen United States efforts to reduce the
stockpiles of separated plutonium in other countries.
Large-scale bulk processing of plutonium, including processes to
convert plutonium pits to oxide and prepare other forms for
disposition, as well as fuel fabrication or immobilization processes,
represents the stage of the disposition process when material is most
vulnerable to covert theft by insiders or covert diversion by the host
state. However, such bulk processing is required for all disposition
alternatives. In particular, initial processing of plutonium pits and
other forms is among the most proliferation sensitive stages of the
disposition process, but it is largely common to all the options.
Transport of plutonium is the point in the disposition process when
the material is most vulnerable to overt armed attacks designed to
steal plutonium. With sufficient resources devoted to security,
however, high levels of protection against such overt attacks can be
provided.
Conclusions Relating to Specific Disposition Technologies
Reactor technology will meet the Spent Fuel Standard. Reactor
technology has some advantage over the immobilization technology with
respect to perceived irreversibility, in that the plutonium would be
converted from weapons-grade to reactor-grade, even though it is
possible to produce nuclear weapons with both weapons and reactor-grade
plutonium. However, the immobilization technology has some advantage
over the reactor technology in avoiding the perception that the latter
approach could potentially encourage additional separation and civilian
use of plutonium, which itself poses
[[Page 1619]]
proliferation risks. Because reactor technology results in accountable
``items'' (for purposes of international safeguards) whose plutonium
content can be accurately measured, this approach offers some advantage
in accounting to ensure that the output plutonium matches the input
plutonium from the process. The principal uncertainty with respect to
using excess weapons plutonium as MOX fuel in domestic reactors relates
to the potential difficulty of gaining political and regulatory
approvals for the various operations required.
Immobilization technology (can-in-canister) is being refined
resulting in an increase in the resistance to separation of the
plutonium cans from the surrounding glass, with the goal of meeting the
Spent Fuel Standard. The immobilization options have the potential to
be implemented more quickly than the reactor options. They face
somewhat less political uncertainty but somewhat more technical
uncertainty than the reactor options.
The ``can-in-canister'' immobilization options have a timing
advantage over the homogeneous immobilization options, in that, by
potentially relying on existing facilities, they could begin several
years sooner. As noted above, however, modified systems intended to
allow this option to meet the Spent Fuel Standard are still being
designed.
Decisions 17
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ included in these decisions is the Department's decision to
fulfill the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security agreement to apply
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to surplus plutonium
as soon as it is practical. Further, consistent with a Presidential
Directive, the Department is continuing to work towards maximizing
the quantities of materials eligible for International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the January 1997 decision on the Storage and
Disposition PEIS, the Department of Energy is affirming its decision to
use a hybrid approach for the safe and secure disposition of up to 50
metric tons of surplus plutonium using both immobilization and mixed
oxide fuel technologies and to construct and operate three new
facilities at its Savannah River Site. The hybrid approach allows for
the immobilization of approximately 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium
and the use of up to 33 metric tons as mixed oxide fuel which would be
irradiated in commercial reactors.
Construction and Operation of a Pit Disassembly and Conversion
Facility
Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the SPD Final EIS, the
Department has decided to construct and operate a new pit conversion
facility at SRS for the purpose of disassembling nuclear weapons pits
and converting the plutonium metal to a declassified oxide form
suitable for international inspection and disposition, using either
immobilization or MOX/reactor approaches. SRS was selected for the pit
conversion facility because the site has extensive experience with
plutonium processing, and the pit conversion facility complements
existing missions and takes advantage of existing infrastructure.
Construction and Operation of an Immobilization Facility and
Selection of an Immobilization Technology 18
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The Department intends to use essentially all of the
plutonium oxide produced by the Pit Disassembly and Conversion
Facility as feed material for mixed oxide fuel. However, some small
amounts may be unsuitable for this purpose and will be shipped to
the Immobilization Facility for disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the SPD Final EIS, the
Department has decided to construct and operate a new immobilization
facility at SRS using the ceramic can-in-canister technology. This
technology will be used to immobilize approximately 17 metric tons of
surplus plutonium in a ceramic form, seal it in cans, and place the
cans in canisters filled with borosilicate glass containing intensely
radioactive high-level waste at the existing Defense Waste Processing
Facility. The decision is based, in part, on the fact that the can-in-
canister approach at SRS complements existing missions, takes advantage
of existing infrastructure and staff expertise, and enables DOE to use
an existing facility (DWPF). The ceramic can-in-canister approach will
also provide better performance in a geologic repository and provide
greater proliferation resistance than the glass can-in-canister
approach.
Construction and Operation of a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication
Facility and Irradiation in Commercial Reactors
Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the SPD Final EIS, the
Department has decided to construct and operate a new facility at SRS
to produce MOX fuel containing up to 33 metric tons of surplus weapons-
usable plutonium for irradiation in existing domestic, commercial
reactors. The decision to use SRS is made, in part, because this
activity complements existing missions and takes advantage of existing
infrastructure and staff expertise. Based on this selection, the
Department will authorize DCS to fully implement the base contract.
As previously stated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD (62 FR
3014, January 21, 1997), the use of MOX fuel in existing reactors will
be undertaken in a manner that is consistent with the United States'
policy objective on the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament
process and the United States' policy discouraging the civilian use of
plutonium. To this end, implementing the MOX alternative will include
government ownership and control of the MOX fuel fabrication facility
at a DOE site, and use of the facility only for the surplus plutonium
disposition program. There will be no reprocessing or subsequent reuse
of spent MOX fuel. The MOX fuel will be used in a once-through fuel
cycle in existing reactors, with appropriate arrangements, including
contractual or licensing provisions limiting use of MOX fuel to surplus
plutonium disposition.
Selection of a Site for Lead Assembly Fabrication
Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the SPD EIS, the
Department has decided to use LANL for fabrication of MOX fuel rods for
use in fabrication of lead assemblies. Based on consideration of the
capabilities of the candidate sites and input from the team chosen for
the MOX approach, LANL was selected because it already has facilities
(i.e., Technical Area 55) that will not require major modifications in
order to fabricate fuel rods, and takes advantage of existing
infrastructure and staff experience. Additionally, the surplus
plutonium dioxide needed to fabricate the MOX fuel rods for lead
assemblies will already be on site.
At this time, however, no decision is being made as to which
facility at LANL will be used for final assembly of the MOX fuel rods
into lead assemblies. DOE is currently evaluating whether there may be
the need for additional environmental analysis to support the final
stages of lead assembly fabrication at LANL. Pending completion of that
review, DOE is deferring a decision as to where on the LANL site this
final lead assembly work will be done.
Selection of a Site for Post-Irradiation Examination of Lead
Assemblies
If post-irradiation examination is necessary for the purpose of
qualifying the MOX fuel for commercial reactor use, the Department has
decided to perform that task at ORNL, consistent with the Preferred
Alternative in the SPD Final EIS. ORNL has the existing
[[Page 1620]]
facilities and staff expertise needed to perform post-irradiation
examination as a matter of its routine activities and no major
modifications to facilities or processing capabilities would be
required. In addition, ORNL is only about 500 km from the reactor site
that would irradiate the fuel, considerably closer than ANL--W, which
is about 3,700 km away.
Use of MOX Fuel in Canadian Uranium Deuterium Reactors
In the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD, DOE retained the option to
use some of the surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in Canadian Uranium
Deuterium (CANDU) reactors, which would have been undertaken only in
the event that a multilateral agreement were negotiated among Russia,
Canada, and the United States. Since the SPD Draft EIS was issued, DOE
determined that adequate reactor capacity is available in the United
States for disposition of that portion of the U.S. surplus plutonium
suitable for MOX fuel. Therefore, DOE is no longer actively pursuing
the CANDU option. However, the CANDU option is still being considered
for the disposition of Russian surplus plutonium. To assist U.S.,
Russia, and Canada in considering this option the three countries are
jointly conducting an experiment which will involve irradiating MOX
fuel pins that have been fabricated from U.S. and Russian surplus
weapons plutonium in a Canadian research reactor. This effort involves
a one-time shipment of a small quantity of weapons plutonium from the
U.S. to Canada.
Conclusion
The Department of Energy has decided to disposition up to 50 metric
tons of plutonium at SRS using a hybrid approach that involves both the
ceramic can-in-canister immobilization approach and the MOX fuel
approach. Approximately 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be
immobilized in a ceramic form, placed in cans, and embedded in large
canisters containing high-level vitrified waste for ultimate disposal
in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Approximately 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be used to
fabricate MOX fuel, which will be irradiated in existing domestic,
commercial reactors. The reactors are the Catawba Nuclear Station near
York, South Carolina; the McGuire Nuclear Station near Huntersville,
North Carolina; and the North Anna Power Station near Mineral,
Virginia. The resulting spent fuel will be placed in a geologic
repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Pursuing this
hybrid approach provides the best opportunity for U.S. leadership in
working with Russia to implement similar options for reducing Russia's
excess plutonium in parallel. Further, it sends the strongest possible
signal to the world of U.S. determination to reduce stockpiles of
surplus weapons-usable plutonium as quickly as possible and in an
irreversible manner. Pursuing both immobilization and MOX fuel
fabrication also provides important insurance against uncertainties of
implementing either approach by itself. The construction of new
facilities for the disposition of surplus U.S. plutonium would not take
place unless there is significant progress on plans for plutonium
disposition in Russia. In the plutonium disposition effort, the United
States will work with Russia to develop acceptable methods and
technologies for transparency measures, including appropriate
international verification measures and stringent standards of physical
protection, control, and accounting for the management of surplus
plutonium.
Issued in Washington, DC, January 4, 2000.
Bill Richardson,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-594 Filed 1-11-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
