[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 8 (Wednesday, January 13, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2237-2241]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-758]
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-400]
Carolina Power & Light; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-63 issued to Carolina Power & Light (CP&L or the licensee) for
operation of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
[[Page 2238]]
located in Wake and Chatham Counties, North Carolina.
The proposed amendment would support a modification to the plant to
increase the spent fuel storage capacity by adding rack modules to
spent fuel pools (SFPs) ``C'' and ``D'' and placing the pools in
service. In order to activate the pools, CP&L requests that the NRC
review and approve the following:
i. Revised Technical Specification 5.6 to identify PWR burnup
restrictions, BWR enrichment limits, pool capacities, heat load
limitations and nominal center-to-center distances between fuel
assemblies in the racks to be installed in SFPs `C' and `D.'
ii. 10 CFR 50.55a Alternative Plan to demonstrate acceptable level
of quality and safety in the completion of the component cooling water
(CCW) and SFP `C' and `D' cooling and cleanup system piping.
The cooling system for SFPs `C' and `D' cannot be N stamped in
accordance with ASME Section III since some installation records are
not available, a partial turnover was not performed when construction
was halted following the cancellation of Unit 2 and CP&L's N
certificate program was discontinued following completion of Unit 1.
iii. Unreviewed safety question for additional heat load on the CCW
system. The acceptability of the 1.0 MBtu/hr heat load from SFPs `C'
and `D' was demonstrated by the use of thermal-hydraulic analyses of
the CCW system under various operating scenarios. The dynamic modeling
used in the thermal-hydraulic analyses identified a decrease in the
minimum required CCW system flow rate to the residual heat removal heat
exchangers. This change has not been previously reviewed by the NRC and
is deemed to constitute an unreviewed safety question.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
In the analysis of the safety issues concerning the expanded
pool storage capacity within Harris' Fuel Handling Building, the
following previously postulated accident scenarios have been
considered:
a. A spent fuel assembly drop in a Spent Fuel Pool.
b. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling flow.
c. A seismic event.
d. Misloaded fuel assembly.
The probability that any of the accidents in the above list can
occur is not significantly increased by the activity itself. The
probabilities of a seismic event or loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling
flow are not influenced by the proposed changes. The probabilities
of accidental fuel assembly drops or misloadings are primarily
influenced by the methods used to lift and move these loads. The
method of handling loads during normal plant operations is not
significantly changed, since the same equipment (i.e., Spent Fuel
Handling Machine and tools) and procedures as those in current use
in pools `A' and `B' will be used in pools `C' and `D'. Since the
methods used to move loads during normal operations remain nearly
the same as those used previously, there is no significant increase
in the probability of an accident. Current shipping activities at
the Harris Nuclear Plant will continue as previously licensed. The
consequences of an accident involving shipping activities [are] not
changed and there is no significant increase in the probability of
an accident.
During rack installation, all work in the pool area will be
controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific written
procedures. Any movement of fuel assemblies which is required to be
performed to support this activity (e.g., installation of racks)
will be performed in the same manner as during normal refueling
operations.
Accordingly, the proposed activity does not involve a
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously
evaluated.
The consequences of the previously postulated scenarios for an
accidental drop of a fuel assembly in the Spent Fuel Pool have been
re-evaluated for the proposed change. The results show that such the
postulated accident of a fuel assembly striking the top of the
storage racks will not distort the racks sufficiently to impair
their functionality. The minimum subcriticality margin,
Keff less than or equal to 0.95, will be maintained. The
structural damage to the Fuel Handling Building, pool liner, and
fuel assembly resulting from a fuel assembly drop striking the pool
floor or another assembly located within the racks is primarily
dependent on the mass of the falling object and the drop height.
Since these two parameters are not changed by the proposed activity
from those considered previously, the structural damage to these
items remains unchanged. The radiological dose at the exclusion area
boundary will not be increased from those previously considered,
since the pertinent fuel parameters remain unchanged. These dose
levels remain ``well within'' the levels required by 10 CFR 100,
paragraph 11, as defined in Section 15.7.4.II.1 of the Standard
Review Plan. Thus, the results of the postulated fuel drop accidents
remain acceptable and do not represent a significant increase in
consequences from any of the same previously evaluated accidents
that have been reviewed and found acceptable by the NRC.
The consequences of a loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling have been
evaluated and found to have no increase. The concern with this
accident is a reduction of Spent Fuel Pool water inventory from bulk
pool boiling resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies. This situation
would lead to fuel failure and subsequent significant increase in
offsite dose. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling at Harris is mitigated
in the usual manner by ensuring that a sufficient time lapse exists
between the loss of forced cooling and uncovering fuel. This period
of time is compared against a reasonable period to re-establish
cooling or supply an alternative water source. Evaluation of this
accident usually includes determination of a time to boil, which in
the case of pools `C' and `D' is in excess of 13 hours based on a
consideration of end of plant life heat loads. This evaluation
neglects any possible cooling from the connection to pools `A' and
`B' through the transfer canal. The 13 hour period is much shorter
than the onset of any significant increase in offsite dose, since
once boiling begins it would have to continue unchecked until the
pool surface was lowered to the point of exposing active fuel. The
time to boil represents the onset of loss of pool water inventory
and is commonly used as a gauge for establishing the comparison of
consequences before and after a refueling project. The heatup rate
in the Spent Fuel Pool is a nearly linear function of the fuel decay
heat load. Subsequent to the proposed changes, the fuel decay heat
load will increase because of the increase in the number assemblies
from those considered from Pools `A' and `B' alone. The methodology
used in the thermal-hydraulic analysis determined the maximum fuel
decay heat loads. In the unlikely event that pool cooling is lost to
pools `C' and `D', sufficient time will still be available for the
operators to provide alternate means of cooling before the onset of
pool boiling. Therefore, the proposed change represents no increase
in the consequences of loss of pool cooling.
The consequences of a design basis seismic event are not
increased. The consequences of this accident are evaluated on the
basis of subsequent fuel damage or compromise of the fuel storage or
building configurations leading to radiological or criticality
concerns. The new racks have been analyzed in their new
configuration and found safe during seismic motion. The fuel stored
in these racks has been determined to remain intact and the racks
maintain the fuel and fixed poison configurations subsequent to a
seismic event. The structural capability of the pool and liner will
not be exceeded under the appropriate combinations of dead weight,
thermal, and seismic loads. The Fuel
[[Page 2239]]
Handling Building structure will remain intact during a seismic
event and will continue to adequately support and protect the fuel
racks, storage array, and pool moderator/coolant. Thus, the
consequences of a seismic event are not increased.
Fuel misloading and mislocation accidents were previously
credible occurrences, since fuel could be placed at an unintended
storage location or could have been lowered outside and adjacent to
a storage rack in Pools `A' or `B'. However, neither of these two
scenarios previously represented any concern because of the flux
trap style of the rack designs in these two pools. Similar
procedures, equipment and methods of fuel movement will be used for
Pools `C' and `D' as those used previously for Pools `A' and `B'.
Therefore, the proposed activity does not represent any increase in
the probability of occurrence. The proposed non-flux trap design
racks for Pools `C' and `D' require administrative controls to
ensure that fuel assemblies meet effective enrichment criteria prior
to storage. Under these conditions, misloading of a fuel assembly by
placement in an unintended storage cell has no significant
consequences. Therefore, the only remaining potential mislocation of
a fuel assembly is for an assembly to be lowered outside of and
directly adjacent to a storage rack. This accident occurring in
Pools `C' or `D' has been analyzed for the worst possible storage
configuration subsequent to the proposed activity and it has been
shown that the consequences remain acceptable with respect to the
same criteria used previously. Thus, there is no increase in
consequences for fuel mislocation or misloading.
Therefore it is concluded that the proposed changes do not
significantly increase the probability or consequences of any
accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any previously analyzed.
To assess the possibility of new or different kind of accidents,
a list of the important parameters required to ensure safe fuel
storage was established. Safe fuel storage is defined here as
providing an environment, which would not present any significant
threats to workers or the general public (i.e., meeting the
requirements of 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20). Any new events, which
would modify these parameters sufficiently to place them outside of
the boundaries analyzed for normal conditions and/or outside of the
boundaries previously considered for accidents would be considered
to create the possibility of a new or different accident. The
criticality and radiological safety evaluations were reviewed to
establish the list of important parameters. The fuel configuration
and the existence of the moderator/coolant were identified as the
only two parameters, which were important to safe fuel storage.
Significant modification of these two parameters represents the only
possibility of an unsafe storage condition. Once the two important
parameters were established, an additional step was taken to
determine what events (which were not previously considered) could
result in changes to the storage configuration or moderator/coolant
presence during or subsequent to the proposed changes.
This process was adopted to ensure that the possibility of any
new or different accident scenario or event would be identified. Due
to the proposed activity, an accidental drop of a rack module during
construction activity in the pool was considered as the only event
which might represent a new or different kind of accident.
A construction accident resulting in a rack drop is an unlikely
event. The proposed activity will utilize the defense-in-depth
approach for these heavy loads. The defense-in-depth approach is
intended to meet the requirements of NUREG-0612 and preclude the
possibility of a rack drop. All movements of heavy loads over the
pool will comply with the applicable administrative controls and
guidelines (i.e. plant procedures, NUREG-0612, etc.). A temporary
hoist and rack lifting rig will be introduced to lift and suspend
the racks from the bridge of the Auxiliary Crane. These items have
been designed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0612 and
ANSI N14.6 and will be similar to those used recently to install
storage rack modules in Pool `B'.
The postulated rack drop event is commonly referred to as a
``heavy load drop'' over the pools. Heavy loads will not be allowed
to travel over any racks containing fuel assemblies. The danger
represented by this event is that the racks will drop to the pool
floor and the pool structure will be compromised leading to loss of
moderator/coolant, which is one of the two important parameters
identified above. Although the analysis of this event has been
performed and shown to be acceptable, the question of a new or
different type of event is answered by determining whether heavy
load drops over the pool have been considered previously. As stated
above, heavy loads (storage rack modules) were recently installed in
Pool `B' using similar methods. Therefore, the rack drop does not
represent a new or different kind of accident.
The proposed change does not alter the operating requirements of
the plant or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the
design basis accidents. The proposed change does not affect any of
the important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage.
Therefore, the potential for a new or previously unanalyzed accident
is not created.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The function of the Spent Fuel Pool is to store the fuel
assemblies in a subcritical and coolable configuration through all
environmental and abnormal loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel
assembly drop. The new rack design must meet all applicable
requirements for safe storage and be functionally compatible with
Pools `C' and `D'.
CP&L has Addressed the Safety Issues Related to the Expanded Pool
Storage Capacity in the Following Areas:
1. Material, mechanical and structural considerations. The
mechanical, material, and structural designs of the new racks have
been reviewed in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
NRC Guidance entitled, ``Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage
and Handling Applications''. The rack materials used are compatible
with the spent fuel assemblies and the Spent Fuel Pool environment.
The design of the new racks preserves the proper margin of safety
during normal and abnormal loads. It has been shown that such loads
will not invalidate the mechanical design and material selection to
safely store fuel in a coolable and subcritical configuration.
2. Nuclear Criticality
The methodology used in the criticality analysis of the expanded
Spent Fuel Pool meets the appropriate NRC guidelines and the ANSI
standards (GDC 62, NUREG 0800, Section 9.1.2, the OT Position for
Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling
Applications, Reg. Guide 1.13, and ANSI/ANS 8.17). The margin of
safety for subcriticality is maintained by having the neutron
multiplication factor equal to, or less than, 0.95 under all
accident conditions, including uncertainties. This criterion is the
same as that used previously to establish criticality safety
evaluation acceptance and remains satisfied for all analyzed
accidents.
3. Thermal-hydraulic and Pool Cooling
The thermal-hydraulic and cooling evaluation of the pools
demonstrated that the pools can be maintained below the specified
thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat load and
during all credible accident sequences and seismic events. The pool
temperature will not exceed 137 deg.F during the highest heat load
conditions. The maximum local water temperature in the hot channel
will remain below the boiling point. The fuel will not undergo any
significant heat up after an accidental drop of a fuel assembly on
top of the rack blocking the flow path. A loss of cooling to the
pool will allow sufficient time (>13 hours) for the operators to
intervene and line up alternate cooling paths and the means of
inventory make-up before the onset of pool boiling. The thermal
limits specified for the evaluations performed to support the
proposed activity are the same as those that were used in the
previous evaluations. It has also been demonstrated that adequate
margin exists in the Unit 1 CCW system to support near term
operation of the pools subject to the requirements of the proposed
changes to the Technical Specifications.
Based on the preceding discussion it is concluded that this
activity does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
[[Page 2240]]
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By February 12, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Cameron Village Regional Library, 1930
Clark Avenue, Raleigh, North Carolina 27605. If a request for a hearing
or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to William D. Johnson, Vice President
and Senior Counsel, Carolina Power & Light Company, Post Office Box
1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
The Commission hereby provides such notice that this is a
proceeding on an application for a license amendment falling within the
scope of section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42
U.S.C. 10154. Under section 134 of the NWPA, the
[[Page 2241]]
Commission, at the request of any party to the proceeding, must use
hybrid hearing procedures with respect to ``any matter which the
Commission determines to be in controversy among the parties.''
The hybrid procedures in section 134 provide for oral argument on
matters in controversy, preceded by discovery under the Commission's
rules and the designation, following argument of only those factual
issues that involve a genuine and substantial dispute, together with
any remaining questions of law, to be resolved in an adjudicatory
hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings are to be held on only those
issues found to meet the criteria of section 134 and set for hearing
after oral argument.
The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are
found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for
Expansion of Spent Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear Power
Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41662 dated October 15, 1985). Under
those rules, any party to the proceeding may invoke the hybrid hearing
procedures by filing with the presiding officer a written request for
oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be timely, the request must be
filed within ten (10) days of an order granting a request for hearing
or petition to intervene. The presiding officer must grant a timely
request for oral argument. The presiding officer may grant an untimely
request for oral argument only upon a showing of good cause by the
requesting party for the failure to file on time and after providing
the other parties an opportunity to respond to the untimely request. If
the presiding officer grants a request for oral argument, any hearing
held on the application must be conducted in accordance with the hybrid
hearing procedures. In essence, those procedures limit the time
available for discovery and require that an oral argument be held to
determine whether any contentions must be resolved in an adjudicatory
hearing. If no party to the proceeding timely requests oral argument,
and if all untimely requests for oral argument are denied, then the
usual procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G apply.
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated December 23, 1998, which is available
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local
public document room located at the Cameron Village Regional Library,
1930 Clark Avenue, Raleigh, North Carolina 27605.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of January 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott Flanders,
Project Manager, Project Directorate II-3, Division of Reactor
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-758 Filed 1-12-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
