00-804. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact  

  • [Federal Register Volume 65, Number 9 (Thursday, January 13, 2000)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 2201-2203]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 00-804]
    
    
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    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    
    [Docket No. 50-346]
    
    
    FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 
    Station, Unit 1, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant 
    Impact
    
        The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
    considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-
    3, issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee), for 
    operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (DBNPS), 
    located in Ottawa County, Ohio.
    
    Environmental Assessment
    
    Identification of the Proposed Action
    
        The proposed action will expand the present spent fuel storage 
    capability by 289 storage locations by allowing the use of spent fuel 
    racks in the cask pit area adjacent to the spent fuel pool (SFP). The 
    cask pit is accessible from the SFP through a gated opening in the wall 
    dividing the two pool areas. The modification will be achieved by two 
    separate activities. In support of the twelfth refueling outage 
    (12RFO), currently scheduled for April 2000, the licensee has installed 
    two rack modules in the cask pit, containing a total of 153 storage 
    locations. Later, during Cycle 13, the licensee plans to install two 
    additional rack modules in the cask pit containing 136 additional 
    storage locations. The licensee's long-term plans include submitting a 
    request for a complete re-racking of the SFP. The four rack modules in 
    the cask pit, which will be used to support shuffling of spent fuel 
    during the re-racking, will be relocated into the SFP. The design of 
    the new high density spent fuel storage racks incorporates Boral as a 
    neutron absorber in the cell walls to allow for more dense storage of 
    spent fuel.
        The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
    application for amendment dated May 21, 1999, as supplemented by 
    submittal dated December 1, 1999.
    
    The Need for the Proposed Action
    
        An increase in spent fuel storage capacity is needed to reestablish 
    full core off-load capability. The licensee currently has insufficient 
    storage capacity in the SFP to fully off-load the reactor core (177 
    fuel assemblies). The current spent fuel storage capacity in the SFP is 
    735 fuel assemblies and there are only 114 empty storage locations 
    available. The licensee needs to conduct a full core off-load in order 
    to perform reactor vessel Inservice Inspection activities during the 
    twelfth refueling outage (12RFO) which is currently scheduled to begin 
    in April 2000. The licensee's long-term plans include submitting a 
    license amendment request to permit a complete re-racking of the SFP 
    with higher density fuel storage racks.
    
    Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
    
    Radioactive Waste Treatment
        DBNPS uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process 
    gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive 
    material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in 
    the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated October 1975. The 
    proposed SFP expansion will not involve any change in the waste 
    treatment systems described in the FES.
    Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
        The storage of additional spent fuel assemblies in the SFP is not 
    expected to affect the release of radioactive gases from the pool. 
    Gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 are produced 
    by the fuel in the core during reactor operation. A small percentage of 
    these fission gases is released to the reactor coolant from the small 
    number of fuel assemblies that are expected to develop leaks during 
    reactor operation. During refueling operations, some of these fission 
    products enter the pool and are subsequently released into the air. 
    Since the frequency of refueling (and therefore the number of freshly 
    off-loaded spent fuel assemblies stored in the SFP at any one time) 
    will not increase, there will be no increase in the amounts of these 
    types of fission products released to the atmosphere as a result of the 
    increased SFP storage capacity.
        The increased heat load on the pool from the storage of additional 
    spent fuel assemblies will potentially result in an increase in the 
    pool's evaporation rate. However, this increased evaporation rate is 
    not expected to result in an increase in the amount of gaseous tritium 
    released from the pool. The overall release of radioactive gases from 
    DBNPS will remain a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR 20.1301.
    Solid Radioactive Wastes
        Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through 
    the pool's purification system. The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup 
    system at DBNPS currently generates
    
    [[Page 2202]]
    
    approximately 50 cubic feet of solid radioactive waste annually. The 
    necessity for pool filtration resin replacement is determined primarily 
    by the need for water clarity, and the resin is normally changed about 
    once every 18 months. The additional number of fuel assemblies in 
    storage is not expected to significantly affect the resin replacement 
    frequency. Therefore, the staff does not expect that the additional 
    fuel storage provided by the new rack modules will result in a 
    significant change in the generation of solid radwaste at DBNPS.
    Liquid Radioactive Waste
        The release of radioactive liquids will not be affected directly as 
    a result of the modifications. The SFP ion exchanger resins remove 
    soluble radioactive materials from the SFP water. When the resins are 
    changed out, the small amount of resin sluice water which is released 
    is processed by the radwaste system. As stated above, the staff does 
    not expect that the additional fuel storage provided by the new rack 
    modules will result in a significant change in the generation of solid 
    radwaste at DBNPS. The volume of SFP water processed for discharge is 
    also not expected to be significantly changed. Therefore, the staff 
    expects that the amount of radioactive liquid released to the 
    environment as a result of the proposed SFP expansion will be 
    negligible.
    Occupational Dose Consideration
        Radiation Protection personnel at DBNPS will constantly monitor the 
    doses to the workers during the SFP expansion operation. Operating 
    experience has shown that area radiation dose rates originate primarily 
    from radionuclides in the pool water. During refueling and other fuel 
    movement operations, pool water concentrations might be expected to 
    increase slightly due to crud deposits spalling from fuel assemblies 
    and due to activities carried into the pool from the primary system. 
    Should dose rates above and around the cask pit perimeter increase, 
    this change would be identified by routine surveillances. Where there 
    is a potential for significant airborne activity, continuous air 
    monitors will be in operation. Personnel will wear protective clothing 
    as required and, if necessary, respiratory protective equipment. If it 
    becomes necessary to utilize divers for the operation, the licensee 
    will equip each diver with appropriate personal dosimetry. The total 
    occupational dose to plant workers as a result of this SFP expansion is 
    estimated to be between 1.85 and 4.0 person-rems. This dose estimate is 
    comparable to doses for SFP re-racking modifications at other nuclear 
    plants. The planned activities will follow detailed procedures prepared 
    with full consideration of ALARA (as low as is reasonably achievable) 
    principles.
        On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the staff 
    concludes that the SFP expansion operation can be performed in a manner 
    that will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained ALARA. The 
    estimated dose of 1.85 to 4.0 person-rem to perform the modification is 
    a small fraction of the annual collective dose accrued at DBNPS.
    Accident Considerations
        In its application, the licensee evaluated the possible 
    consequences of a fuel handling accident to determine the thyroid and 
    whole-body doses at the site's Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population 
    Zone, and in the DBNPS Control Room. The proposed cask pit storage 
    racks will not affect any of the assumptions or inputs used in 
    evaluating the dose consequences of a fuel handling accident and, 
    therefore, will not result in an increase in the doses from a 
    postulated fuel handling accident.
        The licensee proposes to place restrictions on the spent fuel that 
    will be stored in the cask pit racks. The restrictions stipulate that 
    the spent fuel must have been removed from the reactor vessel for at 
    least three years. The length of the decay period was determined by the 
    licensee to address onsite ALARA and thermal-hydraulics considerations. 
    The licensee will establish administrative controls to ensure the three 
    year age limitation will not be violated.
        The staff reviewed the licensee's analysis of a fuel handling 
    accident and performed confirmatory calculations to check the 
    acceptability of the licensee's doses. The staff's calculations 
    confirmed that the offsite doses from a fuel handling accident meet the 
    acceptance criteria and that the licensee's calculations are 
    acceptable. The results of the staff's calculations are presented in 
    the Safety Evaluation to be issued with the license amendment.
        An accidental cask drop into the pool continues to be unlikely as 
    none of the features preventing such a drop (e.g., design and 
    maintenance of the main hoist, the controlled cask movement path, and 
    the hydraulic guide cylinder cask drop protection system) are affected 
    by the proposed action. The licensee also found that the consequences 
    of a loss of SFP cooling were acceptable in that ample time would be 
    available for the operators to reestablish cooling before the onset of 
    pool boiling. Evaluation of a design basis seismic event indicated the 
    new racks would remain safe and impact-free, the structural capability 
    of the pool would not be exceeded, and the reactor building and crane 
    structure would continue to retain necessary safety margins. Thus, 
    these potential accidents have no environmental consequences.
        The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability 
    or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of 
    any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant 
    increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Therefore, there 
    are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with 
    the proposed action.
        With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
    action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect 
    nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. 
    Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental 
    impacts associated with the proposed action.
        Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant 
    environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
    
    Alternatives to the Proposed Action
    
    Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
        Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
    is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
    However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive 
    waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until 
    approximately 2010, at the earliest. In October 1996, the 
    Administration did commit DOE to begin storing waste at a centralized 
    location by January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified 
    and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be identified in 
    advance of a decision on a permanent repository. Therefore, shipping 
    spent fuel to the DOE repository is not considered an alternative to 
    increased onsite spent fuel storage capacity at this time.
    Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
        Reprocessing of spent fuel from DBNPS is not a viable alternative 
    since there are no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the 
    United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be shipped to an 
    overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this approach
    
    [[Page 2203]]
    
    has never been used and it would require approval by the Department of 
    State as well as other entities. Additionally, the cost of spent fuel 
    reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the residual 
    uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost.
    Shipping Fuel to Another Utility or Site or to Another FirstEnergy 
    Facility
        The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring DBNPS fuel 
    to another FirstEnergy facility (i.e., Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 
    1, or Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2) for storage would 
    provide short-term relief from the storage problem at DBNPS. The 
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and 10 CFR Part 53, however, clearly 
    place the responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with 
    each owner or operator of a nuclear plant. The other FirstEnergy spent 
    fuel pools have been designed with capacity to accommodate their own 
    needs and, therefore, transferring spent fuel from DBNPS to another 
    FirstEnergy pool would create fuel storage capacity problems for these 
    other facilities. The shipment of fuel to another site or transferring 
    it to another FirstEnergy facility is not an acceptable alternative 
    because of increased fuel handling risks and additional occupational 
    radiation exposure, as well as the fact that no additional storage 
    capacity would be created.
    Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
        Alternative technologies that would create additional storage 
    capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, and constructing 
    a new pool. Rod consolidation involves disassembling the spent fuel 
    assemblies and storing the fuel rods from two or more assemblies into a 
    stainless steel canister that can be stored in the spent fuel racks. 
    Industry experience with rod consolidation is currently limited, 
    primarily due to concerns for potential gap activity release due to rod 
    breakage, the potential for increased fuel cladding corrosion due to 
    some of the protective oxide layer being scraped off, and because the 
    prolonged consolidation activity could interfere with ongoing plant 
    operations.
        Dry cask storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after 
    storage in the pool for several years, to high capacity casks with 
    passive heat dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored 
    outdoors on a seismically qualified concrete pad. In the early 1990s, 
    the licensee made the decision to reclaim some of the DBNPS SFP storage 
    using a dry fuel storage system. In January 1996, 72 spent fuel 
    assemblies were loaded into three Dry Shielded Canisters and were 
    placed in dry fuel storage utilizing the certified Nutech Horizontal 
    Modular Storage (NUHOMS) system, in accordance with 10 CFR 72.214, 
    Certificate Number 1004. However, changes within the dry spent fuel 
    storage industry have caused cost increases. In addition, the 
    contracted supplier of the NUHOMS system voluntarily stopped 
    fabrication activities and was unable to provide additional storage 
    systems within an acceptable schedule. Further use of this technology 
    was re-evaluated and determined not to be the best choice for future 
    storage expansion at DBNPS. Based upon economics, schedule, and risk 
    management, the licensee concluded that dry cask storage was not a 
    viable alternative at DBNPS.
        The alternative of constructing and licensing a new fuel pool is 
    not practical because such an effort would require about 10 years to 
    complete and would be the most expensive alternative.
        The alternative technologies that could create additional storage 
    capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity 
    for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers 
    effecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures, are 
    significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant 
    improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed re-
    racking modifications.
    Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
        Generally, improved usage of the fuel or operation at a reduced 
    power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of 
    fuel being stored in the pool and thus, increase the amount of time 
    before full core off-load capacity is lost. With extended burnup of 
    fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended and fewer off-loads 
    would be necessary. This is not an alternative for resolving the loss 
    of full core off-load capability that will occur as a result of the 
    DBNPS refueling outage scheduled to begin in April 2000, because the 
    spent fuel to be transferred to the pool for storage has now almost 
    completed its operating history in the core. DBNPS has been operating 
    on the basis of 24-month refueling cycles, with core designs and fuel 
    management schemes optimized accordingly. Operating the plant at a 
    reduced power level would not make effective use of available 
    resources, and would cause unnecessary economic hardship on the 
    licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent 
    fuel generated by increasing burnup further or reducing power is not 
    considered a practical alternative.
    The No-Action Alternative
        As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered 
    denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). 
    Denial of the application would result in no change in current 
    environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action 
    and the alternative action are similar.
    
    Alternative Use of Resources
    
        This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
    previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for DBNPS.
    
    Agencies and Persons Consulted
    
        In accordance with its stated policy, on December 14, 1999, the 
    staff consulted with the Ohio State official, Carol O'Claire, of the 
    Ohio Emergency Management Agency, regarding the environmental impact of 
    the proposed action. The State official had no comments.
    
    Finding of No Significant Impact
    
        On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes 
    that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the 
    quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined 
    not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed 
    action.
        For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
    licensee's letter dated May 21, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated 
    December 1, 1999, which are available for public inspection at the 
    Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, 
    NW., Washington, DC. Publicly available records will be accessible 
    electronically from the ADAMS Public Library component on the NRC Web 
    site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Electronic Reading Room).
    
        Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of January 2000.
    
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Anthony J. Mendiola,
    Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate III, Division of Licensing 
    Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
    [FR Doc. 00-804 Filed 1-12-00; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
01/13/2000
Department:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
00-804
Pages:
2201-2203 (3 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. 50-346
PDF File:
00-804.pdf