96-701. Commonwealth Edison Company (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3); Exemption  

  • [Federal Register Volume 61, Number 14 (Monday, January 22, 1996)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 1648-1649]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 96-701]
    
    
    
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    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    [Docket Nos. 50-237, 50-249]
    
    
    Commonwealth Edison Company (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 
    Nos. 2 and 3); Exemption
    
    I
    
        The Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd, the licensee) is the holder 
    of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25, which authorize 
    operation of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (the 
    facilities). The licenses provide, among other things, that the 
    facilities are subject to all the rules, regulations, and orders of the 
    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in 
    effect.
        The facilities are boiling water reactors located at the licensee's 
    site in Grundy County, Illinois.
    
    II
    
        In 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed 
    Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage,'' 
    paragraph (a), in part, states that ``the licensee shall establish and 
    maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization 
    which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that 
    activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the 
    common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk 
    to the public health and safety.''
        In 10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), it 
    specifies that ``the licensee shall control all points of personnel and 
    vehicle access into a protected area.'' Also, 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) 
    requires that ``A numbered picture badge identification system shall be 
    used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas 
    without escort.'' It further states that individuals not employed by 
    the licensee (e.g., contractors) may be authorized access to protected 
    areas 
    
    [[Page 1649]]
    without escort provided that the individual, ``receives a picture badge 
    upon entrance into a protected area which must be returned upon exit 
    from the protected area * * *.''
        By letter dated November 20, 1995, the licensee requested an 
    exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. The licensee 
    proposes to implement an alternative unescorted access system which 
    would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve picture badges at the 
    entrance/exit location to the protected area and would allow all 
    individuals, including contractors, to keep their picture badges in 
    their possession when departing Dresden Station.
    
    III
    
        Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
    may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
    initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the 
    regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and 
    will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, 
    and are otherwise in the public interest. According to 10 CFR 73.55, 
    the Commission may authorize a licensee to provide alternative measures 
    for protection against radiological sabotage provided the licensee 
    demonstrates that the alternative measures have the same ``high 
    assurance'' objective, that the proposed measures meet the general 
    performance requirements of the regulation, and that the overall level 
    of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage 
    equivalent to that which would be provided by the regulation.
        Currently, unescorted access into the protected area for both 
    employee and contractor personnel into Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3, 
    is controlled through the use of picture badges. Positive 
    identification of personnel who are authorized and request access into 
    the protected area is established by security personnel making a visual 
    comparison of the individual requesting access and that individual's 
    picture badge. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), contractor 
    personnel are not allowed to take their picture badges off site. In 
    addition, in accordance with the plant's physical security plan, the 
    licensee's employees are also not allowed to take their picture badges 
    off site.
        The proposed system will require that all individuals with 
    authorized unescorted access have the physical characteristics of their 
    hand (hand geometry) registered with their picture badge number in a 
    computerized access control system. Therefore, all authorized 
    individuals must not only have their picture badge to gain access to 
    the protected area, but must also have their hand geometry confirmed. 
    All individuals, including contractors, who have authorized unescorted 
    access into the protected area will be allowed to keep their picture 
    badges in their possession when departing the Dresden Station.
        All other access processes, including search function capability 
    and access revocation, will remain the same. A security officer 
    responsible for access control will continue to be positioned within a 
    bullet-resistant structure. It should also be noted that the proposed 
    system is only for individuals with authorized unescorted access and 
    will not be used for those individuals requiring escorts.
        Sandia National Laboratories conducted testing which demonstrated 
    that the hand geometry equipment possesses strong performance 
    characteristics. Details of the testing performed are in the Sandia 
    report, ``A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification 
    Devices,'' SAND91--0276 UC--906 Unlimited Release, June 1991. Based on 
    the Sandia report and the licensee's experience using the current photo 
    picture identification system, the false acceptance rate for the 
    proposed hand geometry system would be at least equivalent to that of 
    the current system. To assure that the proposed system will continue to 
    meet the general performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), the 
    licensee will implement a process for testing the system. The site 
    security plans will also be revised to allow implementation of the hand 
    geometry system and to allow employees and contractors with unescorted 
    access to keep their picture badges in their possession when leaving 
    Dresden Station.
    
    IV
    
        For the foregoing reasons, the NRC staff has determined that the 
    proposed alternative measures for protection against radiological 
    sabotage meet the same high assurance objective and the general 
    performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. In addition, the staff has 
    determined that the overall level of the proposed system's performance 
    will provide protection against radiological sabotage equivalent to 
    that which is provided by the current system in accordance with 10 CFR 
    73.55.
        Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
    73.5, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
    property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
    interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the following 
    exemption:
    
        The requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that individuals who have 
    been granted unescorted access and are not employed by the licensee 
    are to return their picture badges upon exit from the protected area 
    is no longer necessary. Thus, these individuals may keep their 
    picture badges in their possession upon leaving Dresden Nuclear 
    Power Station.
    
        Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
    granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
    environmental impact (61 FR 669).
    
        Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of January 1996.
    
        For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Elinor G. Adensam,
    Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects--III/IV, Office of 
    Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
    [FR Doc. 96-701 Filed 1-19-96; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
    
    

Document Information

Published:
01/22/1996
Department:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
96-701
Pages:
1648-1649 (2 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket Nos. 50-237, 50-249
PDF File:
96-701.pdf