[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 15 (Tuesday, January 23, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1752-1753]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-902]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DOE Response to Recommendation 95-2 of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board Regarding Safety Management
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: Section 315 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
42 U.S.C. 2286d(b) requires the Department of Energy to publish its
response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recommendations for
notice and public comment. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
published Recommendation 95-2 concerning Safety Management in the
Federal Register on October 19, 1995 (60 FR 54065). The Department of
Energy published notice of a request for an additional 45 days to
respond to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 95-2
concerning Safety Management in the Federal Register on December 11,
1995 (60 FR 63514). The Department of Energy (DOE) hereby publishes its
response to Recommendation 95-2 as allowed by the statute cited above.
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the Secretary's
request are due on or before February 22, 1996.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625
Indiana Avenue NW., Suite 700. Washington, D.C. 20004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Peter N. Brush, Principal Deputy,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental, Safety and Health, Department of
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC. 20585.
Issued in Washington, D.C., on January 18, 1996.
Mark B. Whitaker,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board.
The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
January 17, 1996
The Honorable John T. Conway,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20004
Dear Mr. Chairman: On October 11, 1995, the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board issued Recommendation 95-2, Safety
Management, to the Department of Energy. The Department shares the
concerns that prompted the Board to formulate its recommendation.
Like you, we are committed to conducting our work efficiently and in
a manner that ensures protection of workers, the public and the
environment. Over the past three years, we have developed and
implemented a number of systems that are designed to achieve an
acceptable level of safety throughout Departmental operations. These
systems are designed to achieve the following objectives:
--enhance our ability to plan and execute work, identify the hazards
associated with specific operations and activities, and control or
eliminate such hazards in an appropriate and cost-effective manner;
--clarify our expectations for the work to be accomplished and the
level of environment, safety and health protection to be established
and to do so in a manner that is not overly prescriptive but allows
contractors to exercise the best means of meeting these
expectations;
--establish clear roles and responsibilities for protection of
environment, safety and health throughout the Department and our
contractor corps;
--shift the focus of attention from ``paper requirements'' and
documentation to a disciplined, analytical and collaborative focus
on work planning, hazards analysis and hazards control; and
--establish analytical bases for setting risk-based management and
project priorities.
Key among these policy initiatives and programs are directives
reform, the Necessary and Sufficient Closure Process, including the
companion process relating to Standards/Requirements Identification
Documents, and contract reform, including performance-based
contracting.
In developing and implementing these safety systems, we have
recognized that the size and diversity of the Department's
organization and operations do not permit a ``one-size-fits-all''
approach to management. Further, the need for the Department's
Headquarters program managers to be responsible and accountable for
establishing environment, safety and health policies and management
systems must be balanced against the practical imperative to provide
field operations and contractors sufficient flexibility to
accomplish their missions effectively. Finally, in this period of
severely constrained resources, it is critical that management
systems ensure that we are attending to our most significant risks
to environment, safety and health, that resources dedicated to
environment, safety and health are both adequate and appropriate to
the attendant level of risk throughout the complex, and that hazard
control be achieved in a cost-effective manner.
The Department accepts Recommendation 95-2 as follows:
1. The first subpart of Recommendation 95-2 calls for the
Department to institutionalize the process of incorporating into the
planning and execution of every major defense nuclear activity
involving hazardous materials those controls necessary to ensure
that environment, safety and health objectives are achieved. We
accept this Recommendation. While we believe that we have
accomplished a great deal in this regard, we are committed to
further improvements as evidenced by our ongoing safety management
initiatives and recognize the need to further institutionalize the
process of incorporating environment, safety and health
considerations into the planning and execution of all activities at
our facilities.
The task of institutionalizing the process includes
incorporation in work planning of the ``Necessary and Sufficient
Closure Process,'' along with other relevant processes, such as the
process for Standards/Requirements Identification Documents.
2. Subpart 2 calls for the conduct of all operations and
activities within the defense nuclear complex or the former defense
nuclear complex that involve radioactive and other substantially
hazardous materials to be subject to management plans that are
graded according to the risk associated with the activity. We accept
this portion of the Recommendation.
We cannot accept the portion of subpart 2 which calls for
``Safety Management Plans'' to be ``structured on the lines'' of
certain Board Technical Documents. As stated above, we are committed
to the development of effective safety plans which reflect the
diversity of the Department's operations and the need for a flexible
approach to these activities. We stand ready to work closely with
the Board as we refine our approach to subpart 2, but the Department
is not able to accept this part in all of its detail.
3. Subpart 3 calls for the Department to prioritize its
facilities and activities according to their hazard and their
importance to defense and cleanup programs. We accept this portion
of the Recommendation because for both safety and budget formulation
reasons, the Department always will need an effective understanding
of its priorities.
The Department cannot accept the portion of subpart 3 that calls
for the development of priorities ``following the process of Section
I of DNFSB/TECH-6,'' relating to the revised Standards/Requirements
Identification Document process, and Safety Management Plans. To be
useful, any such new list of prioritized facilities and activities
must reflect other current initiatives underway in the Department
and should not be carried out exclusively for the purpose of
focusing the transition from implementation programs related to
Board Recommendations 90-2 and 92-5. Again, the Department stands
ready to
[[Page 1753]]
work with the Board to seek a common understanding of an acceptable
approach to this subpart.
4. Subpart 4 calls for the Department to promulgate requirements
and associated instructions (Orders/Standards) which provide
direction and guidance for the process defined in subpart 1,
including responsibility for carrying it out. It also recommends
that these requirements and associated instructions be made a
contract term. We accept these portions of the Recommendation.
The Department cannot accept that portion of subpart 4 that
would impose as a ``model'' for this process a specific Departmental
Order relating to Operational Readiness Reviews. This ``model,''
which has proven quite effective for start-up and re-start of high
hazard nuclear facilities, may simply prove to be inappropriate for
all activities covered by this subpart.
5. The Department accepts subpart 5 of Recommendation 95-2 and
will continue to take measures to ensure that we have or will
acquire the technical expertise to implement effectively our
integrated safety management process.
The Department's initiatives and programs to improve safety
management are at various stages of maturation, implementation and
institutionalization. We are mindful of our responsibility to keep
the Board apprised of the direction and progress of these
undertakings and are appreciative of the time and attention that
Board Members and staff already have devoted to reviewing and
consulting with Departmental management and staff on several of the
initiatives and programs.
It is our intent to work closely with the Board and any
individuals identified by the Board as the Department prepares its
plan to develop this integrated safety management process. We also
look forward to further discussions with the Board to determine how
we may best accomplish our mutual objectives and responsibilities in
these matters.
Sincerely,
Hazel R. O'Leary
[FR Doc. 96-902 Filed 1-18-96; 4:01 pm]
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