[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 16 (Wednesday, January 25, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4932-4934]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-1813]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455, STN 50-456 and STN 50-457]
Commonwealth Edison Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance
of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos.
NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72 and NPF-77, issued to the Commonwealth Edison
Company (the licensee) for operation of the Byron Station, Units 1 and
2, located in Ogle County, Illinois, and the Braidwood Station, Units 1
and 2, located in Will County, Illinois.
The proposed amendments would revise the Byron Station, Unit 1 and
2, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS)
Section 3/4.7.6 concerning the Control Room Ventilation (VC) System.
These changes are consistent with the revised Standard Technical
Specifications for Westinghouse Plants. Specifically, the allowed
outage time for one train of the system would be changed from 7 to 30
days, if the train was declared inoperable only due to an inoperable
chiller unit. An alternative action would also be added to TS 3.7.6.a,
requiring the cessation of all core alterations, reactivity, additions,
and spent fuel movement if one train of the system is inoperable during
refueling operations. By letter dated July 19, 1994, the licensee
responded to the Commission staff's comments and proposed to revise TS
3/4.7.6 by adding a surveillance requirement to demonstrate the control
room ventilation heat load removal capability every 18 months.
Revisions to associated Bases and minor editorial changes would also be
made for the purpose of updating and clarifying the TS.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
A. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The first proposed change will increase the allowed outage time
(AOT) for a VC chiller from seven days to thirty days in Modes 1
through 4. The thirty day AOT is based on the low probability of an
event requiring control room isolation concurrent with failure of
the redundant train of VC. Therefore, one train of VC will always be
available to remove normal and accident heat loads and provide
control room isolation. Consequently, this change will not result in
an increase to offsite dose rates or the exposure of control room
operators.
Increasing the AOT will allow for more extensive maintenance and
should increase overall availability of the VC chillers. This
provides additional assurance that a chiller will be operable on at
least one train of VC. In the unlikely event that both VC chillers
became inoperable, alternate non-safety related means to maintain
control room temperature are available. Based on the above, the
proposed increase to the AOT will not increase the probability or
consequences of any previously analyzed accident.
The proposed change to the Action a for Modes 5 and 6 adds an
alternative to placing the remaining operable VC train in the makeup
mode. The alternative would allow the option to suspend CORE
ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, and movement of irradiated
fuel. In Modes 5 and 6, this greatly reduces the probability of an
event that would require control room isolation. The change will
have no impact on the consequences of an accident since the
remaining train of VC would be capable of isolating the control room
on a high radiation signal and providing the necessary temperature
control. Based on this review, the proposed Action will not result
in an increase in the probability or consequences of a previously
analyzed accident.
As noted above, the proposed amendment adds a restriction to
suspend movement of irradiated fuel. This change reduces the
probability of the occurrence of a fuel handling accident and has no
impact on the consequences of any accident. In addition, the wording
in Action b was revised to be consistent with the wording in Action
a. This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has no impact on
the probability or consequences of an accident.
The proposed changes to Section 3/4.7.6 are requested to ensure
that surveillances are performed to verify that the Control Room
Ventilation System remains capable of performing its design
function. Operability of the Control Room Chillers ensures that the
ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature
for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation
cooled by the Control Room Ventilation System. The ability of the
Control Room Ventilation System to limit the radiation exposure to
personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or
its equivalent, is not affected by the addition of this surveillance
requirement. The proposed changes do not affect any accident
initiators or precursors and do not change or alter the design
assumptions for the systems or components used to mitigate the
consequences of an accident. Consequently, the changes do not impact
any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve an increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
B. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The first proposed change will increase the AOT for a VC chiller
from seven days to thirty days in Modes 1 through 4. During the time
one chiller is inoperable, the redundant train is capable of
handling the heat loads during normal operation and during all
accident scenarios. No new operating conditions are created by this
change. Therefore, this change will not result in any new or
different accident from those previously analyzed.
The proposed change to the Action for Modes 5 and 6 adds an
alternative to allow the option to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS,
positive reactivity changes, and movement of irradiated fuel. In
Modes 5 and 6, this greatly reduces the probability of an event that
would require control room isolation. Also, the remaining train of
VC would still be [[Page 4933]] capable of temperature control and
isolating the control room on a high radiation signal. This change
will not create any new plant operating conditions. Based on this
review, the proposed Action will not result in a new or different
kind of accident.
The additional restriction on the movement of irradiated fuel in
Modes 5 and 6 will not create any new condition which has not been
previously analyzed. In addition, for consistency with the wording
in Action a, the word ``changes'' was replaced by the word
``additions.'' This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has
no potential to create a new kind of accident.
The proposed changes to add a surveillance requirement to
Section 3/4.7.6 do not affect the design or operation of any system,
structure, or component in the plant. There are no changes to
parameters governing plant operation; no new or different type of
equipment will be installed. The proposed changes ensure that
equipment remains capable of performing its design function.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different type of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The basis for the VC Technical Specification to ensure that the
temperature in the control room does not exceed maximum allowable
for the equipment and instrumentation inside. The VC system is also
required to limit radiation exposure to control room personnel
following an accident. Either of the two redundant trains can
perform both of these functions. As long as one train of VC is
available, the margin of safety assumed in the bases for this
specification is maintained.
Increasing the AOT for one VC chiller unit has no impact on the
redundant train of VC. Although one train of VC may be inoperable
for a longer period of time, the redundant train can perform all
normal and accident functions. The length of the AOT is sufficiently
short to assure that a scenario involving an accident requiring
control room isolation concurrent with the failure of the redundant
train is not credible. Therefore, one train of VC will remain
available and no reduction is made to the margin of safety.
The second change involves adding an alternative Action in Modes
5 and 6 that would restrict CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity
additions, and movement of irradiated fuel. The existing Action
requires that the operable train of VC be placed in the makeup mode
of operation. This Action ensures that any failures are readily
detected. The alternate Action reduces the potential of an event
that would require control room isolation while maintaining one
train of VC operable. In both cases, the Actions assure that one
train of VC is available for normal and emergency use. Therefore,
the proposed change maintains the margin of safety.
Another proposed change involves the condition with no VC trains
operable in Modes 5 and 6. Since VC is not available, alternative
means must be used to maintain control room temperature. Since the
primary alternative involves utilization of outside air, the most
appropriate action is to reduce the probability of an event that
would require control room isolation. The proposed additional
restriction on the movement of irradiated fuel provides added
assurance that such an event will not occur. Therefore, the margin
of safety is maintained. Also, for consistency with the wording in
Action a, the word ``changes'' was replaced by the word
``additions.'' This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has
no impact on the margin of safety.
The final proposed change to add a surveillance requirement does
not affect the margin of safety for any Technical Specification. The
initial conditions and methodologies used in the accident analyses
remain unchanged, therefore, accident analysis results are not
impacted. The addition of a Technical Specification surveillance
provides further assurance that the Control Room Ventilation System
is operable and capable of maintaining the ambient air temperature
below the allowable temperature for the continuous duty rating of
the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system. These
changes also provides consistency with Standard Technical
Specifications.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a reduction in
the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications
Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be
delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By February 24, 1995, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document rooms located at the Byron Public Library, 109 N. Franklin,
P.O. Box 434, Byron, Illinois 61010 for the Byron Station; for
Braidwood, the Wilmington Township Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee
Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481. If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the [[Page 4934]] nature
and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest
in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may
be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contention shall be limited to matters within the
scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one
which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner
who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements
with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to
participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services
Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room,
the Gelman Building, 2120 L street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above
date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice
period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the
Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800)
248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator
should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the following
message addressed to Robert A. Capra: petitioner's name and telephone
number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication date and
page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition
should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to Michael I. Miller,
Esquire; Sidley and Austin, One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
60690, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendments dated August 31, 1993, as supplemented July
19, 1994, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's
Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,
Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the
Bryon Public Library, 109 N. Franklin, P.O. Box 434, Byron, Illinois
61010 for the Byron Station; for Braidwood, the Wilmington Township
Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of January 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ramin R. Assa,
Project Manager, Project Directorate III-2, Division of Reactor
Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-1813 Filed 1-24-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
