[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 19 (Friday, January 28, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page ]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-1922]
[Federal Register: January 28, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Social Security Administration
Social Security Ruling SSR 94-3c; Timely Filing for Attorney Fees
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act
AGENCY: Social Security Administration, HHS.
ACTION: Notice of Social Security Ruling.
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SUMMARY: In accordance with 20 CFR 422.406(b)(1), the Commissioner of
Social Security gives notice of Social Security Ruling 94-3c. This
Ruling, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Shalala v. Schaefer,
________ U.S. ________, 113 S.Ct. 2625 (1993), concerns the time period
for filing for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA). Specifically, the issue before the Court was whether the 30-day
period for filing a petition for EAJA fees begins immediately upon
expiration of the time for appeal of a remand order issued by a court
under sentence four of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, or
after the administrative proceedings on remand are complete.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 28, 1994.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joanne K. Castello, Office of
Regulations, Social Security Administration, 6401 Security Boulevard,
Baltimore, MD 21235, (410) 965-1711.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although we are not required to do so
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (a)(1) and (a)(2), we are publishing this
Social Security Ruling in accordance with 20 CFR 422.406(b)(1).
Social Security Rulings make available to the public precedential
decisions relating to the Federal old-age, survivors, disability,
supplemental security income, and black lung benefits programs. Social
Security Rulings may be based on case decisions made at all
administrative levels of adjudication, Federal court decisions,
Commissioner's decisions, opinions of the Office of the General
Counsel, and other policy interpretations of the law and regulations.
Although Social Security Rulings do not have the force and effect
of the law or regulations, they are binding on all components of the
Social Security Administration, in accordance with 20 CFR
422.406(b)(1), and are to be relied upon as precedents in adjudicating
other cases.
If this Social Security Ruling is later superseded, modified, or
rescinded, we will publish a notice in the Federal Register to that
effect.
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Programs Nos. 93.802 Social
Security--Disability Insurance; 93.803 Social Security--Retirement
Insurance; 93.805 Social Security--Survivors Insurance; 93.806
Special Benefits for Disabled Coal Miners; 93.807 Supplemental
Security Income.)
Dated: January 11, 1994.
Shirley S. Chater,
Commissioner of Social Security.
Sections 205(g) and 223 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(g)
and 423) Timely Filing for Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access to
Justice Act
Shalala v. Schaefer, ________ U.S. ________, 113 S.Ct. 2625 (1993)
This Ruling concerns whether the 30-day period for filing an
application for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA) begins immediately upon expiration of the time for appeal
of a remand order issued by a court under sentence four of section
205(g) of the Social Security Act (the Act), or after the
administrative proceedings on remand are complete. Sentence four
states, ``[t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings
and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding
the cause for a rehearing.''
The claimant filed for and was denied title II disability
benefits. The claimant sought review in district court under section
205(g) of the Act. Reversing the Secretary, the district court held
that the Secretary had erred in her decision on this case and
remanded the case under sentence four of section 205(g) of the Act
to the Secretary for further consideration. The Secretary
subsequently awarded benefits.
More than a year later, the claimant filed a petition for
attorney's fees under the EAJA. The Secretary, in response, noted
that the claimant was required to file the petition for EAJA fees
``within 30 days of final judgment in the action'' pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), and argued that the ``final judgment'' in this
case was the administrative decision on remand.
The district court relied on Welter v. Sullivan in which the
eighth circuit held that the district court did not intend to enter
final judgment when it remanded the plaintiffs' cases under sentence
four. When the Secretary appealed Schaefer to the circuit court, the
court declined the Secretary's suggestion for en banc
reconsideration of Welter.
The circuit court affirmed the district court's award of EAJA
fees to the claimant. On review by the Supreme Court, the Secretary
argued that, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Sullivan
v. Finkelstein and Melkonyan v. Sullivan, a district court cannot
retain jurisdiction of a case after a remand under sentence four of
section 205(g) of the Act. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the
circuit court's decision to award EAJA fees, it rejected its
analysis. The Court held that, under the clear language of section
205(g) of the Act, a district court may not retain jurisdiction
after a sentence four remand. The Court found that a sentence four
remand is an appealable final judgment of the district court that
terminates the action and makes a plaintiff a ``prevailing party''
for the purposes of the EAJA. The Court clarified dicta in Sullivan
v. Hudson, emphasizing that a sentence four remand (as opposed to a
remand under sentence six of section 205(g), in which the court
retains jurisdiction of the case) confers prevailing party status on
the plaintiff.
The Court also clarified that, in a sentence four remand, the
time period in which an EAJA petition must be filed begins at the
conclusion of the appeal period following the district court's entry
of a judgment. However, in this case, the Court found that, because
the district court failed to enter a judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, neither the appeal period nor
the EAJA 30-day filing period had lapsed.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeals.
SCALIA, Supreme Court Justice
This case concerns the proper timing of an application for
attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) in a
Social Security case. Under 42 U.S.C. 405(g), a claimant has the right
to seek judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services denying Social Security benefits. One possible
outcome of such a suit is that the district court, pursuant to sentence
four of section 405(g), will enter ``a judgment * * * reversing the
decision of the Secretary * * * (and) remanding the cause for a
rehearing.'' The issue here is whether the 30-day period for filing an
application for EAJA fees begins immediately upon expiration of the
time for appeal of such a ``sentence-four remand order,'' or sometime
after the administrative proceedings on remand are complete.
In 1986, respondent Richard Schaefer filed an application for
disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat.
622, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. III). He was
denied benefits at the administrative level, and sought judicial review
by filing suit against the Secretary as authorized by section 405(g).
Schaefer and the Secretary filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On
April 4, 1989, the District Court held that the Secretary had committed
three errors in ruling on Schaefer's case and entered an order stating
that ``the Secretary's decision denying disability insurance benefits
to [Schaefer] is reversed, that the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment are denied, and that the case is remanded to the Secretary for
further consideration in light of this Order.'' App. to Pet. for Cert.
27a.
In accordance with this order, Schaefer's application for benefits
was reconsidered at the administrative level, and was granted. On July
18, 1990, Schaefer returned to the District Court and filed an
application for attorney's fees pursuant to EAJA. In response, the
Secretary noted that Schaefer was required to file any application for
EAJA fees ``within thirty days of final judgment in the action,'' 28
U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), and argued that the relevant ``final judgment''
in the case was the administrative decision on remand, which had become
final on April 2, 1990. The District Court stayed action on Schaefer's
EAJA application pending this Court's imminent ruling in Melkonyan v.
Sullivan, 501 U.S. ________, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991).
Melkonyan was announced shortly thereafter, holding that a final
administrative decision could not constitute a ``final judgment'' for
purposes of section 2412(d)(1)(B). Id., at ________, 111 S.Ct., at
2162. In light of Melkonyan, the Secretary changed positions to argue
that EAJA's 30-day clock began running when the District Court's April
4, 1989 order (not the administrative ruling on remand) became final,
which would have occurred at the end of the 60 days for appeal provided
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Thus, the Secretary
concluded, Schaefer's time to file his EAJA application expired on July
3, 1989, over a year before the application was filed. The District
Court, however, found Schaefer's EAJA application timely under the
controlling circuit precedent of Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 674 (CA8
1991), which held that a sentence-four remand order is not a final
judgment where ``the district court retain[s] jurisdiction * * * and
plan[s] to enter dispositive sentence four judgmen[t]'' after the
administrative proceedings on remand are complete. Id., at 675. The
District Court went on to rule that Schaefer was entitled to $1,372.50
in attorney's fees.
The Secretary fared no better on appeal. The Eighth Circuit
declined the Secretary's suggestion for en banc reconsideration of
Welter, and affirmed the District Court in an unpublished per curiam
opinion. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari, urging us to
reverse the Court of Appeals summarily. We granted certiorari, 506 U.S.
______, 113 S.Ct. 594, 121 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992), and set the case for
oral argument.
II
The first sentence of 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B) provides:
``A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall,
within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the
court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that
the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized
statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or
appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended
and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.''
(Emphasis added.)
In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, we held that the term ``final judgment''
in the highlighted phrase above ``refers to judgments entered by a
court of law, and does not encompass decisions rendered by an
administrative agency.'' See 501 U.S., at ______, 111 S.Ct., at 2162.
Thus, the only order in this case that could have resulted in the
starting of EAJA's 30-day clock was the District Court's April 4, 1989
order, which reversed the Secretary's decision denying disability
benefits and remanded the case to the Secretary for further
proceedings.
In cases reviewing final agency decisions on Social Security
benefits, the exclusive methods by which district courts may remand to
the Secretary are set forth in sentence four and sentence six of
section 405(g), which are set forth in the margin.1 See Melkonyan,
supra, at ______-______, 111 S.Ct., at 2163-2164. Schaefer correctly
concedes that the District Court's remand order in this case was
entered pursuant to sentence four.2 He argues, however, that a
district court proceeding under that provision need not enter a
judgment at the time of remand, but may postpone it and retain
jurisdiction pending completion of the administrative proceedings. That
argument, however, is inconsistent with the plain language of sentence
four, which authorizes a district court to enter a judgment ``with or
without'' a remand order, not a remand order ``with or without'' a
judgment.
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\1\Sentences four and six of section 405(g) provide:
``[4] The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing * * *. [6] The court
may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he
files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further
action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional
evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing
that there is now evidence which is material and that there is good
cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record
in a prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is
remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered,
modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and
shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings
of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and
testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was
based.''
\2\Sentence-six remands may be ordered in only two situations:
where the Secretary requests a remand before answering the
complaint, or where new, material evidence is adduced that was for
good cause not presented before the agency. See section 405(g)
(sentence six); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. ______, ______, and
n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 2163-2164, and n. 2, (1991); cf. Sullivan v.
Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 110 L.Ed.2d
563 (1990). The District Court's April 4, 1989 remand order clearly
does not fit within either situation.
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See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 629, 110 S. Ct. 2658,
2666, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990). Immediate entry of judgment (as opposed
to entry of judgment after postremand agency proceedings have been
completed and their results filed with the court) is in fact the
principal feature that distinguishes a sentence-four remand from a
sentence-six remand. See Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at ______-______, 111
S.Ct., at 2164-2165.
Nor is it possible to argue that the judgment authorized by
sentence four, if it includes a remand, does not become a ``final
judgment''--as required by section 2412(d)--upon expiration of the time
for appeal. If that were true, there would never be any final judgment
in cases reversed and remanded for further agency proceedings
(including those which suffer that fate after the Secretary has filed
the results of a sentence-six remand). Sentence eight of section 405(g)
states that ``(t)he judgment of the court''--which must be a reference
to a sentence-four judgment, since that is the only judgment authorized
by section 405(g)--``shall be final except that it shall be subject to
review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions.'' Thus,
when the time for seeking appellate review has run, the sentence-four
judgment fits squarely within the term ``final judgment'' as used in
section 2412(d), which is defined to mean ``a judgment that is final
and not appealable.'' 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(G). We described the law
with complete accuracy in Melkonyan, when we said:
In sentence four cases, the filing period begins after the final
judgment (``affirming, modifying, or reversing'') is entered by the
court and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no
longer appealable * * *. In sentence six cases, the filing period
does not begin until after the postremand proceedings are completed,
the Secretary returns to court, the court enters a final judgment,
and the appeal period runs. 501 U.S. at ______, 111 S.Ct., at 2165.
Schaefer raises two arguments that merit further discussion. The
first is based on our decision in Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877,
892, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 2257, 104 L.Ed.2d 941, (1989), which held that
fees incurred during administrative proceedings held pursuant to a
district court's remand order could be recovered under EAJA. In order
``to effectuate Hudson,'' Schaefer contends, a district court entering
a sentence-four remand order may properly hold its judgment in abeyance
(and thereby delay the start of EAJA's 30-day clock) until postremand
administrative proceedings are complete; otherwise, as far as fees
incurred during the yet-to-be-held administrative proceedings are
concerned, the claimant would be unable to comply with the requirement
of section 2412(d)(1)(B) that the fee application include ``the amount
sought'' and ``an itemized statement * * * [of] the actual time
expended'' by attorneys and experts. In response, the Secretary argues
that Hudson applies only to cases remanded pursuant to sentence six of
section 405(g), where there is no final judgment and the clock does not
begin to run. The difficulty with that, Schaefer contends, is that
Hudson itself clearly involved a sentence-four remand.
On the last point, Schaefer is right. Given the facts recited by
the Court in Hudson, the remand order there could have been authorized
only under sentence four. See 490 U.S., at 880-881, 109 S.Ct.,at 2252;
cf. n. 2, supra. However, the facts in Hudson also show that the
District Court had not terminated the case, but had retained
jurisdiction during the remand. And that was a central element in our
decision, as the penultimate sentence of the opinion shows:
We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary
in a benefits litigation and retains continuing jurisdiction over
the case pending a decision from the Secretary which will determine
the claimant's entitlement to benefits, the proceedings on remand
are an integral part of the ``civil action'' for judicial review,
and thus attorney's fees for representation on remand are available
subject to the other limitations in the EAJA. 490 U.S., at 892, 109
S.Ct., at 2258 (emphasis added).
We have since made clear, in Finkelstein, that that retention of
jurisdiction, that failure to terminate the case, was error: Under
section 405(g), ``each final decision of the Secretary [is] reviewable
by a separate piece of litigation,'' and a sentence-four remand order
``terminate[s] the civil action'' seeking judicial review of the
Secretary's final decision. 496 U.S., at 624-625, 110 S.Ct., at 2663
(emphases added). What we adjudicated in Hudson, in other words, was a
hybrid: a sentence-four remand that the District Court had improperly
(but without objection) treated like a sentence-six remand.3 We
specifically noted in Melkonyan that Hudson was limited to a ``narrow
class of qualifying administrative proceedings'' where ``the district
court retains jurisdiction of the civil action'' pending the completion
of the administrative proceedings. 501 U.S. at ______, 111 S.Ct., at
2162. We therefore do not consider the holding of Hudson binding as to
sentence-four remands that are ordered (as they should be) without
retention of jurisdiction, or that are ordered with retention of
jurisdiction that is challenged.4
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\3\ The Secretary not only failed to object to the District
Court's retention of jurisdiction, but affirmatively endorsed the
practice as a means of accommodating the lower court cases holding
that a section 405(g) plaintiff does not become a prevailing party
until Social Security benefits are actually awarded. Reply Brief for
Petitioner in Sullivan v. Hudson, O.T. 1988, No. 616, pp. 12-13.
Those precedents were highly favorable to the Government, of course,
because they relieved the Secretary of liability for EAJA fees in
all cases where Social Security benefits were ultimately denied. But
they were also at war with the view--expressed later in the
Secretary's Hudson reply brief--that a sentence-four remand order is
a ``final judgment'' in the civil action. Id., at 16. Essentially,
the Secretary in Hudson wanted it both ways: He wanted us to regard
retention of jurisdiction as proper for purposes of determining
prevailing-party status, but as improper for purposes of awarding
fees on remand.
\4\Justice STEVENS says that our holding ``overrul[es]''
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 104 L.Ed.2d 941,
(1989). Post, at 2633, 2636. We do not think that is an accurate
characterization. Hudson remains good law as applied to remands
ordered pursuant to sentence six. And since the distinction between
sentence-four and sentence-six remands was neither properly
presented nor considered in Hudson, see supra, at 2630 and n. 3, and
infra, at 2631, limiting Hudson to sentence-six cases does not
``overrule'' the decision even in part. See Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. ______, ______, 113 S.Ct., 1710, 1718, 123 L.Ed.2d 353
(1993). We agree with Justice STEVENS that until today there has
been some contradiction in our case law on this subject. In
resolving it, however, we have not simply chosen Melkonyan's dicta
over Hudson, but have grounded our decision in the text and
structure of the relevant statutes, particularly section 405.
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Schaefer's second argument is that a sentence-four remand order
cannot be considered a ``final judgment'' for purposes of section
2412(d)(1)(B) because that provision requires the party seeking fees to
submit an application ``show[ing] that [he] is a prevailing party.''
That showing, Schaefer contends, cannot be made until the proceedings
on remand are complete, since a Social Security claimant does not
``prevail'' until he is awarded Social Security benefits. The premise
of this argument is wrong. No holding of this Court has ever denied
prevailing-party status (under section 2412(d)(1)(B)) to a plaintiff
who won a remand order pursuant to sentence four of section 405(g).
Dicta in Hudson stated that ``a Social Security claimant would not, as
a general matter, be a prevailing party within the meaning of the EAJA
merely because a court had remanded the action to the agency for
further proceedings.'' 490 U.S., at 887, 109 S.Ct., at 2255. But that
statement (like the holding of the case) simply failed to recognize the
distinction between a sentence-four remand, which terminates the
litigation with victory for the plaintiff, and a sentence-six remand,
which does not. The sharp distinction between the two types of remand
had not been made in the lower-court opinions in Hudson, see Hudson v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 1453 (CA11 1988); App.
to Pet. for Cert. in Sullivan v. Hudson, O.T.1988, No. 616, pp. 17a-20a
(setting forth unpublished District Court opinion), was not included in
the question presented for decision,5 and was mentioned for the
first time in the closing pages of the Secretary's reply brief, see
Reply Brief for Petitioner in Sullivan v. Hudson, O.T.1988, No. 616,
pp. 14-17. It is only decisions after Hudson--specifically Finkelstein
and Melkonyan--which establish that the sentence-four, sentence-six
distinction is crucial to the structure of judicial review established
under section 405(g). See Finkelstein, 496 U.S., at 626, 110 S.Ct., at
2664; Melkonyan, 501 U.S., at ______-______, 111 S.Ct., at 2162-2163.
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\5\As formulated in the Secretary's petition, the question on
which the Court granted certiorari in Hudson was: ``Whether Social
Security administrative proceedings conducted after a remand from
the courts are `adversary adjudications' for which attorney fees are
available under the [EAJA].'' Pet. for Cert. in Sullivan v. Hudson,
O.T.1988, No. 616, p. I.
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Hudson's dicta that remand does not generally confer prevailing-
party status relied on three cases, none of which supports that
proposition as applied to sentence-four remands. Hanrahan v. Hampton,
446 U.S. 754, 758-759, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1990, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980),
rejected an assertion of prevailing-party status, not by virtue of
having secured a remand, but by virtue of having obtained a favorable
procedural ruling (the reversal on appeal of a directed verdict) during
the course of the judicial proceedings. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,
107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987), held that a plaintiff does not
become a prevailing party merely by obtaining ``a favorable judicial
statement of law in the course of litigation that results in judgment
against the plaintiff,'' id., at 763, 107 S.Ct., at 2677 (emphasis
added). (A sentence-four remand, of course, is a judgment for the
plaintiff.) And the third case cited in Hudson, Texas Teachers Assn. v.
Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103
L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), affirmatively supports the proposition that a party
who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing party. Garland
held that status to have been obtained ``[i]f the plaintiff has
succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some
of the benefit * * * sought in bringing suit.'' Id., at 791-792, 109
S.Ct., at 1493 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Obtaining a sentence-four judgment reversing the Secretary's denial of
benefits certainly meets this description. See also Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. ______, 113 S.Ct., 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).
III
Finally, Schaefer argues that, even if the District Court should
have entered judgment in connection with its April 4, 1989 order
remanding the case to the Secretary, the fact remains that it did not.
And since no judgment was entered, he contends, the 30-day time period
for filing an application for EAJA fees cannot have run. We agree.
An EAJA application may be filed until 30 days after a judgment
becomes ``not appealable''--i.e., 30 days after the time for appeal has
ended. See section 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G); see also Melkonyan, 501
U.S., at ______, 111 S.Ct., at 2165. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure establishes that, in a civil case to which a
federal officer is a party, the time for appeal does not end until 60
days after ``entry of judgment,'' and that a judgment is considered
entered for purposes of the rule only if it has been ``entered in
compliance with Rul[e] 58 * * * of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.'' Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(a)(1), (7). Rule 58, in turn,
requires a district court to set forth every judgment ``on a separate
document'' and provides that ``[a] judgment is effective only when so
set forth.'' See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 220, 93
S.Ct. 1562, 1564, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam).
Since the District Court's April 4 remand order was a final
judgment, see ante, at 2630, a ``separate document'' of judgment should
have been entered. It is clear from the record that this was not done.
The Secretary does not dispute that, but argues that a formal
``separate document'' of judgment is not needed for an order of a
district court to become appealable. That is quite true, see 28 U.S.C.
1291; Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55
L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (per curiam); Finkelstein, supra, 496 U.S. at 628,
n. 7, 110 S.Ct., at 2665, n. 7, but also quite irrelevant. EAJA's 30-
day time limit runs from the end of the period for appeal, not the
beginning. Absent a formal judgment, the District Court's April 4 order
remained ``appealable'' at the time that Schaefer filed his application
for EAJA fees, and thus the application was timely under section
2412(d)(1).6
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\6\We disagree with Justice STEVENS' assertion that ``the
respondent has prevailed precisely because the District Court in
this case did enter a remand order without entering a judgment.''
Post, at 2633, n. 2 (emphasis in original). By entering a sentence-
four remand order, the District Court did enter a judgment; it just
failed to comply with the formalities of Rule 58 in doing so. That
was error but, as detailed in the text, the relevant rules and
statutes impose the burden of that error on the party seeking to
assert an untimeliness defense, here the Secretary. Thus, contrary
to Justice STEVENS' suggestion, see post, at 2633, n. 2, our ruling
in favor of respondent is not at all inconsistent with the
proposition that sentence four and sentence six provide the
exclusive methods by which district courts may remand a section 405
case to the Secretary.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which Justice Blackmun joined.
[FR Doc. 94-1922 Filed 1-27-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4190-29-P
