[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 19 (Wednesday, January 29, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4360-4365]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-2162]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-255 and 72-7]
Consumers Power Co., Palisades Nuclear Plant, License Nos. DPR-
20; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision concerning a
Petition dated September 19, 1995, as amended on September 30, 1996,
filed by Don't Waste Michigan and Lake Michigan Federation
(Petitioners) under Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). The Petition requested that the NRC (1)
find that Consumers Power Company (licensee) violated NRC requirements
related to unloading procedures for dry storage casks for spent nuclear
fuel, (2) suspend the licensee's use of the general license provisions
related to dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel, (3) require a
substantial penalty be paid by the licensee, and (4) conduct hearings
related to unloading procedures for dry storage casks at Palisades.
The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
determined that Petition should be granted in part and denied in part
for the reasons stated in the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR
2.206'' (DD-97-01), the complete text of which follows this notice. The
decision and documents cited in the decision are available for public
inspection and copying in the Commission's Public Document Room, the
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the local
public document room located in the Van Wylen Library at Hope College
in Holland, Michigan.
A copy of this decision has been filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c). As provided therein, this decision will become the final
action of the Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission,
on its own motion, institutes review of the decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, MD., this 23d day of January 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
On September 19, 1995, the organizations Don't Waste Michigan and
Lake Michigan Federation (Petitioners) filed a Petition pursuant to
Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR
2.206) requesting that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (1)
find that Consumers Power Company (licensee) violated NRC requirements
related to unloading procedures for dry storage casks for spent nuclear
fuel, (2) suspend the licensee's use of the general license provisions
related to dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel, (3) require a
substantial penalty be paid by the licensee, and (4) conduct hearings
related to unloading procedures for dry storage casks at Palisades.
On September 30, 1996, the Petitioners amended the Petition by
including additional information in support of their position that the
licensee did not have a workable unloading procedure before loading the
13 dry storage casks currently in the Palisades independent spent fuel
storage installation (ISFSI).
The Petition has been referred to me pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. The
NRC letter dated October 24, 1995, to Dr. Sinclair and Mr. Skavroneck,
on behalf of the Petitioners, acknowledged receipt of the Petition.
Notice of receipt was published in the Federal Register on October 31,
1995 (60 FR 55388).
On the basis of the NRC staff's evaluation of the issues and for
the reasons given below, the Petitioners' requests are granted in part
and denied in part.
II. Background
NRC regulations contain a general license that authorizes nuclear
power plants licensed by the NRC, such as Palisades, to store spent
nuclear fuel at the reactor site in storage casks approved by the NRC.
(See 10 CFR part 72, subpart K.) In regard to dry cask storage of spent
nuclear fuel at Palisades, the licensee opted to use the VSC-24 Cask
Storage System designed by Sierra Nuclear Corporation. The VSC-24 Cask
Storage System was added to the list of NRC certified casks in May 1993
(58 FR 17948). The associated certificate of compliance, Certificate
Number 1007, specifies the conditions for use of VSC-24 casks under the
general license provisions of 10 CFR part 72. Section 1.1.2,
``Operating Procedures,'' in the certificate of compliance for the VSC-
24 casks, requires that licensees prepare an operating procedure
related to cask unloading. Specifically, the condition states
Written operating procedures shall be prepared for cask
handling, loading, movement, surveillance, and maintenance. The
operating procedures suggested generically in the SAR (safety
analysis report) are considered appropriate, as discussed in Section
11.0 of the SER (safety evaluation report), and should provide the
basis for the user's written operating procedures. The following
additional written procedures shall also be developed as part of the
user operating procedures:
1. A procedure shall be developed for cask unloading, assuming
damaged fuel. If fuel needs to be removed from the multi-assembly
sealed basket (MSB), either at the end of service life or for
inspection after an accident, precautions must be taken against the
potential for the presence of oxidized fuel and to prevent
radiological exposure to personnel during this operation. This
activity can be achieved by the use of the Swagelok valves, which
permit a determination of the atmosphere within the MSB before the
removal of the structural and shield lids. If the atmosphere within
the MSB is helium, then operations should proceed normally, with
fuel removal, either via the transfer cask or in the pool. However,
if air is present within the MSB, then appropriate filters should be
in place to permit the flushing of any potential airborne
radioactive particulate from the MSB, via the Swagelok valves. This
action will protect both personnel and the operations area from
potential contamination. For the accident case, personnel protection
in the form of respirators or supplied air should be
[[Page 4361]]
considered in accordance with the licensee's Radiation Protection
Program.
The licensee for Palisades began loading casks in May 1993 after
implementing pertinent certificate conditions, including those in
Section 1.1.2.
In July 1994, the licensee discovered radiographic indications of
possible defects in a weld in multi-assembly sealed basket (MSB) No. 4.
MSB No. 4 had been loaded with spent fuel earlier that month and
placed, inside a ventilated concrete cask, on the ISFSI storage pad.
The licensee evaluated the flaw indications and determined that the MSB
continued to meet its design basis and was capable of safely storing
spent fuel for the duration of the certificate (20 years).
Nevertheless, the licensee stated that MSB No. 4 would be unloaded to
support additional inspections and evaluations related to its future
use.1 In preparation for the unloading of MSB No. 4, the licensee
reviewed the unloading procedure issued in May 1993 (Revision 0) and
identified several technical questions. A revision of the unloading
procedure (Revision 1) was subsequently developed to resolve the
identified technical questions.
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\1\ The schedule for unloading MSB No. 4 remains indefinite. The
staff has recently learned that the licensee may postpone the
unloading until a multi-purpose cask is available. This would allow
the spent fuel currently stored in MSB No. 4 to be transferred to a
cask that would support both storage and transportation of the spent
fuel. The NRC staff is reviewing this plan and will initiate
discussions pertaining to this matter with the licensee and other
affected parties.
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The technical questions and the associated procedural changes were
discussed during meetings with the NRC staff, and additional
information was provided in submittals from the licensee to the NRC.
Evaluation of the revised unloading procedure by the NRC staff was
initially made through the review of submittals from the licensee and
has continued through an inspection of the licensee's revised unloading
procedure.
As a result of its inspections and reviews, the NRC staff
recognized that some licensees, including Consumers Power Company, had
developed unloading procedures that tended to be simplistic and lacked
sufficient details and contingencies. In order to address these issues,
an item related to cask loading and unloading procedures was added to
the NRC dry cask storage action plan that was implemented in July 1995.
Some issues, such as the thermal-hydraulic behavior of casks during the
unloading process, were included largely as a result of questions
related to the original unloading procedure at Palisades. Experience at
other facilities using storage and transportation casks resulted in the
identification of other issues. For example, as a result of the
turbidity of the spent fuel pool during the unloading of a
transportation cask at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, the NRC
staff assessed the potential for and significance of deposits on fuel
assembly surfaces becoming loose during the unloading of dry storage
casks. Evaluations and inspections were used to resolve these issues
for specific facilities and revisions to NRC guidance documents have
been prepared to resolve generic concerns.
Completion of the NRC inspection of the revised unloading procedure
for Palisades was postponed following an event at the Point Beach
Nuclear Plant.2 Following the hydrogen ignition event at Point
Beach, the NRC issued confirmatory action letters (CALs) to those
licensees using or planning to use VSC-24 casks for the storage of
spent nuclear fuel (i.e., licensees for Point Beach, Palisades, and
Arkansas Nuclear One). The CALs document the licensees' commitments not
to load or unload a VSC-24 cask without resolution of material
compatibility issues identified in NRC Bulletin 96-04, ``Chemical,
Galvanic, or Other Reactions in Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation
Casks,'' and confirmation of corrective actions by the NRC.3
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\2\ On May 28, 1996, a hydrogen gas ignition occurred during the
welding of the shield lid on a VSC-24 cask at the Point Beach
Nuclear Plant. The hydrogen was formed by a chemical reaction
between a zinc-based coating (Carbo Zinc 11) and the borated water
in the spent fuel pool.
\3\ On December 3, 1996, the NRC staff informed the licensee for
the Arkansas Nuclear One facility in Russellville, Arkansas, that it
had completed its reviews and inspections associated with that
facility and found that the licensee had satisfactorily completed
the commitments documented in the CAL. Shortly thereafter, the
licensee initiated cask-loading activities.
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The NRC staff is continuing to review the bulletin responses and
corrective actions for the Palisades facility, and, therefore, the
licensee is restrained from loading or unloading additional VSC-24
casks. Completion of the ongoing NRC inspection of the revised
unloading procedure at Palisades will be coordinated with the staff's
review of the licensee's response to the bulletin. Further, the NRC has
committed to State officials and members of the public that the exit
meeting for the inspection at Palisades will be open to the public, the
meeting will be noticed sufficiently in advance to allow interested
parties to attend, and the NRC staff will allocate time to discuss
issues with the public following the meeting with the licensee.
III. Discussion
The Petition requests four actions by the NRC on the basis of the
contention that the original unloading procedure (Revision 0)
implemented by the licensee was inadequate, and therefore, the licensee
violated NRC regulations requiring the licensee, prior to using an
approved cask, to establish that all conditions in a dry storage cask
certificate of compliance have been met (see 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2)).
(1) Determine That the Licensee Violated NRC Requirements
In support of the Petition's contention that the licensee violated
NRC requirements related to the original unloading procedure, the
Petitioners claim that issues identified in licensee documents dated
November 11, 1994, and June 2, 1995, regarding revisions to the
unloading procedure to support the planned unloading of Cask No. 4,
demonstrate that the original procedure was inadequate. The amendment
to the Petition filed on September 30, 1996, included issues related to
material compatibility identified in NRC Bulletin 96-04 as additional
evidence that the licensee's original unloading procedure was
inadequate.
The primary information offered by the Petitioners in support of
their claim that the original procedure violated NRC requirements is
identified in the licensee's document dated November 11, 1994. Although
the issues identified by the Petitioners have been represented by the
licensee as improvements or enhancements to the original unloading
procedure to support the planned unloading of Cask No. 4 at Palisades,
a potential inference that might be drawn from the November 11 document
is that the original unloading procedure could not adequately support
the unloading of Cask No. 4. However, the licensee's letter dated
December 29, 1994, affirmed the licensee's position that the original
unloading procedure was adequate, and therefore complied with the
certificate of compliance. Additional information, including the
revised unloading procedure and the supporting engineering analyses,
was provided in the licensee's submittal to the NRC dated June 2, 1995.
The NRC staff requested additional information from the licensee, and
that information was provided by the licensee in submittals dated
October 16, 1995, December 20, 1995, and July 19, 1996.
On the basis of its review, the NRC staff concluded that, had the
licensee attempted to unload a cask using the
[[Page 4362]]
original unloading procedure, certain deficiencies associated with the
original procedure would have prevented completion of the unloading
process. The original unloading procedure's administrative limit for
maximum cask pressure would have prevented the licensee from
establishing a continuous cooling cycle because the internal cask
pressure would not have been sufficient to force steam to the outlet of
the discharge piping at the bottom of the spent fuel pool. Other
weaknesses in the original unloading procedure that would have hampered
cask unloading included a restrictive venting capacity due to reliance
upon a small vent line with an installed Swagelok fitting, scant
guidance for personnel performing tasks such as drawing a gas sample
from the MSB to check for damaged fuel, and several examples of
references to the wrong step within the procedure. Such deficiencies
and weaknesses would have required the licensee to suspend activities
at one or more times during the unloading process in order to evaluate
the problems encountered and implement necessary revisions to the
procedure. Therefore, because the original unloading procedure would
have required revision in order to complete the unloading process, this
was a violation of requirements that all activities affecting quality
be prescribed by procedures appropriate for the circumstances and that
procedures are reviewed for adequacy. (See Criteria V and VI in
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.) 4 However, the staff also
determined that the deficiencies in the original unloading procedure
would not have challenged the integrity of the cask or fuel contained
in the cask and that the licensee would have ultimately been able to
safely unload a cask. Thus, given the limited safety significance of
the procedural deficiencies and the fact that the licensee identified
and corrected the deficiencies, the NRC exercised its discretion to
refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation or a civil penalty for the
violation.
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\4\ Section 1.1.3 of the certificate of compliance for the VSC-
24 cask states that activities at the ISFSI shall be conducted in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.
Requirements related to quality assurance for ISFSIs are also
contained in subpart G to 10 CFR part 72. The requirements of
Criteria V and VI in appendix B to 10 CFR part 50 are the same as
the requirements stated in 10 CFR 72.150 and 10 CFR 72.152. In the
case of the original cask unloading procedure at Palisades, the
number of problems in the original procedure and the failure of the
licensee to identify these problems during reviews performed prior
to approval of the procedure resulted in the finding that a
violation of NRC regulations had occurred. This finding is
documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-255/96014.
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The purpose and objective of the NRC's enforcement program are
focused on using enforcement actions (1) as a deterrent to emphasize
the importance of compliance with requirements, and (2) to encourage
prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of
violations. Mitigation of enforcement sanctions, such as refraining
from issuing a civil penalty and/or a Notice of Violation, is described
in Section VII.B of the ``General Statement of Policy and Procedures
for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy),'' for those cases in
which a licensee identifies a problem and corrects it within a
reasonable time. These mitigating factors were applicable to the
subject Severity Level IV violation pertaining to the original
unloading procedure at Palisades and the violation was, therefore,
dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation.5
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\5\ Although the NRC staff has identified weaknesses and
deficiencies in the unloading procedure developed by the licensee,
these problems resulted from the licensee giving insufficient
consideration to the complexity of the activity. As part of its
evaluation pertaining to the mitigation of enforcement sanctions,
the NRC staff concluded that the licensee had not knowingly and
willfully violated NRC requirements related to having an unloading
procedure for dry storage casks as was claimed by the Petitioners.
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As noted, the licensee, in various correspondence, took the
position that the original unloading procedure was adequate and that
subsequent changes incorporated into the revised procedure were
enhancements based on lessons learned from operating experience and
additional evaluations. Several statements in the licensee's
correspondence appear to assert that unloading procedures for dry
storage casks do not need to maintain fuel integrity during the
unloading process in order to satisfy requirements of the certificate
of compliance or NRC regulations. The NRC staff disagrees with this
interpretation. NRC requirements mandate that the unloading process
should be developed with due consideration to maintaining fuel
integrity (see 10 CFR 72.122(h), 72.122(l), and 72.236(h)). Unloading
activities are required to prevent gross ruptures of the fuel cladding
in order to prevent operational safety problems. Unloading procedures
are also required to include contingencies in case fuel cladding has
degraded during storage such that additional measures are necessary to
address increased radiological hazards during the unloading process.
The NRC staff has concluded that the original unloading procedure would
have supported unloading of undamaged fuel assemblies without causing a
significant loss of fuel cladding integrity.
The issues identified by the licensee in the document of November
11, 1994, and for which the Petitioners claim that the original
unloading procedure was inadequate, are addressed below.
MSB Cooling Skid
The licensee modified the configuration of the fill and vent piping
and components from that used in the original unloading procedure. An
increase in the venting capacity and the use of the previous vent path
for instrumentation necessitated these modifications. The original
unloading procedure included steps to remove a gas sample for analysis,
connect the venting arrangement to the spent fuel pool, and connect the
cooling water supply from the spent fuel pool to the vacuum drying
system water pump and the MSB drain line. Neither the Petitioners nor
the NRC staff have identified fundamental safety concerns with the
arrangement used in the original unloading procedure.
Thermal Hydraulic Modeling
In order to verify that undamaged fuel could be safely removed from
MSB No. 4 and to support preparing the revised unloading procedure, the
licensee performed multiple analyses by modeling the thermal hydraulic
behavior of the cask during the cooling process. These analyses were
used to estimate the pressure response of the cask, to estimate the
time requirements for cooling the cask, and to select the appropriate
venting capacity in the revised unloading procedure. The analyses
performed by the licensee showed that the venting capacity available
for the original unloading procedure would have supported the cooling
and refill of the MSB. These analyses also showed that cask unloading
using the original procedure would have taken significantly longer than
the time estimated for the revised procedure. However, no violations of
regulatory requirements would have resulted from taking longer to
complete the unloading process. The licensee's performance of the
analyses during preparation of the revised unloading procedure
highlighted the lack of supporting analyses or evaluations for the
original version of the unloading procedure and contributed to the
staff's finding that the licensee had violated the requirements of
Criterion VI of appendix B to 10 CFR part 50 by issuing the original
procedure without sufficient reviews to determine its adequacy.
[[Page 4363]]
Maximum Allowable Pressurization
During its review of the unloading procedure, the licensee
determined that the cask should be limited to 38.3 psig in order to
satisfy criteria established by the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. This value is conservative
with respect to the pressure that would challenge the structural
integrity of the MSB. The original unloading procedure included
precautions to maintain the internal pressure less than 10 psig and
thus was bounded by the subsequent evaluations and the acceptable
conditions specified in the revised procedure.
However, the staff has concluded that the procedural limitation of
10 psig in the original unloading procedure would have introduced
problems in establishing the cooling cycle because the pressure would
have been too low to force steam or water from the MSB to the coolant
discharge at the bottom of the spent fuel pool. These problems, in
turn, likely would have prevented completion of cask unloading without
revising the procedure. However, the problems would not have challenged
the integrity of the cask or otherwise introduced a safety concern.
Rather, upon identifying the problems caused by the administrative
limit of 10 psig, the licensee could have revised the procedure,
proceeded to establish the desired cooling cycle, and completed
unloading of a cask.
Fuel Integrity During Cooling
In support of preparing the revised unloading procedure, the
licensee, with support from the nuclear fuel supplier, analyzed the
allowable temperature differences between fuel assembly components and
cooling water. Additional analyses determined maximum expected fuel
temperatures before establishing the cooling flow to the MSB. These
evaluations and the expected thermal response of the MSB and fuel
assemblies following the introduction of coolant during the unloading
procedure confirmed that thermal shocking would not challenge the
integrity of the fuel assemblies in the MSB.
Fuel Heatup While the MSB is in the Transport Cask
As previously mentioned, the licensee and the contractors analyzed
the maximum fuel temperatures that could be experienced during the time
that the MSB is in the transfer cask before establishing the cooling
flow from the spent fuel pool to the MSB interior. These analyses were
performed for various heat loads and time periods and included
conservative analysis assumptions. The analyses showed that fuel
temperature limits would not be exceeded before establishing the
cooling flow from the spent fuel pool using the original (or the
revised) unloading procedure.
MSB Lid Removal
The revised unloading procedure uses more advanced cutting
technologies in order to incorporate operating experience, ease lid
removal, and minimize personnel exposure. The capability of the
original unloading procedure to control removal of the MSB lid was
verified by the licensee during mockups before loading casks at
Palisades. Some of the improvements in the revised procedure are
related to problems experienced during that exercise. However, the
licensee has demonstrated that techniques for lid removal in the
original unloading procedure were adequate to remove the lids and
provide access to the fuel assemblies in compliance with NRC
requirements.
Criticality Prevention
The original unloading procedure included steps for sampling the
spent fuel pool boron concentration and establishing time limits for
lid removal following termination of recirculation flow. The NRC staff
considers the original procedure's lack of a detailed contingency for
preventing bulk boiling, as was incorporated into the revised
procedure, a procedural weakness. However, the weakness does not
translate into a concern related to public health and safety or
personnel exposure because of the inherent conservatisms related to
reactivity control for storage casks, such as assuming nonirradiated
fuel assemblies in supporting calculations, and the time that would be
available for the licensee to implement compensatory actions.
10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Related to the MSB Cooling Skid
Modifications to the MSB cooling skid led the licensee to question
whether an unreviewed safety question was introduced by a possible
break of the return line to the spent fuel pool. Upon further review,
the licensee determined that the cooling system configuration did not
create the possibility for an accident or a malfunction of a different
type than any evaluated previously in the facility's final safety
analysis report or otherwise exceed the criteria that define an
unreviewed safety question under 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee has stated
that this conclusion is also applicable for the original unloading
procedure. Neither the Petitioners nor the NRC staff have identified a
safety or compliance issue regarding the licensee's conclusion.
Rigging Procedures
The licensee investigated several minor changes to the rigging
process during the development of the revised unloading procedure.
These changes are intended to ease the operations and reduce personnel
radiation exposures. However, the staff determined that the guidance
provided by the original procedure, combined with expected skill of
licensee personnel, would have been adequate to control the lifting of
the various loads associated with unloading a cask.
Helium Sampling
During the development of the revised unloading procedure, the
licensee recognized possible difficulties in drawing a gas sample from
the MSB before initiating the cooling operation. The original unloading
procedure included a step to ``remove a gas sample from the cask,'' but
did not include the more detailed guidance that is incorporated into
the revised procedure. This lack of guidance in the original procedure
may have resulted in licensee personnel underestimating the helium
concentration in the MSB. The original unloading procedure included
provisions to suspend the unloading process if the sampling indicated
air within the MSB. Therefore, this potential weakness in the original
unloading procedure would not have introduced adverse safety
consequences but instead may have erroneously caused the licensee to
suspend cask unloading activities in order to conduct management
briefings and determine compensatory measures due to the potential
oxidation of the fuel cladding.
Summary for (1) ``Determine That the Licensee Violated NRC
Requirements''
On the basis of its evaluation of the licensee's original unloading
procedure, the NRC staff affirmed the licensee's determination that the
procedure had numerous weaknesses. The staff believes that the
administrative limit of 10 psig for maximum cask pressure and other
identified weaknesses in the original unloading procedure would have
required the licensee to suspend activities at one or more times during
the unloading process in order to evaluate the problems encountered and
implement necessary revisions to the procedure. Given the number of
weaknesses in the original unloading procedure and the licensee's
failure to
[[Page 4364]]
perform the necessary levels of review and analysis to have determined
its adequacy prior to its issuance, the NRC staff found that the
licensee violated NRC requirements contained in Criteria V and VI of
appendix B to 10 CFR part 50. The first request in the Petition, to
find that the licensee violated NRC requirements related to unloading
procedures for dry storage casks for spent nuclear fuel, is therefore
granted. The violation was dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation
consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The Petitioners' amendment to the Petition dated September 30,
1996, claims that the original unloading procedure was inadequate
because of its lack of controls related to the generation of hydrogen
gas from a chemical reaction between coatings used on the VSC-24 casks
and the borated water in the spent fuel pool. The chemical reactions
and hydrogen issue were identified following an event that occurred
during welding of the shield lid on a spent fuel storage cask at the
Point Beach plant on May 28, 1996. The need to include special
precautions in the unloading procedures for VSC-24 casks in order to
prevent ignition of hydrogen gas had not been recognized by the cask
vendor, licensees, or the NRC staff prior to the event at Point Beach.
The licensee's original unloading procedure was developed before the
event at Point Beach caused the recognition of the potential for
ignition of hydrogen gas during the unloading of a VSC-24 cask.
Accordingly, the NRC cannot reasonably fault the licensee, by taking
enforcement action, for not having accounted for an issue that was not
known to the NRC staff, the vendor, or the licensee.
(2) Suspend the Licensee's Use of the General License
On the basis of the contention that the licensee's unloading
procedure was inadequate, the Petitioners requested that the licensee's
use of the general license provisions of 10 CFR part 72 be suspended
until such time as the significant issues described in the licensee's
document of June 2, 1995, have been resolved, the NRC has documented
its review, approved the licensee's revised procedure, and Cask No. 4
has been safely unloaded.
The licensee's submittal of June 2, 1995, provided Revision 1 of
the unloading procedure and supporting engineering analyses. The
Petition includes specific questions and comments regarding the
licensee's submittal of June 2, 1995, in support of the Petitioners'
position that actions taken by the licensee had not resolved
significant safety issues. In response to questions from the NRC staff,
the licensee provided additional information related to the submittal
dated June 2, 1995. The subsequent submittals were dated October 16,
and December 20, 1995.6 In addition, the NRC staff was reviewing
and will continue to review the issues included in the submittal dated
June 2, 1995, as part of the ongoing NRC inspection of the revised
unloading procedure. Further, as described above, the NRC staff has
already concluded that the deficiencies in the original unloading
procedure violated NRC requirements, and that the violation should be
treated as a Non-Cited Violation because of the limited safety
significance of the procedural deficiencies and consideration of
mitigating factors defined in the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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\6\ These documents, like all others identified in this
decision, are available to the public at the NRC Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, and
from the local public document room located in the Van Wylen Library
at Hope College in Holland, Michigan.
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On June 3, 1996, the NRC issued CALs to the licensee and other
users of the VSC-24 cask system. The CALs confirmed a commitment made
by each licensee to the NRC staff to refrain from loading or unloading
a VSC-24 cask pending completion of investigations and implementation
of corrective actions. On June 27, 1996, a supplement to the CAL was
issued to confirm a further commitment by the licensee to refrain from
placing a VSC-24 cask into the spent fuel pool until after the NRC has
reviewed and accepted applicable responses to NRC Bulletin 96-04 and
verified corrective actions taken in response to the bulletin. CALs are
among the administrative mechanisms that the NRC uses to supplement
Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and orders in its enforcement
program. CALs may be issued to confirm an agreement by a licensee or
vendor to take certain actions to remove significant concerns about
health, safety, safeguards, or the environment. The NRC expects
licensees and vendors to adhere to stated obligations or commitments
included in a CAL and will not hesitate to issue appropriate orders to
ensure that such obligations or commitments are met.
The NRC issued the CALs and Bulletin 96-04 in recognition of the
fact that the generation of hydrogen gas during the loading of VSC-24
casks at Point Beach was evidence that possible material compatibility
issues were not fully addressed during the design or certification
reviews associated with some spent fuel storage and transportation
casks. It is not unusual for the NRC to use such administrative
mechanisms to address generic issues. Given that the generation of
flammable gases was a particular concern for the users of the VSC-24
cask system, those licensees, including Consumers Power Company, were
issued CALs to confirm that VSC-24 casks would not be loaded, unloaded,
or otherwise placed in a spent fuel pool before the resolution of
issues identified in NRC Bulletin 96-04.
In regard to those issues contained in the amendment to the
Petition, the existing CAL documents the licensee's commitment to
refrain from loading, unloading, or otherwise placing a VSC-24 cask
into the spent fuel pool pending verification of corrective actions
related to NRC Bulletin 96-04. Given the licensee's commitment not to
load or unload a cask, the NRC does not, in this instance, envision the
need to issue an order as requested by the Petitioners.
Those portions of the Petition that address NRC's approval of the
revised unloading procedure and include the unloading of Cask No. 4 as
a condition for resuming normal activities under the general license
are denied. The NRC staff does not generally review and approve
specific procedures developed by licensees. NRC regulations, facility
licenses, and NRC-approved quality assurance programs require licensees
to establish and maintain a formal process for the preparation and
issuance of procedures and changes thereto. NRC assessments of licensee
procedures are generally conducted as part of the NRC's inspection
program. In this instance, given the licensee's commitment to refrain
from action until completion of NRC's inspections, the inspections will
confirm that applicable regulatory requirements are satisfied before
use of the licensee's revised unloading procedure. As previously
mentioned, the NRC staff will resume its inspection activities related
to the revised unloading procedure when the licensee has resolved the
issues identified in NRC Bulletin 96-04. If, and provided that, there
is satisfactory resolution of the issues identified in NRC Bulletin 96-
04 and any other questions that may arise during the inspection of the
licensee's revised unloading procedure, then the NRC will have
reasonable assurance of the licensee's compliance with regulatory
requirements. Accordingly, the staff would not have any basis or reason
to require the licensee to unload Cask No. 4 before resuming normal
activities under the general license at Palisades. Thus, following
resolution of all issues to the satisfaction of the NRC staff, the
determination of the sequence of events
[[Page 4365]]
related to the planned unloading of Cask No. 4 and the loading of
additional casks at Palisades will be at the discretion of the
licensee. As noted above, the NRC staff has committed to open the exit
meeting with the licensee to the public at the conclusion of the
ongoing inspection and will document its review in an inspection report
that will be available for public review.
(3) Require the Licensee to Pay a Substantial Penalty
On the basis of the contention that the licensee's original
unloading procedure was inadequate, the Petitioners requested that the
NRC levy a monetary penalty of $1.3 million against the licensee. As
previously mentioned, the NRC staff determined that, although finding
that the deficiencies in the original unloading procedure violated NRC
requirements, the violation satisfied the criteria to be treated as a
Non-Cited Violation because of the limited safety significance of the
procedural deficiencies and consideration of mitigating factors defined
in the NRC Enforcement Policy. Enforcement sanctions, including
issuance of civil penalties and orders, are normally used as a
deterrent to emphasize the importance of compliance with requirements,
and to encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive
correction of violations. In this case, the licensee identified the
deficiencies that constituted the violation of NRC requirements and
subsequently revised the unloading procedure to resolve the identified
technical issues. It was the judgement of the NRC staff that the
violation should be dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation in order to
convey the appropriate regulatory message in this case. Further, even
if the violation had been cited, it is the NRC staff's judgment that it
would have been categorized at a Severity Level IV, for which a civil
penalty would not ordinarily be issued.
In regard to the hydrogen issues identified in the amendment to the
Petition, the NRC staff has utilized an administrative mechanism in its
enforcement policy (CALs) to ensure that the licensee takes certain
actions to resolve this safety concern. As previously mentioned, the
specific contentions raised by the Petitioners pertaining to hydrogen
issues and the original unloading procedure do not warrant additional
enforcement actions by the NRC.
(4) Allow Petitioners to Review Procedure, Require NRC to Hold
Hearings, and Allow Petitioners to Participate in Proceedings
The original unloading procedure and the first revision of the
unloading procedure have been provided to the Petitioners. In addition,
correspondence between the NRC and the licensee regarding the
procedures have been furnished to the Petitioners. Further, due to the
course of events following the licensee's decision to unload Cask No.
4--including the licensee's evaluation of the original unloading
procedure, identification of improvements to the unloading process, and
the submittal of this Petition--the original and first revision of the
unloading procedure and related documentation have been available for
public review. Accordingly, Petitioners have had the opportunity to
review the unloading procedure. Further, as noted elsewhere, it is the
NRC staff's intention to hold a public meeting in the vicinity of the
Palisades Nuclear Plant at the conclusion of its ongoing inspection of
the licensee's revised unloading procedure.
The Petitioners' request for hearings and participation in
proceedings has been addressed in previous correspondence with the
Petitioners and the Attorney General for the State of Michigan. In that
correspondence, the NRC staff explained that neither the general
licensing provisions of 10 CFR part 72 nor the petition process
described in 10 CFR 2.206 require the NRC to institute a proceeding.
Under Sec. 2.206, the NRC office director responsible for the subject
matter of the request ``shall either institute the requested proceeding
in accordance with this subpart or shall advise the person who made the
request in writing that no proceeding will be instituted in whole or in
part, with respect to the request, and the reasons for the decision.''
As set forth in this Director's Decision, the NRC has determined
not to institute the proceeding as requested by the Petition.
IV. Conclusion
Petitioners requested that the NRC determine that Consumers Power
Company violated NRC requirements, suspend the licensee's use of the
general license, impose a substantial penalty, and hold hearings
related to the licensee's unloading procedure for dry storage casks. In
response, the NRC determined the licensee violated NRC requirements
insofar as the original unloading procedure (Revision 0) would have
required revision in order to have completed the unloading process.
Further, NRC staff determined that the violation, which was identified
and corrected by the licensee, should be treated as a Non-Cited
Violation consistent with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Therefore, to
this extent, Petitioners' request for a determination that the licensee
violated NRC requirements is granted. The available information is
sufficient to conclude, however, that no substantial safety issue has
been raised regarding the operation of Palisades or its associated
ISFSI given the licensee's commitment not to load or unload a cask
until the NRC staff is satisfied that the licensee's procedures are
adequate. Therefore, the NRC has determined that no adequate basis
exists for granting Petitioners' requests for suspension of Consumers
Power Company's use of the general license for dry cask storage of
spent nuclear fuel at Palisades or imposition of a civil penalty.
A copy of this decision will be filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission to review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c).
As provided by this regulation, this decision will constitute the
final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the decision
within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Md., this 23d day of January 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-2162 Filed 1-28-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7690-01-P
