[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 5 (Friday, January 7, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1215-1219]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-411]
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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Social Security Ruling, SSR 00-1c; Disability Insurance
Benefits--Claims Filed Under Both the Social Security Act and the
Americans With Disabilities Act
AGENCY: Social Security Administration.
ACTION: Notice of Social Security Ruling.
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SUMMARY: In accordance with 20 CFR 402.35(b)(1), the Commissioner of
Social Security gives notice of Social Security Ruling (SSR) 00-1c.
This Ruling, based on the Supreme Court's decision in
[[Page 1216]]
Carolyn C. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation et al.,
____ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999), concerns whether a claim for
disability insurance benefits filed under the Social Security Act would
preclude the claimant from pursuing relief under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2000.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joanne K. Castello, Office of Program
Support, Social Security Administration, 6401 Security Boulevard,
Baltimore, MD 21235-6401, (410) 965-1711.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although we are not required to do so
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1) and (a)(2), we are publishing this
Social Security Ruling in accordance with 20 CFR 402.35(b)(1).
Social Security Rulings make available to the public precedential
decisions relating to the Federal old-age, survivors, disability,
supplemental security income, and black lung benefits programs. Social
Security Rulings may be based on case decisions made at all
administrative levels of adjudication, Federal court decisions,
Commissioner's decisions, opinions of the Office of the General
Counsel, and Agency interpretations of the law and regulations.
Although Social Security Rulings do not have the same force and
effect as the statute or regulations, they are binding on all
components of the Social Security Administration, in accordance with 20
CFR 402.35(b)(1), and are to be relied upon as precedents in
adjudicating cases.
If this Social Security Ruling is later superseded, modified, or
rescinded, we will publish a notice in the Federal Register to that
effect.
Dated: December 20, 1999.
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Programs 96.001 Social
Security--Disability Insurance; 96.005 Special Benefits for Disabled
Coal Miners; 96.006 Supplemental Security Income)
Kenneth S. Apfel,
Commissioner of Social Security.
Sections 222(c) and 223(a), (d)(2)(a), and (e)(1) of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 422(c) and 423(a), (d)(2)(A), and (e)(1))
Disability Insurance Benefits--Claims Filed Under Both the Social
Security Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act
20 CFR 404.1520(b)-(f), 404.1525, 404.1526, 404.1560(c), 404.1592,
and 404.1592a
Carolyn C. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation et
al., ____U.S.____, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999)
This Ruling concerns whether an individual's claim for, or receipt
of, disability insurance benefits filed under the Social Security Act
(the SSAct) would preclude the individual from pursuing relief under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The SSAct and the ADA both help individuals with disabilities but
in different ways. The SSAct provides monetary benefits to insured
individuals who are under a disability, as defined in the SSAct. The
ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against any
individual who is considered a ``qualified individual with a
disability'' as defined in the ADA.
In January 1994, the claimant filed for Social Security disability
insurance benefits. By April 1994, her condition improved and she
returned to work. She reported this to the Social Security
Administration (SSA) which denied her claim. Her employer subsequently
terminated her. She then asked SSA to reconsider its denial of her
claim. SSA again denied her claim, but following a hearing, she was
awarded benefits. However, before her Social Security award, the
claimant brought an ADA lawsuit contending that her employer terminated
her employment without reasonably accommodating her disability.
The District Court did not evaluate her ``reasonable
accommodation'' claim on the merits, but granted summary judgment to
the defendant because, in the court's view, the plaintiff, by applying
for and receiving Social Security disability insurance benefits, had
conceded that she was totally disabled. This fact, the court concluded,
estopped the plaintiff from proving an essential element of her ADA
claim, i.e., that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her
job with ``reasonable accommodation.''
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
grant of summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's statement
on her Social Security application that she was totally disabled and
unable to work was sufficient evidence to judically estop her later ADA
claim. In her ADA claim, the plaintiff contended that, for the time in
question, with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the
essential functions of her job. The Court of Appeals thought that her
claims under both Acts would incorporate two directly conflicting
propositions; namely, ``I am too disabled to work'' and ``I am not too
disabled to work.'' That court, in an effort to prevent two conflicting
claims under both Acts, used a special judicial presumption that it
believed would prevent the plaintiff from successfully pursuing her ADA
claim.
The Supreme Court (the Court) granted certiorari in light of the
disagreement among the circuits concerning the legal effect upon an ADA
claim of the application for, or receipt of, Social Security disability
insurance benefits. The Court held that, despite the appearance of
conflict between the two statutes, the two claims do not conflict to
the point where courts should apply a special negative presumption as
in the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. The Court believed that
there are too many situations in which a Social Security claim and an
ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side. The Court, therefore,
vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.
BREYER, Supreme Court Justice:
The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides
benefits to a person with a disability so severe that she is ``unable
to do (her) previous work'' and ``cannot * * * engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.''
Sec. 223(a) of the Social Security Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C.
423(d)(2)(A). This case asks whether the law erects a special
presumption that would significantly inhibit an SSDI recipient from
simultaneously pursuing an action for disability discrimination under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), claiming that ``with
* * * reasonable accommodation'' she could ``perform the essential
functions'' of her job. Section 101, 104 Stat. 331, 42 U.S.C. 12111(8).
We believe that, in context, these two seemingly divergent
statutory contentions are often consistent, each with the other. Thus
pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the
recipient from pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a strong
presumption against the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless,
an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she was
too disabled to work. To survive a defendant's motion for summary
judgment, she must explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with
her ADA claim that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her
previous job, at least with ``reasonable accommodation.''
After suffering a disabling stroke and losing her job, Carolyn
Cleveland sought and obtained SSDI benefits from the Social Security
Administration (SSA). She has also brought this ADA suit in which she
claims that her former
[[Page 1217]]
employer, Policy Management Systems Corporation, discriminated against
her on account of her disability. The two claims developed in the
following way:
August 1993: Cleveland began work at Policy Management Systems. Her
job required her to perform background checks on prospective employees
of Policy Management System's clients.
January 7, 1994: Cleveland suffered a stroke, which damaged her
concentration, memory, and language skills.
January 28, 1994: Cleveland filed an SSDI application in which she
stated that she was ``disabled'' and ``unable to work.'' App. 21.
April 11, 1994: Cleveland's condition having improved, she returned
to work with Policy Management Systems. She reported that fact to the
SSA two weeks later.
July 11, 1994: Noting that Cleveland had returned to work, the SSA
denied her SSDI application.
July 15, 1994: Policy Management Systems fired Cleveland.
September 14, 1994: Cleveland asked the SSA to reconsider its July
11th SSDI denial. In doing so, she said, ``I was terminated [by Policy
Management Systems] due to my condition and I have not been able to
work since. I continue to be disabled.'' Id., at 46. She later added
that she had ``attempted to return to work in mid April,'' that she had
``worked for three months,'' and that Policy Management Systems
terminated her because she ``could no longer do the job'' in light of
her ``condition.'' Id., at 47.
November 1994: The SSA denied Cleveland's request for
reconsideration. Cleveland sought an SSA hearing, reiterating that ``I
am unable to work due to my disability,'' and presenting new evidence
about the extent of her injuries. Id., at 79.
September 29, 1995: The SSA awarded Cleveland SSDI benefits
retroactive to the day of her stroke, January 7, 1994.
On September 22, 1995, the week before her SSDI award, Cleveland
brought this ADA lawsuit. She contended that Policy Management Systems
had ``terminat[ed]'' her employment without reasonably
``accommodat(ing) her disability.'' Id., at 7. She alleged that she
requested, but was denied, accommodations such as training and
additional time to complete her work. Id., at 96. And she submitted a
supporting affidavit from her treating physician. Id., at 101. The
District Court did not evaluate her reasonable accommodation claim on
the merits, but granted summary judgment to the defendant because, in
that court's view, Cleveland, by applying for and receiving SSDI
benefits, had conceded that she was totally disabled. And that fact,
the court concluded, now estopped Cleveland from proving an essential
element of her ADA claim, namely that she could ``perform the essential
functions'' of her job, at least with ``reasonable accommodation.'' 42
U.S.C. 12111(8).
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary
judgment. 120 F.3d 513 (1997). The court wrote:
``[T]he application for or the receipt of social security
disability benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant
or recipient of such benefits is judicially estopped from asserting
that he is a `qualified individual with a disability.' '' Id., at 518.
The Circuit Court noted that it was ``at least theoretically
conceivable that under some limited and highly unusual set of
circumstances the two claims would not necessarily be mutually
exclusive.'' Id., at 517. But it concluded that, because
``Cleveland consistently represented to the SSA that she was
totally disabled, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact rebutting the presumption that she is judicially estopped from now
asserting that for the time in question she was nevertheless a
`qualified individual with a disability' for purposes of her ADA
claim.'' Id., at 518-519.
We granted certiorari in light of disagreement among the Circuits
about the legal effect upon an ADA suit of the application for, or
receipt of, disability benefits. Compare, e.g., Rascon v. U S West
Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (C.A.10 1998) (application
for, and receipt of, SSDI benefits is relevant to, but does not estop
plaintiff from bringing, an ADA claim); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382 (C.A.6 1998) (same), cert. pending, No. 97-
1991; Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 116
F.3d 582, 586 (C.A.D.C. 1997) (same), with McNemar v. Disney Store,
Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618-620 (C.A.3 1996) (applying judicial estoppel to
bar plaintiff who applied for disability benefits from bringing suit
under the ADA), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 958, 136 L.Ed.2d
845 (1997), and Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-1482
(C.A.9 1996) (declining to apply judicial estoppel but holding that
claimant who declared total disability in a benefits application failed
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a
qualified individual with a disability).
The Social Security Act and the ADA both help individuals with
disabilities, but in different ways. The Social Security Act provides
monetary benefits to every insured individual who ``is under a
disability.'' 42 U.S.C. 423(a)(1). The Act defines ``disability'' as an
``inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any * * * physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.'' Section
423(d)(1)(A).
The individual's impairment, as we have said, supra, at 1599, must
be
``of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her]
previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy * * * .'' Section 423(d)(2)(A).
The ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against
disabled individuals in order both to guarantee those individuals equal
opportunity and to provide the Nation with the benefit of their
consequently increased productivity. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(8),
(9). The Act prohibits covered employers from discriminating ``against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual.'' Section 12112(a). The Act defines a ``qualified
individual with a disability'' as a disabled person ``who * * * can
perform the essential functions'' of her job, including those who can
do so only ``with * * * reasonable accommodation.'' Section 12111(8).
We here consider but one of the many ways in which these two
statutes might interact. This case does not involve, for example, the
interaction of either of the statutes before us with other statutes,
such as the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq. Nor
does it involve directly conflicting statements about purely factual
matters, such as ``The light was red/green,'' or ``I can/cannot raise
my arm above my head.'' An SSA representation of total disability
differs from a purely factual statement in that it often implies a
context-related legal conclusion, namely ``I am disabled for purposes
of the Social Security Act.'' And our consideration of this latter kind
of statement consequently leaves the law related to the former, purely
factual, kind of conflict where we found it.
The case before us concerns an ADA plaintiff who both applied for,
and received, SSDI benefits. It requires us to review a Court of
Appeals decision upholding the grant of summary judgment on the ground
that an ADA plaintiff's ``represent(ation) to the SSA that she was
totally disabled'' created a
[[Page 1218]]
``rebuttable presumption'' sufficient to ``judicially esto[p]'' her
later representation that, ``for the time in question,'' with
reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of
her job. 120 F.3d, at 518-519. The Court of Appeals thought, in
essence, that claims under both Acts would incorporate two directly
conflicting propositions, namely ``I am too disabled to work'' and ``I
am not too disabled to work.'' And in an effort to prevent two claims
that would embody that kind of factual conflict, the court used a
special judicial presumption, which it believed would ordinarily
prevent a plaintiff like Cleveland from successfully asserting an ADA
claim.
In our view, however, despite the appearance of conflict that
arises from the language of the two statutes, the two claims do not
inherently conflict to the point where courts should apply a special
negative presumption like the one applied by the Court of Appeals here.
That is because there are too many situations in which an SSDI claim
and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side.
For one thing, as we have noted, the ADA defines a ``qualified
individual'' to include a disabled person ``who * * * can perform the
essential functions'' of her job ``with reasonable accommodation.''
Reasonable accommodations may include:
``job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations.'' 42 U.S.C. 12111(9)(B).
By way of contrast, when the SSA determines whether an individual
is disabled for SSDI purposes, it does not take the possibility of
``reasonable accommodation'' into account, nor need an applicant refer
to the possibility of reasonable accommodation when she applies for
SSDI. See Memorandum from Daniel L. Skoler, Associate Comm'r for
Hearings and Appeals, SSA, to Administrative Appeals Judges, reprinted
in 2 Social Security Practice Guide, App. Section 15C[9], pp. 15-401 to
15-402 (1998). The omission reflects the facts that the SSA receives
more than 2.5 million claims for disability benefits each year; its
administrative resources are limited; the matter of ``reasonable
accommodation'' may turn on highly disputed workplace-specific matters;
and an SSA misjudgment about that detailed, and often fact-specific
matter would deprive a seriously disabled person of the critical
financial support the statute seeks to provide. See Brief for United
States et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11, and n. 2, 13. The result is that
an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can perform her job with
reasonable accommodation may well prove consistent with an SSDI claim
that the plaintiff could not perform her own job (or other jobs)
without it.
For another thing, in order to process the large number of SSDI
claims, the SSA administers SSDI with the help of a five-step procedure
that embodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job
availability, and their interrelation. The SSA asks:
Step One: Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.)
See 20 CFR 404.1520(b) (1998).
Step Two: Do you have a ``severe impairment,'' i.e., one that
``significantly limits'' your ability to do basic work activities? (If
not, you are ineligible.) See Sec. 404.1520(c).
Step Three: Does your impairment ``mee[t] or equa[l]'' an
impairment on a specific (and fairly lengthy) SSA list? (If so, you are
eligible without more.) See Secs. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.
Step Four: If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, can you perform your ``past relevant work?'' (If so, you
are ineligible.) See Sec. 404.1520(e).
Step Five: If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment and you cannot perform your ``past relevant work,'' then can
you perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy? (If not, you are eligible.) See Secs. 404.1520(f),
404.1560(c).
The presumptions embodied in these questions--particularly those
necessary to produce Step Three's list, which, the Government tells us,
accounts for approximately 60 percent of all awards, see Tr. of Oral
Arg. 20--grow out of the need to administer a large benefits system
efficiently. But they inevitably simplify, eliminating consideration of
many differences potentially relevant to an individual's ability to
perform a particular job. Hence, an individual might qualify for SSDI
under the SSA's administrative rules and yet, due to special individual
circumstances, remain capable of ``perform[ing] the essential
functions'' of her job.
Further, the SSA sometimes grants SSDI benefits to individuals who
not only can work, but are working. For example, to facilitate a
disabled person's reentry into the workforce, the SSA authorizes a 9-
month trial-work period during which SSDI recipients may receive full
benefits. See 42 U.S.C. 422(c), 423(e)(1); 20 CFR 404.1592 (1998). See
also Sec. 404.1592a (benefits available for an additional 15-month
1 period depending upon earnings). Improvement in a totally
disabled person's physical condition, while permitting that person to
work, will not necessarily or immediately lead the SSA to terminate
SSDI benefits. And the nature of an individual's disability may change
over time, so that a statement about that disability at the time of an
individual's application for SSDI benefits may not reflect an
individual's capacities at the time of the relevant employment
decision.
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\1\ Effective January 1, 1988, the law was amended to lengthen
the reentitlement period to SSDI benefits from 15 months to 36
months. See section 223(a)(1) of the SSAct. [Ed. note]
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Finally, if an individual has merely applied for, but has not been
awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the theory of the claims
is of the sort normally tolerated by our legal system. Our ordinary
rules recognize that a person may not be sure in advance upon which
legal theory she will succeed, and so permit parties to ``set forth two
or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or
hypothetically,'' and to ``state as many separate claims or defenses as
the party has regardless of consistency.'' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
8(e)(2). We do not see why the law in respect to the assertion of SSDI
and ADA claims should differ. (And, as we said, we leave the law in
respect to purely factual contradictions where we found it.)
In light of these examples, we would not apply a special legal
presumption permitting someone who has applied for, or received, SSDI
benefits to bring an ADA suit only in ``some limited and highly unusual
set of circumstances.'' 120 F.3d, at 517.
Nonetheless, in some cases an earlier SSDI claim may turn out
genuinely to conflict with an ADA claim. Summary judgment for a
defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff ``fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to (her)
case, and on which (she) will bear the burden of proof at trial.''
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986). An ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a
``qualified individual with a disability''--that is, a person ``who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions'' of her job. 42 U.S.C. 12111(8). And a plaintiff's sworn
assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for
example, ``unable to work'' will appear to negate an essential element
of her ADA case--
[[Page 1219]]
at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation. For that
reason, we hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent
contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI total disability
claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient explanation.
The lower courts, in somewhat comparable circumstances, have found
a similar need for explanation. They have held with virtual unanimity
that a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to
survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own
previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly
contradicts that party's earlier sworn deposition) without explaining
the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity. See, e.g.,
Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 5 (C.A.1 1994);
Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (C.A.2 1996); Hackman v. Valley
Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (C.A.3 1991); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736
F.2d 946, 960 (C.A.4 1984); Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d
223, 228 (C.A.5 1984); Davidson & Jones Development Co. v. Elmore
Development Co., 921 F.2d 1343, 1352 (C.A.6 1991); Slowiak v. Land
O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (C.A.7 1993); Camfield Tires, Inc.
v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (C.A.8 1983); Kennedy
v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (C.A.9 1991); Franks v.
Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (C.A.10 1986); Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805
F.2d 949, 953-954 (C.A.11 1986); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB
Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 822, 112 S.Ct. 85, 116 L.Ed.2d 57 (1991); Sinskey v. Pharmacia
Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (C.A.Fed. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 256 (1993). Although these cases
for the most part involve purely factual contradictions (as to which we
do not necessarily endorse these cases, but leave the law as we found
it), we believe that a similar insistence upon explanation is warranted
here, where the conflict involves a legal conclusion. When faced with a
plaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting ``total disability'' or
the like, the court should require an explanation of any apparent
inconsistency with the necessary elements of an ADA claim. To defeat
summary judgment, that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a
reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the
plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff
could nonetheless ``perform the essential functions'' of her job, with
or without ``reasonable accommodation.''
III
In her brief in this Court, Cleveland explains the discrepancy
between her SSDI statements that she was ``totally disabled'' and her
ADA claim that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her
job. The first statements, she says, ``were made in a forum which does
not consider the effect that reasonable workplace accommodations would
have on the ability to work.'' Brief for Petitioner 43. Moreover, she
claims the SSDI statements were ``accurate statements'' if examined
``in the time period in which they were made.'' Ibid. The parties
should have the opportunity in the trial court to present, or to
contest, these explanations, in sworn form where appropriate.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
[FR Doc. 00-411 Filed 1-6-00; 8:45 am]
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