[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 199 (Friday, October 11, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53461-53463]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-26160]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-302]
Florida Power Corporation; Crystal River Nuclear Generating
Plant, Unit 3 Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR), has taken action on a Petition of March 28, 1996
(Petition), for action under Sec. 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206) filed by Louis D. Putney, Esq., on
behalf of Barry L. Bennett (Petitioner) concerning the Crystal River
Nuclear Generating Plant (CR3) of the Florida Power Corporation (the
licensee).
The Petition alleged a number of security-related deficiencies
associated with the CR3 facility. The Petition requested, pursuant to
10 CFR 2.206, NRC to investigate security concerns at CR3 and, upon a
determination of their validity, institute a proceeding to suspend or
revoke the operating license of CR3 pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 until such
time as these concerns are corrected. The Notice of Receipt of Petition
Under 10 CFR 2.206 was published in the Federal Register on June 20,
1996 (61 FR 31562).
The Director of NRR determined that the Petition should be denied
for the reasons explained in the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR
2.206'' (DD-96-13), the complete text of which follows this notice and
is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document
Room at 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the Local Public
Document Room for the CR3 plant located at the Coastal Region Library,
8619 W. Crystal Street, Crystal River, Florida.
A copy of this Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c).
As provided by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the
final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision
within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of October 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
On March 28, 1996, Louis D. Putney, Esq., on behalf of Barry L.
Bennett (Petitioner), filed a Petition pursuant to Sec. 2.206 of Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206) and alleged a
number of security deficiencies at Florida Power Corporation's (the
licensee's) Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3 (CR3). The
Petitioner requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC
or the staff) investigate the security deficiencies at CR3 and, upon
determination of their validity, institute a proceeding to suspend or
revoke the operating license of CR3, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, until
such time as these concerns are corrected. The Petition was referred to
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for action in accordance
with 10 CFR 2.206.
In a letter dated April 24, 1996, to the Petitioner, the Director
of NRR acknowledged receipt of the Petition and informed the Petitioner
that his request was being treated as a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
The April 24th letter also informed the Petitioner that as provided by
10 CFR 2.206, action will be taken on his request within a reasonable
time. Receipt of the petition was noticed in the Federal Register (61
FR 31562). The staff has completed its review of the issues and has
reached its conclusions, which are discussed herein.
II. Background
The Petitioner alleged security deficiencies at the CR3 plant and
stated that they render the nuclear security program at CR3
ineffective. As the basis of his request, the Petitioner described
examples of the security concerns,
[[Page 53462]]
which involved the following four areas: Compliance with licensing
requirements and maintaining an effective security program; a pattern
of lax security and failure to report security breaches; a practice of
using only one guard to monitor several protected zones or entrances to
the protected area; and a reduction of security force personnel.
The NRC staff has reviewed the Petition and the results of this
review are discussed below.
A special inspection was conducted during the periods of March 13-
22 and April 3-5, 1996, and is documented in NRC Inspection Report (IR)
50-302/96-02. This IR contains safeguards information as defined by 10
CFR 73.21 and its disclosure to unauthorized individuals is prohibited
by Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended and
therefore, is not available for public review. However, the IR summary
does not contain safeguards information and, therefore, is available
for public review at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L
Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public document room
located at Coastal Region Library, 8619 W. Crystal Street, Crystal
River, Florida 32629.
III. Discussion
The Petitioner alleged that CR3's compliance with one of its
licensing requirements, that is, maintaining a security program that
would be effective against terrorist attack, is inadequate.
Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that an operational security
response effectiveness drill conducted in 1995 was unsuccessful and the
results were not formally documented and reported to the NRC. Further,
the Petitioner claims that the deficiencies revealed by the drill have
never been corrected, and thus the plant remains susceptible to
terrorist attack.
Two types of security drills have been conducted at CR3: an
Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) by the NRC and a
Security Organization Response Exercise (SORX) by the licensee. The NRC
staff conducted an OSRE on February 15-18, 1994, and its results are
documented in a letter to the licensee dated August 11, 1994. The
licensee conducted SORX drills during May and June 1995. The staff
contacted Louis D. Putney, the attorney for the Petitioner, to clarify
whether the Petitioner's concern is related to the licensee's SORX or
the NRC's Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation. Mr. Putney
confirmed that the issue is related to the licensee's SORX drill.
In the course of the March 18-22 and April 3-5, 1996 inspection,
the inspector reviewed documentation, and interviewed licensed
representatives to determine whether the licensee was meeting
commitments specified in the Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP).
The inspector verified during these two inspection periods that the
security force was being trained in accordance with the provisions
outlined in the T&QP by reviewing 1995 records for 10 randomly selected
security force members employed in the position of either response team
member, alarm station operator/analyst, or access control officer. All
members of the security force were appropriately equipped. The records
reviewed indicate that the tasks, weapon requalification scores, and
physical fitness requirements were documented satisfactorily.
Interviews with security officers in various positions verified that
they were knowledgeable for their duties and responsibilities. The
inspector concluded that the licensee, at the time of these
inspections, was meeting the commitments specified in the licensee's
T&QP.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation for SORX
drills, which were conducted during May and June 1995. The licensee
used attendance sheets to document each participant's attendance and
performance. All participants for the seven SORX drills were documented
as performing satisfactorily. In addition, these attendance sheets were
signed and dated by the instructor/assessor, who on several occasions
was the Petitioner. The licensee stated that the drills were
successful, and inspection of the licensee's records and interviews
with its employees did not show otherwise. Upon further discussion with
licensee representatives, the inspector learned that licensee
documented the 1993 and 1994 drills on Form TDP-307 and the 1995 drills
on the attendance sheets as discussed above. Based on review of the
documentation, interviews of the licensee representatives and security
officers, and direct observations, the inspector concluded that there
were no discovered vulnerabilities in the licensee's safeguards system
or violations of licensed requirements during the licensee's SORX
drills and that the licensee's training and qualification program meets
the requirements in the T&QP.
The NRC inspector verified that the 1995 SORX drill results were
not reported to the NRC, as alleged by the Petitioner. However, there
is no regulatory requirement to report the results of drills unless
certain safeguards system weaknesses are discovered during the drills
that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to protected or
vital areas of the reactor. If the above weaknesses are discovered they
are required to be compensated, corrected and reported or documented in
accordance with NRC regulations; 10 CFR 73.55 and 73.71. No such
vulnerabilities in the 1995 SORX drills were identified. The staff did
not find violations of regulatory requirements in the conduct or
documentation of the 1995 drills, and the Petitioner's concerns are not
substantiated.
The Petitioner states that ``there is a general laxity of
security'' and ``a pattern of failure to report security breaches'' at
Crystal River. As the basis for these claims, the Petitioner cites
three separate incidents that occurred in 1995 for which security
reports were not filed: (1) A guard was found asleep at a compensatory
post, (2) a security lieutenant took his badge off site, and (3) a
guard was found reading a book instead of watching three security zones
as assigned.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71, licensees are required to report certain
safeguards events to the NRC within one hour of discovery and other
events must be recorded within 24 hours in the Safeguards Event Logs
that are maintained by each licensee. During the weeks of March 18-22
and April 3-5, 1996, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Safeguards
Event Logs for the period January 1995 to March 1996 to verify that the
criteria specified in 10 CFR 73.71 were being met. The inspector
verified that the three safeguards events identified by the Petitioner
were documented in Security Incident Reports and logged in the
licensee's Safeguards Event Log as required by 10 CFR 73.71. The
inspector also determined that these three events were not one hour
reportable events pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71, Appendix G. All of the
three events identified by the Petitioner were properly logged and
compensated for in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71. Therefore, the staff
substantiated that these incidents occurred, but did not substantiate
the Petitioner's claim of ``failure to report security breaches.''
During the March and April inspections, the inspector identified
four violations of regulatory requirements relating to failure to
adhere to the licensee's Physical Security Plan but unrelated to the
specific issues raised by the Petitioner. By letter dated May 1, 1996,
the staff issued a Notice of Violation citing these violations.
Three of these violations are related to operability of the vehicle
barrier gate,
[[Page 53463]]
protected area lighting and storage of safeguards material. In
response, on May 31, 1996, the licensee submitted its corrective action
plan to ensure that such violations would not recur.
The fourth violation related to certain compensatory measures that
the licensee implemented as part of its security upgrade. Specifically,
the violation cited that the licensee's compensatory actions decreased
the effectiveness of the alarm stations and did not meet the provisions
specified in 10 CFR 50.54(p). The NRC staff, in a letter dated March
29, 1996, informed the licensee to cease the compensatory measures. In
a subsequent meeting with the NRC on April 2, 1996, the licensee
informed the NRC of the actions that it would take to maintain
compliance with regulatory requirements. During the inspection of April
3-5, 1996, the NRC staff verified that the licensee was adhering to its
commitments. Although this violation was serious, the NRC staff
believes the timely actions implemented by the licensee to correct
these deficiencies were satisfactory and that no further action by the
NRC is warranted. Further, the staff concludes that neither the
incidents identified by the petitioner with respect to security
personnel's performance, nor the violations identified by the staff
constitute ``a general laxity of security.''
The Petitioner states that the licensee's current practice of using
only one guard to monitor several protected zones or entrances to the
protected area does not provide adequate security. The licensee has
committed to monitoring multiple protected zones or entrances in its
NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (hereinafter referred to as the
Plan) which describes compensatory measures that must be implemented
when equipment or other resources are not in service. During the weeks
of March 18-22 and April 3-5, 1996, the inspector reviewed the
licensee's security program at CR3 with respect to guard monitoring of
protected zones and found it to be in compliance with the Plan.
Additionally, the inspector reviewed the established compensatory posts
and determined that they were in accordance with the licensee's Plan
and also with the recommended NRC guidance developed in NUREG-1045,
``Guidance on the Application of Compensatory Safeguards Measures for
Power Reactor Licensees,'' dated January 1984.
On the basis of its inspection, the staff finds that the licensee's
current practice of monitoring multiple protected zones or entrances to
the protected area is consistent with the Plan and provides adequate
security. Therefore, the Petitioner's concern regarding the adequacy of
having one guard monitor several protected zones or entrances to the
protected area was not substantiated.
The Petitioner states that the licensee intends to reduce its
security force at CR3, and on that basis, the Petitioner raises a
concern that the reduction in the security force would compromise
security at the plant. In a discussion with licensee representatives on
April 4, 1996, the inspector confirmed that the licensee intends to
implement cost-saving measures that would employ new technology and
result in a slight reduction in the number of security officers. The
mere reduction in force does not indicate that plant security will be
compromised. The licensee must ensure that, notwithstanding its cost-
saving measures, its plan and security staffing will meet NRC
requirements and are adequate to protect public health and safety. The
number of security officers the licensee intends to utilize is required
to, and will, meet the current commitments specified in the licensee's
Plan. If the licensee decides to change the Plan commitments, it must
identify the changes and submit them to NRC in accordance with NRC
regulations. Therefore, the staff finds that the Petitioner's concern
regarding personnel reduction and its consequent effect on plant
security is not substantiated.
IV. Conclusion
The Petitioner's allegations have been partly substantiated.
However, the NRC staff concludes that these concerns do not warrant
suspension or revocation of Florida Power's license to operate CR3.
With respect to violations identified, the NRC is satisfied that the
licensee has taken appropriate action to correct the deficiencies. No
further action based on concerns raised by the Petitioner is warranted.
See Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Units 1, 2,
and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975); Washington Public Power Supply
System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 924 (1984).
Therefore, any further action on the issues addressed in this
Director's Decision is not warranted and the Petitioner's request for
suspension or revocation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 is denied. As
provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Director's Decision will be
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.
As provided by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the
final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision
within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of October 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-26160 Filed 10-10-96; 8:45 am]
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