[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 196 (Tuesday, October 12, 1999)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 55115-55123]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-26670]
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 1999 /
Presidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3--
The President
[[Page 55115]]
Executive Order 13140 of October 6, 1999
1999 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, including chapter 47 of title 10, United
States Code (Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. 801-946), in order to prescribe amendments to
the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
prescribed by Executive Order 12473, as amended by
Executive Order 12484, Executive Order 12550, Executive
Order 12586, Executive Order 12708, Executive Order
12767, Executive Order 12888, Executive Order 12936,
Executive Order 12960, and Executive Order 13086, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Part II of the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, is amended as follows:
a. R.C.M. 502(c) is amended to read as follows:
L``(c) Qualifications of military judge. A military
judge shall be a commissioned officer of the armed
forces who is a member of the bar of a Federal
court or a member of the bar of the highest court
of a State and who is certified to be qualified for
duty as a military judge by the Judge Advocate
General of the armed force of which such military
judge is a member. In addition, the military judge
of a general court-martial shall be designated for
such duties by the Judge Advocate General or the
Judge Advocate General's designee, certified to be
qualified for duty as a military judge of a general
court-martial, and assigned and directly
responsible to the Judge Advocate General or the
Judge Advocate General's designee. The Secretary
concerned may prescribe additional qualifications
for military judges in special courts-martial. As
used in this subsection ``military judge'' does not
include the president of a special court-martial
without a military judge.''
b. R.C.M. 804 is amended by redesignating the
current subsection (c) as subsection (d) and inserting
after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c):
L``(c) Voluntary absence for limited purpose of child
testimony.
L (1) Election by accused. Following a determination
by the military judge that remote live testimony of
a child is appropriate pursuant to Mil. R. Evid.
611(d)(3), the accused may elect to voluntarily
absent himself from the courtroom in order to
preclude the use of procedures described in R.C.M.
914A.
L (2) Procedure. The accused's absence will be
conditional upon his being able to view the
witness' testimony from a remote location.
Normally, a two-way closed circuit television
system will be used to transmit the child's
testimony from the courtroom to the accused's
location. A one-way closed circuit television
system may be used if deemed necessary by the
military judge. The accused will also be provided
private, contemporaneous communication with his
counsel. The procedures described herein shall be
employed unless the accused has made a knowing and
affirmative waiver of these procedures.
L (3) Effect on accused's rights generally. An
election by the accused to be absent pursuant to
subsection (c)(1) shall not otherwise affect the
accused's right to be present at the remainder of
the trial in accordance with this rule.''
[[Page 55116]]
c. The following new rule is inserted after R.C.M.
914:
L``Rule 914A. Use of remote live testimony of a child
L(a) General procedures. A child shall be allowed to
testify out of the presence of the accused after
the military judge has determined that the
requirements of Mil. R. Evid. 611(d)(3) have been
satisfied. The procedure used to take such
testimony will be determined by the military judge
based upon the exigencies of the situation.
However, such testimony should normally be taken
via a two-way closed circuit television system. At
a minimum, the following procedures shall be
observed:
L (1) The witness shall testify from a remote
location outside the courtroom;
L (2) Attendance at the remote location shall be
limited to the child, counsel for each side (not
including an accused pro se), equipment operators,
and other persons, such as an attendant for the
child, whose presence is deemed necessary by the
military judge;
L (3) Sufficient monitors shall be placed in the
courtroom to allow viewing and hearing of the
testimony by the military judge, the accused, the
members, the court reporter and the public;
L (4) The voice of the military judge shall be
transmitted into the remote location to allow
control of the proceedings; and
L (5) The accused shall be permitted private,
contemporaneous communication with his counsel.
L(b) Prohibitions. The procedures described above
shall not be used where the accused elects to
absent himself from the courtroom pursuant to
R.C.M. 804(c).''
d. R.C.M. 1001(b)(4) is amended by inserting the
following sentences between the first and second
sentences:
L``Evidence in aggravation includes, but is not
limited to, evidence of financial, social,
psychological, and medical impact on or cost to any
person or entity who was the victim of an offense
committed by the accused and evidence of
significant adverse impact on the mission,
discipline, or efficiency of the command directly
and immediately resulting from the accused's
offense. In addition, evidence in aggravation may 3
Linclude evidence that the accused intentionally
selected any victim or any property as the object
of the offense because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any
person.''
e. R.C.M. 1003(b) is amended--
L (1) by striking subsection (4) and
L (2) by redesignating subsections (5), (6), (7),
(8), (9), (10), and (11) as subsections (4), (5),
(6), (7), (8), (9), and (10), respectively.
f. R.C.M. 1004(c)(7) is amended by adding at end
the following new subsection:
L``(K) The victim of the murder was under 15 years of
age.''
Sec. 2. Part III of the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, is amended as follows:
a. Insert the following new rule after Mil. R.
Evid. 512:
L``Rule 513. Psychotherapist-patient privilege
L(a) General rule of privilege. A patient has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing a confidential
communication made between the patient and a
psychotherapist or an assistant to the
psychotherapist, in a case arising under the UCMJ,
if such communication was made for the purpose of
facilitating diagnosis or treatment of the
patient's mental or emotional condition.
L(b) Definitions. As used in this rule of evidence:
[[Page 55117]]
L (1) A ``patient'' is a person who consults with or
is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist for
purposes of advice, diagnosis, or treatment of a
mental or emotional condition.
L (2) A ``psychotherapist'' is a psychiatrist,
clinical psychologist, or clinical social worker
who is licensed in any state, territory,
possession, the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico
to perform professional services as such, or who
holds credentials to provide such services from any
military health care facility, or is a person
reasonably believed by the patient to have such
license or credentials.
L (3) An ``assistant to a psychotherapist'' is a
person directed by or assigned to assist a
psychotherapist in providing professional services,
or is reasonably believed by the patient to be
such.
L (4) A communication is ``confidential'' if not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of
the rendition of professional services to the
patient or those reasonably necessary for such
transmission of the communication.
L (5) ``Evidence of a patient's records or
communications'' is testimony of a psychotherapist,
or assistant to the same, or patient records that
pertain to communications by a patient to a
psychotherapist, or assistant to the same for the
purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's
mental or emotional condition.
L(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may
be claimed by the patient or the guardian or
conservator of the patient. A person who may claim
the privilege may authorize trial counsel or
defense counsel to claim the privilege on his or
her behalf. The psychotherapist or assistant to the
psychotherapist who received the communication may
claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. The
authority of such a psychotherapist, assistant,
guardian, or conservator to so assert the privilege
is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
L(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this
rule:
L (1) when the patient is dead;
L (2) when the communication is evidence of spouse
abuse, child abuse, or neglect or in a proceeding
in which one spouse is charged with a crime against
the person of the other spouse or a child of either
spouse;
L (3) when federal law, state law, or service
regulation imposes a duty to report information
contained in a communication;
L (4) when a psychotherapist or assistant to a
psychotherapist believes that a patient's mental or
emotional condition makes the patient a danger to
any person, including the patient;
L (5) if the communication clearly contemplated the
future commission of a fraud or crime or if the
services of the psychotherapist are sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan
to commit what the patient knew or reasonably
should have known to be a crime or fraud;
L (6) when necessary to ensure the safety and
security of military personnel, military
dependents, military property, classified
information, or the accomplishment of a military
mission;
L (7) when an accused offers statements or other
evidence concerning his mental condition in
defense, extenuation, or mitigation, under
circumstances not covered by R.C.M. 706 or Mil. R.
Evid. 302. In such situations, the military judge
may, upon motion, order disclosure of any statement
made by the accused to a psychotherapist as may be
necessary in the interests of justice; or
L (8) when admission or disclosure of a
communication is constitutionally required.
L(e) Procedure to determine admissibility of patient
records or communications.
L (1) In any case in which the production or
admission of records or communications of a patient
other than the accused is a matter in dis
[[Page 55118]]
pute, a party may seek an interlocutory ruling by
the military judge. In order to obtain such a
ruling, the party shall:
L (A) file a written motion at least 5 days prior to
entry of pleas specifically describing the evidence
and stating the purpose for which it is sought or
offered, or objected to, unless the military judge,
for good cause shown, requires a different time for
filing or permits filing during trial; and
L (B) serve the motion on the opposing party, the
military judge and, if practical, notify the
patient or the patient's guardian, conservator, or
representative that the motion has been filed and
that the patient has an opportunity to be heard as
set forth in subparagraph (e)(2).
L (2) Before ordering the production or admission of
evidence of a patient's records or communication,
the military judge shall conduct a hearing. Upon
the motion of counsel for either party and upon
good cause shown, the military judge may order the
hearing closed. At the hearing, the parties may
call witnesses, including the patient, and offer
other relevant evidence. The patient shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend the
hearing and be heard at the patient's own expense
unless the patient has been otherwise subpoenaed or
ordered to appear at the hearing. However, the
proceedings shall not be unduly delayed for this
purpose. In a case before a court-martial composed
of a military judge and members, the military judge
shall conduct the hearing outside the presence of
the members.
L (3) The military judge shall examine the evidence
or a proffer thereof in camera, if such examination
is necessary to rule on the motion.
L (4) To prevent unnecessary disclosure of evidence
of a patient's records or communications, the
military judge may issue protective orders or may
admit only portions of the evidence.
L (5) The motion, related papers, and the record of
the hearing shall be sealed and shall remain under
seal unless the military judge or an appellate
court orders otherwise.''
b. Mil. R. Evid. 611 is amended by inserting the
following new subsection at the end:
L(d) Remote live testimony of a child.
L (1) In a case involving abuse of a child or
domestic violence, the military judge shall,
subject to the requirements of subsection (3) of
this rule, allow a child victim or witness to
testify from an area outside the courtroom as
prescribed in R.C.M. 914A.
L (2) The term ``child'' means a person who is under
the age of 16 at the time of his or her testimony.
The term ``abuse of a child'' means the physical or
mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, or
negligent treatment of a child. The term
``exploitation'' means child pornography or child
prostitution. The term ``negligent treatment''
means the failure to provide, for reasons other
than poverty, adequate food, clothing, shelter, or
medical care so as to endanger seriously the
physical health of the child. The term ``domestic
violence'' means an offense that has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against a person and is committed by
a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of
the victim; by a person with whom the victim shares
a child in common; by a person who is cohabiting
with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse,
parent, or guardian; or by a person similarly
situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim.
L (3) Remote live testimony will be used only where
the military judge makes a finding on the record
that a child is unable to testify in open court in
the presence of the accused, for any of the
following reasons:
L (A) The child is unable to testify because of
fear;
L (B) There is substantial likelihood, established
by expert testimony, that the child would suffer
emotional trauma from testifying;
L (C) The child suffers from a mental or other
infirmity; or
[[Page 55119]]
L (D) Conduct by an accused or defense counsel
causes the child to be unable to continue
testifying.
L (4) Remote live testimony of a child shall not be
utilized where the accused elects to absent himself
from the courtroom in accordance with R.C.M.
804(c).''
Sec. 3. Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, is amended as follows:
a. Insert the following new paragraph after
paragraph 100:
L100a. Article 134--(Reckless endangerment)
La. Text. See paragraph 60.
Lb. Elements.
L (1) That the accused did engage in conduct;
L (2) That the conduct was wrongful and reckless or
wanton;
L (3) That the conduct was likely to produce death
or grievous bodily harm to another person; and
L (4) That under the circumstances, the conduct of
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
Lc. Explanation.
L (1) In general. This offense is intended to
prohibit and therefore deter reckless or wanton
conduct that wrongfully creates a substantial risk
of death or serious injury to others.
L (2) Wrongfulness. Conduct is wrongful when it is
without legal justification or excuse.
L (3) Recklessness. ``Reckless'' conduct is conduct
that exhibits a culpable disregard of foreseeable
consequences to others from the act or omission
involved. The accused need not intentionally cause
a resulting harm or know that his conduct is
substantially certain to cause that result. The
ultimate question is whether, under all the
circumstances, the accused's conduct was of that
heedless nature that made it actually or imminently
dangerous to the rights or safety of others.
L (4) Wantonness. ``Wanton'' includes ``reckless,''
but may connote willfulness, or a disregard of
probable consequences, and thus describe a more
aggravated offense.
L (5) Likely to produce. When the natural or
probable consequence of particular conduct would be
death or grievous bodily harm, it may be inferred
that the conduct is ``likely'' to produce that
result. See paragraph 54c(4)(a)(ii).
L (6) Grievous bodily harm. ``Grievous bodily harm''
means serious bodily injury. It does not include
minor injuries, such as a black eye or a bloody
nose, but does include fractured or dislocated
bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious
damage to internal organs, and other serious bodily
injuries.
L (7) Death or injury not required. It is not
necessary that death or grievous bodily harm be
actually inflicted to prove reckless endangerment.
Ld. Lesser included offenses. None.
Le. Maximum punishment. Bad-conduct discharge,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
confinement for 1 year.
Lf. Sample specification. In that
______________________ (personal jurisdiction
data), did, (at/on board--location) (subject-matter
jurisdiction data, if required), on or about
________________________ 19____, wrongfully and
recklessly engage in conduct, to wit:
L(he/she)(describe conduct) and that the accused's
conduct was likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm to __________________.''
Sec. 4. These amendments shall take effect on 1
November 1999, subject to the following:
[[Page 55120]]
a. The amendments made to Military Rule of Evidence
611, shall apply only in cases in which arraignment has
been completed on or after 1 November 1999.
b. Military Rule of Evidence 513 shall only apply
to communications made after 1 November 1999.
c. The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Martial
502, 804, and 914A shall only apply in cases in which
arraignment has been completed on or after 1 November
1999.
d. The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Martial
1001(b)(4) and 1004(c)(7) shall only apply to offenses
committed after 1 November 1999.
e. Nothing in these amendments shall be construed
to make punishable any act done or omitted prior to 1
November 1999, which was not punishable when done or
omitted.
f. The maximum punishment for an offense committed
prior to 1 November 1999, shall not exceed the
applicable maximum in effect at the time of the
commission of such offense.
g. Nothing in these amendments shall be construed
to invalidate any nonjudicial punishment proceeding,
restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial in
which arraignment occurred, or other action begun prior
to 1 November 1999, and any such nonjudicial
punishment, restraint, investigation, referral of
charges, trial, or other action may proceed in the same
manner and with the same effect as if these amendments
had not been prescribed.
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 6, 1999.
Changes to the Analysis Accompanying the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States.
1. Changes to Appendix 21, the Analysis accompanying
the Rules for Courts-Martial, United States (Part II,
MCM).
a. R.C.M. 502(c). The analysis accompanying R.C.M.
502(c) is amended by inserting the following at the end
thereof:
L ``1999 Amendment: R.C.M. 502(c) was amended to
delete the requirement that military judges be ``on
active duty'' to enable Reserve Component judges to
conduct trials during periods of inactive duty for
training (IDT) and inactive duty training travel
(IATT). The active duty requirement does not appear in
Article 26, UCMJ which prescribes the qualifications
for military judges. It appears to be a vestigial
requirement from paragraph 4e of the 1951 and 1969 MCM.
Neither the current MCM nor its predecessors provide an
explanation for this additional requirement. It was
deleted to enhance efficiency in the military justice
system.''
b. R.C.M. 804(c). The analysis accompanying R.C.M.
804 is amended by redesignating the current subsection
(c) as subsection (d) and by inserting after subsection
(b) the following new subsection (c):
L ``(c) Voluntary absence for limited purpose of
child testimony.
L 1999 Amendment: The amendment provides for two-
way closed circuit television to transmit a child's
testimony from the courtroom to the accused's location.
The use of two-way closed circuit television, to some
degree, may defeat the purpose of these alternative
procedures, which is to avoid trauma to children. In
such cases, the judge has discretion
[[Page 55121]]
to direct one-way television communication. The use of
one-way closed circuit television was approved by the
Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(1990). This amendment also gives the accused the
election to absent himself from the courtroom to
prevent remote testimony. Such a provision gives the
accused a greater role in determining how this issue
will be resolved.''
c. R.C.M. 914A. Insert the following analysis after
the analysis to R.C.M. 914:
L ``1999 Amendment: This rule allows the military
judge to determine what procedure to use when taking
testimony under Mil. R. Evid. 611(d)(3). It states that
normally such testimony should be taken via a two-way
closed circuit television system. The rule further
prescribes the procedures to be used if a television
system is employed. The use of two-way closed circuit
television, to some degree, may defeat the purpose of
these alternative procedures, which is to avoid trauma
to children. In such cases, the judge has discretion to
direct one-way television communication. The use of
one-way closed circuit television was approved by the
Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(1990). This amendment also gives the accused an
election to absent himself from the courtroom to
prevent remote testimony. Such a provision gives the
accused a greater role in determining how this issue
will be resolved.''
d. R.C.M. 1001(b)(4). The analysis to R.C.M.
1001(b)(4) is amended by inserting the following
paragraph before the analysis of R.C.M. 1001(b)(5):
L ``1999 Amendment: R.C.M. 1001(b)(4) was amended
by elevating to the Rule language that heretofore
appeared in the Discussion to the Rule. The Rule was
further amended to recognize that evidence that the
offense was a ``hate crime'' may also be presented to
the sentencing authority. The additional ``hate crime''
language was derived in part from section 3A1.1 of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in which hate crime
motivation results in an upward adjustment in the level
of the offense for which the defendant is sentenced.
Courts-martial sentences are not awarded upon the basis
of guidelines, such as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, but rather upon broad considerations of the
needs of the service and the accused and on the premise
that each sentence is individually tailored to the
offender and offense. The upward adjustment used in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines does not directly
translate to the court-martial presentencing procedure.
Therefore, in order to adapt this concept to the court-
martial process, this amendment was made to recognize
that ``hate crime'' motivation is admissible in the
court-martial presentencing procedure. This amendment
also differs from the Federal Sentencing Guideline in
that the amendment does not specify the burden of proof
required regarding evidence of ``hate crime''
motivation. No burden of proof is customarily specified
regarding aggravating evidence admitted in the
presentencing procedure, with the notable exception of
aggravating factors under R.C.M. 1004 in capital
cases.''
e. R.C.M. 1003(b). The analysis accompanying R.C.M.
1003 is amended by adding the following as the last
paragraph of the analysis:
L ``1999 Amendment: Loss of numbers, lineal
position, or seniority has been deleted. Although loss
of numbers had the effect of lowering precedence for
some purposes, e.g., quarters priority, board and court
seniority, and actual date of promotion, loss of
numbers did not affect the officer's original position
for purposes of consideration for retention or
promotion. Accordingly, this punishment was deleted
because of its negligible consequences and the
misconception that it was a meaningful punishment.''
f. R.C.M. 1004. The analysis to R.C.M. 1004(c)(7)
is amended by adding the following as the last
paragraph of the analysis:
L ``1999 Amendment: R.C.M. 1004(c)(7)(K) was added
to afford greater protection to victims who are
especially vulnerable due to their age.''
[[Page 55122]]
2. Changes to Appendix 22, the Analysis accompanying
the Military Rules of Evidence (Part III, MCM).
a. Mil. R. Evid. 501. The analysis to Mil. R. Evid.
501 is amended--
(1) by striking:
L``The privilege expressed in Rule 302 and its
conforming Manual change in Para. 121, is not a doctor-
patient privilege and is not affected by Rule 501(d).''
(2) by adding at the end:
L ``1999 Amendment: The privileges expressed in
Rule 513 and Rule 302 and the conforming Manual change
in R.C.M. 706, are not physician-patient privileges and
are not affected by Rule 501(d).''
b. Mil. R. Evid. 513. Insert the following analysis
after the analysis of Mil. R. Evid. 512:
L ``1999 Amendment: Military Rule of Evidence 513
establishes a psychotherapist-patient privilege for
investigations or proceedings authorized under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Rule 513 clarifies
military law in light of the Supreme Court decision in
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135
L.Ed.2d 337 (1996). Jaffee interpreted Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 to create a federal psychotherapist-
patient privilege in civil proceedings and refers
federal courts to state laws to determine the extent of
privileges. In deciding to adopt this privilege for
courts-martial, the committee balanced the policy of
following federal law and rules, when practicable and
not inconsistent with the UCMJ or MCM, with the needs
of commanders for knowledge of certain types of
information affecting the military. The exceptions to
the rule have been developed to address the specialized
society of the military and separate concerns that must
be met to ensure military readiness and national
security. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974);
U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955);
Dept. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
There is no intent to apply Rule 513 in any proceeding
other than those authorized under the UCMJ. Rule 513
was based in part on proposed Fed. R. Evid. (not
adopted) 504 and state rules of evidence.
L Rule 513 is not a physician-patient privilege.
It is a separate rule based on the social benefit of
confidential counseling recognized by Jaffee, and
similar to the clergy-penitent privilege. In keeping
with American military law since its inception, there
is still no physician-patient privilege for members of
the Armed Forces. See the analyses for Rule 302 and
Rule 501.
L(a) General rule of privilege. The words ``under
the UCMJ'' in this rule mean Rule 513 applies only to
UCMJ proceedings, and do not limit the availability of
such information internally to the services, for
appropriate purposes.
L(d) Exceptions. These exceptions are intended to
emphasize that military commanders are to have access
to all information that is necessary for the safety and
security of military personnel, operations,
installations, and equipment. Therefore,
psychotherapists are to provide such information
despite a claim of privilege.''
c. Mil. R. Evid. 611. The analysis accompanying
Rule 611 is amended by adding at the end of the
analysis the following:
L ``1999 Amendment: Rule 611(d) is new. This
amendment to Rule 611 gives substantive guidance to
military judges regarding the use of alternative
examination methods for child victims and witnesses in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) and the change in Federal
law in 18 U.S.C. section 3509. Although Maryland v.
Craig dealt with child witnesses who were themselves
the victims of abuse, it should be noted that 18 U.S.C.
section 3509, as construed by Federal courts, has been
applied to allow non-victim child
[[Page 55123]]
witnesses to testify remotely. See, e.g., United States
v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying
section 3509 to a non-victim child witness, but
reversing a child sexual assault conviction on other
grounds) and United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885
(9th Cir. 1994) (affirming conviction based on remote
testimony of non-victim child witness, but remanding
for re-sentencing). This amendment recognizes that
child witnesses may be particularly traumatized, even
if they are not themselves the direct victims, in cases
involving the abuse of other children or domestic
violence. This amendment also gives the accused an
election to absent himself from the courtroom to
prevent remote testimony. Such a provision gives the
accused a greater role in determining how this issue
will be resolved.''
3. Changes to Appendix 23, the Analysis accompanying
the Punitive Articles (Part IV, MCM).
The following paragraph is inserted after the
analysis of paragraph 100:
L``100a. Article 134--(Reckless endangerment)
Lc. Explanation. This paragraph is new and is based
on United States v. Woods, 28 M.J. 318 (C.M.A. 1989);
see also Md. Ann. Code art. 27, sect. 120. The
definitions of ``reckless'' and ``wanton'' have been
taken from Article 111 (drunken or reckless driving).
The definition of ``likely to produce grievous bodily
harm'' has been taken from Article 128 (assault).''
Changes to Forms of Sentences of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States
a. Paragraph b of Appendix 11, Forms of Sentences,
is amended--
L (1) by striking the catch phrase ``Loss of
Numbers, Etc.''
L (2) by striking subparagraph 6;
L (3) by striking subparagraph 7;
L (5) by striking the last sentence from the Note
at the end of Paragraph b.
b. Paragraph b of Appendix 11, Forms of Sentences,
is amended by redesignating paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 as paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, and 14 respectively.
Changes to the Maximum Punishment Chart of the Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States
Appendix 12, the Maximum Punishment Chart, is
amended by adding after Art. 134 (Quarantine, breaking)
the following:
``Reckless endangerment . . . . BCD 1 yr. Total''
Changes to the Discussion Accompanying the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States
a. The Discussion following R.C.M. 1001(b)(4) is
amended by striking the first paragraph.
b. The Discussion to R.C.M. 1003(b) is amended by
striking subparagraph (4).
[FR Doc. 99-26670
Filed 10-8-99; 8:45 am]
Billing code 3195-01-P
