[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 203 (Friday, October 21, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-26090]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: October 21, 1994]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part V
Federal Communications Commission
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47 CFR Parts 25 and 94
Licensing Policies and Procedures, Satellite Communications; Final Rule
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 25 and 94
[CC Docket No. 92-166; FCC No. 94-261]
Licensing Policies and Procedures, Satellite Communications
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final Rule.
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SUMMARY: In this final rule, the Commission publishes rules to govern
the licensing and regulation of low-Earth orbit (LEO) mobile-satellite
systems operating in the 1610-1626.5/2483.5-2500 MHz frequency bands.
This rule follows a notice of proposed rulemaking published in the
Federal Register on March 14, 1994 [59 FR 11746]. The qualification
requirements and technical rules are intended to permit licensing of
these systems and the provision of new domestic and international
satellite services.
EFFECTIVE DATE: November 21, 1994.
ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20554.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Fern Jarmulnek, International Bureau, (202) 634-1682; Kathleen
Campbell, International Bureau, (202) 634-1952.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
1. By this Report and Order, the Commission takes the next step in
the process of licensing the world's first commercial low-Earth orbit
(LEO) satellites capable of providing both voice and data mobile
satellite services (MSS) on a global basis. The satellites are to
operate in the 1610-1626.5/2483.5-2500 MHz bands that were recently
allocated both internationally and domestically to MSS.\1\ This new
mobile satellite service--the ``MSS Above 1 GHz'' or ``Big LEO''
satellite service--has the potential to provide not only a variety of
new services to users in the United States, but to provide integrated
communication services to all parts of the world, including those that
are now grossly underserved. In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(Notice), adopted in January 1994,\2\ the Commission proposed rules and
policies to govern the service. Thirty-three parties filed comments in
response to the Notice and 18 parties filed reply comments.\3\ Since
the pleading cycle closed, four of the applicants filed a Joint
Proposal and Supplemental Comments (Joint Proposal).\4\ A fifth
applicant sent a letter to the Chairman (FCC) on September 14, 1994
regarding the Joint Proposal.\5\ In this Report and Order, we adopt
many of the proposals in the Notice, adopt others with modification,
and defer action on several issues where a decision is premature. We
also adopt many, but not all, of the terms of the Joint Proposal. We
believe our decision will promote participation by the greatest number
of applicants in an expeditious time frame.\6\ It will create a new
industry providing enormous economic benefit to the United States, and
any other country that chooses to participate in the service.
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\1\International Telecommunication Union, Final Acts of the
World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-92), Malaga-Torremolinos
(1992); Report and Order, ET Docket No. 92-28, 9 FCC Rcd 536 (1994)
(Allocation Order).
\2\Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish Rules and
Policies Pertaining to a Mobile Satellite Service in the 1610-
1626.5/2483.5-2500 MHz Frequency Bands, 9 FCC 2d 1094 (1994).
\3\A list of commenters is attached as Appendix A.
\4\See Note 23, infra.
\5\See Note 23, infra.
\6\See S.R. 103-309 (July 14, 1994).
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2. All six applicants who filed applications by the cut-off date,
as detailed below, will be provided with an opportunity to file amended
applications that conform with the rules adopted today. Given the
importance of proceeding quickly with licensing systems in this
revolutionary service, amended applications must be filed by November
16, 1994 in order to receive continued consideration. As is our usual
practice in the satellite area, each applicant must request
construction, launch and operating authority to retain its status in
this processing group. All amendments must be accompanied by the
appropriate fee for applications for launch and operating authority for
LEO satellite systems, if that fee has not yet been submitted.
Applicants will be provided until January 31, 1996, at their option, in
which to make a complete financial showing.\7\
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\7\See para. 40, Infra.
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3. As described in the Notice, the Big LEO service can offer an
almost limitless number of services, including ubiquitous voice and
date mobile services position location services, search and rescue
communications, disaster management communications, environmental
monitoring, paging services, facsimile transmission services, cargo
tracking, and industrial monitoring and control.\8\ Domestically, this
service will help meet the demand for a seamless, nationwide and
eventually global communications system that is available to all and
that can offer a wide range of voice and data telecommunication
services. In addition to enhancing the competitive market for mobile
telecommunication services in areas served by terrestrial mobile
services, this new mobile satellite service will offer Americans in
rural areas that are not otherwise linked to the communications
infrastructure immediate access to a feature-rich communications
network. Moreover, Big LEO systems can extend these benefits throughout
the world, and can provide those countries that have not been able to
develop a nationwide communication service an ``instant'' global and
national telecommunication infrastructure.\9\ This network can be used
to provide both basic and emergency communications to their entire
populations. Big LEO systems may prove to be critical component in the
development of the global information highway.
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\8\See paras. 196-202, infra, regarding the use of Big LEO
systems of emergency communications.
\9\It is estimated that some of these services will cost as
little as 22 cents per minute.
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4. The Big LEO service also has the potential to stimulate
significant economic growth both in the United States and abroad. A
potential multi-billion dollar industry will be created, generating
opportunities for economic growth in a variety of markets. First, the
estimated costs to construct the applicants' space segments range from
$97 million to over $2 billion each. The manufacturing costs for the
ground segment, which include both user units and gateway stations, are
expected to be hundreds of millions of dollars more. Thus,
manufacturing these systems may lead to a substantial investment in the
United States economy and create a significant number of high paying
jobs in the areas of research and development, production, marketing
and service administration. As the services become available,
additional growth opportunities will be created. One of the applicants,
for example, expects that by 2001 the demand for user transceivers will
be 1.3 million in the United States and 4.7 million worldwide.\10\ If
so, this will create a major global industry whose function will be to
provide users with mobile units and services. As demand grows and as
markets develop, additional employment opportunities will be created.
Customer purchases of transceivers and user service charges will
generate additional investment in the economies of the host countries.
Finally, the enhanced communications services offered by this industry
will, of themselves, create a broad secondary economic growth.
Immediate access to an advanced global communications infrastructure
can increase the efficiency of existing businesses and create new ones.
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\10\Application of Motorola Satellite Communications, Inc. at
11.
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5. The United States has led the world in developing and
implementing satellite technology. We expect many of the economic,
cultural and other gains we have seen in the fixed-satellite industry
to be reflected in the new mobile satellite industry. The Big LEO
proposal before us represent an opportunity for the United States to
continue its leadership role in promoting global development through
enhanced communication infrastructures and services. We intend to
license these systems as quickly as possible so that this opportunity
is not lost.
II. Background
6. As described in the Notice,\11\ this proceeding was initiated in
late 1990, when Ellipsat Corporation (Ellipsat)\12\ and Motorola
Satellite Communications, Inc. (Motorola) filed applications to
construct LEO satellite systems in the 1610-1626.5/2483.5-2500 MHz
bands and the 1610-1626.5 MHz band, respectively.\13\ At the time these
applications were filed, there was no frequency allocation in these
bands for MSS. The banks were allocated to, among other services, the
radiodetermination satellite service (RDSS), which encompasses
satellite radionavigation and radiolocation services.\14\ The Motorola
and Ellipsat systems were intended to provide voice and data MSS in
addition to RDSS. Both applicants requested waivers of the U.S. Table
of Frequency Allocations, 47 CFR Sec. 2.1, to permit non-conforming MSS
operations in the bands.\15\
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\11\See Notice, note 2, supra, at paras. 5-9.
\12\Ellipsat is now doing business as Mobile Communications
Holdings, Inc. Because it has participated throughout this
proceeding as Ellipsat, we will continue to refer to it as Ellipsat
in this Report and Order.
\13\Ellipsat proposed the 1.6 GHz band for Earth-to-space
transmissions and the 2.4 GHz band for space-to-Earth transmissions.
Motorola proposed to use the 1.6 GHz band for bidirectional
transmissions. Motorola later modified its application to request
the 1616-1626.5 MHz band only. See Minor Amendment filed by Motorola
(Aug. 14, 1992).
\14\Portions of the banks are also allocated to the aeronautical
radionavigation service (ARNS), the radioastronomy service, the
terrestrial fixed-service and for use by industrial, scientific, and
medical equipment. See paras. 98-162, infra, for a complete
discussion of sharing between MSS and other allocated services.
\15\These waiver requests have become moot in light of the
subsequent domestic and international MSS allocation in these bands.
See note 1, supra.
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7. The Commission placed the Ellipsat and Motorola proposals on
public notice and established a June 3, 1991 cut-off date for filing
applications to be considered concurrently with them.\16\ In response,
Constellation Communications, Inc. (Constellation), Loral Cellular
Systems Corp., now doing business as Loral Qualcomm Partnership (LQP),
TRW, Inc. (TRW), and AMSC Subsidiary Corporation (AMSC) filed
applications. Constellation, LQP, and TRW proposed to construct LEO
satellite systems. AMSC proposed to add additional frequencies onto its
authorized geostationary satelliteorbit (GSO) system.\17\ The LEO
applicants proposed two basic LEO system architectures. TRW, LQP,
Ellipsat, and Constellation proposed a code division multiple access
(CDMA) architecture. CDMA systems can share the same frequencies when
operating under certain technical constraints.\18\ Motorola proposed a
time division multiple access/frequency division multiple access (TDMA/
FDMA) architecture. TDMA/FDMA systems must operate on separate
dedicated frequencies.\19\ AMSC's proposed GSO system could use either
CDMA or narrowband FDMA techniques.
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\16\Public Notice, Report No. DS-1068, 6 FCC Rcd 2083 (1991).
\17\AMSC requested authority to modify its authorized upper L-
band (1545-1559/1646.5-1600.5 MHz) MSS system to include the 1616.5-
1626.5 MHZ frequency bands.
\18\Spread spectrum CDMA is a digital transmission technique in
which the signal occupies a bandwidth larger than that needed to
contain the information being transmitted. Because the signal is
spread over a wide bandwidth, the power is dispersed and
interference potential is reduced. The spreading is accomplished by
modulating the signal by a code that is independent of the
information data. A synchronized code in the receiver is used to de-
spread the signal and recover the information. The spreading and the
variation in the code permit a number of users to operate on the
same frequency simultaneously without causing harmful interference.
\19\TDMA is a transmission technique in which the same frequency
band is used by both uplink and downlink transmissions in
alternating time slots. FDMA provides multiple discrete channels
with different center frequencies.
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8. The World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-92), allocated
frequencies for MSS in February 1992.\20\ Specifically, the 1610-1626.5
MHz band was allocated on a co-primary basis with other radio services
for MSS Earth-to-space operations and the 2483.5-2500 MHz band was
allocated on a co-primary basis for space-to-Earth operations.\21\ In
addition, a secondary allocation was made for MSS space-to-Earth
operations in the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz segment of the 1.6 GHz band.
Shortly thereafter, the Commission proposed an identical domestic
allocation and subsequently adopted that allocation in December
1993.\22\
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\20\See note 1, supra.
\21\``Primary'' services have equal rights to operate in
particular frequencies. Stations operating in primary services are
protected against interference from stations of ``secondary''
services. Moreover, stations operating in a secondary service cannot
claim protection from harmful interference from stations of a
primary service. See 47 CFR Secs. 2.104(d) and 2.105(c).
\22\See note 1, supra.
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9. The Commission conducted a negotiated rulemaking from January
through April 1993 to assist it in developing technical rules for the
MSS Above 1 GHz service. The Negotiated Rulemaking Committee's (the
Committee's) work included technical matters relating to compatibility
among the proposed MMS systems (inter-system sharing issues),
compatibility between MSS and other services in the band or in adjacent
bands (inter-service sharing issues), and the operations of MSS feeder
links and intersatellite links. The Committee reached consensus on many
issues, but did not reach a consensus regarding a technical method by
which all proposed systems could be accommodated within the 1610-
1626.5/2483.5-2500 MHz bands.\23\
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\23\See Report of the MSS Above 1 GHz Negotiated Rulemaking
Committee (Apr. 6, 1993). The Committee included two independent
attachments discussing this issue in the Report. One was supported
by AMSC, Celsat, Inc., Constellation, Ellipsat, LQP and TRW. The
other was supported by Motorola. Since the end of the Negotiated
Rulemaking, the LEO applicants have submitted several partial
settlement proposals. See Joint Filed Comments, submitted by
Motorola and LQP (Oct. 7. 1993); Joint Spectrum Sharing Proposal,
submitted by Constellation, Ellipsat and TRW (Oct. 8, 1993). Joint
Proposal and Supplemental Comments submitted by Constellation,
Ellipsat, Motorola, and TRW (Sept. 9, 1994). See also letter from
LQP to FCC (Sept. 13, 1994).
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10. In January 1994, the FCC adopted the Notice proposing, among
other things, a LEO design requirement, a requirement that systems be
capable of serving all areas of the world (except for the polar
regions) for at least 75% of each day, a requirement that systems be
capable of serving all areas of the United States at all times. and a
requirement that applicants demonstrate sufficient current assets or
irrevocably committed financing to meet construction and launch costs
for the entire system. We also proposed a spectrum sharing plan that
could accommodate up to five systems. We indicated that if mutual
exclusivity could not be resolved, we would consider awarding licenses
by auction, lottery or comparative hearing.\24\
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\24\Notice, note 2, supra, at paras. 29-47.
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III. Discussion
A. Licensing Procedures
1. Qualification Requirements
11. As discussed in the Notice, unless otherwise proscribed by
rule, statute or treaty, the Commission has traditionally adopted
qualification requirements for each satellite service that reflect the
nature of and entry opportunities for the particular service being
licensed. Where entry opportunities for a particular service are
limited, our threshold qualification requirements for that service are
designed to ensure that those awarded licenses can expeditiously
implement state-of-the-art systems that further the public interest. If
applicants are unable to meet the basic qualifying criteria, their
applications are dismissed without additional hearing.
a. Technical qualifications--i. Orbit considerations. 12. In the
Notice, we proposed to require MSS Above 1 GHz systems to operate in
non-geostationary orbits.\25\ Because of their lower altitude orbits,
LEO systems ``can shorten the transmission time between two earth
stations, serving to reduce or eliminate the time delay that may now be
present in [GSO] satellite-delivered telephone service.''\26\ We also
stated that the Communications Act specifically requires us ``to
encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the
public.''\27\ We noted that LEO satellite systems, which cover higher
latitudes than GSO satellites, and provide a variety of low power links
to and from terrestrial equipment, represent such a new technology. We
also noted that the inherently global nature of LEO systems offers a
broad range of public interest benefits for the United States,
including increased possibilities of U.S. leadership in developing and
implementing satellite technology, and enhanced U.S. global
competitiveness in telecommunication. We suggested that the unique
features of LEO systems would foster social and economic benefits
throughout the world.
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\25\Id. at paras. 20-22; proposed Sec. 25.143(b)(1).
\26\Id. at para. 22.
\27\47 U.S.C. 157.
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13. We requested comment on the potential for MSS Above 1 GHz
systems to generate social, economic, and technical benefits, both
domestically and globally, and the extent to which these benefits are
realizable with LEO and GSO satellites. We also asked applicants to
specify the extent to which their proposed systems will foster these
goals and the manner in which their services are planned to be offered.
Prospective customers were asked to specify their anticipated use or
uses of MSS Above 1 GHz systems, including a discussion of whether
equivalent services can be provided by LEO and GSO facilities and
whether, and the extent to which, alternative terrestrial services are
available.
14. AirTouch Communications (AirTouch), Constellation, Ellipsat,
LQP, Motorola, Novacom Inc. (Novacom), and TRW support our proposal to
require MSS Above 1 GHz systems to operate in LEO orbits. The range of
technical benefits to the United States and world communities by LEO
systems includes virtually instantaneous voice transmissions, broader
geographic coverage, use of low power handheld transceivers and small
antennas. AMSC, Comsat, Mobile Communications (Comsat), Mobile Datacom
Corporation (Mobile Datacom), and Newcomb Communications, Inc.
(Newcomb) do not support our proposal. They argue that there will be no
significant qualitative or quantitative difference in the time delay
experienced by users of GSO and non-GSO systems and that GSO systems
are capable of providing services to most of the Earth. They further
argue that LEO technology is subject to shadowing outages,\28\ is more
complex, and is unproven.
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\28\Shadowing occurs when transmissions from the satellite or
mobile transceivers are blocked by buildings and vegetation.
Shadowing also occurs to GSO systems when the user transceiver
terminal is located on a vehicle.
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15. We adopt our proposed LEO design requirement. First, AMSC has
not convinced us that our assumption regarding the time delay in high
altitude GSO systems was in error. While system processing times
associated with non-GSO satellite handoffs may be marginally longer
than the 18 milliseconds noted by LQP, AMSC has not shown that a GSO
system's typical voice transmission delay of some 250 milliseconds, or
even longer for multiple hops, is not noticeable to users.
16. Further, LEO systems are significantly superior in their
coverage capabilities. While GSO systems can provide coverage to most
of the world, this coverage is limited in areas of high latitude,
including parts of Alaska. AMSC concedes that GSO systems can provide
only ``near'' total coverage of the Earth. Although GSO systems are
capable of providing acceptable services across most of the Earth's
surface, LEOs are capable of providing truly global coverage. LEO
technology, for example, may enable residents of remote parts of Alaska
to have individual telephone access for the first time. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that provision of such broad
geographical service reduces the capacity of LEO systems to serve more
concentrated areas, as AMSC suggests. The public interest would be best
served by the technology that offers the broadest potential coverage.
17. The use of handheld transceivers also is facilitated by LEO
systems. LEO satellites' lower power levels alleviate the need for
large antennas aboard the spacecraft and reduce transceiver weight and
volume, enhancing their portability. By contrast, AMSC suggests that
handheld transceivers are not contemplated by GSO systems.\29\ Its
immediate plans do not include handheld capability, though its second
generation system is expected to support them.\30\ As we embark on the
promise of new mobile technologies, we find it in the public interest
to permit the timely deployment of personal communications services
that include the broad use of handheld transceivers.
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\29\AMSC Reply Comments at 3, n. 1.
\30\Id.
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18. One risk cited by AMSC is the increased possibility that the
satellites in the LEO constellation will collide with other objects in
space. We do not view this as stifling LEO technology. Both the
likelihood of collisions and future mitigation methods are being
discussed in domestic and international fora. However, the record in
this proceeding does not support a finding that space collisions will
become a significant problem for LEO systems. We also acknowledge that
the reception shadowing associated with LEO satellite movement relative
to the Earth's surface (which AMSC suggests would adversely affect
signal quality during voice communications) may add to the operational
challenges confronting LEO MSS technology. There is no showing,
however, that shadowing is more of a problem with LEO technology than
it is with GSO technology.
19. Advocates of both GSO and LEO systems argue that their
technology will offer economic and social benefits, domestically and
globally. The essential advantage of GSO systems is their proven
capability to provide telecommunication services. Intelsat and Inmarsat
are but two examples. These successes, however, are not sufficient to
preclude embracing a new and potentially more efficient technology,
notwithstanding its substantial risks and costs. On the contrary, the
Commission has a mandate to encourage new technologies and
services.\31\ While both LEO and GSO systems portend substantial
opportunities for employment growth and export of U.S. technologies
worldwide, LEO systems have greater potential to serve more uniformly
the United States and international locations with smaller, more
ubiquitous and lower power equipment. This leads us to conclude that
the primary use of the subject spectrum should be by LEO systems. We
therefore adopt Section 25.143(b)(2)(i) as proposed in the Notice.
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\31\47 U.S.C. 157.
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20. Most commenters agree that it would be difficult for GSO and
LEO systems to operate MSS services together in this band. Indeed, this
was a significant factor in our decision to propose limiting the 1610-
1626.5/2483.5-2500 MHz band to LEO systems Notwithstanding our decision
to adopt a LEO design requirement, we would consider authorizing a GSO
system in these bands upon a showing that its operations would not
cause interference to or affect LEO operations. Similarly, the
provision of radiodetermination satellite services (RDSS) by either LEO
or GSO systems would be permissible if fully compatible with licensed
LEO MSS systems.\32\
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\32\See 47 CFR Sec. 25.141(f).
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ii. Global vs. regional coverage. 21 In our Notice, we discussed
the geographic coverage we would require these satellite systems to
provide. In view of our interest in furthering the creation of the
global information infrastructure, we proposed to require each MSS
Above 1 GHz applicant to demonstrate that its proposed system is
capable of providing mobile satellite service to all areas of the
world, with the exception of the polar regions, for at least 75% of
every 24 hour period. Specifically, we proposed that Big LEO satellite
systems be designed so that at least one satellite would be visible
above the horizon at an elevation angle of at least 5 deg. for at least
18 hours each day at latitudes less than 80 deg..\33\
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\33\See Notice, note 2, supra, App. A at 1152; proposed Section
25.143(b)(2)(ii).
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22. The commenters generally support this requirement. They
disagree, however, on the extent to which systems must offer service in
or near the polar regions. The majority, including the system
applicants, agree that there is little need for a requirement to serve
unpopulated areas. They argue that the additional costs associated with
such service would not be justified. For example, TRW suggests that
service up to 80 deg. northern and southern latitudes may not be
necessary, because there are no populated areas that far north or south
and the economic costs of requiring such service are high. Ellipsat
favors requirements of 55 deg. Southern Latitude and 75 deg. degrees
Northern Latitude, to cover all but the most remote population centers.
The parties to the Joint Proposal modify their previous positions by
suggesting a coverage requirement of up to 70 deg. North Latitude and
55 deg. South Latitude.
23. As noted, LEO systems are capable of providing service to all
points on Earth. We recognize, however, the need to balance system cost
against geographical service area. We agree with the commenters that it
is sufficient, given projected need and alternative service options, to
require service only to populated areas. We therefore require that Big
LEO systems be capable of serving locations as far north as 70 deg.
latitude and as far south as 55 deg. latitude. This will allow coverage
to populated areas that cannot be reached by GSO systems. While ships
and airplanes may traverse the polar regions beyond these latitudes,
they are not necessarily deprived of service because the LEO satellites
may, in fact, be visible.
iii. Continuous coverage of the fifty states. 24. We indicated in
the Notice that the public interest would be served if LEO systems
provided efficient and ubiquitous voice service to users throughout the
United States. We therefore proposed to require each LEO system to have
at least one satellite at an elevation angle of at least 5 deg. at any
given time in all areas of the United States.\34\
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\34\See id.; proposed Section 25.143(b)(2)(iii).
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25. Several commenters note that we proposed to require global
``mobile satellite services'' in proposed Section 25.143(b)(2)(ii) and
domestic ``voice'' service in proposed Section 25.143(b)(2)(iii). Our
expectation is that LEO system operators will have market incentives to
offer more than merely voice services, but for purposes of consistency
we will revise proposed Section 25.143(b)(2)(iii) to read ``mobile
satellite services.'' Further, in the Joint Proposal, the parties agree
that Big LEO systems should be capable of covering all fifty states,
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. We will amend Section
25.143(b)(2)(iii) to reflect this coverage.
b. Financial qualifications. 26. In light of the enormous costs
involved in constructing and launching a satellite system, we have
always considered financial ability a significant factor in determining
whether an applicant is qualified to hold a license. Historically, the
Commission has fashioned financial requirements for satellite services
on the basis of entry opportunities in the particular service being
licensed. This stems from our repeated experience that licensees
without sufficient available resources spend a significant amount of
time attempting to raise the necessary financing and that those
attempts often end unsuccessfully.\35\ Consequently, where a grant to
an under-financed applicant may preclude a fully capitalized applicant
from implementing its plans, and service to the public may be
consequently delayed, we have required a stringent financial showing to
ensure that the public interest would be served.\36\ We have required a
less stringent financial showing where grant to an under-financed
applicant will not prevent another from going forward. For example, we
required only a detailed business plan in the radiodetermination
satellite service, where all applicants could be accommodated and
future entry was possible.\37\ In contrast, we required evidence of
full, irrevocable financing in the domestic-fixed satellite service,
where applications to implement space stations regularly exceed the
number of available orbital locations for those satellites.\38\
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\35\See, e.g., National Exchange Satellite, Inc., 7 FCC Red 1990
(Com. Car. Bur. 1992); Rainbow Satellite, Inc., Mimeo No. 2584 (Com.
Car. Bur., released Feb. 14, 1985); United States Satellite Systems,
Inc., Mimeo No. 2583 (Com. Car. Bur., released Feb. 14, 1985)
(domestic satellite licenses declared null and void for failure to
begin implementation as required by license). In addition, Geostar
Corporation, a start-up company licensed in the radiodetermination
satellite service, declared bankruptcy nearly five years after its
licenses were issued. It had not built any of its satellites.
\36\This approach has not prevented smaller firms from
participating in the satellite services market because ownership of
a space station is not mandatory. Space station capacity can be
leased or bought, and earth stations can be acquired at relatively
low costs.
\37\Amendment to the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum
for, and to Establish Other Rules and Policies Pertaining to, a
Radiodetermination Satellite Service, 104 FCC 2d 650 (1986) (RDSS
Licensing Order). We note that none of the four entities awarded
licenses implemented their proposed systems, with the last remaining
licensee, Geostar Corporation, declaring bankruptcy in 1991.
\38\Licensing Space Stations in the Domestic-Fixed Satellite
Service, 50 Fed. Reg. 36071 (Sept. 5, 1985) (1985 Processing Order).
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27. The Negotiated Rulemaking Committee could not agree to a method
by which all six proposed systems could be licensed. Further, the
sharing plan we proposed in the Notice, and which we adopt today,\39\
does not accommodate all pending applicants and leaves little or no
spectrum available for expansion of existing systems or the development
of future MSS systems within the United States. Consequently,
consistent with our past practice, we seek to ensure that those
applicants awarded Big LEO licenses have the financial ability to
proceed.
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\39\See paras. 44-45, infra.
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28. The domestic fixed-satellite standard was developed to serve
the public interest by deterring warehousing and inefficient use of
valuable orbit spectrum resources. Given the same public interest
concerns here, we proposed in the Notice a financial standard for the
Big LEO service identical to the one used in the domestic fixed-
satellite service, noting that a lesser standard could allow permittees
to tie up scarce spectrum resources while preventing other qualified
entities from providing service to the public.\40\ Thus, we proposed to
require Big LEO applicants to provide evidence of current assets,
operating revenues, or irrevocably committed debt or equity financing
sufficient to meet the estimated costs of constructing and launching
all planned satellites, and operating the system for the first
year.\41\
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\40\1985 Processing Order, note 38, supra, at para. 8.
\41\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 27. We noted that ``first
year operational costs'' were to be calculated for the year
following the launch of the first satellite in the constellation.
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29. The four parties to the Joint Proposal suggest using a less
stringent financial standard that requires an applicant to show
``financial preparedness, including reliance on projected revenues and
future public offerings'' in order to be granted a construction permit.
Within one year from the date of the grant of a license, each permittee
would be required to demonstrate that it meets the domestic fixed-
satellite service financial standard with respect to 25% of the total
constellation construction and launch costs. LQP, in contrast, argues
that this proposed relaxation of financial standards must be balanced
against the concern that only viable applicants be licensed.\42\
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\42\See Letter from Chairman, Loral Corporation to Christopher
B. Galvin, Motorola, Inc. (Sept. 13, 1994).
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30. We conclude that although more relaxed approaches may be used
for some satellite services, a strict financial requirement is
warranted for the Big LEO service. The proposed Big LEO systems will
cost between $97 million and $2 billion to implement. These are, by
far, the most expensive satellite systems to date. As we indicated in
the Notice, our experience with the satellite industry has proven that
arranging financing for any space station system, even one
significantly less costly than a Big LEO system, is extremely
difficult, even after a construction permit has been granted.\43\
Consequently, adopting a lesser financial standard than the domestic
fixed-satellite standard, such as the one suggested in the Joint
Proposal, could tie up spectrum for years, with contrary to the public
interest. While system implementation milestone requirements\44\ will
provide a mechanism by which to revoke the licenses of those entities
that are not capable of going forward, this process takes considerable
time and can delay qualified entities from implementing systems and
providing service to the public.\45\ Because all pending Big LEO
applicants cannot be accommodated and because there appears to be no
room for future entry, granting an under-financed space station
applicant a license may preclude an applicant that possesses the
necessary financial resources from implementing its plans, and
consequently service to the public may be delayed. Accordingly, we
conclude that a financial demonstration identical to the one used in
the domestic fixed-satellite service, as proposed in the Notice, should
be adopted for the Big LEO service.
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\43\See note 35, supra.
\44\See paras. 188-193, infra.
\45\For example, ABCI, Rainbow, and USSSI were granted domestic
fixed-satellite licenses in early 1983. Those licenses were not
declared null and void until two years later, shortly before action
was taken on the next processing group of domsat applications.
Applications in that particular processing group had been on file
since late 1983 and action on that group was delayed, in part, by
the ABCI, Rainbow, and USSSI proceedings. See e.g., United States
Satellite Systems, Inc., FCC 83-602 (released Jan. 23, 1984)
(granting USSSI an additional six months in which to complete its
financing), Mimeo No. 2583 (released Feb. 14, 1985) (revoking USSSI
authorizations), FCC 85-394 (released Aug. 29, 1985) (denying
USSSI's applications for review).
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31. Applicants relying on internal financing need not set aside
specific funds for their systems. Rather, as in the domestic fixed-
satellite service, we require only a demonstration of current assets or
operating income sufficient to cover system costs. The availability of
internal funds sufficient to cover a system's costs provides adequate
assurance at the time the Commission acts on the application that the
system can be built and launched. Current assets--which includes cash,
inventory, and accounts receivable--provide a general measure of a
company's ability to finance the project itself or to raise funds from
lenders and equity investors on the basis of its on-going operations.
Highly capitalized companies possess more collateral and, thus, are in
a better position to borrow money than thinly capitalized companies.
32. Further, ``irrevocably'' committed external financing is
financing that has been approved and does not rest on contingencies
which require action by either party to the loan or equity investment.
In other words, the instrument of financing must demonstrate that the
lender has already determined that the applicant is creditworthy and,
absent a material change in circumstances, is prepared to make the loan
immediately upon grant of a Commission authorization.\46\ This is not
to preclude applicants from relying on operating revenues from the
initial operations of their systems to finance the remainder of their
systems. Nevertheless, to ensure that the system is completed in a
timely manner if revenues are not available as soon as anticipated, we
require a commitment that a lender is prepared to finance the entire
cost of the system.
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\46\For example, a change in general market conditions or in the
applicant's creditworthiness is an acceptable limitation on the
lender's commitment to make the loan. Further, a lender is not
required to lend the applicant the entire sum at once. Rather,
funding can be staggered to reflect the system's implementation
schedule or the applicant's need to access those funds. See
Licensing Space Stations in the Domestic-Satellite Service, 101 FCC
2d 223 (1985) (1985 Processing Group Notice of Proposed Rulemaking),
at para. 22.
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33. Some of the applicants argued in their comments\47\ that a more
relaxed standard is supported by our use of a less stringent financial
requirement in the radiodetermination satellite service (RDSS) and the
non-voice, non-geostationary (NVNG) service. These parties argue that
the unproven nature of the RDSS and NVNG services led to the adoption
of a financial standard that permitted applicants to finance the
systems as they are built and deployed, and that similar considerations
apply in the Big LEO service. Our primary reason for the ``relaxed''
standard in the RDSS and NVNG services, however, was that all pending
applicants could be accommodated and future entry was possible.\48\
Consequently, a grant to an under-financed applicant would not preclude
another qualified entity from going forward. The financial
qualification standard adopted for RDSS and NVNG services is therefore
inappropriate for Big LEOs.
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\47\We will address all concerns raised in the comments even
though they may be inconsistent with the positions taken by the
applicants in the Joint Proposal.
\48\See Notice, note 2, supra, at 1108; RDSS Licensing Order,
note 37, supra; Report and Order in CC Docket No. 92-76, 8 FCC Rcd
8450 (1993) (NVNG MSS Order).
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34. Some of the applicants also argue that we should require only a
demonstration of partial financing. They contend that applicants that
have the financing to meet construction and launch costs for the number
of satellites needed to provide limited domestic and global service
will be able to finance the remainder of their systems with the
operating income from these services. Such a position, however, would
not promote the global availability of this service. A system that
relies too heavily on operating income from its first satellites for
its completion could easily become stalled before it is able to provide
domestic or global service that meets our service requirements.\49\ Any
applicant that cannot demonstrate the capability to launch more than a
limited number of satellites should not be considered for licensing at
the expense of potential entrants that could provide global service and
continuous domestic service.
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\49\See para. 29, supra.
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35. Ellipsat comments that we should require applicants relying on
internal funds to demonstrate a management ``commitment'' to expend
those funds for the Big LEO project. Ellipsat argues that this
requirement would put companies with greater capital assets on an even
footing with smaller applicants who must rely on ``irrevocable''
outside loan commitments to establish their financial qualifications.
As we stated in adopting the domestic-fixed satellite standard, we will
not require management to set aside specific funds for the system. We
will, however, require applicants relying on internal assets to provide
a balance sheet demonstrating current assets or operating income
sufficient to meet the space segment costs together with evidence of a
management commitment to the project. This does not require an
unalterable commitment that the funds will be expended regardless of
market conditions. Rather, consistent with our approach to credit
arrangements provided by outside sources, management of the corporation
providing the funding must commit that absent a material change in
circumstances, it is prepared to expend the necessary funds.\50\ Those
applicants relying on financing from parent corporations must make the
same showing with respect to the parent corporation's commitment.
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\50\See 1985 Processing Order, note 38, supra, at n. 26.
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36. AMSC urges that, given the short life of LEO satellites, we
should require the applicants to demonstrate the financial capability
to build an entire constellation and a fleet of replacement satellites.
Although some of the proposed systems use satellites with a short life,
a requirement to demonstrate full funding for these before the first
generation is built would be exceptionally onerous and unnecessary. We
are confident that after constructing and operating a full fleet of
satellites, a licensee would have ample incentive and resources to
implement replacement satellites, unless there is insufficient demand.
In that case, however, the public would not be harmed by
discontinuation of the licensee's service.
37. We recognize that applicants may be able to provide the service
requirements adopted today with fewer satellites than proposed in the
pending applications. In such a case, an applicant has the option of
course, to modify its pending application to specify only those
satellites necessary to meet our minimum requirements, and its
financial and technical showing would need to cover only such a
constellation. It could then apply to expand its constellation as
originally envisioned, as it attains the financial capability to do so.
38. Consequently, to meet the public interest objective of ensuring
prompt initiation of this new satellite service, we adopt our proposed
rule that requires each Big Leo applicant to demonstrate the ability to
build and launch all satellites for which it has applied, which
includes those satellites necessary to fulfill our service
requirements, and to operate its system for one year after launch of
the first satellite in its constellation. In doing so, however, we
shall modify our eligibility requirements somewhat in an effort to
achieve greater participation by the applicants in this processing
group.
39. First, consistent with our paramount objective of securing
early implementation of these satellite services, we shall adopt a
rule, consistent with our proposal in the Notice, that will enable
applicants who can now demonstrate their financial qualifications to
receive priority in obtaining license grants. Thus, any applicant who
can submit a complete, amended application on or before November 16,
1994, and demonstrates financial capability under the standards set
forth in the rule adopted in this proceeding, will be processed
immediately. Assuming sufficient spectrum is available to award
licenses to all such financially and otherwise qualified applicants, we
will grant licenses to these applicants. Given the national and other
public interest benefits of ensuring the United States' global
leadership in providing these important new satellite services, we also
plan to process these applications on an expedited basis, with action
anticipated by January 31, 1995. Making these grants promptly will
enable such fully qualified applicants to begin immediately the time-
consuming process of satellite construction, thereby significantly
assisting in United States' efforts to complete the international
coordination process and achieving our statutory and public interest
objective of bringing new and innovative services to the public at the
earliest possible time.
40. We also wish, however, to accord some processing priority to
other applicants in this group who may need more time to establish
their financial qualifications, and who have all devoted significant
time, effort and resources towards establishing the Big LEO service
both domestically, in the Negotiated Rulemaking, and internationally.
For example, until feeder link frequencies can be assigned to a
particular system, which will not likely occur until after the next
World Radio Conference to be held in November 1995 (WRC-95), it may be
difficult for some of these applicants to finalize financial
arrangements for their systems. Consequently, in an effort to afford an
additional opportunity for entry by such applicants, we will allow
applicants who cannot meet our financial qualifications requirement at
this time an additional period of time to establish their
qualifications. Specifically, we will require these applicants to file
amended applications by November 16, 1994 to ensure their continued
consideration, but we will allow them until January 31, 1996--two
months after the completion of WRC-95--to demonstrate compliance with
the financial standard adopted today.
41. Under our two-tiered eligibility rule, applicants who make a
decision to defer their financial showing until January, 1996, will not
jeopardize their status in the current processing group. Specifically,
new applications for Big LEO systems will not be considered until after
action on the six pending applications is completed. Nevertheless, such
applicants will not be accorded the same processing priority as those
applicants who are willing and able to demonstrate their financial
qualifications far sooner, by November 16, 1994, and whose expeditious
grants will better enable us to achieve early and successful
international coordination and implementation of this service. Because
the spectrum sharing plan we adopt today accommodates up to five
systems,\51\ we also recognize that applicants choosing not to make a
financial showing until January 1996, may find their applications are
mutually exclusive situations. Nevertheless, we believe a very
significant likelihood exists that our financial eligibility rule will
result in more of these applicants obtaining grants and that, in the
intervening time frame until January 1996, events may occur that avoid
mutual exclusivity altogether.
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\51\See paras. 44-45, infra.
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42. If it turns out that all six applicants are able to establish
their financial qualifications by the November 16, 1994 deadline for
amended applications, or alternatively, that all six applicants defer
their financial showings until January 1996 and all are then deemed
financially qualified, we will implement the auction procedure
described below, paras. 88-97, to award licenses. If, however, some
grants have been made prior to January 1996, and a mutually exclusive
situation arises then, the auction procedure outlined below cannot be
used. However, given the uncertainty that such a situation will ever
arise, we will not at this time decide how to process any such
remaining mutually exclusive applications. Presumably, however, such
grants would be awarded through an auction mechanism that is
appropriate in the circumstances. We have decided, however, to defer
any final decision on that issue at this time.
2. Spectrum Sharing Plan
a. Background. 43. As we discussed in the Notice, the six
applicants proposed two system designs (LEO and GSO) and two system
architectures (CDMA and TDMA/FDMA). A CDMA architecture would permit
multiple systems to share the same frequencies. A TDMA/FDMA
architecture would operate bi-directionally in a portion of the 1.6 GHz
band only and would require each system to operate on discrete
frequency band segments. The Committee's work plan called for the
Committee to develop rules that would maximize multiple entry and avoid
or resolve mutual exclusivity among the six applications. The
applicants, however, could not develop a set of technical parameters
and sharing criteria that could accommodate all proposed systems. In
the Notice, we proposed a sharing plan that could accommodate up to
four CDMA systems and one TDMA/FDMA system.\52\ The plan was based, in
part, upon partial settlement proposals filed by two groups of LEO
applicants after the Negotiated Rulemaking was concluded.\53\ The plan
proposed to assign licensees implementing CDMA systems in the United
States to 11.35 MHz of shared bandwidth at 1610-1621.35 MHz. It
proposed to assign a TDMA/FDMA system operating in the United States to
5.15 MHz of dedicated bandwidth at 1621.35-1626.5 MHz. If only one CDMA
system is implemented, the plan proposed to adjust the domestic
assignment for that system to 8.25 MHz at 1610-1618.25 MHz, leaving the
freed 3.15 MHz of spectrum available for possible reassignment to the
TDMA/FDMA licensee or for new entry. We also tentatively concluded that
CDMA systems would be provided with equal amounts of downlink and
uplink spectrum, unless CDMA system proponents could demonstrate an
unequal assignment was warranted.
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\52\Our plan included both system architectures for two reasons:
(1) the record did not support a finding that one architecture is
superior to the other, and (2) the plan would permit up to five
systems to be licensed, furthering our multiple entry policy.
\53\See note 23, supra.
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b. The basic plan. 44. All five applicants proposing LEO systems
agree that our plan provides a basis for accommodating five LEO
systems. None takes issue with the framework of the plan: up to four
CDMA systems can share 11.35 MHz of bandwidth in the 1.6 GHz band and
that one TDMA/FDMA system can operate over 5.15 MHz of dedicated
bandwidth. Constellation, for example, states that 11.35 MHz can
``support competitive CDMA systems operating in a sharing
environment.''\54\ Motorola supports awarding a single TDMA/FDMA
license in 5.15 MHz of bandwidth.\55\ LQP, TRW, and Ellipsat all agree
that both LEO transmission techniques can be accommodated, with CDMA
systems operating on shared spectrum. Indeed, the four proponents of
the Joint Proposal, supported by LQP, explicitly agree to an 11.35 MHz/
5.15 MHz spectrum split.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\Constellation Comments at 19.
\55\Motorola Comments at 47, n. 35.
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45. Despite its general agreement that its system could be
accommodated in 11.35 MHz of shared spectrum, Constellation contends in
its comments that all five LEO applicants should be given equal options
to use the spectrum. Specifically, it argues that adoption of rules
requiring four LEO applicants share spectrum, while allowing the
remaining applicant to have exclusive use of its own band segment or
assigning prime spectrum to one applicant and impaired spectrum to
another, would violate the doctrine enunciated in Ashbacker Radio Corp.
v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) (Ashbacker). We do not agree that a rule
requiring sharing by applicants proposing CDMA systems, and that
permits other applicants to have exclusive spectrum, implicates
Ashbacker. Such a rule is merely a reasonable exercise of our
rulemaking authority, based upon the technical characteristics of the
systems involved. We also note that the CDMA applicants agreed to a
band sharing plan. Indeed, Constellation agrees that its system can be
accommodated in a shared band. Consequently, we adopt the plan's basic
framework.\56\
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\56\See Final Report of the Majority of the Active Participants
of Informal Working Group 1 to Above 1 GHz Negotiated Rulemaking
Committee, Annex 1 (Attachment 1 to Committee Report) and Joint
Proposal, note 23, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
46. Despite their general support for the plan, all LEO applicants
request some modifications or clarifications. The requests center
around three issues: (1) what portion of the 2.4 GHz MSS downlink band
will be available to the CDMA licensees; (2) whether MSS operations in
the lower 6 MHz of the 1.6 MHz band will be impaired by GLONASS, the
Russian Global Navigation Satellite System, and radioastronomy serviced
(RAS) operations in that band; and (3) whether the 11.35 MHz CDMA
assignment will be automatically reduced to 8.25 MHz should only one
CDMA system become operational. We discuss these in turn.
c. Downlink assignment. 47. In the Notice, we assumed that CDMA
systems assigned to share the 1.6 GHz uplink spectrum would require a
corresponding amount of 2.4 GHz downlink spectrum. We requested comment
on this assumption. All CDMA operators strongly disagree, arguing in
their comments and in the Joint Proposal that CDMA applicants should be
allowed to share the entire 16.5 MHz of 2.4 GHz downlink spectrum
allocated to MSS. They argue that the systems must operate over the
entire bandwidth to achieve maximum capacity at minimum cost. According
to the CDMA proponents, if the number of satellites transmitting in any
segment of the 2.4 GHz band is minimized, the satellites' cost can be
substantially reduced. They also argue that the 2.4 GHz band is already
constrained by international and domestic power flux density (pfd)
limits and other existing services, which limits the number of users
that can be served, and that any limitations on bandwidth will further
affect system capacity.
48. We are convinced that the entire 16.5 MHz of spectrum allocated
domestically and internationally at 2483.5-2500 MHz should be assigned
to Big LEO system downlinks in the United States. There is no
compelling reason to restrict use of this band. Indeed, assignment of
the entire band should provide operators with sufficient flexibility to
coordinate their operations with other Big LEO systems in the band and
to accommodate other users in the band or in adjacent bands with little
or no corresponding loss of capacity. Consequently, we will provide
CDMA operators with access to the entire allocated 2.4 GHz band.
Moreover, only satellite systems using CDMA will be permitted in this
band.
d. Interim plan. 49. As we discussed in the Notice, interference
problems between MSS and certain proposed applications on GLONASS, the
Russian Global Navigation Satellite System, will not permit co-
frequency co-system coverage in the United States and internationally
in the 1610-1616 MHz band. Specifically, if GLONASS is used in
conjunction with the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) to provide
aircraft precision approach and terminal communications, as
contemplated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), MSS would
not be able to operate in the shared band because of the potential for
MSS mobile terminal interference into GLONASS mobile receivers.\57\ We
indicated in the Notice that we had initiated inter-agency and
international negotiations regarding the use of GLONASS and were
encouraged that even if GLONASS were ultimately used to provide
services incompatible with MSS, the GLONASS final frequency plan would
be changed to bands below 1606 MHz only, making the 1610-1616 MHz band
available for MSS operations.\58\ We recognized, however, that a
GLONASS transition to bands below 1606 MHz may not be completed when
the first MSS satellites are launched in the late 1990's. In that case,
we stated we would need to develop a transitional plan for MSS
migration into the vacated 1610-1616 MHz band ``with MSS licensees
operating on less than the full amount of their assigned spectrum
during the initial phases of their operation.''\59\
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\57\The FAA and the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) are investigating using the GLONASS and GPS systems in a
joint Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) that can support the
civil aviation community with the integrity that is required to
provide for precision approach landings. The Russian Federation is
now launching a second generation of GLONASS satellites, GLONASS-M,
which is operating over 24 channels in the 1596.7-1620.6 MHz band.
GLONASS-M has not been coordinated internationally. Approximately 40
administrations, including the United States, have submitted
comments or objections to the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau with
respect to GLONASS-M. However, the Russian Federation has been
coordinating the GLONASS-M system and has indicated that it has
resolved most of the objections by these administrations.
\58\The Russian Federation has indicated a willingness to use
channels 0-12 (1602-1608.75 MHz center frequency) commencing in
1998. A guardband of approximately 4 MHz would be required to
protect GLONASS-M narrowband signals from ground-based Mobile Earth
Station (MES) out-of-band radio frequency emissions on aviation GNSS
receivers using GLONASS signals.
\59\Notice, note 2, supra, at n.59.
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50. The applicants agree in their Joint Proposal that if GLONASS is
not moved in a timely manner, the Big LEO licensees should share the
burden of any spectrum loss. They argue, however, that we need not
develop a transitional plan now, but, rather, that we should allow the
parties to negotiate and reach such an agreement in the event GLONASS
compromises MSS operations. Both Motorola and LQP argue in their
comments that an interim plan would impede MSS by suggesting to GLONASS
equipment manufacturers and other countries that they need not plan for
the change in GLONASS frequencies and may lead to the view that
revision of the GLONASS frequency plan is optional.
51. Our ongoing discussions with other agencies and with the
Russian Federation continue to clarify the GLONASS issue. While we are
confident that GLONASS will be moved to bands below 1606 MHz, we do not
know when a full transition will occur. At our most recent bilateral
discussions, the Russian Federation suggested that a GLONASS migration
may not begin until 1998 and may not be completed until 2005.\60\ We do
not know whether GLONASS operations, before a migration to the final
frequency configuration, will affect MSS CDMA systems operating in the
lower frequency portion of the 1.6 GHz band, domestically or
internationally. This depends upon two related factors: (1) the extent
to which domestic and international civil aeronautical agencies and
organizations (such as ICAO) use GLONASS to provide approach and
terminal communications that are incompatible with MSS operations and
(2) the extent to which out-of-band emission limitations may be needed
for MSS transmissions.\61\ Nevertheless, a portion of the 1.6 GHz MSS
frequency band may not be available for first-generation domestic MSS
operations. At this time, the most likely worst-case scenario is that
the 1610-1612 MHz band segment assigned to CDMA systems in our sharing
plan may not be available for initial operations in the United
States.\62\ This is based on the launch and operation schedules
outlined in the various applications.
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\60\The Russian Federation has indicated that it can operate on
channels -7 to +6 after 2005 (1598 to 1605.375 MHz center
frequency). It has also indicated that it would only use channels 5
and 6 as technical channels over the Russian Federation. When this
is implemented, GLONASS's highest effective operational channel will
be 1604.25 MHz center frequency. Allowing for a 4 MHz guard band,
there will then be no restrictions on MSS in the 1.6 GHz band.
\61\RTCA, Inc., an advisory committee to the FAA, is studying
out-of-band emissions from mobile earth stations among other
potential interference sources to GNSS receivers. RTCA, Inc. has
formed an Ad Hoc Interference Subgroup (AHIS) of Special Committee
159 (SC-159) on Global Positioning Systems. A special Joint Task
Group on SATCOM/GNSS Interference is also studying the mutual
problems of electromagnetic compatibility of AMSS and GPS/GLONASS
equipment operating on the same platforms or on platforms located at
very close distances, i.e., airport terminals. See para. 137, infra.
\62\We note that to the extent MSS systems are launched before
1998, the 1610-1616 MHz portion of the 1.6 GHz band segment might
not be available if GLONASS is being used in the GNSS for
aeronautical operations. In that case, licensees can begin to
implement channels starting from the highest frequency range
downwards in conformance with the interim plan. We believe that this
should not present significant problems since it will occur at the
earliest stages of operations. We also note that it is possible that
the FAA will decide not to use GLONASS until it shifts its
frequencies to its final configuration. It may be prohibitively
expensive for airlines to develop and install equipment using
interim standards capable of protecting equipment using GLONASS. In
that event, we believe that it is likely that the Russian Federation
will advance the date to shift GLONASS frequencies to channel 6 and
below as early as possible. The most recent bilateral discussion
with the Russian Federation provides for periodic review of this
time table and the deployment of the MSS systems in order to resolve
any interference.
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52. We agree with the applicants that the burden of the potential 2
MHz shortfall should be shared among all 1.6/2.4 GHz MSS licensees. We
believe, however, that a transitional plan is warranted. Such a plan
will allow system launch to begin without potential delay and without
the uncertainty associated with allowing the licensees to attempt to
devise an interim plan on an ad hoc basis, as the Joint Proposal
suggests.\63\ In adopting an interim plan, we emphasize that we remain
optimistic that the plan will not need to be implemented. Indeed, as
provided in the Joint Proposal, all Big LEO operators will be
authorized to construct systems capable of operating across the entire
band allocated for that system architecture, that is, 1610-1626.5 MHz
for CDMA systems and 1616-1626.5 MHz for bi-directional FDMA/TDMA
systems. Further, even if the transitional plan is implemented, MSS
operators will be permitted to expand into the unused 1.6 GHz MSS
frequencies immediately after the GLONASS migration is completed. We
believe that any necessary transition among LEO licensees can be
completed within six months of that date.
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\63\We will, however, entertain a request for modification of
the interim plan if agreed to by all licensees.
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53. Our interim plan is based upon the most recent system designs
presented to us in the context of the Negotiated Rulemaking. Four of
the CDMA applicants propose to build systems using narrowband 1.25 MHz
transmission channels while one--TRW--proposes wider 5 MHz channels. If
the entire 11.35 MHz assignment designated for CDMA systems were
available, the narrowband licensees would be able to operate over 9
transmission channels, while the wider band operator would be able to
operate over two. If MSS cannot be provided in the 1610-1612 MHz
portion of the CDMA band segment because of GLONASS considerations, two
narrowband channels would be lost and one wideband channel would be
lost. Allowing CDMA licensees to shift frequencies by 1.25 MHz into the
designated TDMA/FDMA band at 1621.35-1626.5 MHz would provide both
narrowband and wideband CDMA licensees with access to one additional
channel. Consequently, until the entire 1610-1626.5 MHz band is
available for MSS operations, we will provide CDMA operators with the
option of operating in the 1621.35-1622.60 MHz band segment. In their
way, all Big LEO operators will bear some of the necessary operating
constraints--the narrow band CDMA operators by the net loss of one
channel, the wideband CDMA operators by the loss of one channel or by
the need to retune the center frequencies on both of its channels once
GLONASS is fully moved,\64\ and the FDMA/TDMA licensee by the loss of
operating bandwidth. Nevertheless, we are optimistic that these
measures will not be necessary or, if they are, that the effect on the
MSS industry will not be significant given their short term nature and
the anticipated incremental implementation of Big LEO service.
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\64\The additional interim bandwidth of 1.25 MHz (1621.35-
1622.60 MHz) would allow TRW to operate two 5 MHz CDMA channels at
1612.60 MHz to 1617.60 MHz and 1617.60 MHz to 1622.6 MHz. If it
chooses to do this, it would be required to move these channels to
1610 to 1615 MHz and 1615 to 1620 MHz once GLONASS is moved. This
would require the center frequencies on each channel to be shifted
or retuned.
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e. Conditions to the plan--i. Reduction in spectrum for single CDMA
system: 54. Another issue raised by the LEO applicants is our proposed
modification to the plan in the event only one CDMA licensee goes
forward.\65\ In this unlikely scenario, we proposed to reduce the
bandwidth assigned to that system automatically from 11.35 MHz to 8.25
MHz. We stated that an 8.25 MHz assignment, or one-half of the
available 1.6 GHz MSS allocation, should be sufficient to support a
viable system. We noted that the remaining 3.1 MHz of spectrum would be
made available to an operational FDMA/TDMA system upon a showing of
need or, if this demonstration could not be made, to a new entrant. The
four parties to the Joint Proposal suggest that if one CDMA and one
FDMA/TDMA system become operational, the 3.1 MHz of spectrum should be
available to both of these licensees upon a showing of need and should
not be made available to new entrants. In their comments, the CDMA
operators argued that an automatic spectrum reduction for a CDMA system
with no possibility of adjustment would penalize a CDMA licensee for
the failure of another operator to launch a system, that it does not
consider the efficiency of the system or whether the CDMA system is
sharing spectrum with a foreign system, that it does not give CDMA
operators a corresponding opportunity to gain access to bands above
1621.35 MHz upon failure or inefficient spectrum use by the FDMA/TDMA
licensee, and that it will seriously impair CDMA operations. They
further argued that even if GLONASS is moved, the lower frequency
portion of the band is subject to more interservice sharing constraints
because of protected radio astronomy operations.
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\65\Under the terms of each authorization, Big LEO licensees
will be required to meet specified implementation milestones for the
system. Failure to meet these deadlines will render the
authorization null and void. See para. 189, infra. The bandwidth
adjustment discussed here would be triggered only; (1) if no CDMA
system is licensed: (2) if only one CDMA system is licensed; or, (3)
if more than one CDMA system is licensed and all but one is declared
null and void.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
55. The CDMA proponents correctly state that uncertainties are
present in the lower portion of the band that are not present in the
upper portion. As noted, GLONASS is now operating in 1610-1616 MHz band
and we do not know exactly when it will be moved or the limitations its
operations will impose on MSS operations. Further, the radioastronomy
service (RAS) operates on a co-primary basis in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz
band. The agreement reached by the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee
regarding sharing between RAS and MSS imposes restrictions on MSS
operations provides certain operating constraints on MSS mobile earth
terminals in geographic areas near RAS sites.\66\ If RAS sharing proves
burdensome or if GLONASS is not fully moved in a timely fashion, an
assignment of 8.25 MHz for each of the two LEO system architectures may
not prove equivalent. Further, we do not know if, and the extent to
which, foreign systems will impact U.S. systems' operations across the
entire band. Consequently, we will defer any decision with respect to
the 3.1 MHz between 1618.25 and 1621.35 MHz until, and if, either of
those contingencies arises. At that time, we will have a clearer notion
of the extent of any inter-service sharing constraints in the lower
portion of the 1.6 GHz band. We will not, however, limit our
consideration for assignment of this band to the two licensed systems,
as the parties to the Joint Proposal urge. We do not think it is
advisable at this time to preclude new entrants from access to this
band. Rather, we will make the decision with respect to the 3.1 MHz, if
necessary, in the context of a rulemaking, based upon the circumstances
that have developed at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\See paras. 101-109, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Other potential scenarios. 56. Although not specifically
address in the Notice, the four parties to the Joint Proposal have
developed a plan in the event that only one system retains a
construction permit. In this scenario, the Joint Proposal would provide
that that system, whether TDMA/FDMA or CDMA, would be given access to
the entire 16.5 MHz of bandwidth.
57. We need not decide now on a course of action to be taken in the
event that only one Big LEO system is implemented, whether it is a CDMA
or TDMA/FDMA system. If and when that occurs, we will weigh a variety
of factors in a rulemaking, including our preference for multiple
entry, constraints on the assigned spectrum due to international
coordination agreements, system efficiency, and system loading, when
considering a spectrum adjustment for that system.
f. System amendments. 58. Several of the commenters question
whether applicants will be permitted to change their system designs
when amendments are filed. TRW, for example, asks us to clarify that a
change in transmission techniques from CDMA to TDMA/FDMA following
adoption of service rules will not constitute a major amendment under
Commission rules. This concern apparently stems from Section 25.116(c)
of our rules, which provides, in general, that any pending application
is to be considered a newly filed application if it is amended by a
major amendment after a ``cut-off'' date. The rule contains several
exceptions, including instances where the amendment resolves frequency
conflicts with other pending applications, but does not create new or
increased frequency conflicts.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\47 CFR 25.116(c)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
59. We have repeatedly emphasized that MSS Above 1 GHz applicants
who filed by the cut-off date will be afforded an opportunity to amend
their applications, if necessary, to bring them into conformance with
any requirements and policies that are adopted for satellite systems in
these bands.\68\ Thus, a change from a GSO system configuration to a
LEO system configuration to meet our satellite system design
requirement or a change in coverage patterns to conform with our
satellite visibility requirements would be permitted without affecting
a particular application's status in this processing group. However, a
change that is not necessary to bring the application into conformance
with our rules and which would increase frequency conflicts, such as a
change from a CDMA to a TDMA/FDMA architecture, would render the
application a newly filed application to be considered in a future
processing group.\69\ We recognize that if all six of the pending
applicants are found qualified under our Big LEO rules, our five-system
sharing plan will not be able to accommodate all of them. We discuss in
a succeeding section of this Report and Order the procedures that will
apply to applicants in these circumstances and that we will follow to
decide among the mutually exclusive applications.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\See Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 18 Public Notice, note
16, supra.
\69\We note that the three CDMA applicants participating in the
Joint Proposal have agreed not to change to a TDMA/FDMA
architecture.
\70\See paras. 88-97, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Inter-system coordination. 60. Several commenters also suggest
that we institute formal, but not necessarily codified, procedures or
guidelines for CDMA inter-system coordination in the context of
adopting a domestic sharing plan. Some suggest that we use the initial
sharing proposal submitted to the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee by
the CDMA applicants as the basis for a domestic framework. Indeed, the
three CDMA applicants participating in the Joint Proposal agree to
coordinate their systems in accordance with this framework
expeditiously and in good faith.
61. We applaud the CDMA applicants for their good faith efforts to
develop a framework for coordination. We have decided, however, not to
incorporate these procedures in the Commission's rules. Historically,
we have left domestic and separate international system inter-system
coordination to the satellite licensees themselves, since they are in
the best position to weigh the technical and economic trade-offs
inherent in any coordination agreement.\71\ This approach has proven
successful. Since the CDMA applicants have represented that sharing is
feasible, we expect that good faith efforts to resolve any outstanding
coordination issues expeditiously in accordance with the Joint Proposal
will commence after this Report and Order is issued. If the parties
believe that any entity is not negotiating in good faith or if an
impasse is reached on any issue, we will, upon request, become involved
in the process and, if necessary, will devise a solution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\See, e.g., Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc., 7 FCC Rcd
4672 (1992), at para. 8; GE American Communications, Inc. 3 FCC Red
6871 (1988), at para. 2; Assignment of Orbital Locations to Space
Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Service, 50 Fed. Reg. 35228
(1985), at para. 19; RDSS Licensing Order, note 37, supra, at para.
19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
62. Another coordination issued raised by some of the commenters is
whether and the extent to which a guardband is necessary between CDMA
and TDMA/FDMA systems and, if so, which architecture would bear the
burden. The parties to the Joint Proposal have agreed to develop an
emissions mask between the CDMA and TDMA/FDMA band segments that
spreads the burden between them. LQP, in contrast, suggests that an
emissions mask may override the allocations made at WARC-92 because a
mask will, in essence, protect Motorola's secondary downlink
transmissions in the 1.6 GHz band.
63. We need not resolve this matter now. Rather, while we recognize
that secondary services cannot, as a general matter, claim interference
protection from harmful interference from stations of a primary
service,\72\ we will leave the parties free to negotiate a guardband
agreement once the technical parameters of their amended system
proposals are finalized. If the parties negotiate an agreement that
protects secondary operations, we will accept that solution. If the
parties cannot agree, however, we will become involved and will look to
the Table of Frequency Allocations to determine where any operational
constraints are appropriately placed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\See note 21, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Plan If Mutual Exclusivity Is Not Resolved
64. We do not intend to continue our already-prolonged attempt to
resolve this proceeding by compromise in the event that mutual
exclusivity among the Big LEO applicants is not eliminated by
amendments submitted by the November 16, 1994 filing deadline, as there
is little reason to suppose that further pursuit of that elusive goal
would be useful. In the Notice, we discussed three alternative
procedures--comparative hearing, lottery, and auction--for resolving
this proceeding in the event that the proposed sharing plan did not
resolve mutual exclusivity and called for comment concerning the
feasibility and/or legal availability of each of them. If an auction or
lottery\73\ was employed, we proposed to divide the spectrum into
paired 2.0625 MHz uplink and downlink segments, with eight paired
segments available for licensing. We proposed to limit each successful
bidder or lottery winner to an award of up to four 2.0625 MHz paired
segments, noting that this should provide ample spectrum to support a
Big LEO system while allowing for at least two licensees.\74\ We
conclude that we can lawfully resolve this proceeding by means of an
auction and that, of the three, an auction would better serve the
public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\Because the LEO applications were filed prior to July 26,
1993, the Commission is not statutorily prohibited from considering
random selection as a licensing option. See Section 6002(e) of
Pub.L. 103-66.
\74\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Comparative hearing. 65. We continue to believe that the
prospect of delay in the initiation of service weighs heavily against
use of a comparative hearing, particularly in light of the need for
prompt participation by U.S. licensees in international
coordination.\75\ Whether conflict between Big LEO applications could
be resolved through a comparative hearing in less time than is
typically consumed in comparative hearings involving applications for
broadcast licenses--as TRW, the only commenter advocating use of
comparative hearings as a fall-back procedure, contends--is largely
beside the point. Even under the most optimistic assumptions, selection
of Big LEO licensees through a comparative hearing is likely to take
considerably longer than the use of a lottery or competitive bidding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Id. at para. 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
66. We also believe that a comparative hearing would be inadvisable
for other reasons. The Commission has previously stated that
comparative hearings would be inconsistent with our aim of affording
flexibility to satellite licensees.\76\ As a general matter, moreover,
we are reluctant to substitute our judgment for the wisdom of the
marketplace by dictating outcomes based on assessment of the relative
merits of applicants' service proposals. We doubt whether we would be
able to resolve all conflicts among LEO applications based on findings
that certain of the applications are demonstrably technically superior
to others. As previously noted, satellite design decisions involve
complex trade-offs between engineering, marketing, and financial
considerations, which are difficult to evaluate without reference to
the functioning of the marketplace.\77\ These design decisions are also
modified to accommodate regulations, marketplace and financial
constraints and uncertainties as these uncertainties become more
clearly defined in time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\See Rules to Allocate Spectrum for Mobile Satellite
Services, 6 FCC Rcd 4900, 4904 (1991), at paras. 19-20; and Rules to
Allocate Spectrum for a Land Mobile Satellite Service, 2 FCC Rcd
485, 487 (1987), at para. 15.
\77\2 FCC Rcd at 487, para. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Lottery. 67. Constellation is the only applicant that recommends
use of a lottery in the event that we cannot accommodate all qualified
applicants. It states that it favors this procedure only because it
believes that auctions would create unacceptable international
ramifications. LQP and TRW, in contrast, maintain that none of the
factors listed in the Conference Report on Section 309(i) that would
support the use of a lottery procedure is present here.\78\ LQP,
Motorola, and TRW also contend that a lottery would be inappropriate
because the pending applications involve technically diverse, non-
fungible proposals. LQP and TRW argue that it would be unfair to the
existing applicants, who have invested large sums of money in research
and development for their proposals, to choose winners by the luck of
the draw. TRW warns that a random selection process here would
discourage planning and innovation by future applicants. Motorola
objects that the results of a lottery would bear no relation to the
best use of the available spectrum and would bestow insufficient
spectrum or unusable combinations of spectrum-segments upon the winning
applicants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\See 47 U.S.C. 309(i). See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 765, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess, at 37 (1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
68. We will not use a lottery in this case because we have
concluded that awarding Big LEO licenses through the use of competitive
bidding procedures would better serve the public interest. Most
importantly, an auction would be an economically efficient means of
allocation. A well-designed auction produces an outcome approximating
allocation to highest-valued use, which we believe promotes spectrum
efficiency and other public interest considerations.\79\ Use of
competitive bidding procedures would provide participants with the
incentive to conceive innovative, cost-effective and spectrum efficient
uses for the spectrum-blocks to be assigned and to estimate accurately
their potential commercial value. Further, a lottery may produce a
haphazard outcome. Although such an outcome might be partially
redressed through resale, that would entail further transaction costs.
We do not believe that an auction would have significant adverse
international ramifications, as discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\Second Report and Order in the Implementation of Section
309(j)--Competitive Bidding, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2361 (1944)
(Implementation of Section 309(j), at para. 73. Moreover, an
efficient auction would award licenses more quickly to those that
value them most highly and would facilitate the efficient
aggregation of interdependent licenses. We also note that the
applicants here did not submit their proposals in reliance on an
expectation that the Commission would use lotteries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Competitive bidding. 69. Legality. Having decided that it would
best serve the public interest to use competitive bidding in the event
that the sharing plan does not resolve mutual exclusivity, we next
respond to arguments concerning our legal authority to do so. Section
309(j) (1) and (2) of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
Sec. 309(j) (1), (2), permits auctions where mutually exclusive
applications for initial licenses or construction permits are accepted
for filing by the Commission and where the principal use of the
spectrum will involve or is reasonably likely to involve the receipt by
the licensee of compensation from subscribers in return for enabling
those subscribers to receive or transmit communications signals.\80\
TRW, however, asserts that ``the entire thrust and substance'' of the
legislation authorizing the Commission to assign licenses by auction is
``geared toward'' licensing for the personal communication service
(PCS) service and that the underlying legislative purposes ``simply do
not apply to * * * an inherently global * * * satellite service [for
which] there are currently no more than six applications.'' However,
nothing in Section 309(j) precludes the use of auctions for satellite
services, and the scope of our Section 309(j) authority to use auctions
clearly is not limited to PCS licensing.\81\ Indeed, we have decided to
use auctions for many services besides PCS.\82\ Nor does Section 309(j)
withhold authority to use auctions for licensing international
satellite systems or specify a minimum number of competing applications
for a class of licenses that must be on file in order for licenses to
be assigned by competitive bidding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\No commenter disputes the holding in para. 42 of the Notice
that Big LEO service will involve a ``use of the electromagnetic
spectrum'' as defined in 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(2), notwithstanding that
most of the applicants propose to provide service to resellers
rather than end-users. As we noted previously, the legislative
record indicates that it is irrelevant to the applicability of the
309(j)(2) definition whether a licensee's subscribers are end-users
or resellers, and we believe that understanding is consistent with
the plain meaning of the pertinent statutory text.
\81\The legislative record confirms that proponents of the
legislation were well aware that it did not merely pertain to PCS
licensing. See H.R. Report No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at
256 (1993) (``[S]ection 309(j) is a generic statute that will govern
the issuance of licenses in many different services''). See also
Implementation of Section 309(j), note 79, supra.
\82\For example, auctions will be used to award licenses in the
900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio Services and the Multipoint
Distribution Services. See 47 CFR 1.2102(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
70. Constellation, Motorola and LQP contend that the statute
forbids us from conducting an auction until we have used every means to
attempt to eliminate mutual exclusivity. Motorola and LQP cite
commentary in the House Report and in a letter from Congressman Dingell
to then-Chairman Quello as evidence that Congress ``clearly had the Big
LEO proceeding in mind when it added this language to the bill'' and
that it believed that mutual exclusivity could be avoided in this
proceeding. Further, TRW and COMSAT cite this commentary as proof that
Congress enacted Subsection 309(j)(6)(E) to prevent the Commission from
using an auction to assign Big LEO licenses.
71. Nothing on the face of Subsection 309(j)(6)(E), or in its
legislative history, indicates that we are prohibited from granting Big
LEO licenses by auction. The text of the Section merely provides that
the Commission should continue to use techniques that avoid mutual
exclusivity among applicants. Similarly, the commentary in the House
Report states that it generally serves the public interest for the
Commission to use engineering solutions and other mechanisms to avoid
or eliminate mutual exclusivity and that the Commission should continue
to do so in the Big LEO licensing proceeding. The Report does not
assert, however, that if the Commission is unsuccessful in resolving
mutual exclusivity, the legislation bars the Commission from auctioning
Big LEO licenses. Rather, we construe the provision to mean that the
Commission is obliged to attempt to eliminate mutual exclusivity.
Indeed, if the Commission could avoid mutual exclusivity in every
instance in which it arises, no need would exist for the Commission's
auction authority. In the course of this proceeding, we have proposed
several spectrum sharing plans to that end.\83\ We do not think that it
would serve the public interest to continue this effort in the event
that the six applications before us, as amended in response to this
Report and Order, are mutually exclusive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\See, e.g., Committee Report, Addendum 1 (proposal developed
by FCC Representative to the Committee that would have permitted all
proposed systems to be licensed with some design modifications);
Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
72. Regardless of our general authority to conduct an auction in
the Big LEO service, TRW contends that we may not auction the allocated
2.4 GHz band downlink frequencies because the pending applications for
these frequencies are not mutually exclusive. According to TRW, all
four applicants desiring to use the 2.4 GHz band could do so on a
shared basis using the CDMA technology that all of them propose.\84\
Similarly, since the same four applicants are the only ones proposing
to use the lower six MHz of 1.6 GHz band, TRW argues that we cannot use
auctions to assign authorizations for that frequency range either. As
TRW sees it, the only portion of the Big LEO spectrum that we can
auction consistently with the mutual exclusivity proviso of Subsection
309(j)(1) is the sector of the 1.6 GHz band between 1616-1626.5 MHz,
where both Motorola and the CDMA proponents have competing applications
on file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\LQP contends, moreover, that segmentation of the 2.4 GHz
band pursuant to the tentative auction plan outlined in the NPRM
would be impracticable because any CDMA system would require use of
all 16.5 MHz of the available 2.4 GHz band, whether it intends to
share that spectrum in common with other CDMA systems or to use it
exclusively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
73. We do not agree with TRW that Subsection 309(j)(1) bars us from
using an auction to award licenses for the lower portion of the 1.6 GHz
band. There is simply not enough spectrum in the band to accommodate
all pending applications. While we recognize that there are certain
portions of the spectrum in which sharing among CDMA systems is
possible (i.e., the 1610-1616 MHz and the 2483.5-2500 MHz bands), these
frequencies cannot in themselves accommodate all proposed CDMA systems,
including AMSC's. Consequently, these bands cannot be separated from
the rest of the MSS frequencies in determining whether mutual
exclusivity exists and whether auctions can be employed. Moreover, we
are not proposing to conduct an auction until after the applicants have
had an opportunity to amend their applications to conform with our
rules. If our spectrum sharing plan does not then accommodate the
systems of all qualified applicants, the plan will not be implemented.
Rather, the 1.6 GHz band spectrum would be segmented and the qualified
applicants will be required, in order to preserve their eligibility, to
apply for a separate license for each segment that they want to use.
Consistent with the mutual exclusivity prerequisite of Subsection
309(j)(1), in the event that only a single eligible application is
filed for a particular segment within the filing window, the segment
will be assigned to the applicant requesting it. We would not assign
the license for a segment through competitive bidding unless two or
more eligible applications for it were on file. Winners would be
permitted to employ their choice of CDMA or TDMA/FDMA architectures.
74. We do agree with TRW that there is no need to assign 2.4 GHz
band authorizations by competitive bidding. Because CDMA systems must
use 1.6 GHz uplink and corresponding 2.4 GHz downlink frequencies to
operate, we proposed in the Notice to pair 1.6 GHz and 2.4 GHz spectrum
blocks for auctioning.\85\ All applicants requesting authority to use
the 2.4 GHz band concede that they can share it using CDMA technology,
however. We therefore conclude that would be more appropriate to
license all winners of auctioned 1.6 GHz spectrum blocks to operate in
the space-to-Earth transmission direction in the 2483.5-2500 MHz band
on a shared basis using CDMA techniques.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
75. TRW contends that dividing sharable spectrum into segments and
assigning a license for each segment to the highest bidder, as we
proposed in the Notice, rather than assigning co-extensive licenses for
the entire bandwidth to as many as could share it, would be ``spectrum-
inefficient'' and therefore ``manifestly contrary to the auction
legislation.'' Constellation likewise asserts that assigning licenses
for discrete segments of the Big LEO spectrum by competitive bidding
would probably eliminate any chance of CDMA sharing, as auction winners
would probably not consent to share use of their licensed segments with
competing service providers. Constellation, accordingly, contends that
such a licensing procedure would not promote efficient spectrum use.
Similarly, LQP asserts that assigning Big LEO licenses by auction would
deter multiple entry and competition.
76. We do not agree that auctioning the 1.6 GHz band in band
segments would disserve the statutory objectives of promoting
competition and efficient spectrum use. First, it is not clear that
using an auction licensing mechanism would discourage spectrum sharing.
Applicants who obtain licenses for band segments by competitive bidding
could negotiate post-auction sharing agreements among themselves and
request license modifications, as TRW acknowledges in its comments.\86\
If, in fact, the potential economic value of some or all of the
available 1.6 GHz band could best be realized through frequency
sharing, licensees will have an incentive to enter into such mutually
beneficial sharing agreements, no matter how they acquire their
licenses. Second, there is no evident reason to conclude that
competitive bidding would impede competition. Our auction rules will
ensure that there will be at least two providers. Further, by dividing
the available bandwidth into relatively small segments and allowing
bidders to acquire several segments and aggregate them, the number of
initial licensees and the amounts of spectrum held by particular
licensees will be determined largely by market forces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\TRW Comments at 102-103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
77. We recognize it is possible that an auction might result in
fewer licensees than could otherwise have been accommodated using a
sharing plan. As discussed above, however, we have been unable to
develop a sharing plan that avoids mutual exclusivity, assuming all
applicants are deemed qualified. If mutual exclusivity cannot be
avoided by sharing, implementing an auction may achieve countervailing
public interest benefits. As we have explained, assigning spectrum
rights to those who place the highest value on them generally serves
the public interest because it ensures an award to the highest-valued
use.
78. We do not agree with LQP that using auctions is contrary to our
established policy of favoring multiple entry in new satellite
services. We have ensured that our competitive bidding framework will
result in at least two licensees, thereby ensuring the benefits of a
competitive market structure.\87\ Moreover, insofar as our policy
permits marketplace incentives to determine the number of service
providers, the policy is fully consistent with our ``open skies''
satellite policy, which was based on similar considerations.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\See para. 89, infra.
\88\Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, 22 FCC 2d
(1970), 35 FCC 2d 844 (1972), recon. in part, 38 FCC 2d 665 (1972)
(DOMSAT I, II, and III, respectively).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
79. TRW also suggests that we may not lawfully use an auction to
assign Big LEO licenses because of the statutory mandate concerning
promotion of economic opportunity. TRW claims, for instance, that the
statute requires the Commission, consistent with the public interest
and the characteristics of the proposed service, to ``prescribe * * *
bandwidth assignments that promote * * * economic opportunity for a
wide variety of applicants'' (emphasis added),\89\ which is impossible
here given the number of Big LEO licenses that can be awarded. TRW
further asserts we cannot meet the statute's requirements to afford
opportunity for small businesses, businesses owned by members of
minority groups or women, and rural telephone companies, since there
are no representatives of those ``designated entity'' (DE) classes
among the existing applicants, that it is virtually impossible for a
company qualifying as a small business to raise enough capital to
finance construction and operation of a Big LEO system, and that it
would be a daunting task to devise a system of viable set-asides for
designated entities without drastically impairing the ability of other
applicants to implement service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
80. Subsection 309(j)(3) requires the Commission to seek to promote
``economic opportunity and competition,'' among other goals, ``by
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including
[DEs],'' and Subsection 309(j)(4)(D) directs us to ensure, when
prescribing regulations governing auction procedures or eligibility to
apply for licenses to be assigned by auction, that DEs are given an
opportunity to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services.
The statute, however, directs the Commission, in specifying auction
procedures, to pursue other objectives, aside from ensuring opportunity
for DEs. Among these are the goals of promoting ``the development and
rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and services for the
benefit of the public, including those residing in rural areas, without
administrative or judicial delays''and of promoting ``efficient and
intensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum.'' 47 U.S.C.
Sec. 309(j)(3). In the Notice, we tentatively concluded auctions would
further these objectives and we affirm these conclusions on this Report
and Order.\90\ The statute also implicitly leaves it to the Commission
to strike a balance in the public interest among the statutory
objectives.\91\ Here, only six applications are being considered. No
one disputes TRW's assertion that none of the applicants qualifies as
small, minority-owned or women-owned.\92\ It therefore would appear
that to disseminate Big LEO licenses to DEs we would have to open a new
filing window for Big LEO applications.\93\ While in some circumstances
it might be feasible to take such an approach, we believe that it is
not the case here. To ensure that this needed service is made available
as quickly as possible, particularly to rural residents not otherwise
served by the telecommunications infrastructure, and to preserve the
opportunity for the United States to continue its leadership role in
promoting global development through an enhanced global information
infrastructure, we are committed to awarding licenses by January 31,
1995.\94\ Opening a new filing window would make that goal impossible.
Potential new applicants would need a reasonable amount of time,
traditionally three months from the date of publication in the Federal
Register, in which to develop and submit system proposals.\95\ Opening
a new filing window also would be inequitable to the pending
applicants, who filed their proposals well before Section 309(j) was
enacted and who have spent considerable time and expense participating
in this proceeding. In light of these considerations, we believe that
an auction to award Big LEO licenses is an appropriate exercise of our
discretion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\See Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 43.
\91\See Implementation of Section 309(j), note 79, supra, at
para. 74.
\92\See Docket 93-253 for criteria.
\93\DEs can, of course, participate in the Big LEO industry by
leasing space segment capacity, by manufacturing user handsets, or
by offering services to end users.
\94\See also note 6, supra.
\95\See NVNG MSS Order, note 48, supra. See also RDSS Licensing
Order, note 37, supra, where licensee was given six months to amend
its applications to conform to rules as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
81. Other considerations. In the Notice, we recognized that
although auctions appear advantageous for many reasons, the approach
might have unintended consequences internationally. In particular, we
noted that other countries may look to our lead in imposing these costs
on Big LEO systems.\96\ Given the number of countries that may be
served by Big LEO systems, we stated that these costs may be
considerable and may preclude a U.S.-owned system from serving other
countries. We noted, however, that these costs may not in fact be
significant in countries that seek to ensure that voice MSS is
available within its borders. We further noted that applicants will pay
no more than that which they determine is consistent with their
expected revenues from providing service in that country. Nevertheless,
we recognize that the international nature of the Big LEO service
raises concerns that are not applicable to the domestic-only services
for which auctions are implemented and requested comment on this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
82. Motorola, Constellation, LQP, TRW, and COMSTAT all contend that
an auction is inadvisable because it would set a bad example for
foreign governments. If foreign governments were to use auctions to
assign spectrum rights, they maintain, the cost of providing global MSS
would be driven up, possibly to such an extent that Big LEO operators
would be unable to provide worldwide service. TRW asserts that the
consequent cost increases might deter most potential entrants, to the
impairment of competition, or might even make it infeasible for anyone
to provide Big LEO service. COMSAT speculates that foreign governments
might conduct auctions in a manner that places U.S. companies at a
disadvantage.
83. The comments have provided no concrete evidence, however, that
an auction would have these harmful effects. We have concluded
elsewhere that, as a general matter, the public interest is served by
awarding licenses to those who assign the highest value to them.\97\ In
light of these substantial public interest benefits, the commenters'
mere recitals of the concerns we raised in the Notice do not persuade
us that auctions are inadvisable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\Implementation of 309(j), note 79, supra, at paras. 73-74
and n.65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
84. We doubt, first, that our choice of licensing method for the
Big LEO service will determine foreign licensing practices as much as
the commenters predict. Foreign officials already know that we recently
obtained a statutory mandate for assigning spectrum licenses by
competitive bidding and have decided to assign licenses of enormous
aggregate commercial value for a variety of new services by that means.
We assume that those responsible for assigning spectrum rights in other
countries will conduct spectrum auctions if that would best serve the
interests that they are obligated to promote, regardless of what we
choose to do in this proceeding. Further, even if auctions are
implemented, applicants will bid no more at an auction than that which
they determine is economically feasible.
85. Conversely, TRW contends that if we assign Big LEO licenses at
auction and foreign authorities issue such licenses to others free of
charge, the U.S. licensees would be at a competitive disadvantage in
the global market. Constellation similarly maintains that by assigning
the licenses at auction the Commission ``would create an incentive for
U.S. companies to develop LEO technology through foreign based systems
that did not have to spend significant amounts of capital for operating
licenses.'' TRW also contends that companies who purchase MSS licenses
in the United States at auction might encounter unfair competition from
INMARSAT because the INMARSAT Convention and the Communications
Satellite Act might be construed to require that COMSAT be allowed to
access INMARSAT capacity from the U.S. without paying for spectrum use.
86. We do not believe the prospect that auctions will be conducted
only in the United States would disadvantage U.S. licensees globally.
We have not yet decided whether, and the terms on which, foreign
providers, including INMARSAT, will be able to provide domestic
service. We envision that reciprocal bilateral arrangements on a
country-by-country basis will be negotiated. In reaching and
implementing these arrangements, we will consider at that time whether
foreign entities not subject to U.S. auctions would have the economic
incentive and ability to offer domestic service at significantly lower
rates than Big LEO operators who purchased spectrum. Further, under
this scenario, both U.S. and foreign operators appear able to receive
licenses free of charge in a foreign country. We fail to see how this
would put U.S. operators at a ``global disadvantage.'' Finally,
contrary to Constellation's argument, we see no reason to suppose that
applicants who could compete successfully as providers of Big LEO
service in the U.S. market would lose interest in developing systems in
the United States merely because it would be necessary to purchase
licenses. If it would be undesirable to serve the U.S. market at high
spectrum prices, the prices paid at an auction should fall until
serving the U.S. market is commercially desirable.
87. Consequently, we conclude that we have the statutory authority
to award Big LEO licenses through an auction process. We will implement
competitive bidding procedures in the event that all six pending
applicants file amendments on November 16, 1994 that meet all
requirements, including financial requirements, for the Big LEO
service, but their applications are still mutually exclusive.\98\ We
place applicants on notice that if an auction needs to be held it will
be scheduled as quickly as possible. Given the importance of proceeding
with Big LEO licensing, preparation time for the applicants will
necessarily be circumscribed.
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\98\If some applicants defer their financial showings as
described in para. 13, supra, all deferred applications may not be
able to be granted. If, at that time, we have issued some licenses,
we will not implement the auction procedure described below, which
assumes that none of the MSS spectrum has been assigned, to choose
among the mutually exclusive deferred applications. Rather, as
noted, we will develop another processing procedure at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Competitive bidding procedure. 88. Segmentation. As proposed in
the Notice, we will divide the 1.6 GHz band spectrum into eight 2.0625
MHz segments.\99\ We recognize that Constellation and LQP assert that a
2.0625 MHz block is ``unworkable'' because it is inconsistent with some
of the applicants' channelization plans, which proposed 1.25 MHz
channels. Further, LQP asserts that any auction of discrete bandwidth
segments within the 1.6 GHz band would inevitably result in some
applicants getting unusable, disjointed spectrum blocks. We do not
believe these concerns warrant a change in the proposed spectrum
blocks. First, two of the six applicants do not propose to use 1.25 MHz
channels. Moreover, any anomalies in spectrum awards can be corrected
in post-auction transactions, as we intend (as explained infra) to
allow the licensees to aggregate and disaggregate spectrum through
resale.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\As discussed in the Notice, it appeared that as little as
2.0 MHz of spectrum could provide an individual CDMA system with the
same capacity as it would have operating on a shared basis over
11.35 MHz of spectrum. See Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
89. Bandwidth cap. To ensure that there are at least two Big LEO
providers, we will not permit any applicant to acquire more than four
2.0625 MHz band segments in the 1.6 GHz band, i.e., no more than 8.25
MHz, at auction.\100\ We would also deny permission for a post-auction
transaction that would result in an accumulation in excess of that
limit in the absence of a compelling showing of justification for a
waiver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\See Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
90. Competitive Bidding Design. In determining the procedures to be
employed if an auction of Big LEO licenses is necessary, we are guided
by the principles developed in PP Docket No. 93-253, the proceeding
instituted to implement Section 309(j) of the Communications Act. The
Second Report and Order in that proceeding\101\ established the
criteria to be used in selecting the auction design method to use for
each particular actionable service. The Commission received voluminous
comment on auction design issues. Generally, we concluded that awarding
licenses to those parties who value them most highly will foster
Congress' policy objectives. In this regard, we noted that since a
bidder's ability to introduce valuable new services and to deploy them
quickly, intensively, and efficiently increases the value of a license
to that bidder, an auction design that awards licenses to those bidders
with the highest willingness to pay the most tends to promote the
development and rapid deployment of new services and the efficient and
intensive use of the spectrum. In articulating our auction design
principles we agreed with the weight of the comments in that
proceeding--many of which were supported by academic auction design
experts--that: (1) licenses with strong value interdependencies should
be auctioned simultaneously; (2) multiple round auctions generally will
yield more efficient allocations of licenses and higher revenues,
especially where there is substantial uncertainty as to value because
they provide bidders with information regarding other bidders'
valuations of licenses; and (3) since they may be relatively expensive
to implement and time-consuming, simultaneous and/or multiple round
auctions may become less cost-effective as the value of licenses
decreases.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Note 79, supra.
\102\Id. at para. 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
91. Based on the foregoing, we concluded that where the licenses to
be auctioned are interdependent and their value is expected to be high,
simultaneous multiple round auctions would best achieve the
Commission's goals for competitive bidding.\103\ We indicated that
compared with other bidding mechanisms (such as sequential and sealed
bid auctions), simultaneous multiple round bidding will generate the
most information about license values during the course of the auction
and provide bidders with the most flexibility to pursue back-up
strategies. Thus, we concluded that simultaneous multiple round bidding
is most likely to award interdependent licenses to the bidders who
value them most highly. We also indicated that this method will
facilitate efficient aggregation of licenses across spectrum bands,
thereby resulting in vigorous competition among several strong service
providers who will be able rapidly to introduce a wide variety of
services highly valued by end users.\104\ In addition, we concluded
that because of the superior information and flexibility it provides,
this method is likely to yield greater revenues than other auction
designs. Thus, we found that the use of simultaneous multiple round
auctions would generally be preferred.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\Id. at paras. 109-111.
\104\Id. at para. 106.
\105\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
92. Because, however, simultaneous multiple round bidding is likely
to be more administratively complex and costly both for bidders and for
the FCC than sequential or single round bidding, we indicated that we
would use this auction design only where license values are
interdependent and the expected value of the licenses to be auctioned
is high relative to the costs of conducting a simultaneous multiple
round auction.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\Id. at paras. 110-111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
93. If it becomes necessary to employ competitive bidding
procedures to award Big LEO licenses, we will conduct a single
simultaneous multiple round auction to award licenses in those 2.065
MHz bands for which two or more applications have been filed.\107\ Each
of the characteristics that lead to selection of this auction design
are present here. We expect that there will be a high degree of
interdependence in the values of Big LEO licenses. Licenses may be
interdependent either because they are substitutes or because they are
worth more as part of a package than individually. We would expect
there to be some substitutability among these licenses. There may be
important ways in which they might be complements as well. Though all
will be nationwide licenses, a single entity will be able to aggregate
up to four licenses. It is reasonable to assume that the value that a
bidder places on one license will to at least some degree depend upon
whether it will be able to acquire other licenses. We also expect that
the value of Big LEO licenses will be high relative to the costs of
conducting a simultaneous multiple round auction, in part because as
the Commission gains experience with simultaneous multiple round
auctions, the costs associated with implementing them may fall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\See para. 73, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
94. Procedural, Payment and Penalty Issues. Through our July 1994
auction of nationwide licenses to provide Personal Communications
Services in the 900 MHz band (narrowband PCS), we have gained some
experience with simultaneous multiple round auctions. It appears that
the rules we adopted concerning the procedures to be used in conducting
auctions, the schedule for payment for licenses, and the penalties to
be paid for bid withdrawal, default or disqualification, have worked
well.\108\ In the event that it becomes necessary to employ competitive
bidding in Big LEO licensing, we will conduct auctions as specified
under those rules. If such an auction is required, we will issue a
Public Notice explaining further the administrative details of the
auction, but we generally expect the auction will be conducted
similarly to the nationwide narrowband PCS auction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\See Sections 1.2104-1.2109 of the Commission's Rules, 47
CFR 1.2104-1.2109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
95. In order to reduce the risk of defaults and to ensure that the
Commission has a ready source of funds to satisfy any bid withdrawal or
default penalties, we will impose a requirement that, to be qualified
to participate in the Big LEO auction, applicants must submit an
upfront payment to the Commission prior to the auction.\109\ Consistent
with our auction rules for Personal Communications Services, we have
decided to set the upfront payment at approximately two cents per MHz
of spectrum per person residing in the proposed service area ($0.02 per
MHz-pop).\110\ Because Big LEO systems must be able to provide service
to all areas of the fifty states, $0.02 per MHz-pop would amount to
approximately $10 million per 2.0625 MHz segment.\111\ For simplicity,
we will round this to the nearest million, and require an upfront
payment of $10 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\The upfront payment will be fully refunded to unsuccessful
bidders who are not subject to bid withdrawal or default penalties.
\110\See Implementation of Section 309(j), note 79, supra, at
para. 169 and 47 CFR 1.2106.
\111\I.e., .02 x 2.0625 x [U.S. pop.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
96. Resale, aggregation and disaggregation. Aside from imposing the
8.25 MHz cap on aggregation, we will not restrict auction winners from
reselling 1.6 GHz band spectrum-rights. They would be free not only to
resell 2.065 MHz segments but also to reassign any smaller portion of
1.6 GHz band spectrum. Affording such flexibility enhances beneficial
incentives.\112\ Although we do not think that such post-auction
transactions would be likely to entail unjust enrichment,\113\
applications for consent to assignment of Big LEO spectrum
authorizations obtained by auction will be subject to the disclosure
and close-scrutiny policies delineated in the Second Report and Order
in the auction rulemaking.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\Of course, parties to such transactions must comply with 47
U.S.C. 310(d) by filing applications for consent to assignment.
\113\See Implementation of Section 309(j), note 79, supra, at
paras. 211-12.
\114\Id. at para. 214.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
97. Assignment of 2.4 GHz band. As previously noted, all auction
winners will be authorized to operate over the entire 2483.5-2500 MHz
band, with the stipulation that operation in that band must be in the
CDMA mode and must be used for downlink transmissions.
B. Interservice Sharing
98. In the Notice, we recognized that Big LEO systems will be
required to share the 1.6/2.4 GHz and adjacent frequency bands with a
number of existing services. In the 1.6 GHz range, the 1610-1626.5 MHz
band is allocated to the aeronautical radionavigation service (ARNS) on
a co-primary basis, and a segment of the band, at 1610.6-1613.8 MHz, is
allocated to the radioastronomy service (RAS) on a co-primary basis. In
the 2.4 GHz range, the 2483.5-2500 MHz band is allocated for co-primary
use by the broadcast auxiliary service, by the terrestrial fixed-
service and by industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) operations.
Adjacent bands are allocated to the aeronautical radionavigation
satellite service, the instructional television fixed service (ITFS)
and the multi-channel multi-point distribution service (MMDS).
99. The Negotiated Rulemaking Committee was comprised of Big LEO
applicants and representatives of most parties potentially affected by
Big LEO services, and analyzed extensively interservice sharing at 1.6/
2.4 GHz. We used the Committee's recommendations as the primary basis
the proposals in our Notice. We sought comment on those proposals as
well as those areas where a representative of an affected interest did
not participate in the Committee, or where the Committee could not
reach a consensus on an interservice sharing issue.
1. Radio Astronomy Service
100. As noted above, the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz frequency band is
allocated to the RAS on a co-primary basis.\115\ RAS operations involve
the reception of radio waves of cosmic origin,\116\ and are responsible
for amassing a substantial portion of information about the universe
that has been acquired in the last sixty years. Because the RAS
involves only radio reception, it cannot interfere with other services
operating in the same frequency band. However, it can receive harmful
interference from other services. As a co-primary service, the RAS is
entitled to protection from harmful interference. Ensuring this
protection is complicated by the nature of cosmic radiation emissions,
which are similar to random noise emissions and have extremely low
power flux density levels at the Earth. Further, there is a potential
for both in-band and out-of-band interference.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\The 4990-5000 MHz band is also allocated to the RAS on a
primary basis. Second harmonic spurious emissions from 2.4 GHz MSS
operations could cause interference of RAS in that band. See paras.
120-121, infra.
\116\See International Radio Regulations 55 and 14.
\117\An out-of-band emission is radio frequency energy, located
on a frequency or frequencies immediately outside the necessary
bandwidth, that result from the modulation process. This does not
include spurious emissions, which may be reduced without affecting
the corresponding transmission of information. See 47 CFR 2.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. In-band interference to the RAS. 101. The Committee was able to
agree on procedures that would permit sharing between Big LEOs and the
RAS. The Committee's task was made somewhat easier by the fact that
radio astronomy observations are usually conducted in remote areas and
are not always continuous. The Committee's proposal, developed
cooperatively with the Committee on Radio Frequencies (CORF),\118\
would establish fixed-radius protection zones around the sixteen radio
astronomy sites in the United States and technical requirements for MSS
downlink transmissions. Based on this recommendation, we proposed to
establish protection zones around radio astronomy sites in the United
States as a means of preventing MSS transmissions from interfering with
RAS observations in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz band.\119\ To that end, we
also proposed that ``all 1.6/2.4 GHz MSS systems shall be capable of
determining the position of MSS user transceivers accessing the space
segment through either internal radiodetermination calculations or
external sources such as LORAN-C or GPS.''\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\CORF operates under the auspices of the National Academy of
Sciences and is responsible for advancing the interest of radio
astronomy in the United States.
\119\See proposed Sec. 25.213(a)(1)(i)-(iii).
\120\See proposed Sec. 25.213(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
102. Big LEO parties generally agree with the fixed-radius
protection zone approach. However, both TRW and Constellation question
whether it is necessary to require all MSS systems to be capable of
determining the position of their user terminals.\121\ They contend
that a position location requirement need not be imposed on those MSS
systems that elect to use beacon-actuated protection systems as a means
for avoiding harmful interference to RAS observations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\TRW Comments at 120, Constellation Reply at 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
103. As we stated in the Notice, the Committee decided that a
beacon actuated protection system might provide an alternative to fixed
radius protection zones. Under such a system, a beacon would transmit a
signal when RAS observations were in progress. Upon receipt of this
signal, an MSS control center would automatically assign the MSS
terminal to a communications channel outside of the shared MSS-RAS
frequency band. The Committee concluded, however, that several
theoretical and practical concerns must be addressed before a beacon
system can be implemented.\122\ CORF continues to support that
position.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\Notice, note 2, supra, at n.90.
\123\CORF Reply Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
104. Because beacon actuated protection systems are not yet fully
developed, we will adopt our original proposal that requires MSS
operators to protect RAS observations in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz band
using the fixed-radius protection zone method. Nevertheless, because we
expect that more efficient solutions will be developed, we will permit
MSS licensees to use smaller geographic protection zones in lieu of the
specified areas upon a showing that MSS operations will not cause
harmful interference to an RAS observatory during periods of
observation.\124\ We will, however, as proposed, allow beacon-actuated
protection zones to be used in lieu of fixed protection zones if a
coordination agreement is reached between a mobile-satellite system
licensee and the Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Unit (ESMU) on the
specifics of beacon operations.''\125\ Should any of the Big LEO
licensees show at a later time, and coordinate with the ESMU, that
certain other methods can be used in lieu of the fixed-radius
protection zone, we will allow MSS system operators to employ these
methods. In the interim, however, position determination of MSS user
transceivers is necessary to accomplish fixed-radius zone protection.
Therefore, we adopt as part of Sec. 25.213(a)(1), the MSS user
transceiver position determination requirement as proposed in the
Notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\See Sec. 25.213(a)(1)(v).
\125\See Sec. 25.213(a)(1)(vii). The ESMU falls under the
auspices of the National Science Foundation and is responsible for
coordinating RAS frequencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
105. In the Notice, we also proposed that MSS user transceivers be
capable of terminating operations as soon as practicable upon entering
an RAS protection zone.\126\ LQP argues that our proposal would require
that calls initiated outside of an RAS protection zone be terminated as
soon as the MSS user transceiver moves within the protection zone,
which, according to LQP, would be inordinately complex and costly.\127\
LQP suggests that our rules should permit the call to be switched
successfully to frequencies outside of the RAS bands (during RAS
observations) before operations are terminated to that unit.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\See proposed Sec. 25.213(a)(1)(v). Notice, note 2, supra,
at para. 50.
\127\LQP Reply at 58.
\128\LQP Comments at 64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
106. We believe that LQP's suggestion is reasonable. Allowing calls
initiated prior to entering an RAS protection zone to continue until a
non-RAS frequency is found will ensure continuity of service to the MSS
user. Further, we believe that other requirements that we are adopting,
such as the notification requirement that is described below, will
ensure that RAS operations are not affected adversely. Therefore, we
modify proposed Sec. 25.213(a)(1)(v) as suggested by LQP.
107. We also proposed in the Notice to require that the ESMU notify
MSS licensees in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz band of radio astronomy
observations.\129\ This requirement was proposed to ensure that MSS
operations terminate as soon as possible after an MSS user transceiver
enters a RAS protection zone where observations are being made. CORF
suggests that it could meet this requirement by providing MSS operators
with schedules of RAS observations.\130\ TRW disagrees, stating that
CORF should be required to provide notification ``of periods of actual
radio astronomy observations rather than a general schedule.''\131\ We
agree with TRW that it would not be overly burdensome for the ESMU to
notify the small number of licensed in-band Big LEO operators of
periods of actual RAS observations. This will help ensure that no
interference is caused to RAS observations in the event that a schedule
is changed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\See proposed Sec. 25.213(a)(1)(v).
\130\CORF Comments at 4-5.
\131\TRW Reply Comments at 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
108. In a related matter, Motorola notes that the Committee
suggested that RAS observations not be scheduled during peak MSS/RDSS
traffic periods to the extent possible.\132\ CORF does not object to
this proposal.\133\ RAS observations are usually carried out in remote
areas and are not continuous. Even during peak MSS traffic periods, the
majority of MSS traffic should not occur in RAS observation areas. We
do not therefore believe that adherence to this provision will be
burdensome to RAS. Consequently, we include this provision in our rules
in Sec. 25.213(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\Motorola Comments at 55, n. 41.
\133\Specifically, CORF supports insertion of the following text
in the rules: ``The RAS shall avoid scheduling radio astronomy
observations during peak MSS/RDSS traffic periods to the greatest
extent practicable.'' See CORF Reply at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
109. Finally, TRW requests that we agree to solicit public comment
before we require MSS systems to protect additional RAS sites beyond
the sixteen sites specified in the rules.\134\ In bands shared by two
or more services on a co-primary basis, new facilities in either
service must be coordinated among affected operators. As provided for
in proposed rule Sec. 25.213(1)(a)(viii), which we adopt, we will
solicit comment with respect to protection from additional RAS sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\Proposed Sec. 25.213(a)(1)(vii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Out-of-band interference to RAS from primary MSS uplinks at 1.6
GHz. 110. In the Notice, we also recognized that MSS uplink operations
in the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz portion of the band could cause unacceptable
out-of-band interference into RAS operations at 1610.6-1613.8 MHz. We
also noted the Committee's suggestion to establish fixed protection
zones similar to, but smaller than, those recommended for in-band
emissions, although we did not propose a rule in this regard.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
111. CORF suggested several alternatives to our proposals:\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\See CORF Comments at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) To require that the power flux density (pfd) level reaching RAS
sites from a mobile user terminal operating anywhere in the 1610-1626.5
MHz band not exceed the pfd from a mobile user terminal operating
within the RAS 1610.6-1613.8 MHz band segment at the edge of the
protection zone applicable for that site, or
(2) To prohibit mobile terminal operations within the 1613.8-1615.8
MHz band during RAS observations within protection zones of 100 km or
30 km around RAS sites depending upon the type of observatory
involved.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\Radio astronomy observatories use two types of antennas.
Observatories with a very long baseline array (VLBA) use
interconnected radio telescopes that are dispersed in widely
separated locations. Due to the geographic separation of the
telescopes, the chance of correlated interference from any single
mobile earth terminal is small. Consequently, VLBA sites are not as
susceptible to interference as are observatories using a single
radio telescope. Eleven of the 16 radio astronomy sites in the U.S.
are VLBA sites and they require relatively smaller protection zones
than non-VLBA sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
112. The MSS parties generally oppose restrictions on out-of-band
emissions for the purpose of protecting RAS. For example, Constellation
argues that MSS out-of-band levels should not be unilaterally defined
by the radio astronomy community without any regard to the impact those
levels would have on other services.\138\ TRW states that it could
agree to CORF's suggestions if a compliant mobile user terminal were
not required to undertake further coordination with the RAS. TRW notes,
however, that CORF's out-of-band protection proposals would relegate
MSS to co-primary or even lower status in frequency bands that are not
allocated to the RAS.''\139\ Only LQP generally agrees with CORF's
suggestion. According to LQP, there is sufficient 1.6 GHz band spectrum
to switch MSS users near RAS sites from potentially interfering
channels to channels separated from RAS observations.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\Constellation Comments at 47.
\139\TRW Reply at 71.
\140\LQP Reply Comments at 57, Reply Tech Appendix at 2.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
113. We have considered the impact of this proposal on Big LEO
licensees and conclude they would not be unduly burdened by protecting
RAS observations from out-of-band MSS emissions. It appears that less
than one percent of the MSS consumer use would be affected by CORF's
alternative proposals for protecting RAS from out-of-band MSS
emissions.\141\ Further, those affected would not be denied
communications. They would simply be assigned to another uplink channel
by the MSS network control center. We do not believe that the CORF
proposals relegate the MSS to co-primary or even lower status. The RAS
is seeking protection in bands only in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz band,
which is allocated to the RAS. Therefore we adopt CORF's proposals to
protect RAS, during observations, from out-of-band emissions caused by
Big LEO systems. If Big LEO operators cannot meet the power density
levels necessary to protect RAS from harmful interference, we will
require that Big LEO operations be terminated within the protection
zones specified in Sec. 25.213(a)(1)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\CORF Reply Comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Out-of-band interference to RAS from secondary downlinks in the
1.6 GHz band. 114. In the Notice, we proposed to codify the Committee's
recommendations to eliminate potential harmful out-of-band interference
to RAS from secondary MSS downlinks operating at 1613.8-1626.5
MHz.\142\ The Committee recommended that such operations be restricted
to frequencies separated by the upper edge of the RAS band by at least
2.2 MHz, that MSS downlink emissions be filtered aboard the spacecraft,
that frequencies be selectively controlled and that an analysis and
testing program be conducted in cooperation with the radio astronomy
community. Based on its deliberations, the Committee proposed that we
adopt rules governing use of the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz band that limit out-
of-band emissions so that they do not exceed -238 dB(W/m\2\/Hz) during
observations at non-VLBA sites and -198 dB(W/m\2\/Hz) during
observations at VLBA sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\Notice, supra note 2, at para. 51; see also proposed
Sec. 25.213(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
115. Motorola argues that the limits proposed in the Notice are too
rigid and would unduly constrain MSS operations.\143\ In support,
Motorola contends that those limits were devised originally using
assumptions that are not applicable to Big LEO operations. For example,
Motorola notes that the calculations assumed an immobile, continuous
interference source, whereas secondary MSS downlink LEO operations
would present an intermittent source. Further, Motorola notes that
although the Committee reached a consensus on a recommendation
regarding limits, it did not agree on a proposed rule to govern Big LEO
MSS operations. Motorola asserts that instead of adopting specific
protection limits applicable to MSS secondary downlinks, the Commission
should only restate the general obligation that secondary services not
cause harmful interference to primary services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\Motorola Comments at 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
116. LQP and TRW disagree with Motorola. LQP states that our
proposal is reasonable and should be adopted.\144\ TRW asserts that
Motorola's proposal does not adequately consider the needs of the RAS.
It states, however, that if secondary downlinks are limited to the
1621.35-1626.5 MHz band, thereby creating a 7.5 MHz guardband between
RAS and secondary MSS, Motorola's proposals would be acceptable.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\LQP Reply at 59-60.
\145\TRW Reply Comments at 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
117. We recognize the need to protect RAS observations from
secondary MSS downlink operations. At this juncture, however, we need
not consider specific limits on Big LEO MSS secondary downlinks.
Secondary services by definition shall not cause harmful interference
nor claim protection from primary services.\146\ This provision applies
to protection of primary services from both in-band and out-of-band
emissions and would apply to secondary MSS downlinks regardless of
specified pfd levels. Thus, we see no reason to codify specific pfd
limits as proposed in the Notice. We will instead modify proposed
Sec. 25.213(a)(2) to note that secondary MSS downlinks shall not cause
harmful interference to primary RAS operations in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz
band. Further, operators of secondary downlinks will be required to
take whatever steps necessary to resolve interference complaints by
radio astronomers. We expect that an applicant proposing to operate MSS
downlinks in the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz band will be able to demonstrate in
its application that it has sufficient satellite out-of-band emission
attenuation to protect adjacent band U.S. RAS operations based upon the
frequency separation inherent in the frequency assignment scheme
adopted here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\See note 21, supra.
118. Finally, Cornell University, Arecibo Observatory, notes its
concern that MSS downlink transmissions at 1.6 GHz could have a
``disastrous effect'' on passive space research in the 1610-1667 MHz
band.\147\ LQP, in support of Cornell, notes that the Commission must
limit MSS downlink transmissions to the 5.15 MHz proposed in the
Commission's Notice, that is, to 1621.35-1626.5 MHz.\148\ Motorola
responds that ``the 1613.8-1660 MHz band is not allocated to the RAS on
a primary or secondary basis'' and thus is not entitled to protection
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
from secondary MSS downlinks operating outside that band.\149\
\147\Cornell Comments at 3-5. The 1610-1667 MHz band is being
used passively, without any allocation, by radio astronomers to
observe red-shifted Hydroxyl (OH) emissions.
\148\LQP Reply Comments at 59.
\149\Motorola Reply Comments at 49.
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119. There is no RAS allocation in the 1613.8-1660 MHz band and the
service is therefore not entitled to protection in these bands.
Consequently, we will not limit MSS transmissions in order to protect
RAS as suggested by Cornell University and LQP. In any case, we do not
believe that RAS observations above 1634 MHz would be affected by
secondary MSS downlinks in the 1621.35-1626.50 MHz band given the
frequency separation.
d. Spurious emissions into the 4990-5000 MHz from primary downlinks
in the 2483.5-2500 MHz band. 120. The Commission recognized that second
harmonic spurious emissions from primary MSS downlink transmissions in
the 2483.5-2500 MHz band could cause unacceptable interference to RAS
operations in the 4990-5000 MHz band. It concluded and we proposed in
Sec. 25.213(a)(3) that MSS downlink out-of-band spectral power flux
density (spfd) levels should be limited to -241 dB)W/m\2\/Hz) in the
4990-5000 MHz band.
121. We will adopt the rules as proposed. Although Constellation
argues that it opposes any such codification of the radio astronomy
community's definition of ``unacceptable'' interference,\150\ we note
that Constellation participated in the Committee and its deliberations
and agreed to the Committee's Report that included this recommendation.
More importantly, as stated in the Notice, we believe that these limits
can be readily met through proper amplifier device selection and
operating conditions in combination with post-amplifier filtering.
\150\Constellation Comments at 48.
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2. Aeronautical Radionavigation Satellite Service and Radionavigation-
Satellite Service
122. The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) can operate under the
radionavigation-satellite (space-to-Earth) service (RNSS) allocation in
the 1565.2-1585.6 MHz band. GPS is a space-based positioning, velocity,
and time system whose space segment, when fully operational, will be
composed of 21 operational satellites in six orbital planes. GLONASS,
the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System, can operate under the
same service allocation in the 1597-1610 MHz bands.\151\ Additionally,
GLONASS can operate under the aeronautical radionavigation service
(ARNS) allocation in the 1610-1616 MHz band pursuant to RR 732 of the
international Radio Regulations.\152\ The GLONASS system will include
24 operational satellites in three orbital planes. The user segment of
both the GPS and GLONASS systems will consist of antennas and receiver-
processors that can receive both GPS and GLONASS signals to provide
positioning, velocity, and precise timing to the user. The Committee
addressed ARNS/RNSS-MSS sharing and developed specific recommendations
in that regard. We based the sharing proposals in the Notice on the
Committee's recommendations and on requirements embodied in the
International Radio Regulations.
\151\See Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 53.
\152\RR 732 reserves the 1610-1626.5 MHz band on a worldwide
basis for the use and development of air navigation and directly
associated terrestrial or satellite based facilities. It also
provides that any satellite use of the band is subject to agreement
under the procedures of Article 14 of the International Radio
Regulations. Pursuant to the international Radio Regulations, MSS
stations may not cause harmful interference to or claim protection
from stations operating in accordance with RR 731E.
a. In-band interference to ARNS and MSS uplinks in the 1610-1626.5
MHz band. 123. Pursuant to international Radio Regulations, MSS
stations may not cause harmful interference to or claim protection from
stations operating under RR 732. Further, international Radio
Regulation RR 731F provides that MSS earth stations operating with MSS
space stations cannot radiate an equivalent isotropically radiated
power (e.i.r.p.) density greater than -15 dB(W/4KHz) in that portion of
the band used by systems operating in accordance with RR 732, and -3 db
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(W/4KHz) in bands not so used.
124. The Committee concluded that GLONASS receivers operating on-
board high altitude aircraft could be protected against interference
from MSS operations operating in accordance with RR 731E.\153\ It also
concluded that protection would not be possible if GLONASS is used for
aircraft approach and terminal communications, as is contemplated by
the FAA.\154\ The Committee recommended and we proposed in
Sec. 25.213(c)(1) to codify the uplink e.i.r.p. limits contained in RR
731E. The Committee had stated that this limit is needed to allow the
proposed Big LEO systems to be implemented, although it acknowledged
that it will not protect GLONASS if GLONASS is used to provide aircraft
approach and terminal communications as a component of a ``sole means''
GNASS. The Committee also examined several methods to improve the ARNS/
RNSS-MSS sharing environment. One was to reconfigure GLONASS so that it
would operate only on frequencies below 1610 MHz.\155\ Another method
for improving sharing possibilities, it noted, would be to modify
GLONASS receiver standards to reduce band MSS. Alternatively, it
suggested that the U.S. GPS be enhanced to lessen or eliminate reliance
on GLONASS altogether. Further, the Committee recommended, and we
proposed in Section 25.213(c)(2), that to protect operations of GLONASS
receivers on-board aircraft, MSS terminals should be prohibited from
being used on civil aircraft.
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\153\The Committee analyzed the potential levels of interference
from a typical CDMA mobile unit to a GPS/GLONASS receiver. It
concluded that MSS units would not interfere with enroute GLONASS
navigation at altitudes in excess of 10,000 meters (Committee
Report, note 23, supra, at 3.3.4.3). However, aviation parties
participating in the Committee stated that the analysis was
inadequate to demonstrate interference compatibility at a 95 percent
confidence level.
\154\See para. 49, supra. For a further discussion of the
disparity between ARNS protection requirements and MSS user terminal
e.i.r.p. requirements, see Committee Report, note 23, supra at 18-
21.
\155\The Committee offered two possible methods for limiting
GLONASS operations to frequencies below 1610 MHz. One would be to
reconfigure the GLONASS frequency plan. Currently, the plan is for a
total of 24 GLONASS satellites to operate using 24 discrete downlink
carrier frequencies. However, GLONASS statellites currently under
construction have the ability to operate on any of the 24
frequencies distributed between 1602 and 1615.5 MHz. This frequency
agility could allow antipodal satellites (those above opposite areas
of the earth) to operate using the same frequencies. Thus, the
entire system could operate using 12 frequencies below 1610 MHz. The
other method would be to shift all 24 GLONASS frequencies to
spectrum below 1610 MHz. The Committee noted however, that this more
radical approach might require redesign of the GLONASS system. In
any event, both the aviation community and the Big LEO community
have indicated that they fully expect GLONASS to shift to
frequencies below 1610 MHz at some point. The recent bilateral
coordination meeting with the Russian Federation have confirmed that
the GLONASS system will shift its frequencies to below 1606 by 2005
or sooner.
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125. Aeronautical Radio, Inc., and the Air Transport Association of
America (ARINC/ATA), Rockwell International Corporation (Rockwell), and
the FAA argue that both GLONASS and GPS operations, as potential
components of the GNSS, must be protected during all phases of flight
over the United States. To that end, they proffer additional
limitations on Big LEO operations. ARINC/ATA argues that the Commission
should clarify that the RR 731E limitation of -15 dB (W/4kHz) for MSS
mobile terminals should apply only after GLONASS moves to frequencies
below 1610 MHz. Until then, they contend, the limit should be -78.5 dB
(W/MHZ).\156\ Similarly, Rockwell states that the RR 731E limit is
insufficient for protecting GLONASS operations at 1610-1616 MHz.
Rockwell claims that the RR 731E power density level is about 140 dB
above the maximum interference level that can be tolerated by a typical
GLONASS receiving system. Rockwell asserts that shared use of this band
segment is impractical absent significant constraints on either MSS or
GLONASS. Therefore, it maintains that MSS operation should not be
permitted in the 1610-1616 MHz band segment until GLONASS operations
are shifted to frequencies below 1610 MHz.\157\ The FAA states that the
Commission indicated that use of the 1610-1616 MHz band by MSS is
premised upon moving GLONASS below 1610 MHz. It maintains that the
e.i.r.p. density specified in RR 731E is too high to protect in-band
GLONASS for anything but high altitude enroute communications.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ARINC/ATA Comments at 2-3.
\157\Rockwell Comments at 2-3.
\158\FAA Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
126. Several of the MSS applicants also disagree that more
restrictive limits should be placed on MSS uplinks pending a GLONASS
frequency shift. Constellation states that more realistic interference
criteria and models must be developed before any requirements other
than the RR 731E uplink e.i.r.p. density limit can be adopted.\159\
Ellipsat contends that no additional requirements should be adopted
because the aviation community has not provided a legitimate basis for
overly stringent requirements on MSS uplinks. Further, Ellipsat
maintains that even if GLONASS becomes a component of the GNSS, the
aviation community has not provided a showing that GNSS performance
would be impaired if degradation were to occur to the small number of
GLONASS satellites that would operate above 1610 MHz.\160\ Motorola
claims that the proposed limits advocated by the aviation community are
based on flawed assumptions and unsound analysis. Additionally,
Motorola asserts that the protection the aviation parties claim as
necessary is based on the erroneous assumption that corrupting a single
measurement from a GLONASS satellite will cause unacceptable
degradation in the ability to navigate.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\Constellation Reply Comments at 47.
\160\Ellipsat Reply at 11.
\161\Motorola Reply Comments at 51. Motorola notes that a study
conducted for LQP by Sat-Tech Systems demonstrates that loss of a
single satellite will never cause a loss of GNSS (LQP Comments at
Technical Appendix, para. 2.2.1 at 12). In addition, the Committee
performed an analysis of the availability of GNSS satellites if the
GLONASS constellation operated only on frequencies below 1610 MHz.
It concluded that a minimum of five satellites would always be
available for GNSS. In addition, it noted that this minimum would
occur for only 14 minutes in every 51-day period. It noted further
that since only four GNSS satellites are required for navigation and
an additional one satellite for system integrity, it appears that
GLONASS satellites operating above 1610 MHz might not be required
for either navigation or terminal approach communications. Committee
Report, note 23, supra at 3.3.4.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
127. Several MSS applicants also state that, to afford new MSS
systems flexibility in how they protect ARNS/RNSS, the Commission
should modify proposed rule Sec. 25.213(c)(1), which, in addition to
the uplink limits contained in RR 731F, requires all MSS operations in
the 1.6 GHz band to be coordinated with systems operating pursuant to
RR 732. Motorola argues that rules embodied in the International Radio
Regulations are adequate for ensuring coordination with and protection
of other services.\162\ Constellation contends that footnote RR 731E
establishes the only enforceable interference criteria (i.e., a maximum
e.i.r.p. density of -15 dB (W/4kHz) from MSS transmitters) that can be
incorporated into the Commission's rules at this time. Motorola, in
contrast, suggests that the e.i.r.p. value set forth in
Sec. 25.213(c)(1) be interpreted as a coordination trigger rather than
an absolute limit.\163\ LQP states that the proposed rule requires MSS
systems to protect GLONASS beyond the limits specified in RR 731E.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\Motorola Reply Comments at 47.
\163\Motorola Comments at 55.
\164\LQP Comments at 66-67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
128. We do not believe it is necessary to protect GLONASS
operations beyond the provisions of RR 731E and the obligation to
coordinate MSS systems under current International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) procedures. RR 731E states clearly that MSS stations shall
not cause interference to, nor claim protection from ARNS stations
operating in accordance with RR 732. In addition, under ITU Resolution
46, Big LEO licensees would be subject to whatever limits or conditions
agreed upon during the coordination process. GLONASS would likely be
part of the coordination negotiations. Accordingly, we reject the
aviation community's requests that additional limits be placed on MSS
operations pending a GLONASS move, particularly absent definitive
technical characteristics and requirements of a future GNSS system, and
a definitive statement as to GLONASS's role in the GNSS.\165\ Further,
imposing additional constraints on Big LEO use of the 1610-1616 MHz
band could jeopardize the applicants' ability to implement their
systems. This could deprive the United States and those countries who
choose to participate in offering services the potential benefits that
Big LEOs could bring. Conversely, we do not believe the limits in RR
731E should be relaxed, as Motorola suggests. It is clear -15 dB(W/
4kHz) is a limit and not a threshold for coordination. Therefore, we
adopt the e.i.r.p. limits embodied in RR 731E in Section 25.213(c)(1)
with the requirement that coordination of MSS mobile earth terminals
must be undertaken according to the provisions of Resolution 46 (WARC-
92).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\LQP notes that the FAA has suggested that it is still
studying how GLONASS ``best fits'' a GNSS. LQP Reply at 62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
129. We also adopt our proposed rule that prohibits operation of
Big LEO terminals on-board civil aircraft unless the terminal has a
direct connection to the aircraft's Cabin Communication System.
However, we agree with Constellation and others that this is a
transceiver operating provision and is not necessarily a sharing
requirement. Therefore, since this provision is contained in
Sec. 25.136(a) of our rules, it need not be repeated in Sec. 25.213.
Consequently, we do not adopt proposed rule Sec. 25.213(c)(2) and refer
licensees to Sec. 25.136(a).
b. Out-of-band interference to ARNS/RNSS in the 1559-1610 MHz band.
130. Protection of GPS from out-of-band emissions from primary uplinks
in the 1610-1626.5 MHz band. The Committee concluded that out-of-band
emissions by MSS uplinks in the 1610-1626.5 MHz band could potentially
interfere with GPS operations near 1575 MHz. The Committee found,
however, that sharing is possible if appropriate limits are put on out-
of-band emissions from MSS user transceivers.\166\ The Committee
recommended, and we proposed, that MSS user transceivers limit out-of-
band emissions (for broadband noise emissions) so as not to exceed an
e.i.r.p. density of -70 dBW/1MHz averaged over any 20 millisecond (ms)
period in any portion of the 1574.397-1576.443 MHz band. For any
discrete spurious emissions in the same band (i.e., bandwidth less than
600 Hz), the user transceiver e.i.r.p. density is not to exceed -80
dbW.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\See Committee Report, note 23, supra, at para. 5.2.2.7.
\167\See proposed Sec. 25.213(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
131. ARINC/ATA agrees that the proposed limits will protect
GPS.\168\ The FAA, however, recommended that the protection bandwidth
for GPS ``be established at least 20 MHz wide (i.e., 1575.42+/-10
MHz).''\169\ No technical analysis was provided to support this
recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\See ARINC/ATA Comments at 3.
\169\See FAA Comments at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
132. TRW, Ellipsat, and LQP contend that the proposed out-of-band
emission limits should be relaxed.\170\ They contend that relaxing the
limits will allow for reasonably priced user terminals and will
adequately protect GPS from out-of-band emissions from these terminals.
Constellation, in contrast, supports the proposed limits. It states
that the protection level of GPS receivers is reasonable given the
frequency separation between the lower end of the MSS band at 1610 MHz
and GPS signals at 1575.42 MHz.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\LQP suggested that the limit be -50 dBW/1 MHz averaged over
any 20 ms period in any portion of the 1575.42+/-1.023 MHz band for
broadband noise emissions. LQP Comments at 65. See also TRW Reply at
77 (n. 118), Ellipsat Reply at 11 (n.7).
\171\Constellation Comments at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
133. We believe that the proposed out-of-band emission limits for
MSS user transceiver operations in the 1610-1626.5 MHz band are
appropriate to protect GPS operations near 1575 MHz. Both the aviation
and MSS parties participated in the Committee's deliberations that
resulted in a consensus on an out-of-band emission limit for protecting
GPS. No party has demonstrated that a modification of those limits is
now warranted. The MSS parties do not demonstrate that the limits are
overly restrictive or that significant additional costs would be
incurred by building transceivers to meet the limits. Similarly, the
aviation parties have not shown that additional protection bandwidth
for GPS is necessary. We therefore adopt proposed Sec. 25.213(b) with
minor editorial changes.
134. Protection of GLONASS from out-of-band emissions from primary
uplinks in the 1610-1626.5 MHz band. The Committee also addressed
potential MSS out-of-band interference to GLONASS operations below 1610
MHz, but did not reach a consensus. It did, however, suggest a
methodology that could be used to determine appropriate limits. It also
noted that there was general agreement that the MSS user transceiver
out-of-band emission limits recommended for protecting GPS would be
sufficient to protect GLONASS operations below 1610 MHz.\172\ We
requested comment on the proposed methodology and on the appropriate
parameters to be used in developing protection criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\See Committee Report, note 23, supra, at para. 5.2.2.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
135. ARINC/ATA and Rockwell maintain that the MSS out-of-band
emission limits appropriate for protecting GPS operations near 1575 MHz
should similarly apply to GLONASS operations below 1610 HMz.\173\ The
FAA suggests an interference threshold of -145 dBW/1MHz of GLONASS
receivers operating below 1610 MHz and calculates a -71 dBW/1MHz MSS
user terminal out-of-band emission limit which, it argues, is necessary
to protect GLONASS operations at that particular interference
threshold.\174\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\See ARINC and ATA Comments at 3 and Reply at 7; Rockwell
Comments at 4.
\174\FAA Comments at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
136. The MSS applicants question whether the assumptions made by
the aviation parties in their analyses are appropriate and disagree
that a direct correlation can be made between the out-of-band emission
limits necessary for protecting GPS and the limits necessary for
protecting GLONASS below 1610 MHz. Constellation, for example, noted
that the provisions to protect GPS from MSS out-of-band emissions were
agreed to in the Committee, but that agreement was ``without prejudice
to the application of the interference protection model to any other
case, i.e., GLONASS, where it would be impractical to provide this same
level of protection and for which other solutions are required to avoid
harmful interference.''\175\ LQP notes that while the FAA, ARINC and
ATA seek protection of individual GLONASS signals, they have not
provided an analysis of why such protection is required to ensure the
integrity of the GLONASS system.\176\ Motorola contends that the
analyses conducted by the aviation community are ``skewed'' because
they have assumed that the MSS transmitter and the aircraft receiver
are static when, in fact, both devices are usually mobile.\177\
Motorola also lists a number of factors which it argues would provide a
more accurate determination of necessary out-of-band emission
limits.\178\ TRW requests that we incorporate in the rules the ongoing
measurement programs and the system vulnerability analyses now being
used to determine actual protection requirements of GNSS.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\See Constellation Comments at 49.
\176\See LQP Reply at 60-61. On LQP's behalf Sat-Tech Systems
conducted an independent study of GNSS satellite availability. Sat-
Tech Systems concluded that since multiple measurements from a
number of GPS and GLONASS satellites would always be available, the
loss of a single GNSS signal would not impair the ability to
navigate using GNSS. LQP Comments, Technical Appendix at para.
2.2.1.
\177\Motorola Reply at 51.
\178\These include the effects of duty cycle, modulation
technique, spectral overlap, channel assignment, airframe shielding,
time duration of event, and signal processing. Motorola describes in
detail the individual impact of each of these factors on the
analyses in its reply technical appendix at 1-10.
\179\See TRW Reply at 77 (n 118).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
137. We will not adopt out-of-band emission limits to protect
GLONASS operations below 1610 MHz at this time. The Committee did not
agree on limits and the record indicates that a suitable methodology
for determining such limits has still not been agreed upon. We note,
however, that RTCA Working Group SC159 ad hoc has been established to
assess interference to GNSS and possible interference mitigation
techniques. The aviation community and the Big LEO applicants
participate in this group. We expect that the report from SC159 ad hoc
will include an assessment of the out-of-band emission limits on MSS
operations necessary to protect GLONASS operations below 1610 MHz. We
also believe that this information will provide a mutually acceptable
out-of-band emission level.
c. Out-of-band interference to ARNS/RNSS from secondary MSS
downlinks in the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz band. 138. The Committee also
examined the potential for harmful interference to GPS and GLONASS from
secondary MSS downlinks in the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz band. It concluded
that interference to GPS operations near 1575 MHz from these downlinks
would be negligible due to the low power density level of MSS satellite
signals at the Earth's surface and the large frequency separation
between the MSS and the GPS frequency bands.\180\ To protect GLONASS
from interference, however, the Committee recommended that space
stations that use the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz band for downlinks not exceed a
pfd of -141.5 dbW/m\2\/4kHz.\181\ We proposed this limit in the Notice
in rule Sec. 25.213(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\Committee Report, note 23, supra, at para. 3.3.8.
\181\Committee Report, note 23, supra, at para. 5.2.2.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
139. Motorola requests that we limit proposed Sec. 25.213(c)(3) to
apply only to those frequencies that are used by systems operating in
accordance with International Radio Regulation RR 732. Motorola
contends that this would ``follow any changes in the frequency plan of
systems, like GLONASS, operating in accordance with RR 732, and would
also avoid restricting the operations of MSS systems in frequencies
where there are no aeronautical radionavigation systems and hence no
need for a more restrictive power flux density limit.''\182\ Motorola
also asks us to clarify that the pfd limit refers to the pfd level at
the Earth's surface.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\See Motorola Comments at 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
140. We believe that the pfd limits proposed in Sec. 25.213(c)(3)
can be readily achieved by MSS operators using the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz
band for secondary downlink transmissions. We also believe that our
intra-service sharing plan provides sufficient separation between the
MSS downlink band and GLONASS operations below 1610 MHz so as not to
create interference. Nevertheless, we have decided not to adopt the
proposed rule containing out-of-band emission limits for secondary MSS
downlinks. Adopting such a rule could be construed to imply that the
secondary service has some protection rights relative to primary
services in the band, which, by definition, it does not.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\See note 21, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
141. We remind MSS operators that plan to use the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz
secondary allocation for MSS space-to-Earth operations that downlink
MSS operations shall not cause harmful interference to GLONASS
operations in the 1598-1610 MHz band.\184\ Further, MSS operators may
not claim interference protection from out-of-band GLONASS operations.
We also remind MSS operators of the obligation to coordinate secondary
downlink operations in the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz band pursuant to RR
731F.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\See note 21, supra.
\185\See Sec. 2.106 of the Commission's Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Industrial, Scientific, and Medical Emissions at 2400-2500 MHz
142. The 2400-2500 MHz band may be used on a co-primary basis for
Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) equipment applications. ISM
applications include microwave ovens, door openers, high frequency
lighting systems, industrial equipment, and other low power devices.
The Committee was unable to reach a consensus as to whether ISM use
represents a significant interference problem to MSS downlinks at
2483.5-2500 MHz.\186\ In the Notice, we stated that the record in this
area was insufficient to propose specific MSS/ISM sharing rules and
requested additional comment on this subject.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\Committee Report, note 23, supra, at 3.4.9.
\187\Notice, note 2, supra at para. 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
143. In their comments, LQP and TRW indicate they conducted
independent analyses of the potential for ISM operations to cause
harmful interference to 2.4 GHz MSS downlinks. LQP concluded that MSS
user transceivers operated in an urban environment with full signal
quality in 98% of the instances it recorded. Further, it concluded that
MSS signals would be usable 99.5% of the time. LQP also noted that
because urban areas are usually served by terrestrial cellular
networks, a dual mode transceiver could be switched to terrestrial
cellular frequencies when very high ISM interference is present.\188\
TRW states that its study generally corroborates LQP's conclusion that
2.4 GHz MSS operations should not be adversely affected by ISM
transmissions.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\LQP Comments, Technical Appendix at 32.
\189\TRW Reply Comments at 86. In earlier comments, TRW
suggested that the Commission reassess the permissible levels of
unwanted ISM emissions in order to maximize sharing possibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
144. Consequently, we do not believe any further inquiry into the
MSS/ISM sharing situation is warranted. Should sharing be more
difficult than anticipated, affected parties may request that we
revisit this matter.
4. Sharing with Fixed Services in the 2483.5-2500 MHz Band
145. Over 700 fixed terrestrial stations, including temporary fixed
(transportable) stations, are licensed and operating in the United
States in the 2483.5-2500 MHz band. These stations are primarily used
as links in microwave relay systems serving petroleum companies and as
broadcast auxiliary links. Since 1985, however, the Commission has
prohibited any further terrestrial licensing in this band.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\Report and Order, Gen. Docket 84-689, FCC 85-388 (released
Sept. 13, 1985) (RDSS Allocation Order).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
146. The Committee recognized that MSS spacecraft operating at
power flux density (pfd) levels in excess of the levels prescribed by
international radio regulation RR 2566 would be required to be
coordinated with these ``grandfathered'' fixed terrestrial
stations.\191\ It stated, however, that these cases should be
infrequent and that, in any event, any interference problems should be
resolvable through coordination. The Committee also noted that
terrestrial operations could interfere with MSS operations, although no
analyses were provided to quantify the sharing constraints needed to
prevent such interference. The Committee stated that because there is
no inherent reason why fixed services need to continue operating in
this frequency band, the Commission should consider moving these fixed
stations to a higher frequency band.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\RR 2566 specifies pfd values at the Earth's surface that
may be produced by space station emissions. The values vary from
-152 to -142 dB (W/m2/4 kHz) depending upon the angle of
arrival. International radio regulation RR 753F incorporates these
limits. According to RR 753F, if the limits of RR 2566 are exceeded
by the MSS, coordination with terrestrial services is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
147. In the Notice, we accepted the Committee's finding that
interference problems between terrestrial fixed-services at 2483.5-2500
MHz and MSS downlinks operating in excess of the prescribed pfd levels
may be settled through the coordination process.\192\ We requested
comment on this assessment. We also specifically requested comment from
terrestrial operators, who did not participate in the Negotiated
Rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
148. In the RDSS Allocation Order, we recognized that fixed and
temporary-fixed operations are unlikely to pose a serious interference
threat to RDSS.\193\ We therefore grandfathered all existing station
licenses as of July 25, 1985, permitting them to continue operations
and subject only to license renewal. However, we acknowledged that
coordination would be somewhat more difficult when temporary-fixed
stations are involved since RDSS licensees would not have exact
information regarding the location of these stations. Therefore, we
required temporary-fixed licensees in this band to notify RDSS
licensees directly whenever the station is moved to a new
location.\194\ A similar interference environment is present with MSS
operations. Consequently, we proposed to modify Section 94.61(b)(4) to
extend the notification requirement for grandfathered temporary-fixed
licensees to MSS licensees as well.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\See RDSS Allocation Order, note 190, supra, at paras. 18-
20.
\194\See 47 CFR 94.61(b)(4).
\195\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 62 (n. 104). See also
Allocation Order, note 1, supra (modifying NG 147 to the Table of
Frequency Allocations, 47 CFR Sec. 2.106, to recognize that
``grandfathered'' terrestrial stations may continue to operate on a
primary basis with the MSS.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
149. The Big LEO parties argue that the Commission should adopt pfd
limits for MSS transmissions that are less stringent than those of RR
2566 and that these limits should be implemented as ``triggers'' for
coordination, not as ``absolute limits.''\196\ This would work in the
following manner: the relaxed pfd limit would be established as a
``trigger level.'' If the trigger level is not exceeded, no further
action would be required. If the trigger level is exceeded, the
interference level to terrestrial systems would then be examined,
taking into account the individual system characteristics of the MSS
system. Only if the protection levels of the second step are exceeded
would coordination be required.\197\ According to the Big LEO parties,
relaxing the pfd levels and applying the coordination trigger method
would enable the MSS systems to enhance capacity and sharing with other
MSS operators and avoid time-consuming and costly coordination.\198\
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\196\LQP Comments at 75, Ellipsat Reply Comments at 24, TRW
Reply Comments at 78.
\197\LQP Comments at 77, TRW Comments at 131.
\198\We note also that LQP has, in a separate proceeding,
recommended that these limits be raised. LQP Comments at 74; see
Petition for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration of Loral
Qualcomm Satellite Service, Inc., ET Docket No. 92-28 at 7-10 (filed
Mar. 30, 1994).
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150. We adopt the pfd threshold of RR 2566 for our domestic Big LEO
systems. The ITU Radiocommunication Study Group, Task Group 2/2 (TG 2/
2), is studying the issue of relaxing the pfd limits of RR 2566, with
the view to present a recommendation at an upcoming World
Radiocommunciation Conference (WRC). The Commission participates
actively in the work of TG 2/2. We do not believe it would be
appropriate to adopt an increase in the allowable pfd limits for MSS
downlinks in the 2483.5-2500 MHz band in the United States before
limits are agreed upon internationally. Indeed, even if we adopted a
relaxation of the RR 2566 pfd limits in the United States, it is
questionable whether MSS systems that are not designed for power
controlled downlink transmissions would be able to take advantage of
this relaxed limit worldwide.
151. We also adopt the notification requirement for grandfathered
temporary-fixed licensees to MSS licensees as proposed in the Notice
and will not require these stations to relocate. No comments were filed
with respect to a possible relocation of grandfathered terrestrial
stations. We therefore have no record in this proceeding on which to
base a finding that a move would serve the public interest.
5. Fixed Services above 2500 MHz (ITFS/MMDS)
152. The instructional television fixed service (ITFS) and the
multi-channel multipoint distribution service (MMDS) operate in the
adjacent 2500-2690 MHz frequency band. The Committee found a potential
for out-of-band emission interference into MSS downlinks at 2483.5-2500
MHz from operations in the lowest frequency portion of the ITFS/MMDS
allocation. It indicated that because both ITFS and MMDS transmissions
are similar to those of television broadcast signals, they will cause
harmful interference into MSS mobile user transceivers operating up to
several kilometers away from an ITFS or a MMDS transmitter. The
Committee concluded that stricter limits on ITFS and MMDS out-of-band
emissions should be imposed, and recommended that the Commission
initiate such a rulemaking.\199\ It acknowledged, however, that making
these improvements would cost up to $30,000 per ITFS or MMDS station,
and that this cost might increase if these stations are converted from
analog to digital technology.
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\199\Specifically, the Committee concluded that out-of-band
emissions from the lowest frequency ITFS/MMDS channel using an
analog video signal at 2500-2506 MHz should be limited to -90 dB
relative to the carrier at a frequency offset from band edge between
1.25 and 2 MHz, assuming that the channel is operating at 30 dBW
e.i.r.p. Adjustments could be made for higher frequency channels and
for higher or lower operating e.i.r.p. Currently, ITFS out-of-band
emissions extending more than 1 MHz below the lower band edge must
be attenuated 60 dB below the peak visual carrier power. See 47 CFR
Sec. 74.936(b).
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153. We stated in the Notice that the record was insufficient to
allow us to make a specific proposal in this area.\200\ No ITFS
representative participated on the Committee nor did the Committee
explore the economic and technical tradeoffs that must be considered in
developing a solution. Therefore, we requested comment on all aspects
of the ITFS/MSS sharing issue, noting that the regulations we
ultimately adopt would be based on these comments. We noted that these
regulations might require ITFS operators to improve out-of-band
suppression, might require MSS operators to accept additional
interference, or might require a combination of both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
154. Ellipsat and TRW contend that new out-of-band emission
constraints on all ITFS/MMDS stations should be applied immediately to
allow for a transition period for these transmitters to conform to new
requirements and that, according to Section 74.936 of the Commission's
Rules, the ``onus is on the ITFS operator to provide the required
interference protection to adjacent band services.''\201\ Further, TRW
asserts the licensing of Big LEO systems or the initiation of service
should not be delayed to permit ITFS operators additional time to
modify their transmitters.
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\201\TRW Comments at 132, Ellipsat Reply Comments at 24. Section
74.936 of the Commission's rules, which pertains to ITFS facilities,
states that ``should interference occur as a result of emissions
outside the assigned channel, additional attenuation may be
required.'' 47 CFR 74.936.
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155. The Wireless Cable Association International (WCAI), the
National Telephone Cooperative Association (NTCA) and the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting (CPB), urge that the Commission adopt rules
that will provide adequate compensation to ITFS/MMDS operators for
costs associated with improving their transmitters to comply with any
stricter out-of-band emission requirements.\202\ WCAI also notes that
broadband repeaters used by some ITFS and wireless cable system
operators to relay signals into areas that would otherwise be
unreachable could pose a threat to MSS downlink operations at the upper
portion of the 2483.5-2500 MHz band.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\WCAI Comments at 3 and 6, NTCA Comments at 2-3, and CPB
Comments at 6.
\203\WCAI Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
156. LQP, in contrast, does not believe that interference is a
significant problem. It conducted a study to assess the impact of ITFS/
MMDS out-of-band interference to MSS downlinks in the 2483.5-2500 MHz
band and concluded that no harmful interference to MSS operations will
result from ITFS/MMDS, including operations of ITFS/MMDS booster
stations, and that stricter standards on ITFS/MMDS out-of-band
emissions are not necessary. LQP maintains that: (1) MSS downlink
operations below 2488.75 MHz will not experience interference from ITFS
stations, (2) in urban areas, where ITFS transmitters are prevalent,
MSS dual mode transceivers can be used to switch customers to existing
terrestrial cellular radio facilities, and (3) MSS user transceivers
operating in the highest channel frequency in the 2483.5-2500 MHz band
within an ITFS coverage area will be able to operate satisfactorily in
all but a few extreme situations by rejecting the ITFS visual carrier
and other out-of-band emissions.\204\
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\204\LQP Comments, Technical Appendix, at 27.
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157. TRW urges that the LQP study ``may have taken an overly
optimistic view of the interference situation.''\205\ TRW also contends
that MSS systems using wider CDMA channels (e.g., 5 MHz or wider) may
not have the flexibility to move to a lower frequency channel and that
until further required measurements are taken and MSS system designs
are finalized, the impact of ITFS/MMDS out-of-band interference is not
certain.\206\
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\205\TRW Reply Comments at 79.
\206\TRW Technical Appendix to Reply Comments at A-24.
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158. Upon review of the technical information in the record, we see
no significant threat of harmful out-of-band emission interference into
MSS from ITFS/MMDS operations above 2500 MHz. Well designed CDMA
receivers should mitigate the effect of out-of-band emissions from
ITFS/MMDS. Additionally, a MSS user transceiver's dynamic channel
switching capability should reduce any adverse affects from ITFS/MMDS.
Further, our intra-service sharing plan allows enough 2.4 GHz band
spectrum for MSS operators to avoid ITFS/MMDS out-of-band emissions in
the upper portions of the allocation. Consequently, we will not
initiate a proceeding to restrict further the out-of-band emissions on
ITFS/MMDS at this time.
6. Other Terrestrial Services provided outside of the United States
159. In sixteen countries throughout the world, the 1550-1645.5 MHz
band is allocated on a primary basis to the fixed service pursuant to
international Radio Regulation RR 730.\207\ Ground-based aeronautical
radionavigation services (ARNS) are also operating throughout the world
in the 1610-1626.5 MHz band pursuant to RR 732.
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\207\These countries are Austria, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Germany,
Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Libya, Mali, Mongolia, Nigeria, Poland,
Romania, Senegal, Czechoslovakia, and the former U.S.S.R.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
160. The Committee concluded that existing fixed stations operating
in the 1610-1626.5 MHz band pursuant to RR 730 and ground-based ARNS
stations operating pursuant to RR 732 will not cause harmful
interference to MSS operations. It also concluded that MSS operations
will not cause harmful interference to these terrestrial services.
Consequently, we proposed only to reiterate in Section 25.213(d) of our
rules the general obligation that MSS stations shall not cause
interference into stations operating under RR 730. The requirement that
MSS stations shall not cause interference to, or claim protection from,
stations operating pursuant to RR 732, (international Radio Regulation
RR 732 encompasses both ground-based and satellite-borne ARNS), was
addressed by proposed rule section 25.213(c)(1), which was adopted
earlier in this order.\208\
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\208\See para. 128, supra.
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161. Constellation contends that we should not adopt proposed
Sec. 25.213(d) since there are no U.S. systems operating pursuant to RR
730.\209\ We disagree. We have repeatedly emphasized in this proceeding
that the operation of LEO MSS systems is inherently global. Though
there are no systems operating in the United States pursuant to RR 730,
it is important that we make clear the obligations of Big LEO operators
to coordinate their systems worldwide. Our rules do not elsewhere
address coordination of Big LEO systems with systems operating pursuant
to RR 730.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\Constellation Reply comments at 47 and Constellation
Comments at 53.
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162. We therefore adopt Section 25.213(d), as proposed, with the
caveat that the coordination and notification procedures fall under
Resolution 46 (WARC-92).\210\ International Radio Regulations RR 731E
and RR 731F require, respectively, that MSS uplink transmissions in the
1610-1626.5 MHz band and MSS downlink operations in the 1613.8-1626.5
MHz band be coordinated and notified pursuant to Resolution 46 (WARC-
92). Also according to RR 731E, MSS mobile earth terminals may not
cause interference to terrestrial stations operating in accordance with
RR 730 and they may not claim interference protection from these
terrestrial stations. We note that all transmitting MSS subscriber
terminals will be subject to the regulatory requirements of those
countries in which they are operating. User countries will be
responsible for undertaking all necessary coordination with neighboring
countries to protect fixed or terrestrial aeronautical radionavigation
operations from MSS mobile earth terminals in those neighboring
countries. Any secondary MSS downlink operations in the 1613.8-1626.5
MHz band also may not cause harmful interference into terrestrial
services operating pursuant to RR 730 or 732. Nor may a MSS mobile
earth terminal which receives secondary downlink transmissions claim
protection against harmful interference from these terrestrial
operation unless a particular country has agreed to provide this
protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\See Motorola Comments at 56.
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C. Feeder Links
163. In addition to the mobile links connecting customers with the
MSS system, one or more ``gateway'' or central earth stations are
needed to complete the transmission paths, process the information
being transmitted, and interconnect the system with other
communications networks or with other user transceivers. Without these
``feeder links,'' an MSS system would be useless. Because feeder links
operate with gateway stations at fixed locations, the feeder link
operates in frequency bands allocated to the fixed-satellite service
(FSS).
164. The six applicants requested a variety of feeder link
frequency bands and bandwidths. In their applications, Constellation,
Ellipsat, and LQP each requested 66 MHz of spectrum in each
transmission direction in the 5/6 GHz C-band. Motorola and TRW and each
requested approximately 100 MHz in each direction the 20/30 GHz Ka-
band. AMSC requested an unspecified amount of spectrum in the 12/14 GHz
Ku-band.\211\ We note, however, that four of the applicants, in the
Joint Proposal, indicate that their feeder link spectrum requirements
have increased significantly since they filed their original
applications. As recognized in the Notice, the FAA has opposed use of
the 5 GHz portion of the C-band for space-to-Earth feeder links because
of the interference potential between the feeder links and a navigation
system it is considering developing in this band.\212\ The 27.5-29.5
GHz portion of the Ka-band was the subject of a recently completed
Negotiated Rulemaking involving various terrestrial and satellite
interests seeking to use the band. The Negotiated Rulemaking Committee
was unable to devise sharing criteria that would satisfy the feeder
link requirements of more than one Big LEO applicant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\Committee Report, Annex 3, Report of Working Group 3, at 2.
\212\See Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 75
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
165. In the Joint Proposal, the parties nevertheless request the
Commission to proceed with licensing. They state that licenses can be
issued to those applicants requesting to operate in feeder link bands
that are available for assignment at the time of licensing. They
suggest that conditional licenses be awarded to applicants requesting
to operate in feeder link bands that are not available. According to
the parties, the license would contain a range of feeder link
frequencies that the licensee will be able to use provided that those
frequencies become available for Big LEO feeder links and are assigned
to that licensee by the Commission.
166. We agree that we should award Big LEO licenses as quickly as
possible. While we are optimistic that sufficient spectrum will be
identified to support Big LEO feeder link operations, we are not
certain when this will occur. It is very likely that we will not be in
a position to assign specific feeder link spectrum to any qualified
applicant by our target date for licensing in January 1995. Even if we
were able to assign specific feeder link spectrum to some, however, we
would not issue unconditional grants to some and conditional grants to
others as the applicants suggest. Until we are certain that the feeder
link requirements of all qualified applicants will be met, we will not
foreclose our options by assigning spectrum unconditionally.\213\ We
will permit applicants to notify us whether they would prefer to have
conditional feeder link frequencies included in their authorizations or
whether they would prefer their initial license to be silent on this
issue. We envision granting unconditional licenses, including specific
feeder link frequencies, at the earlier of two events: (1) Domestic
allocations sufficient to support all Big LEO systems are available,
regardless of frequency band or (2) the completion of the upcoming
World Radio Conference in the Fall of 1995 (WRC-95) assuming sufficient
spectrum is made available to satisfy these feeder link requirements.
If sufficient feeder link spectrum to support all licensed Big LEO
systems is not identified by the completion of the WRC, we will need to
develop a further processing mechanism to assign feeder link bands to
Big LEO licensees. In the interim, we will continue our international
efforts to identity feeder link spectrum at or below 15 GHz.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\We will, however, take action on requests for waiver of the
construction permit requirement under Section 319(d) of the
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 319(d). If an applicant's waiver
request were approved, it would permit the applicant to commence
construction of its system, including the feeder links, at the
applicant's own risk.
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167. To this end, in preparation for the WRC, ITU-
Radiocommunications Study Group Task Groups 8/3 and 4/5 are attempting
to define spectrum requirements, to identify available frequencies and
to evaluate sharing possibilities with existing and future users of the
band. When these Groups complete their work in December of this year,
both will prepare Reports to the Conference Preparatory Meeting (CPM)-
95. These Reports will form the basis for the CPM's Report to WRC-95 on
feeder links, which will be the technical basis for international
decisions regarding feeder links and the International Table of
Allocations.
168. Since the frequencies to be used for LEO feeder links may also
be used by GSO satellites, Task Group 4/5 is studying the sharing
potential between LEO and GSO satellites in all FSS allocations between
3 and 31 GHz. These studies have indicated that certain FSS frequency
bands are used more extensively by GSO FSS systems and other radio
services and that these bands are therefore less likely candidates for
LEO MSS feeder links due to sharing difficulties. In bands at or below
15 GHz, the 5000-5250 GHz and 15.4-15.7 GHz frequencies appear to be
promising candidates for reallocation for LEO feeder links.\214\ Task
Group 4/5 has also studied the interference created by antenna beam
coupling between GSO earth stations and LEO satellite stations,\215\
and is exploring ways to reduce interference through a variety of
coordination procedures, including geographic exclusion zones, reverse
band operation, and dedicated frequency allocations for LEO satellite
feeder link use. When these studies are completed, we will have an
indication as to which bands may be recommended and, hopefully, made
available internationally for MSS feeder links at WRC-95.
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\214\Task Group 4/5 forwarded a preliminary study to TG 8/3 that
identified the 5000-5250 GHz and 15.4-15.7 GHz bands as strong
candidates for Non-GSO Earth-to-space feeder links. The study
indicated that TG 4/5 was of the preliminary view that sharing of
non-GSO feeder links (both downlinks and uplinks) with Aeronautical
Radionavigation Services (ARNS) in these bands appeared feasible,
since the interference to microwave landing system (MLS) receivers
would be within the assumed permissible levels. ICAO, at Task Group
8/3, objected to this study, but further analysis is underway and
the bands are still being considered as possibilities within these
international forums.
\215\Antenna beam coupling occurs when a LEO satellite passes
below a GSO satellite and crosses into the transmission path of an
earth station to the GSO satellite. At that point, the transmission
beams from the LEO satellite and the earth station will intersect.
If the LEO and GSO systems are operating in the same frequency band,
this ``coupling'' will produce significant interference for very
short durations of time when the earth station, LEO and GSO
satellites form a straight line.
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169. Nevertheless, as we stated in the Notice, we will not allow
the uncertain availability of bands below 15 GHz to delay the licensing
and implementation of Big LEO systems. Consequently, if sufficient
spectrum is made available at 20/30 GHz to accommodate all Big LEO
licensees before bands below 15 GHz are identified, we will authorize
all licensees in the 20/30 GHz band, recognizing that several
applicants will be faced with substantial system design and service
concept modifications. We will continue, however, to pursue bands at
and below 15 GHz for Big LEO feeder links, and will allow licensees to
modify their licenses to request operational authority in any new bands
if, and when, they become available.
D. Intersatellite Links
170. Motorola's proposed system includes intersatellite
transmission links in the 23.18-23.38 GHz band. This proposal falls
within the intersatellite service allocation at 22.55-23.55 GHz. The
Committee concluded that Motorola's use of this band would be
compatible with other operations in the band, which include operations
by NASA, the radio astronomy service, and fixed-terrestrial services.
The Committee noted, however, that NASA has indicated it would prefer
that any future MSS intersatellite links operate in the 24.45-24.75 GHz
band, which recently was allocated internationally and domestically for
intersatellite links. Nevertheless, the Committee, which included a
representative of NASA, proposed that we adopt a rule indicating that
the 22.55-23.00 GHz, 23.00-23.55 GHz, 24.45-24.65 GHz, and 24.65-24.75
GHz frequencies are available for use by the intersatellite service. In
the Notice, we proposed to adopt the Committee's recommended rule
regarding intersatellite service frequencies, coordination with
government agencies, and sharing criteria. We adopt the rule as
proposed with several minor changes and clarifications suggested by
Motorola.
E. Service Rules
1. Regulatory Treatment
171. In the Notice, we asked parties to comment on our tentative
conclusion that Big LEO MSS service may be offered as a commercial
mobile radio service (CMRS). We further sought comment on whether we
should exercise our discretion under Section 332(c)(5)\216\ to
determine that Big LEO space station licensees making satellite
capacity available to CMRS providers shall be required to operate as
common carriers. In the alternative, we asked parties to comment on how
we should regulate Big LEO space station operators if they are not
offering CMRS. We noted that when making determinations regarding
common carriage obligations in the past, the Commission has examined
individual service proposals in light of the criteria delineated in
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 525
F.2d 630, 642 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 999 (1976) (NARUC
I).\217\ Referencing the two-pronged test in NARUC I, in the Notice, we
requested comment regarding (1) the likelihood that space station
capacity in this service will be offered indifferently to the public,
and (2) if there is no such likelihood, whether there should be a legal
compulsion for space segment providers to serve the public
indifferently.\218\ We also asked for comment on the impact of
requiring common carrier operation on the amount of foreign investment
and the international coordination of these satellites, given the
requirements of Section 310(b) of the Act.\219\
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\216\Section 332(c)(5) reads as follows: ``SPACE SEGMENT
CAPACITY. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the Commission from
continuing to determine whether the provision of space segment
capacity by satellite systems to providers of commercial mobile
services shall be treated as common carriage.'' 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(5).
\217\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 80.
\218\Id. at paras. 80-81.
\219\Id. at para. 81.
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172. In a recent rulemaking, we determined the classification and
regulatory treatment of providers of CMRS.\220\ Regarding satellite
services, we held that, to the extent that a space station licensee
provides a service that meets the elements of the CMRS definition,\221\
we will generally regulate the provision of that service on a common
carrier basis.\222\ We concluded, however, that so long as the service
provider is not providing service directly to end users, the Commission
retains the authority under section 332(c)(5) to continue to employ its
existing procedures to determine whether the provision of space segment
capacity by satellite licensees to CMRS providers will be offered on a
common carrier or private carrier basis.\223\ We also determined that
the Commission has the discretion to extend this treatment to any
entity that sells or leases space segment capacity, to the extent that
the entity is not providing CMRS directly to end users.\224\
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\220\Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, 9 FCC Rcd 1411 (1994) (CMRS Second Report and
Order), recon. pending.
\221\Id. at 1457-58. A commercial mobile radio service is
defined as ``any mobile service (as defined in section 3(n)) that is
provided for profit and makes interconnected service available (A)
to the public or (B) to such classes of eligible users as to be
effectively available to a substantial portion of the public, as
specified by regulation by the Commission.'' 47 U.S.C. 332(d)(1). A
private mobile radio service is defined as ``any mobile service (as
defined in section 3(n)) that is not a commercial mobile service or
the functional equivalent of a commercial mobile service, as
specified by regulation by the Commission.'' 47 U.S.C. 332(d)(3).
\222\It should be noted, however, that we have chosen to forbear
(pursuant to Section 332(c)(1)(A)) from the application of certain
provisions of Title II of the Act with regard to CMRS providers. As
such, for example, CMRS providers are not permitted to file tariffs
for their services. See CMRS Second Report and Order, note 220,
supra, at 1478-80.
\223\Id. at 1457-58.
\224\Id. at 1457.
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173. Motorola and LQP agree that the Commission must regulate Big
LEO space station licensees as common carriers to the extent that they
provide CMRS to end users.\225\ If the licensees offer only space
segment capacity to resellers, however, the parties contend that this
provision of service does not fall within the definition of CMRS, and
therefore need not be made available on a common carriage basis.\226\
LQP argues that in this situation, the public is assured common
carriage access to the service because, at some point a reseller will
meet the definition of a CMRS provider and will be required to operate
as a common carrier.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\Motorola Comments at 67-68.
\226\See e.g., TRW Comments at 153-54 & n.239; LQP Comments at
97-98.
\227\LQP Comments at 97, 100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
174. Big LEO space station licensees providing service directly to
end users must be regulated as common carriers if the service offering
meets the definition of CMRS. We will determine whether a service
offering meets the definition based on the service description
contained in the operator's application. Operators with pending
applications may amend their applications to the extent necessary to
enable us to make the determination regarding the nature of the
service.\228\
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\228\See para. 2, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
175. Pursuant to section 332(c)(5), however, if space segment
capacity is offered by a Big LEO space station licensee to a reseller
or other entity who then offers CMRS to end users, we have the
discretion to determine whether to require the Big LEO licensee to
offer such service on a common carriage basis, or to permit such
offering to be made on a private carriage basis. In making this
determination, we have looked to the analysis enunciated in NARUC I.
176. Regarding the first prong of the NARUC I test, the commenters
agree unanimously that nothing in the nature of the applicants' service
proposals supports a conclusion that their services will be offered
indifferently to the public. Motorola points out that it and the other
applicants propose to market their space segment capacity to a small
number of resellers, and to tailor these offerings to the individual
requirements of these few customers. Motorola contends that such
offerings have never been viewed as ``common carriage'' under the NARUC
I standard.\229\ Constellation, LQP, TRW, and AirTouch concur, noting
that Commission has historically viewed a service provider's lack of
intent to serve end users as an indication of non-common carriage.\230\
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\229\Motorola Comments at 64-65 (asserting that space capacity
on the IRIDIUM system will never be offered directly to the public;
rather, it will be provided on a wholesale basis to the operators of
the IRIDIUM system gateways, who in turn may provide services to end
users or sell capacity in bulk to service providers, or both).
\230\Constellation Comments at 60; LQP Comments at 97-98; TRW
Comments at 158-160; AirTouch Comments at 9-10.
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177. We agree with the commenters that the record in this
proceeding does not support a finding that the proposed space segment
services are likely to be offered to the public indifferently, a basic
characteristic of common carrier service.\231\ First, in cases where
licensees have not intended to serve the user public directly, the
Commission has found services to be non-common carrier in nature. In
Domestic Fixed-Satellite Transponder Sales, for example, the Commission
noted the slim likelihood that non-common carrier domestic satellites
would hold themselves out indifferently to serve the user public as key
to its decision to permitted qualified persons to apply for domestic
satellite licenses for non-common carrier purposes.\232\ More recently,
the Commission, in assessing its discretion under section 332(c)(5),
held that non-voice, non-geostationary (NVNG) MSS space station
licensees would be permitted to provide system access to CMRS providers
on a non-common carrier basis.\233\ Second, these limited offerings
will be tailored to provide resellers with a wide variety of options,
ranging from position determination and data messaging services, such
as those proposed by the NVNG MSS proponents, to global telephony.
Consequently, there is nothing in this record to support a finding that
the services will be offered indifferently to the public.
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\231\See para. 171, supra. See also Motorola Comments at 64.
\232\Domestic Fixed-Satellite Transponder Sales, 90 FCC 2d 1238,
1256-57 (1982), aff'd, Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d
1456 (D.C. Cir. 1984), modified Martin Marietta Communications
Systems, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 Rad.Reg. (P&F) 2d 779
(1986).
\233\NVNG MSS Order, note 48, supra, at 8456.
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178. Regarding the second prong of the NARUC I test, the commenters
unanimously agree that there should be no legal compulsion for space
segment provides to serve the public indifferently. AirTouch and other
commenters allege that there will be significant competition in the
provision of these services to CMRS providers, both from Big LEO
systems, as well as from GSO MSS and NVNG MSS systems.\234\ These
commenters also assert that sufficient capacity will be available to
assure service availability to those that wish to receive it.\235\ TRW
further contends that the danger of unreasonable or anticompetitive
practices that common carrier regulation is designed to prevent will
not exist in the competitive environment in which Big LEO licensees
will operate because five applicants seek authority to operate these
services.\236\
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\234\See, e.g., AirTouch Comments at 7-8; Ellipsat Comments at
46; TRW Comments at 156-157.
\235\AirTouch Comments at 8; TRW Comments at 157; Ellipsat
Comments at 46.
\236\See TRW Comments at 156. See also Motorola Comments at 63.
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179. We concur that there does not appear to be a need to impose
common carrier requirements on Big LEO licensees at this time. The
Commission has found the presence of capacity and the resulting
competition to be an important factor in determining whether non-common
carrier treatment should be permitted.\237\ As the commenters state,
competitive voice mobile services already exist or are imminent.
Furthermore, satellite-delivered radiolocation and messaging services
are currently provided by a Commission licensee,\238\ and are proposed
by a number of NVNG MSS applicants.\239\ Moreover, under our rules
adopted today, sufficient spectrum is available to support the grant of
up to five of the pending Big LEO applications.\240\ Thus, significant
direct competition is approaching.\241\ We accordingly believe that
sufficient competitive capacity will be available to assure the public
of ample access to these services. Therefore, we find that there is no
reason to require the provision of space segment capacity to be offered
to resellers on a common carrier basis.\242\ Of course, if a space
segment capacity provider chooses to provide service on a common
carrier basis, that service provider would be subject to regulation as
a CMRS provider.\243\ The Commission has forborne from applying certain
provisions of Title II to CMRS providers.\244\
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\237\Domestic Fixed-Satellite Transponder Sales, note 232,
supra, at 1250-53.
\238\See Qualcomm, Inc., Application for Blanket Authority to
Construct and Operate a Network of 12/14 GHz Transmit/Receive Mobile
and Transportable Earth Stations and a Hub Earth Station, 4 FCC Rcd
1543 (1989).
\239\Final rules have been adopted establishing the NVNG mobile-
satellite service, and three applications are pending. See NVNG MSS
Order, note 48, supra.
\240\See paras. 44-45, supra.
\241\There is also support in antitrust law and policy for
examining potential competition for that purpose. See Implementation
of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory
Treatment of Mobile Services, Amendment of Part 90 of the
Commission's Rules To Facilitate Future Development of SMR Systems
in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, Amendment of Parts 2 and 90 of the
Commission's Rules to Provide for the Use of 200 Channels Outside
the Designated Filing Areas in the 896-901 MHz and 935-940 MHz Band
Allotted to the Specialized Mobile Radio Pool, GN Docket No. 93-252,
PR Docket No. 93-144, PR Docket No. 89-553, FCC 94-212, at paras.
69-70, (released Sept. 23, 1994).
\242\We emphasize that our decision with regard to the
regulatory status of the provision of space segment capacity is
taken pursuant to the Commission's authority under Section
332(c)(5). Therefore, our actions here should not be viewed as
altering our decision in the CMRS Second Report and Order regarding
individualized or customized service offerings made by CMRS
providers to individual customers. As we explained in the CMRS
Second Report and Order, individualized or customized offerings will
be classified and regulated as CMRS, regardless of whether such
offerings would be treated as common carriage under existing case
law, if the service falls within the definition of CMRS. See CMRS
Second Report and Order note 220, supra, at 1439 and n.130. We also
explained that the public availability prong of the CMRS definition
is met unless the service is used for a licensee's internal use or
if Commission rules limit eligibility to specified user groups. Id.
at 1441.
\243\See CMRS Second Report and Order, note 220, supra, at 1475-
90.
\244\See 47 CFR 20.15.
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180. In so finding, we recognize that the commenters argued the
imposition of common carrier requirements may have an adverse effect on
the development of this service. AirTouch and others argue that Section
310(b) restrictions on foreign involvement in the affairs of domestic
common carrier licensees may significantly hinder investment by foreign
entities, as well as their willingness to allow a U.S. licensee to
operate within their own borders.\245\ The commenters allege that this
investment is critical to the development of a global satellite
service.\246\ Further, Motorola states that the submission of U.S.
service providers to common carrier requirements will inhibit their
ability to compete with foreign systems that are not similarly
encumbered.\247\ LQP concurs, noting that the space station licensees
should be free to tailor their business plans to their respective
customer bases.\248\
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\245\See AirTouch Comments at 4-7. See also TRW Comments at 161-
163.
\246\See Ellipsat Comments at 46; AirTouch Comments at 5-6;
Motorola Comments at 66-67.
\247\Motorola Comments at 66-67.
\248\LQP Comments at 99.
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181. While we have already found that common 2 carrier requirements
need not be imposed on space segment operators providing service to
resellers, there are several other factors that militate against the
imposition of common carrier requirements, particularly those limiting
alien ownership under Section 310(b) of the Communications Act.
Specifically, these systems are inherently global, and extremely
expensive. Systems may be comprised of as many as 66 satellites, only a
small number of which are visible over the United States at any one
time. Because of their global nature, many systems are raising capital
in international markets.\249\ As such, it is reasonable to expect that
investors will want to be involved with system operation, particularly
if the system will be accessed from the investor's jurisdiction. We
concur that this foreign participation is likely to improve the
likelihood of receiving a grant of space station access by foreign
administrations.
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\249\See, e.g., Motorola Comments at 67; TRW Comments at 161-162
(noting that global geostationary satellite systems, like Panamsat,
also have found it necessary to form partnerships with foreign
companies in order to raise foreign capital).
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2. System License and License Term
182. As proposed in the Notice, and unanimously endorsed by the
parties, we will follow the policy we established in licensing NVNG MSS
systems, which are also composed of constellations of technically
identical LEO satellites. Specifically, we will issue a single
``blanket'' authorization for the construction, launch, and operation
of all the satellites in an entity's constellation. This authorization
will cover all construction and launches necessary to put the complete
constellation into place and to maintain it until the end of the
license term, including any replacement satellites necessitated by
launch or operational failures, or by the retirement of satellites
prior to the end of the license period. All replacement satellites,
however, must be technically identical to those in service and may not
cause a net increase in the number of operating satellites.\250\ This
blanket authorization will include any in-orbit spares for which the
applicant seeks authorization as part of its system. Any such spares
can be activated as required. Within ten days of activation, the
licensee must certify to the Commission that the activation did not
cause it to exceed the total number of operation satellites for which
its system is authorized. Any spares or replacements that do not fall
under the blanket authorization will need separate authorizations to
build, launch and operate, but their terms will expire concurrently
with the blanket authorization. As proposed in the Notice, the license
will run from the date on which the first space station in the system
begins transmissions and will be valid for a ten-year period.
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\250\Technically identical satellites must have identical
satellite antenna footprints and transmission parameters. They need
not, however, have the identical physical structure or
microelectronics.
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183. Some applicants urge us to permit replacement satellites that
are ``functionally equivalent'' to those authorized or have ``the same
particulars of operation,'' to enable them to more readily include
evolutions in design into newer satellites. These are the same
proposals and arguments we rejected when we adopted the blanket
authorization standards for NVNG MSS satellites.\251\ In the absence of
arguments or evidence demonstrating that the NVNG MSS service is not
analogous to the Big LEO service, we continue to believe our interests
in assuring the continued compatibility of the subject systems with
other users of the spectrum outweigh any convenience for licensees in a
laxer standard. A modification application to upgrade satellite design
will not be unduly burdensome and should not impede technical
innovation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\See NVNG MSS Order, note 48, supra, at 8452.
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184. We also deny the request of LQP and Constellation that a
licensee be permitted to put ``spare'' satellites into service under
their blanket license in order to enhance their systems. These parties
would require only that there be no overall increase in effective
isotropically radiated power (e.i.r.p.), pfd, or any other sharing
criterion, and argue that this policy would allow licensees to increase
path diversity, which can be a significant service improvement for CDMA
systems. We are not convinced by LQP and Constellation that other
operators would not be affected by the operation of facilities that
have not been specifically analyzed and appropriately authorized.
Accordingly, we affirm our requirement that any satellites that an
applicant wishes to include in its system must be specified in its
initial application or a modification application.
185. We proposed in the Notice that license terms will begin
automatically with the first transmission from the first authorized
satellite, and will continue for ten years.\252\ All parties agree with
the length of the license term. One party proposes that a license term
should commence only after commencement of actual service or within six
months of launch, whichever occurs first. Apparently, the concern is
that the license term will begin to run before a licensee has launched
a sufficient number of satellites with which to begin commercial
operations. This overlooks our general policy that, because all
transmissions are capable of causing interference, satellite license
terms in all satellite services begin when radio transmissions
commence. We will not treat Big LEO operators differently by permitting
them to engage in any transmissions, whether those transmissions are to
test the system's functioning or to provide a fully implemented
commercial service, without a valid operating license. Further, we do
not believe that Big LEO operators will be unduly burdened if the
license term for the system begins to run on the date of the first
transmission. If fuel is left on the satellite after its license term
has expired, we will entertain a request for special temporary
authority to continue to operate if that location has not been assigned
to a new system.\253\ Thus, we adopt our rule as proposed.
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\252\This follows the one-step processing and licensing policy
that has been used for satellites since 1980. See 1980 Assignment
Order, 84 FCC 2d 584 (1981).
\253\In the past, we have granted such requests when continued
operations will not prevent a state-of-the-art satellite from taking
its place. See, e.g., Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc., 9 FCC Rcd
217 (1994); Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc., 9 FCC Rcd 218
(1994); and American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 8 FCC Rcd 8741
(1993).
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186. We also proposed a filing window for system replacement
applications identical to the one implemented in the analogous NVNG MSS
service. Specifically, we proposed that applications for the next
generation Big LEO systems must be filed no earlier than three months
prior to and no later than one month after the end of the seventh year
of the existing license.\254\ Motorola, LQP and Constellation variously
contend that some replacement applications could affect other
licensees' rights and thus potentially affected licensees should be
able to file replacement applications earlier. No party has explained,
however, why our proposed rules fail to provide adequate opportunity
for affected entities to respond to proposed replacement systems, thus
protecting their rights. We will therefore adopt the filing window for
replacement systems as proposed.
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\254\Proposed Sec. 25.120(e).
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187. In the Notice, we stated that we intend to grant replacement
applications if frequencies remain available for use by such systems,
consistent with our practice for other satellite services.\255\ Three
applicants urge us to adopt an explicit replacement expectancy, with
TRW proposing a specific provision that would provide such an
expectancy upon a licensee's consistent regulatory compliance. The
Commission, however, has historically rejected establishing an explicit
replacement expectancy for space station systems.\256\ We have
repeatedly noted circumstances such as intervening international
agreements or changes in technology may affect our determination as to
whether a replacement system would serve the public interest. We assure
Big LEO licensees that given the enormous investment necessary to
construct and operate a satellite system, we will consider replacement
applications in this service similar to other satellite services, that
is, we will grant authority to implement a next generation system
unless extraordinary circumstances prevent us from doing so.
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\255\Notice, note 2, supra, at n. 134.
\256\See, e.g., Assignment of Orbital Locations to Space
Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Service, 3 FCC Rcd 6972
(1988 Assignment Order), at n. 31.
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3. Implementation Milestones
188. As proposed in the Notice, we will adopt a set of satellite
construction milestones modeled on those used in the NVNG MSS service.
All parties agree that implementation milestones to monitor the
progress of system implementation are advisable, and most parties
approve of the essential elements of our proposed milestones, with
certain minor clarifications and modifications, some of which we are
adopting.
189. Each licensee will be required to adhere to a strict timetable
for the system implementation. Failure to meet this timetable will
render the authorization null and void. We will generally require each
licensee to begin construction of its first two satellites within one
year of the unconditional grant of its authorization, and complete
construction of those first two satellites within four years of that
grant. Construction for the remaining authorized operating satellites
in the constellation must begin within three years of the initial
authorization, and the entire authorized system must be operational
within six years.\257\ While we do not intend to deviate from these
requirements for commencing construction, we may authorize a different
schedule if an applicant concretely demonstrates that its proposed
system's size and/or complexity warrants additional time because of the
size or complexity of its proposed system.\258\ In every case, the
licensee's individual milestone timetable will be set and become a
condition of its authorization. Some parties propose that we consider
granting extensions of time to a licensee that has launched at least
part of its system. We will not adopt such a provision, which would
suggest that we will not enforce strictly the system completion
requirement. Incomplete systems will not justify the reservation of the
orbit/spectrum resource from other potential users, and applicants
should not anticipate that their authorization will require anything
less than a complete commitment of those resources necessary to execute
the full global system upon which their authorization is premised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\Some applicants' suggestions for additional milestones are
based on their mistaken belief that the Notice did not include a
final system completion requirement.
\258\See Notice, note 2, supra at 1136.
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190. We also will not impose a separate deadline for construction
of in-orbit spares. We will leave the determination of what is an
appropriate timetable for building or launching in-orbit spares to each
licensee. It is reasonable to believe that if the rest of the system is
implemented in a timely fashion, any in-orbit spares will also be put
into place on a timetable deemed prudent by the operator. Moreover, we
do not wish to discourage applicants from proposing as many in-orbit
spares for inclusion in their initial blanket authorizations as they
deem appropriate.
191. Some of the parties ask us to forego the construction
commencement milestone in favor of a timetable that would focus only on
the initiation of commercial service. They primarily contend that our
milestones are unfair to those systems that could begin to provide
service in stages (and, presumably, finance construction of the last
satellites from initial revenue streams). We are concerned, however,
that such a timetable would prevent prompt identification and
elimination of those applicants that are not, for whatever reason,
committed to building a system expeditiously that is capable of
providing global service.\259\ Most applicants fully support a global
coverage requirement.\260\
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\259\Any applicant whose financial capability would be so
constrained by the proposed construction milestones likely will not
meet our financial qualifications. The milestones and the financial
requirements provide a balanced approach to determining the actual
capability of the applicants to implement the system and service
they propose.
\260\See paras. 21-23, supra.
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192. Several applicants suggest that we adopt a more detailed
standard or a series of milestones to enable us to track implementation
progress more closely. LQP argues that this could result in long
undetected delays in progress. We do not believe interim milestones are
necessary. The annual reporting requirements (further discussed below)
and our ability to demand additional contract and construction
information should enable us to respond promptly to any implementation
failures.
193. Motorola suggests that we require a specific and significant
portion of the ground segment to be constructed on the same timetable
as the space segment.\261\ Such a requirement, opposed by all other
applicants, is undesirable. As noted, service provision in foreign
countries will be subject to a particular country's authorization. We
cannot require a licensee to meet an implementation milestone when its
ability to do so is outside of its control. In any event, licensees
that have launched enough satellites to provide service should have no
difficulty constructing their corresponding earth segments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\Motorola would require a ground segment covering 75% of the
world's population and 75% of the world's land area within six years
of initial system authorization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Reporting Requirements
194. We will also generally follow the NVNG MSS rules for annual
reporting requirements for this service, as proposed in the Notice and
supported by most parties. Every licensee must provide an annual report
fully describing the status of its construction, system loading and any
outages or malfunctions that have occurred during the reporting period.
These reports will be required on June 30 of each year.
195. Although several applicants argue that the information
requested is either too burdensome or too proprietary in nature for
dissemination, we believe this information is needed to allow us to
evaluate whether, and to what extent, the spectrum is being used and to
monitor construction progress. Licensees may request confidentiality
for any portion of their report, pursuant to Sec. 0.459 of the
Commission's rules, 47 CFR 0.459. As proposed in the Notice, we will
also require that each licensee to certify to us within ten days of the
date of any milestone requirement that the milestone was met or to
advise us that it was not.
5. Distress and Safety Communications
196. Although Big LEO applicants did not indicate that they plan to
use their systems for extensive distress and safety communications, we
recognized in the Notice that because these systems have position
determination capability,\262\ they have the potential to complement
existing search and rescue (SAR) and disaster response services.
Further, although we recognize that Big LEO services cannot be used in
lieu of distress beacons, such as satellite emergency position locator
transmitters or emergency indicator radio beacons, that are required to
be carried by international agreement or statute,\263\ Big LEO system
operators have certain obligations relating to maritime distress
communications under sections 321(b) and 359 of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. 321(b), 359.\264\ Other than these mandated requirements, we
did not propose to require Big LEO systems to provide search and rescue
or disaster response communications as a general service offering. We
stated, however, that we expected that any satellite licensee that
chose to offer emergency or safety communications services will
coordinate its effort with the appropriate search and rescue
organizations.\265\ These requirements were contained in proposed rule
Sec. 25.143(f).
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\262\See para. 104, supra.
\263\Compulsory equipment carriage requirements are established
in portions of the Commission's rules as well as by statute. See,
e.g., 47 CFR 80.801, et seq.; Ch. IV, International Convention on
the Safety of Life at Sea, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. 9700 (1974).
\264\Specifically, Section 321 of the Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. Sec. 321, requires, inter alia, that all radio stations
including Government stations and foreign ship stations within U.S.
territorial waters, give absolute priority to radio communications
or signals relating to ships in distress. Section 359 of the
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 359, requires, inter alia, that U.S.
ships that encounter dangers to navigation such as, dangerous ice or
winds whose force is 10 or above on the Beaufort scale must transmit
such information to ships in the vicinity and authorities on land.
Section 359 also prohibits ships or mobile stations from charging
for transmitting messages related to dangers to navigation.
\265\For example, the Interagency Committee on Search and Rescue
(ICSAR) is composed of representatives from seven Federal Agencies,
including the FCC, and has search and rescue responsibilities in the
United States. Any satellite operator offering emergency services
within the United States should coordinate the establishment of
emergency services and procedures for its use with this
organization. Similar procedures should be developed with all other
domestic and international search and rescue organizations so that
coordinated rescue operations can be quickly effected in the
geographic area of concern.
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197. Mr. Bernard Trudell (Trudell) states that in cases of
emergency all MSS providers should be required to comply with standards
and call routing that will ensure the safety and well being of the
public.\266\ Additionally, Trudell states that most MSS providers
indicated that they would provide distress and safety services in part
as justification for license authority.\267\ Trudell concludes that the
Commission should require MSS providers to address these issues. The
U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) states that it will depend increasingly
on 9-1-1 type services and caller ID for its SAR operations and to
prevent hoaxes. It requests, therefore, that Big LEO systems be
required to provide standard location and caller ID information.\268\
Several commenters expressed similar opinions stating, generally, that
the Commission should require that Big LEO systems be required to
provide standardized information that would identify the calling party,
give the calling party's location and route emergency messages to an
appropriate emergency organization.\269\ The Interagency Committee for
Search and Rescue\270\ (ICSAR) noted all proposed Big LEO providers had
stated that their systems will be available for distress and safety
communications and recommends that the Commission develop requirements
to ensure that MSS systems meet public safety needs.\271\ ICSAR also
recommends that these issues--standardized location, caller ID and
routing of emergency or distress calls--be addressed in a separate rule
making.\272\ The National Emergency Number Association states that the
Commission should adopt a rule to require that licensees of Big LEO
systems cooperate in the provision of National Security and Emergency
Preparedness (NS/EP) communications.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\Trudell Comments at 4.
\267\Id at 2.
\268\Coast Guard Comments at 1.
\269\See, e.g., Comments of the National Association of EMS
Physicians at 1; Comments of the Texas Advisory Commission on State
Emergency Communications at 2, Reply Comments at 2; Reply Comments
of the National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue at 2 and 3;
and Reply Comments of the National Emergency Number Association at
3.
\270\ICSAR is made up of representatives from seven Federal
agencies including the Federal Communications Commission. This
Committee has search and rescue responsibilities under the United
States National Search and Rescue Plan.
\271\ICSAR Reply Comments at 2.
\272\Id. See also Summary of Pertinent Comments attached to
ICSAR's Reply comments for a summary of issues.
\273\National Communications System Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
198. LQP states that it supports the Commission's proposed rule
regarding distress and safety communications and in principle its
obligation regarding distress communications, but opposes having to
provide search and rescue or disaster response communications as a
general service offering.\274\ LQP stated that the Commission should
follow its decision reached in the Little LEO proceeding.\275\ Motorola
states that it does not object to the proposed rule and notes that
consistent with the Commission's decision in the Little LEO proceeding,
the Commission did not intend to require that Big LEO MSS licensees
show specific means of interconnection to route distress calls and did
not intend for big LEO MSS stations to be used in lieu of emergency
beacons required to be carried by international agreement or
statute.\276\ Motorola strongly opposes the imposition of a specific
technical model for the 9-1-1 interconnection and location information
delivery.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\LQP Comments at 116, Reply Comments at 94. See also
Comments of TRW at 193 and Constellation Reply Comments at 54.
\275\See NVNG MSS Order, note 48, supra, at 8458.
\276\Motorola Comments at 68.
\277\See Motorola Reply Comments at 54-55.
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199. Many of the Big LEO applicants acknowledge that they may carry
distress and safety or disaster response communications. They argue
that this would be, however, no different than the capability of
cellular radios today or future personal communications services that
may be used in the event of a distress or an emergency. In the Notice,
we reminded licensees of their obligations under the Communications Act
regarding distress communications and noted the potential for such
systems to complement existing services, but, also recognized that Big
LEO systems are not intended to replace existing international safety
services. Further, the Commission has begun to examine matters related
to enhanced 9-1-1 capability including position locations in PCS,
cellular and other mobile services in a recently initiated rule
making.\278\ We are, therefore, denying commenters requests that the
Commission require caller ID, standardized position information and
automatic routing for distress and safety communications or disaster
response communications. We will address those issues in our rulemaking
proceeding on enhanced 9-1-1 capability,\279\ and we will adopt section
25.143(f) substantially as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\See Second Report and Order, Gen. Docket No. 90-314, 8 FCC
Rcd 7700 (1993), at para. 139. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC
Docket No. 94-102, FCC 94-237 (adopted September 19, 1994) (Enhanced
9-1-1 Notice).
\279\Id.
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200. We also noted, however, that we expected any satellite
licensee that chose to offer emergency or safety communications to
coordinate with appropriate SAR organizations.\280\ No commenters
opposed this suggestion and we are adding it to the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\See Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
201. Comsat states that because of the critical nature of distress
and safety communications to the maritime community and the extensive
international effort that is underway to implement the Global Maritime
Distress and Safety System (GMDSS),\281\ the Commission should
determine the extent to which applicants for Big LEO systems will
provide distress and safety communications and participate in the
GMDSS.\282\ Mobile Datacom requests clarification of the proposed
requirement for position determination capability for Big LEO systems
related to distress communications.\283\ Specifically, it requests that
the Commission clarify whether Big LEO systems will be permitted to
arrange for radio determination satellite service (RDSS) from companies
such as Mobile Datacom.\284\.
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\281\Certain U.S. ships are required to carry radio equipment.
Carriage requirements are established by statute, treaty and in the
Commission's Rules. See, Sections 351 through 386 of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 351-386; Amendments to the
1974 SOLAS Convention concerning Radiocommunications for the Global
Maritime Distress and Safety System, Ch. IV, International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S.
9700 (1974); and subparts Q, R, S, T and W of the Commission's
Rules, 47 CFR subparts Q, R, S, T and W.
\282\COMSAT Comments at 14.
\283\Mobile Datacom apparently believes that the Commission
proposed a requirement for position information because of the
requirements in the Communications Act related to distress and
safety communications. The proposed requirement for position
information is, however, related to interference protection for the
radio astronomy service.
\284\Mobile Datacom Comments at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
202. As we noted in paragraph 86 of the Notice, Big LEO systems may
not be used in lieu of emergency beacons required to be carried by
statute or treaty. In response to Comsat's request, we note that Big
LEO systems cannot now be used to comply with the requirements of the
GMDSS. The requirements for GMDSS equipment and the approval process
are contained in Sec. Sec. 80.1101 and 80.1103, respectively, of the
Commission's Rules.\285\ There are, however, no restrictions
prohibiting any Big LEO system from carrying distress and safety
communications on an ancillary basis. Finally, in response to Mobile
Datacom's request for clarification of whether position determination
information can be supplied by an RDSS licensee, we proposed that Big
LEO systems be capable of determining the position of a user
transceiver, but did not specify how licensees have to derive the
position information. We believe that decision is best left to the
system provider. In conclusion, we are clarifying the language in
Section 25.143(f) regarding a licensee's responsibility to protect
distress communications and to make clear that although it is the
licensee's responsibility to determine position information of
transceivers that we are not prescribing how this must be
accomplished.\286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\See 47 CFR 80.1101 and 80.1103.
\286\TRW states that Big LEO system licensees operating on U.S.
territorial waters are required to give priority to distress
communications. See TRW Comments at 194. Motorola stated that the
requirements of proposed rule section 25.143(f) would apply only for
MSS stations used to comply with an international agreement or
statute. See Motorola Comments at 68 and Reply Comments at 58.
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6. Other Requirements
203. As proposed in the Notice and without objection from any
interested parties, we will adopt a specific rule that prohibits any
licensee from selling a bare license for a profit.\287\ This provision
is critical to discourage speculators and to prevent unjust enrichment
of those who do not implement their proposed systems. This provision is
not intended to prevent the infusion of capital by either debt or
equity financing, but any such transaction will be monitored to ensure
that it does not constitute an evasion of our anti-trafficking
provision.\288\ This rule, however, will not apply if auctions are
implemented. It is not intended to prohibit applicants who obtain
licenses by competitive bidding from negotiating post-auction resale
transactions.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\See Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 84.
\288\Motorola is concerned that one applicant might prop up
another simply to guarantee access to the maximum possible spectrum
by CDMA operations. This concern can be appropriately addressed as a
real party in interest question if the issue arises. Motorola's
speculation about a possible future occurrence does not warrant
further consideration or action at this time.
\289\See para. 96, supra.
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204. In the Notice, we also requested comment on whether any
additional public service requirements should be imposed on Big LEO
licensees. Those favoring such a requirement were instructed to provide
an analysis of the utility of Big LEO systems to provide these services
and an analysis of the existing systems used to provide these services,
including their costs. Several commenters recognize the important
potential of MSS for educational and public service uses.\290\ The
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), for example, discusses the
promise of Big LEO systems to provide educational services to those in
remote areas and to allow users throughout the world to take
``electronic field trips.'' CPB urges that to ensure public access to
these services, the Commission should require licensees to make their
systems available to educators and students at preferential rates. It
further argues that even if the Commission does not mandate a rate
preference in this proceeding, it should consider imposing such a
requirement in a variety of other services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\See Joint Comments of the Association of America's Public
Television Stations and Public Broadcasting Service at 2; Comments
of National Public Radio at 2; Comments of the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
205. None of the LEO applicants support a mandatory service or
preferential rate requirement. Ellipsat notes that MSS systems are
unsuitable for providing the envisioned services. According to
Ellipsat, Big LEO systems have inherently low data rates and cannot
supply the high bandwidth required to support the contemplated
educational services without drastically absorbing MSS capacity.\291\
Motorola further argues that requiring Big LEO operators to dedicate a
portion of their capacity to non-revenue generating activities would
unduly constrain MSS systems and would handicap them in their ability
to compete with other wireless services and with foreign MSS
providers.\292\ TRW and Motorola argue that none of the proponents of
such a requirement have provided a detailed analysis of existing
systems and costs, as required. In the absence of this analysis, they
conclude that there is no basis upon which the Commission could impose
public service requirements.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\Ellipsat Reply Comments at 36.
\292\Motorola Reply Comments at 58.
\293\TRW Reply Comments at 95; Motorola Reply Comments at 59.
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206. In light of the service hardships alleged by the system
proponents, we believe that a strong demonstration of need and
feasibility is required prior to adopting specific public service
requirements for Big LEO systems. We agree with Motorola and TRW that
there is not sufficient information in this record to support such
requirements at this time.
207. The National Communication Systems (NCS) believes that Big LEO
licensees should be required to cooperate in providing national
security/emergency preparedness services (NS/EP) and that any
discussion of technical requirements for Big LEO systems should address
survivable and endurable communications. NCS does not propose specific
rules but instead requests that the Commission consider these issues in
its report and order. We note that the Commission has chartered a
federal advisory committee, the Network Reliability Council (NRC), to
consider whether and to what extent essential services, including
emergency 9-1-1 service, health, safety and other emergency
communications services, are compromised during network outages.\294\
The NRC agreed that national security would be included within the
topic of emergency services pursuant to its charter.\295\ We further
note that on September 19, 1994 the Commission adopted a Notice of
Inquiry requesting comment on the extent to which mobile radio
services, including LEO MSS, should be required to meet compatibility
requirements with 9-1-1 services.\296\ The Commission will consider
issues regarding the availability of reliable emergency services in
these proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\See 59 FR 31246 (June 17, 1994).
\295\See Minutes of the Network Reliability Council Meeting,
July 6, 1994.
\296\See Enhanced 9-1-1 Notice, note 278, supra.
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F. Mobile Earth Station Licensing
208. In the Notice, the Commission proposed a licensing procedure
for the earth station segment of the satellite system. We indicated
that the ground segment will be comprised of central fixed-earth
``gateway'' stations operating in the feeder link frequency bands,
mobile user transceiver units operating in the mobile satellite
frequency bands, and tracking, telemetry and command (TT&C) earth
stations operating in either the feeder link, mobile service or space
bands. We proposed to license gateway and TT&C stations as fixed-
satellite earth stations under Part 25. In addition, we proposed a
blanket licensing approach for the user transceivers. Under this
approach, a service vendor, which may or may not be the space station
licensee, would hold the authorization and would be responsible for a
specified number of technically identical transceiver units. Blanket
applications would include a demonstration that the operation of
transceivers will not interfere with other authorized users. License
term would be ten years from date of grant and requests for additional
units would be treated as minor license modifications.\297\ In
addition, we proposed that an end user be required to obtain
authorization of the space station operator before the user may
transmit to that system and, that once access authority is obtained,
the operations of that transceiver would fall under the blanket earth
station license of the space station operator or the vendor. Our
proposed rules would not preclude bilateral, government-to-government
discussions regarding international roaming arrangements. They would
also permit roaming into the United States by users having technically
compatible transceivers designed to operate with U.S. licensed systems
and once authorized to access a U.S. system, a roaming user's
transceiver operations would fall within the blanket license of the
satellite operator or the service vendor. The regulatory treatment of
earth station licensees providing commercial mobile radio services
would be as common carriers.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\See proposed Secs. 25.115(d), 25.130(b), 25.133(b), 25.136,
and 25.213.
\298\See Notice, note 2, supra, at paras. 88-90.
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209. The comments received in response to our proposals were
favorable\299\ and thus we will adopt the rules substantially as
proposed. Constellation and Motorola, suggested several minor
clarifications to the final rules and we will adopt these
suggestions.\300\ We will not, however, adopt at this time a complete
revision of Sec. 25.115, Applications for Earth Station Authorizations,
as suggested by Motorola. If experience with these licensing procedures
indicates that this rule, as it applies to the Big LEO service, needs
to be amended, we will consider doing so at a later time.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\See e.g., Comments of TRW, Inc. and Comsat Corporation.
\300\These include adding to Sec. 25.115(d)(3) the words ``if
not already licensed under this subpart'' to clarify that gateway,
TT&C and Network Control earth stations can be licensed under other
procedures; adding to Sec. 25.120(e) language relating to renewals
and cut-off periods; clarifying Sec. 25.136(b) to distinguish
between authorization of a particular unit and use of the system;
clarifying Sec. 25.130(b) to recognize specific procedures for NVNG
MSS transceiver units; and clarifying Sec. 25.136(a) to include
cockpit communications.
\301\Other than Sec. 25.213(b), we will not adopt specific
technical requirements for Big LEO transceivers at this time. These
requirements are being considered in domestic and international fora
and will be codified, if necessary, when earth station applications
have been filed. We note that user transceivers will be required to
comply with all applicable domestic and international standards
governing their operations, including the radiofrequency radiation
levels recommended by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI). See 47 CFR 1.1.1307(b).
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G. International Issues
1. Coordination
210. As we stated in the Notice, non-geostationary mobile
satellites, in their orbits around the world, will pass over all
countries. Because these systems provide global coverage, each will
require global coordination. As with all satellite services, each Big
LEO applicant and licensee will be required to provide the Commission
with all information necessary for advance publication, coordination,
and notification of frequency assignments pursuant to the international
Radio Regulations and for consultation pursuant to Article 14 of the
INTELSAT Agreement and Article 8 of the INMARSATQ Convention.\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\See 47 CFR 25.111(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
211. Furthermore, the ITU (WARC-92) has adopted Resolution 46 to
govern the coordination of mobile satellite systems in this frequency
band. This procedure assures that worldwide coordination is
accomplished in a manner that requires both the administration
proposing the system and the administration that is affected by the
planned system to cooperate in resolving coordination
difficulties.\303\ We agree with LQP and TRW that successful
coordination under Resolution 46 is not a prerequisite for licensing,
launching and operating these systems.\304\ We note, however, that
until they successfully complete coordination they cannot cause harmful
interference to other primary services operating in these frequency
bands, nor can they claim protection. We, however, will follow the
coordination procedures prescribed by the ITU and will work with the
global community to promote mobile satellite services through the
development of sharing techniques and the exploration of other
technical issues.\305\ Moreover, as we stated in our Notice, we will
continue to require our licensees to meet both their international
obligations and any national requirements imposed by other licensing
administrations regarding operations within their territories.\306\ We
continue to believe that decisions relating to the implementation of
Big LEO service within a country's territory will remain within that
country's jurisdiction and control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\303\ITU Resolution No. 46 (WARC-92, Res. 46) states that
``[a]ffected administrations, as well as the administration seeking
coordination, shall make all possible mutual efforts to overcome the
difficulties in a manner acceptable to the parties concerned.''
\304\See LQP Comments at 117 and TRW Comments at 196. However,
as we stated in our Notice, if a licensee has not completed
coordination prior to launch, it must operate on a non-interference
basis with respect to authorized users. See International Radio
Regulation (RR) 342.
\305\Indeed, the United States participates actively in ITU-R
Study Groups 2, 4 and 8, all of which are examining issues that
address sharing and coordination of MSS systems.
\306\To the extent a licensee does not desire to meet a national
requirement of a licensing administration within its territory, it
may refrain from providing service to that particular
administration. See TRW Comments at 196.
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212. In the Joint Proposal, the parties state that the Commission
should establish a global band segmentation sharing plan different than
the spectrum domestic spectrum plan. Specifically, the parties state
that outside of North America, CDMA MSS licensees should be limited to
operating their systems over 9.75 MHz of spectrum at 1610-1619.75 MHz
and that the TDMA MSS licensee should be limited to operating its
system over 6.75 MHz of spectrum at 1619.75-1626.5 MHz. According to
the Joint Proposal, all U.S. international coordination activity should
be based either on the domestic band segmentation plan we are adopting
today, or, outside North America, on the proposed global plan. In
addition, the parties to the Joint Proposal request the Commission to
prohibit MSS licensees from seeking or accepting an exclusive
assignment in the 1.6 GHz band that would preclude other MSS systems
from providing service in any foreign country. LQP objects to these
proposals, stating that they could be construed as preempting other
nations' sovereign decisions.
213. We will not impose a global band sharing plan on U.S.
licensees at this time. The four parties to the Joint Proposal have not
given any justification for doing so, and one applicant specifically
opposes the imposition of such a plan. We have no evidence on the
record before us of imminent coordination conflicts among the
applicants beyond U.S. borders. Neither is it clear at present that
operating constraints designed to accommodate our domestic licensees
will provide either necessary or effective in other jurisdictions.
Perhaps most importantly, we do not believe it is appropriate for the
United States to impose global band sharing restrictions, that directly
impact the ability of other countries to access these systems as they
see fit, absent indications from these countries regarding their
planned use of these frequency bands. Accordingly, we will not mandate
a band sharing scheme to be followed beyond U.S. borders.
2. EC Concerns
214. The Delegation of the European Commission (EC) is concerned
that the proposals in the Notice are based purely upon domestic U.S.
interests despite the global nature of the proposed systems and
services. Specifically, the EC alleges that the Notice: (1) Fails to
take into account proposed non-U.S. or future systems, their access to
the U.S. market and use of spectrum in the U.S.; (2) indicates an
intention to extend Section 310 restrictions to the proposed systems
inhibiting potential European investment; (3) advances trade and
industrial policy arguments underlining the importance of the proposed
systems to the U.S. economy and U.S. leadership; (4) proposes
unilateral solutions to orbit, frequency and coverage issues that are
global in nature; (5) fails to discuss requirements to effect the
satisfactory application of Resolutions 46 and 70 of WARC-92; and (6)
fails to address issues related to the 2 GHz band. The EC states that
the regulatory approach that we proposed raises global regulatory and
trade issues and that the U.S. should not proceed with its domestic
licensing process until it consults with foreign administrations.
215. We agree that the proposed systems have international
ramifications. Many of these are or will be addressed in appropriate
international fora and in ITU satellite coordination activities. Others
may be appropriate for bilateral consultations of the nature sought by
the EC. However, we do not agree that the U.S. domestic licensing
process must await final resolution of these issues.
216. We find delaying the U.S. licensing process is unacceptable.
Delaying our regulatory process would delay the improved communications
and economic growth that Big LEO services will create. These benefits
would be developed both for citizens of the United States and all other
countries that may choose to participate in rendering these services.
Such a delay would also harm developing countries by limiting their
opportunity to improve their communications infrastructure. The
uncertainty associated with delay could also adversely impact the
viability of the proposed systems in the financial markets and the
ability of the applicants to attract additional investors. U.S.
applicants have already invested significant resources in research and
development, satellite design, marketing and participation in ITU
meetings and conferences. Even if the United States were to delay its
licensing process, it is unclear how the EC proposes to resolve the
issues it has identified, resulting in open-ended delay. Further, the
EC's criticism of our proposals is not accompanied by recommendations.
Indeed, it is not clear that the EC is yet in a position to speak
authoritatively for its member countries. We do not believe that an
indefinite delay in the U.S. regulatory process under such
circumstances is warranted.
217. It is also clear that we do not need to delay the domestic
licensing proceeding until international agreements are finalized.
Regardless of our domestic decisions, each administration will retain
the right to license gateway earth stations and mobile earth stations
needed to provide service. In addition, U.S. licensees will be subject
to ITU recommendations and coordination procedures. Further, the United
States is working with the ITU Radio Communications sector to develop
standards applicable to LEO systems. However, we seek to leave system
design and service offerings to the licensees as much as possible in
order to encourage technological innovation, to promote rapid
implementation of Big LEO services and to maximize consumer choice.
Therefore it is in the interest of the United States government and
U.S. system operators to seek globally acceptable standards and we will
strive to do so. We disagree with the EC that we are not taking into
account projects envisaged outside the United States and future global
systems that might use the spectrum. In the Notice, we noted that all
U.S. satellite systems are subject to ITU coordination procedures.\307\
Thus, U.S.-licensed operators are required to coordinate their proposed
systems with countries whose existing services, or whose possible
future MSS systems, might be affected. Regardless of the spectrum
licensing arrangement within the United States, we would work with
affected administrations to resolve any spectrum sharing or technical
issues. Further, we are not precluding access to the U.S. market. We
believe, however, that subject is more appropriately handled through
bilateral discussions (as the EC contemplates) and the ITU coordination
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\Notice, not 2, supra, at para. 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
218. In addition, we are not seeking to extend Sec. 310
restrictions on the proposed systems with the intention of inhibiting
European investment. In fact, Sec. 310(b) restrictions will not
necessarily apply to the systems because we are not requiring them to
operate on a common carrier basis.\308\ This policy will permit
investment by European industry and other non-government interests.
Some of the proposed systems already anticipate significant non-U.S.
investment and continue to seek additional such participation. We
recognize multinational participation as an integral part of developing
a global system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\See paras. 171-181, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
219. With regard to the EC's concern that we are advancing trade
and industrial policy arguments by moving ahead with the proposed
systems, we note that a report prepared by PKMG Peat Marwick on behalf
of the European Commission suggests that (with regard to Europe), ``* *
* the immediate priority is international trade and policy
issues;''\309\ the very issues the EC accuses the United States of
advancing. Notwithstanding the EC's views, the United States has every
right under established ITU procedures to move forward with licensing
systems that are necessary to satisfy domestic demand for new
communication services. Other administrations have the right to decide
whether these or any other non-U.S. licensed systems will operate in
their countries and whether to participate in the provision of
services. Participation in providing these MSS services will give their
industries the opportunity to share in the global economic benefits we
believe these systems will bring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\309\See ``Satellite Personal Communications and their
Consequences for European Telecommunications Trade and Industry,''
KPMG Peat Marwick, at 4, emphasis added.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
220. The EC also argues that the Notice proposes unilateral
solutions to orbit, frequency and coverage issues that have global
implications. Further, it contends that the Notice fails to discuss
requirements necessary to effect the application of ITU Resolution Nos.
46 and 70.
221. With regard to orbit considerations\310\ and the use of 1.6/
2.4 GHz frequencies, we note that as a matter of course the United
States engages in good faith negotiations with respect to whatever non-
U.S. systems have been filed with the ITU at the time U.S. systems are
ready to begin coordination.\311\ Consequently, the use of the orbits
and of frequencies by U.S.-licensed systems will be subject to the
outcome of the ITU coordination process. The worldwide coverage
conditions proposed in the Notice\312\ result from our desire that
these systems be capable of providing coverage to all areas of the
world. This could further U.S. participation in the global information
infrastructure and potentially benefit developing countries. Again,
however, whether U.S.-licensed systems provide services outside the
United States would be subject to the agreement of and authorization by
other administrations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\We assume here that the EC refers to non-geostationary vs.
geostationary orbits.
\311\We note that the following administrations have proposed
MSS systems in the 1.6/2.4 GHz bands that have been advance
published, coordinated or notified with the ITU: France (2 systems);
Germany; INMARSAT; Russian Federation (2 systems); Tonga (4
systems); and the United States (2 systems).
\312\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 23.
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222. With regard to the application of Resolutions No. 46 and 70,
we note that Resolution No. 46 relates to ``interim'' procedures for
the coordination and notification of non-geostationary satellite
networks. As an interim procedure it is subject to further development
and will likely evolve. Nevertheless, U.S.-licensed systems will be
subject to whatever coordination procedures are in effect at the time,
including Resolution 46 or its successor. In the Notice we stated
explicitly that we would follow coordination procedures prescribed by
the ITU, and in fact we reference Resolution No. 46 and its
applicability to Big LEO systems.\313\ We also note that each Big LEO
applicant will be required to provide us all information necessary to
advance publish, notify and coordinate their proposed systems.
Implicitly, all applicants will be required to assist us in effecting
whatever coordination procedures the ITU requires.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\313\Notice, note 2, supra, at para. 92 and n. 149.
\314\This requirement applies to all FCC-licensed satellite
systems and is codified in the FCC rules. See 47 CFR 25.111(b).
223. On the other hand, Resolution 70 relates to ``establishment''
of standards for low-orbit satellite systems and has no requirements
per se. It seeks to begin the process of establishing standards for
low-orbit satellite systems and invites the appropriate ITU organs to
begin studies in this regard. The United States participates in these
ITU activities and will continue to do so. However, as Resolution No.
70 has not resulted in any specific ITU recommendations, it is not
possible to address ``requirements'' in a domestic licensing
proceeding.
224. Finally, the EC contends that the Notice fails to address
issues related to access to 2 GHz MSS bands\315\ and the relation
between access to those bands and the bands under consideration here.
First, we note that the 2 GHz bands have not yet been allocated for MSS
in the United States. Therefore, these bands will be the subject of
another proceeding. In such a proceeding, all matters relevant to the
use of 2 GHz bands would be discussed. Nevertheless, we note the
increasing demand for access to MSS spectrum worldwide and the
potential value of the 2 GHz bands for the provision of MSS. We are
also aware of proposals to use the 2 GHz bands for services similar and
competitive to those envisaged by the Big LEO applicants.\316\ The
United States would like to facilitate access to these bands, as does
the EC. We believe that WRC-95 and future multi-lateral consultations
would present the appropriate fora to discuss access to and use of 2
GHz MSS bands.
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\315\The ``2 GHz'' MSS bands were allocated at WARC-92 as
follows: 1970-1980 MHz and 2160-2170 MHz: (Regions 1 and 3)--Fixed,
Mobile; (Region 2)--Fixed, Mobile, Mobile-Satellite*. 1980-2010 MHz
and 2170-2200 MHz: (Regions 1, 2 and 3)--Fixed, Mobile, Mobile-
Satellite*. (*=These MSS allocations are available for use after
Jan. 1, 2005, except in the U.S., when they will be available after
Jan. 1, 1996.)
\316\For example, the FCC has received two petitions (names) to
provide MSS services in this range. In addition, spectrum in this
range has been identified for a satellite component of FLMPTS.
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IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
225. Need for Rules and Objective. We have codified proposed rules
that will permit Big LEO systems to be licensed. Our objectives have
been to promote efficiency and innovation in the licensing and use of
the electromagnetic spectrum, to develop competitive and innovative
communications systems, and to promote effective and adaptive
regulations.
226. Issues Raised by the Public in Response to the Initial
Analysis. No comments were received specifically in response to the
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. We have, however, taken into
account all issues raised by the public in response to the proposed
rules. In certain instances, we have eliminated or modified our
proposed rules in response to those comments.
227. Alternatives that would Lessen Impact. The minimal regulatory
burden that we have imposed is necessary in order to carry out our
duties under the Communications Act and other Federal statutes. We will
continue to examine these requirements in an effort to eliminate
unnecessary regulations and to minimize significant economic impact on
small businesses.
V. Conclusion and Ordering Clause
228. By our action today, we are adopting regulations that will
allow the licensing of competitive voice and data Big LEO systems. This
service has the potential to provide the United States public with a
wide range of needed mobile voice services and to help stimulate the
domestic economy as these multi-billion dollar systems are implemented
in the United States and throughout the world.
229. Accordingly, It Is Ordered that Parts 25 and 94 of the
Commission's rules are amended as specified in Appendix B, effective
November 21, 1994.
230. It Is Further Ordered that the applicants will be required to
file conforming amendments and all necessary fees no later than
November 16, 1994 for continued consideration in this processing group.
List of Subjects
47 CFR Part 25
Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Satellites
47 CFR Part 94
Communications equipment, Radio, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, Title 47, Parts 25 and
94, of the Code of Federal Regulations, is amended as set forth below.
Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 25 and 94, are
amended as follows:
PART 25--[AMENDED]
1-2. The authority citation for Part 25 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 25.101 to 25.601 issued under Sec. 4, 48 Stat.
1066, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 154. Interprets or apply secs. 101-104,
76 Stat. 419-427; 47 U.S.C. 701-744; 47 U.S.C. 554.
3. Section 25.114 is amended by revising paragraphs (c)(6),
(c)(18), and (c)(26), and adding new paragraphs (c)(28) and (d), to
read as follows:
Sec. 25.114 Applications for space station authorizations.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(6)(i) For geostationary satellite orbit satellites, orbital
location, or locations if alternatives are proposed, requested for the
satellite, the factors which support such an orbital assignment, the
range of orbital locations from which adequate service can be provided
and the basis for determining that range of orbital locations, and a
detailed explanation of all factors that would limit the orbital arc
over which the satellite could adequately serve its expected users.
(ii) For non-geostationary satellite orbit satellites, the number
of space stations and applicable information relating to the number of
orbital planes, the inclination of the orbital plane(s), the orbital
period, the apogee, the perigee, the argument(s) of perigee, active
service arc(s), and right ascension of the ascending node(s).
(iii) For 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite Service space stations, the
feeder link frequencies requested for the satellite, together with the
demonstration required by Secs. 25.203 (j) and (k).
* * * * *
(18) Detailed information demonstrating the financial
qualifications of the applicant to construct and launch the proposed
satellites. Applications for domestic fixed-satellite systems and
mobile-satellite systems shall provide the financial information
required by Sec. 25.140(b)-(e), Sec. 25.142(a)(4), or
Sec. 25.143(b)(3), as appropriate. Applications for international
satellite systems authorized pursuant to Establishing of Satellite
Systems Providing International Communications, 50 FR 42266 (October
18, 1985), 101 FCC 2d 1046 (1985), recon. 61 RR 2d 649 (1986), further
recon. 1 FCC Rcd 439 (1986), shall provide the information required by
that decision.
* * * * *
(26) Applications for authorizations in the Mobile-Satellite
Service in the 1545-1559/1646.5-1660.5 MHz frequency bands shall also
provide all information necessary to comply with the policies and
procedures set forth in Rules and Policies Pertaining to the Use of
Radio Frequencies in a Land Mobile Satellite Service, 52 FR 4017 (Feb.
9, 1987), 2 FCC Rcd 485 (1987).
* * * * *
(28) Applications for authorizations in the 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-
Satellite Service shall also provide all information specified in
Sec. 25.143.
(d) Applicants requesting authority to construct and/or launch a
system comprised of technically identical, non-geostationary satellite
orbit mobile-satellite service space stations may file a single
``blanket'' application containing the information specified in
paragraph (c) of this section for each representative space station.
4. Section 25.115 is amended by revising paragraph (d) to read as
follows:
Sec. 25.115 Applications for earth station authorizations.
* * * * *
(d) User transceivers in the NVNG and 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite
Service need not be individually licensed. Service vendors may file
blanket applications for transceiver units using FCC Form 493 and
specifying the number of units to be covered by the blanket license.
Each application for a blanket license under this section shall include
the following:
(1) A general narrative section describing the applicant and the
overall system operation,
(2) A Form 430 (Licensee Qualification Report), if not already on
file in conjunction with other facilities licensed under this subpart,
(3) A Form 493 for each representative type of user transceiver
terminal unit,
(4) A designation of a point of contact where records of individual
users will be maintained.
In addition, applicants in the NVNG MSS service shall provide the
information described in Sec. 25.135. Applicants in the 1.6/2.4 GHz
Mobile-Satellite Service shall demonstrate that the stations comply
with the technical requirements specified in Sec. 25.213.
5. Section 25.120 is amended by revising paragraphs (d) and (e) to
read as follows:
Sec. 25.120 License term and renewals.
* * * * *
(d) Space stations.
(1) For geostationary satellite orbit satellites, the license term
will begin at 3 a.m. EST on the date the licensee certifies to the
Commission that the satellite has been successfully placed into orbit
and that the operations of the satellite fully conform to the terms and
conditions of the space station radio authorization.
(2) For non-geostationary satellite orbit satellites, the license
term will begin at 3 a.m. EST on the date that the licensee certifies
to the Commission that its initial space station has been successfully
placed into orbit and that the operations of that satellite fully
conform to the terms and conditions of the space station system
authorization. All space stations launched and brought into service
during the ten-year license term shall operate pursuant to the system
authorization, and the operating authority for all space stations will
terminate upon the expiration of the system license.
(e) Renewal of licenses. Applications for renewals of earth station
licenses must be submitted on FCC Form 405 (Application for Renewal of
Radio Station License in Specified Services) no earlier than 90 days,
and no later than 30 days, before the expiration date of the license.
Applications for space station system replacement authorization for
non-geostationary orbit satellites shall be filed no earlier than 90
days, and no later than 30 days, prior to the end of the seventh year
of the existing license term.
6. Section 25.130 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as
follows:
Sec. 25.130 Filing requirements for transmitting earth stations.
* * * * *
(b) A frequency coordination analysis in accordance with
Sec. 25.203 shall be provided for earth stations transmitting in the
frequency bands shared with equal rights between terrestrial and space
services, except that applications for user transceiver units
associated with the NVNG mobile-satellite service shall instead provide
the information required by Sec. 25.135 and applications for user
transceiver units associated with the 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite
Service shall demonstrate that user transceiver operations comply with
the requirements set forth in Sec. 25.213.
7. Section 25.133 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as
follows:
Sec. 25.133 period of construction; certification of commencement of
operation.
* * * * *
(b) Each license for a transmitting earth station included in this
part shall also specify as a condition therein that upon the completion
of construction, each licensee must file with the Commission a
certification containing the following information: The name of the
licensee; file number of the application; call sign of the antenna;
date of the license; a certification that the facility as authorized
has been completed and that each antenna facility has been tested and
is within 2 dB of the pattern specified in Sec. 25.209, Sec. 25.135
(NVNG MSS earth stations), or Sec. 25.213 (1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite
Service earth stations); the date on which the station became
operational; and a statement that the station will remain operational
during the license period unless the license is submitted for
cancellation. For stations authorized under Sec. 25.115(c) of this part
(Large Networks of Small Antennas operating in the 12/14 GHz bands) and
Sec. 25.115(d) of this part (User Transceivers in the Mobile-Satellite
Service), a certificate must be filed when the network is put into
operation.
8. A new Sec. 25.136 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 25.136 Operating provisions for earth station networks in the
1.6/2.4 GHz mobile-satellite service.
In addition to the technical requirements specified in Sec. 25.213,
earth stations operating in the 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite Service
are subject to the following operating conditions:
(a) User transceiver units associated with the 1.6/2.4 Mobil-
Satellite service may not be operated on civil aircraft unless the
earth station has a direct physical connection to the aircraft Cabin
Communication system.
(b) User transceiver units in this service are authorized to
communicate with and through U.S. authorized space stations only. No
person shall transmit to a space station unless the specific
transmission is first authorized by the space station licensee or by a
service vendor authorized by that licensee.
(c) Any user transceiver unit associated with this service will be
deemed, when communicating with a particular 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-
Satellite Service system pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to
be temporarily associated with and licensed to the system operator or
service vendor holding the blanket earth station license awarded
pursuant to Section 25.115(d). The domestic earth station licensee
shall, for this temporary period, assume the same licensee
responsibility for the user transceiver as if the user transceiver were
regularly licensed to it.
9. Section 25.141 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) and (f) to
read as follows:
Sec. 25.141 Licensing provisions for the radio-determination satellite
service.
(a) Space station application requirements. Each application for a
space station license in the radiodetermination satellite service shall
describe in detail the proposed radiodetermination satellite system,
setting forth all pertinent technical and operational aspects of the
system, including its capability for providing and controlling
radiodetermination service on a geographic basis, and the technical,
legal and financial qualifications of the applicant. In particular,
each application shall include the information specified in Appendix B
of Space Station Application Filing Procedures, 93 FCC 2d 1260, 1265
(1983), except that in lieu of demonstrating compliance with item II.F
(two degree spacing), applicants are required to demonstrate
compatibility with licensed satellite systems in the same frequency
band. Applicants must also file information demonstrating compliance
with all requirements of this section, specifically including
information demonstrating how the applicant has complied or plans to
comply with the requirements of paragraph (f) of this section.
* * * * *
(f) Radiodetermination satellite service. Licenses shall coordinate
with radiodetermination satellite system licensees to avoid harmful
interference to other radiodetermination satellite systems through:
(1) Power flux density limits;
(2) Use of pseudorandom-noise codes (for both the satellite-to-user
link and for the user-to-satellite link); and
(3) Random access, time division multiplex techniques.
Licensees shall coordinate with 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite Service
system licensees to avoid interference to 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite
Service systems.
10. A new Sec. 25.143 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 25.143 Licensing provisions for the 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite
Service.
(a) System License: Applicants authorized to construct and launch a
system of technically identical non-geostationary satellite orbit
satellites will be awarded a single ``blanket'' license covering a
specified number of space stations to operate in a specified number of
orbital planes.
(b) Qualification Requirements.
(1) General Requirements: Each application for a space station
system authorization in the 1.6/2.4 GHz mobile-satellite service shall
describe in detail the proposed satellite system, setting forth all
pertinent technical and operational aspects of the system, and the
technical, legal, and financial qualifications of the applicant. In
particular, each application shall include the information specified in
Sec. 25.114.
(2) Technical Qualifications: In addition to providing the
information specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, each
applicant shall demonstrate the following:
(i) That the proposed system employs a non-geostationary
constellation or constellations of satellites;
(ii) That the proposed system be capable of providing mobile
satellite services to all locations as far north as 70 deg. latitude
and as far south as 55 deg. latitude for at least 75% of every 24-hour
period, i.e., that at least one satellite will be visible above the
horizon at an elevation angle of at least 5 deg. for at least 18 hours
each day within the described geographic area;
(iii) That the proposed system is capable of providing mobile
satellite services on a continuous basis throughout the fifty states,
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, U.S., i.e., that at least one
satellite will be visible above the horizon at an elevation angle of at
least 5 deg. at all times within the described geographic areas;
(iv) That operations will not cause unacceptable interference to
other authorized users of the spectrum. In particular, each application
shall demonstrate that the space station(s) comply with the
requirements specified in Sec. 25.213.
(3) Financial Qualifications: Each applicant for a space station
system authorization in the 1.6/2.4 GHz mobile-satellite service must
demonstrate, on the basis of the documentation contained in its
application, that it is financially qualified to meet the estimated
costs of the construction and launch of all proposed space stations in
the system and the estimated operating expenses for one year after the
launch of the initial space station. Financial qualifications must be
demonstrated in the form specified in Secs. 25.140(c) and (d). In
addition, applicants relying on current assets or operating income must
submit evidence of a management commitment to the proposed satellite
system. Failure to make such a showing will result in the dismissal of
the application.
(c) Replacement of Space Stations Within the System License Term.
Licensees of 1.6/2.4 GHz mobile-satellite systems authorized through a
blanket license pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section need not file
separate applications to construct, launch and operate technically
identical replacement satellites within the term of the system
authorization. However, the licensee shall certify to the Commission,
at least thirty days prior to launch of such replacement(s) that:
(1) The licensee intends to launch a space station that is
technically identical to those authorized in its system authorization,
and
(2) Launch of this space station will not cause the licensee to
exceed the total number of operating space stations authorized by the
Commission.
(d) In-Orbit Spares. Licensees need not file separate applications
to operate technically identical in-orbit spares authorized as part of
the blanket license pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section. However,
the licensee shall certify to the Commission, within 10 days of
bringing the in-orbit spare into operation, that operation of this
space station did not cause the licensee to exceed the total number of
operating space stations authorized by the Commission.
(e) Reporting requirements.
(1) All operators of 1.6/2.4 GHz mobile-satellite systems shall, on
June 30 of each year, file with the International Bureau and the Field
Office in Laurel, Maryland a report containing the following
information:
(i) Status of satellite construction and anticipated launch dates,
including any major problems or delays encountered;
(ii) A listing of any non-scheduled space station outages for more
than 30 minutes and the cause or causes of the outage;
(iii) A detailed description of the utilization made of the in-
orbit satellite system. That description should identify the percentage
of time that the system is actually used for U.S. domestic or
transborder transmission, the amount of capacity (if any) sold but not
in service within U.S. territorial geographic areas, and the amount of
unused system capacity; and
(iv) Identification of any space stations not available for service
or otherwise not performing to specifications, the cause or causes of
these difficulties, and the date any space station was taken out of
service or the malfunction identified.
(2) All operators of 1.6/2.4 GHz mobile-satellite systems shall,
within 10 days after a required implementation milestone as specified
in the system authorization, certify to the Commission by affidavit
that the milestone has been met or notify the Commission by letter that
it has not been met. At its discretion, the Commission may require the
submission of additional information (supported by affidavit of a
person or persons with knowledge thereof) to demonstrate that the
milestone has been met.
(f) Safety and distress communications.
(1) Stations operating in the 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite Service
that are voluntarily installed on a U.S. ship or are used to comply
with any statute or regulatory equipment carriage requirements may also
be subject to the requirements of sections 321(b) and 359 of the
Communications Act of 1934. Licensees are advised that these provisions
give priority to radio communications or signals relating to ships in
distress and prohibits a charge for the transmission of maritime
distress calls and related traffic.
(2) Licensees offering distress and safety services should
coordinate with the appropriate search and rescue organizations
responsible for the licensees service area.
(g) Considerations involving transfer or assignment applications.
(1) ``Trafficking'' in bare licenses issued pursuant to paragraph
(a) of this section is prohibited, except with respect to licenses
obtained through a competitive bidding procedure.
(2) The Commission will review a proposed transaction to determine
if the circumstances indicate trafficking in licenses whenever
applications (except those involving pro forma assignment or transfer
of control) for consent to assignment of a license, or for transfer of
control of a licensee, involve facilities licensed pursuant to
paragraph (a) of this section. At its discretion, the Commission may
require the submission of an affirmative, factual showing (supported by
affidavits of a person or persons with personal knowledge thereof) to
demonstrate that no trafficking has occurred.
(3) If a proposed transfer of radio facilities is incidental to a
sale of other facilities or merger of interests, any showing requested
under paragraph (g)(2) of this section shall include an additional
exhibit which:
(i) Discloses complete details as to the sale of facilities or
merger of interests;
(ii) Segregates clearly by an itemized accounting, the amount of
consideration involved in the sale of facilities or merger of interest;
and
(iii) Demonstrates that the amount of consideration assignable to
the facilities or business interests involved represents their fair
market value at the time of the transaction.
11. Section 25.201 is amended by adding new paragraphs, in
alphabetical order, to read as follows:
Sec. 25.201 Definitions.
* * * * *
Mobile-Satellite Service. A radiocommunication service:
(1) Between mobile earth stations and one or more space stations,
or between space stations used by this service; or
(2) Between mobile earth stations, by means of one or more space
stations.
This service may also include feeder links necessary for its
operation. (RR)
* * * * *
1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite Service. A mobile-satellite service
that operates in the 1610-1626.5 MHz and 2483.5-2500 MHz frequency
bands, or in any portion thereof.
* * * * *
12. Section 25.202 is amended by adding new paragraphs (a)(4) and
(a)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.202 Frequencies, frequency tolerance and emission limitations.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(4) The following frequencies are available for use by the 1.6/2.4
GHz Mobile-Satellite Service:
1610-1626.5 MHz: User-to-Satellite Link
1613.8-1626.5 MHz: Satellite-to-User Link (secondary)
2483.5-2500 MHz: Satellite-to-User Link
(5) The following frequencies are available for use by the inter-
satellite service:
22.55-23.00 GHz
23.00-23.55 GHz
24.45-24.65 GHz
24.65-24.75 GHz
13. Section 25.203 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(2)(vii) and
adding new paragraphs (j) and (k) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.203 Choice of sites and frequencies.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) * * *
(vii) Antenna horizon gain plot(s) determined in accordance with
Sec. 25.253(b) for satellite longitude range specified in paragraph
(c)(2)(v) of this section, taking into account the provisions of
Sec. 25.253(a)(2) for earth stations operating with non-geostationary
satellites.
* * * * *
(j) Applicants for non-geostationary 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite
Service/radiodetermination satellite service feeder links shall
indicate the frequencies and spacecraft antenna gain contours towards
each feeder-link earth station location and will coordinate with
licensees of other fixed-satellite service and terrestrial-service
systems sharing the band to determine geographic protection areas
around each non-geostationary mobile-satellite service/
radiodetermination satellite service feeder link earth station.
(k) An applicant for a non-geostationary 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-
Satellite Service space station or earth station that will operate with
a geostationary satellite or non-geostationary satellite in a shared
frequency band in which the non-geostationary system is (or is proposed
to be) licensed for feeder links, shall demonstrate in its application
that its proposed space or earth station will not cause unacceptable
interference to any other satellite network that is authorized to
operate in the same frequency band, or certify that the operations of
its space or earth station shall conform to established coordination
agreements between the operator(s) of the space station(s) with which
the earth station is to communicate and the operator(s) of any other
U.S. space station licensed to use the band.
14. Section 25.208 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 25.208 Power flux density limits.
* * * * *
(c) In the 17.7-19.7 GHz, 22.55-23.00 GHz, 23.00-23.55 GHz, and
24.45-24.75 GHz frequency bands, the power flux density at the Earth's
surface produced by emissions from a space station for all conditions
and for all methods of modulation shall not exceed the following
values:
(1) 115 dB (W/m\2\) in any 1 MHz band for angles of arrival between
0 and 5 degrees above the horizontal plane.
(2) 115+0.5 (d-5) dB (W/m\2\) in any 1 MHz band for angles of
arrival d (in degrees) between 5 and 25 degrees above the horizontal
plane.
(3) 105 dB (W/m\2\) in any 1 MHz band for angles of arrival between
25 and 90 degrees above the horizontal plane.
15. A new Sec. 25.213 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 25.213 Inter-Service coordination requirements for the 1.6/2.4
GHz Mobile-Satellite Service.
(a) Protection of the radio astronomy service in the 1610.6-1613.8
MHz band against interference from 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile-Satellite Service
systems.
(1) Protection zones. All 1.6/2.4 GHz Mobile Satellite Service
systems shall be capable of determining the position of the user
transceivers accessing the space segment through either internal
radiodetermination calculations or external sources such as LORAN-C or
the Global Positioning System. During periods of radio astronomy
observations, land mobile earth stations shall not operate when located
within geographic protection zones defined by the radio observatory
coordinates and separation distances as follows:
(i) In the band 1610.6-1613.8 MHz, within a 160 km radius of the
following radio astronomy sites:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Latitude Longitude
Observatory (DMS) (DMS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arecibo, PR..................................... 18 20 46 66 45 11
Green Bank Telescope, WV........................ 38 25 59 79 50 24
38 26 09 79 49 42
Very Large Array, NM............................ 34 04 43 107 37 04
Owens Valley, CA................................ 37 13 54 118 17 36
Ohio State, OH.................................. 40 15 06 83 02 54
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) In the band 1610.6-1613.8 MHz, within a 50 km radius of the
following sites:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Latitude Longitude
Observatory (DMS) (DMS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pile Town, NM................................... 34 18 04 108 07 07
Los Alamos, NM.................................. 35 46 30 106 14 42
Kitt Peak, AZ................................... 31 57 22 111 36 42
Ft. Davis, TX................................... 30 38 06 103 56 39
N. Liberty, IA.................................. 41 46 17 91 34 26
Brewster, WA.................................... 48 07 53 119 40 55
Owens Valley, CA................................ 37 13 54 118 16 34
St. Croix, VI................................... 17 45 31 64 35 03
Mauna Kea, HI................................... 19 48 16 155 27 29
Hancock, NH..................................... 42 56 01 71 59 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) Out-of-band emissions of a mobile earth station licensed to
operate within the 1610.0-1626.5 MHz band shall be attenuated so that
the power flux density it produces in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz band at any
radio astronomy site listed in paragraph (a)(1) (i) or (ii) of this
section shall not exceed the emissions of a mobile earth station
operating within the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz band at the edge of the
protection zone applicable for that site. As an alternative, a mobile
earth station shall not operate during radio astronomy observations
within the 1613.8-1615.8 MHz band within 100 km of the radio astronomy
sites listed in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, and within 30 km
of the sites listed in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, there
being no restriction on a mobile earth station operating within the
1615.8-1626.5 MHz band.
(iv) For airborne mobile earth stations operating in the 1610.0-
1626.5 MHz band, the separation distance shall be the larger of the
distances specified in paragraph (a)(1) (i), (ii) or (iii) of this
section, as applicable, or the distance, d, as given by the formula:
d (km) = 4.1 square root of (h)
where h is the altitude of the aircraft in meters above ground level.
(v) Smaller geographic protection zones may be used in lieu of the
areas specified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of this
section if agreed to by the Mobile-Satellite Service licensee and the
Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Unit (ESMU), National Science
Foundation, Washington, D.C. upon a showing by the Mobile-Satellite
Service licensee that the operation of a mobile earth station will not
cause harmful interference to a radio astronomy observatory during
periods of observation.
(vi) The ESMU shall notify Mobile-Satellite Service space station
licensees authorized to operate mobile earth terminals in the 1610.0-
1626.5 MHz band of periods of radio astronomy observations. The mobile-
satellite systems shall be capable of terminating operations within the
frequency bands and protection zones specified in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)
through (iv) of this section, as applicable, after the first position
fix of the mobile earth terminal either prior to transmission or, based
upon its location within the protection zone at the time of initial
transmission of the mobile earth terminal. Once the mobile-satellite
system determines that a mobile earth terminal is located within an RAS
protection zone, the mobile-satellite system shall immediately initiate
procedures to relocate the mobile earth terminal operations to a non-
RAS frequency.
(vii) A beacon-actuated protection zone may be used in lieu of
fixed protection zones in the 1610.6-1613.8 MHz band if a coordination
agreement is reached between a mobile-satellite system licensee and the
ESMU on the specifics of beacon operations.
(viii) Additional radio astronomy sites, not located within 100
miles of the 100 most populous urbanized areas as defined by the United
States Census Bureau at the time, may be afforded similar protection
one year after notice to the mobile-satellite system licensees by
issuance of a public notice by the Commission.
(2) Mobile-Satellite Service space stations transmitting in the
1613.8-1626.5 MHz band shall take whatever steps necessary to avoid
causing harmful interference to the radio astronomy facilities listed
in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (ii) of this section during periods of
observation.
(3) Mobile-Satellite Service space stations operating in the
2483.5-2500 MHz frequency band shall limit spurious emission levels in
the 4990-5000 MHz band so as not to exceed -241 dB (W/m2/Hz) at
the surface of the Earth.
(4) The Radioastronomy Service shall avoid scheduling radio
astronomy observations during peak MSS/RDSS traffic periods to the
greatest extent practicable.
(b) Protection of the radionavigation-satellite service. Mobile
earth stations operating in the 1610-1626.5 MHz band shall limit out-
of-band emissions in the 1574.397-1576.443 MHz band so as not to exceed
an e.i.r.p. density level of -70 dB (W/MHz) averaged over any 20 ms
period. The e.i.r.p. of any discrete spurious emission (i.e., bandwidth
less than 600 Hz) in the 1574.397-1576.443 MHz band shall not exceed
-80 dBW.
(c) Protection of aeronautical radionavigation systems. Mobile-
satellite earth stations transmitting in the 1610-1626.5 MHz band shall
limit e.i.r.p. levels to no greater than -15 dB (W/4kHz) on frequencies
being used by systems operating in accordance with international Radio
Regulation RR 732, and to no greater than -3 dB (W/4kHz) on frequencies
that are not so being used. Pursuant to international RR 731F,
respectively, all mobile-satellite Earth-to-space operations in the
1610-1626.5 MHz band and mobile-satellite space-to-Earth operations in
the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz band must be coordinated and notified under the
procedures set forth in Resolution 46 (WARC-92). Such mobile-satellite
stations shall not cause harmful interference to, or claim protection
from, stations in the aeronautical radionavigation service and stations
operating pursuant to international RR 732.
(d) Fixed stations operating pursuant to international Radio
Regulation RR 730. Pursuant to international Radio Regulations RR 731E
and RR 731F, all mobile-satellite operations in the 1610-1626.5 MHz
band (Earth-to-space transmissions) and all operations in the 1613.8-
1626.5 MHz band (space-to-Earth transmissions), respectively, must be
coordinated with systems operating pursuant to international RR 730
according to the coordination and notification procedures set forth in
Resolution 46 (WARC-92). All such mobile-satellite stations shall not
cause harmful interference to, or claim protection from, stations in
the fixed service operating pursuant to international RR 730.
16. A new Sec. 25.278 is added to subpart D to read as follows:
Sec. 25.278 Additional Coordination Obligation for Non-Geostationary
and Geostationary Satellite Systems In Frequencies Allocated to the
Fixed-Satellite Service.
Licensees of non-geostationary satellite systems that use frequency
bands allocated to the fixed-satellite service for their feeder link
operations shall coordinate their operations with licensees of
geostationary fixed-satellite service systems licensed by the
Commission for operation in the same frequency bands. Licensees of
geostationary fixed-satellite service systems in the frequency bands
that are licensed to non-geostationary satellite systems for feeder
link operations shall coordinate their operations with the licensees of
such non-geostationary satellite systems.
17. A new Sec. 25.279 is added to subpart D to read as follows:
Sec. 25.279 Inter-satellite service.
(a) Any non-geostationary satellite communicating with other space
stations may use frequencies in the inter-satellite service as
indicated in Sec. 2.106. This does not preclude the use of other
frequencies for such purposes as provided for in several service
definitions, e.g., FSS. The technical details of the proposed inter-
satellite link shall be provided in accordance with Sec. 25.114(c).
(b) Operating conditions. In order to ensure compatible operations
with authorized users in the frequency bands to be utilized for
operations in the inter-satellite service, these inter-satellite
service systems must operate in accordance with the conditions
specified in this section.
(1) Coordination requirements with federal government users. (i) In
frequency bands allocated for use by the inter-satellite service that
are also authorized for use by agencies of the federal government, the
federal use of frequencies in the inter-satellite service frequency
bands is under the regulatory jurisdiction of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).
(ii) The Commission will use its existing procedures to reach
agreement with NTIA to achieve compatible operations between federal
government users under the jurisdiction of NTIA and inter-satellite
service systems through frequency assignment and coordination practice
established by NTIA and the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
(IRAC). In order to facilitate such frequency assignment and
coordination, applicants shall provide the Commission with sufficient
information to evaluate electromagnetic compatibility with the federal
government users of the spectrum, and any additional information
requested by the Commission. As part of the coordination process,
applicants shall show that they will not cause interference to
authorized federal government users, based upon existing system
information provided by the government. The frequency assignment and
coordination of the satellite system shall be completed prior to grant
of construction authorization.
(2) Coordination among inter-satellite service systems. Applicants
for authority to establish inter-satellite service are encouraged to
coordinate their proposed frequency usage with existing permittees and
licensees in the inter-satellite service whose facilities could be
affected by the new proposal in terms of frequency interference or
restricted system capacity. All affected applicants, permittees, and
licensees, shall at the direction of the Commission, cooperate fully
and make every reasonable effort to resolve technical problems and
conflicts that may inhibit effective and efficient use of the radio
spectrum; however, the permittee or licensee being coordinated with is
not obligated to suggest changes or re-engineer an applicant's proposal
in cases involving conflicts.
PART 94--[AMENDED]
18. The authority citation for Part 94 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 4, 303, 48 Stat., as amended, 1066, 1082; 47
U.S.C. 154, 303, unless otherwise noted.
19. The table in paragraph (b) of Sec. 94.61 is amended by revising
footnote 4 to read as follows:
Sec. 94.61 Applicability.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
Frequencies in this band are shared with mobile and
radiolocation stations in other services, and must accept harmful
interference that may be experienced from operations of industrial,
scientific, or medical (ISM) equipment operating at 2450 MHz. In the
2483.5-2500 MHz band, no applications for new stations or
modifications to existing stations to increase the number of
transmitters will be accepted. Existing licensees as of July 25,
1985, are grandfathered and their operation is co-primary with the
Radiodetermination Satellite Service and Mobile-Satellite Service.
However, all grandfathered temporary fixed licensees are required to
notify directly each Radiodetermination Satellite Service and
Mobile-Satellite Service licenses concerning present and proposed
locations of operations.
Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 94-26090 Filed 10-19-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-M
