97-27829. Assessment of Fees; National Banks; District of Columbia Banks  

  • [Federal Register Volume 62, Number 203 (Tuesday, October 21, 1997)]
    [Proposed Rules]
    [Pages 54747-54748]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 97-27829]
    
    
          
    
    Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 203 / Tuesday, October 21, 1997 / 
    Proposed Rules
    
    [[Page 54747]]
    
    
    
    DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
    
    Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
    
    12 CFR Part 8
    
    [Docket No. 97-20]
    RIN 1557-AB60
    
    
    Assessment of Fees; National Banks; District of Columbia Banks
    
    AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury.
    
    ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
    
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    SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in order 
    to more accurately reflect the OCC's costs of supervising banks, is 
    proposing to amend its assessment regulation to impose a surcharge on 
    banks that receive a rating of 3, 4, or 5 under the Uniform Financial 
    Institutions Rating System (UFIRS) (also referred to as the CAMELS 
    rating) and on Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks that 
    receive a rating of 3, 4, or 5 under the ROCA rating system (which 
    rates risk management, operational controls, compliance, and asset 
    quality). This amendment will enable the OCC to distribute more 
    equitably the costs it incurs when supervising institutions that are 
    experiencing significant problems. The OCC also is soliciting comments 
    on the appropriate method of computing assessments for those banks that 
    own other banks.
    
    DATES: Comments must be received by November 20, 1997.
    
    ADDRESSES: Comments should be directed to, and may be inspected and 
    copied at: Communications Division, OCC, 250 E Street, SW., Washington, 
    D.C. 20219, Attention: Docket No. 97-20. In addition, comments may be 
    sent via FAX, at (202) 874-5274, or via Internet at 
    regs.comments@occ.treas.gov.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roy Madsen, Deputy Chief Financial 
    Officer, Financial Review, Policy and Analysis, (202) 874-5130; or Mark 
    Tenhundfeld, Assistant Director, Legislative and Regulatory Activities 
    Division, (202) 874-5090.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    
    Background
    
        The OCC charters, regulates, and supervises approximately 2,700 
    national banks and 64 Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks in 
    the United States, accounting for nearly 60 percent of the nation's 
    banking assets. Its mission is to ensure a safe, sound, and competitive 
    National Banking System that supports the citizens, communities, and 
    economy of the United States. The OCC funds the activities that further 
    this mission by imposing assessments, fees, and other charges on banks 
    within its jurisdiction, as necessary and appropriate to meet the OCC's 
    expenses, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 482.
        The OCC charges each national bank and Federal branch and agency a 
    semiannual assessment according to a formula that is described in 12 
    CFR 8.2. In general, the OCC calculates the semiannual assessment by 
    using a marginal rate that declines as an institution's asset size 
    grows. The OCC also reduces assessments charged to a ``non-lead bank'' 
    (which, generally speaking, refers to a national bank that is not the 
    largest national bank owned by the same company 1) by a 
    percentage determined in accordance with each assessment. For example, 
    the OCC reduced the assessment for non-lead national banks that was due 
    January 31, 1997, by 12 percent.2
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        \1\ In a final rule published elsewhere in this issue of the 
    Federal Register, the OCC has amended the definition of ``non-lead 
    bank'' to include a national bank that is not the largest national 
    bank controlled by a company (as opposed to a bank holding company).
        \2\ The OCC made this reduction pursuant to an interim rule 
    published on December 2, 1996 (61 FR 64000). In the final rule 
    referred to in footnote 1 of this document, the OCC is adopting the 
    changes set forth in that interim rule. The final rule also adopts 
    the changes set forth in an interim rule published in 1994 (59 FR 
    59640) concerning fees for examinations of fiduciary activities, 
    special examinations and investigations, examinations of affiliates, 
    and examinations and investigations of corporate activities.
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        The marginal rate structure (which applies a declining marginal 
    rate as bank asset size grows) and the assessment reduction for non-
    lead national banks reflect the OCC's cost savings resulting from the 
    economies of scale realized in the examination and supervision of large 
    institutions and non-lead banks. However, the current assessment 
    regulation does not reflect the increased costs that the OCC incurs 
    when supervising a bank whose condition requires special attention. As 
    a result, healthy banks subsidize banks that are experiencing 
    significant problems. The proposed imposition of a surcharge on banks 
    requiring additional OCC resources, discussed in the section that 
    follows, addresses this concern.
    
    Discussion of the Proposal and Request for Comment
    
    Surcharge
    
        The proposal adds new paragraphs (a)(7) and (b)(5) to 
    Sec. 8.2,3 which provide that the OCC will impose a 
    surcharge equal to 25 percent of the amount of the assessment that 
    otherwise would be due from (a) national banks that receive a UFIRS 
    rating (also referred to as a CAMELS rating 4) of 3, 4, or 5 
    and (b) Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks that receive a 
    ROCA rating of 3, 4, or 5. OCC cost data show that there is a 
    significant increase in supervision costs once an institution's rating 
    moves from 2 to 3 and that these increased costs continue while the 
    bank is rated 3, 4, or 5. To reflect this increase in costs of 
    supervising a bank rated 3 or worse, the proposal uses a UFIRS or ROCA 
    rating (as appropriate) of 3 as the threshold for applying the 
    surcharge. Using the most recently available data at the time this 
    proposed rule was prepared, the surcharge would affect a total of 
    approximately 85 national banks and Federal branches and agencies of 
    foreign banks, resulting in an aggregate annual increase in assessments 
    for these banks of approximately $0.7 million.
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        \3\ In the final rule referred to in footnote 1, the OCC added a 
    new paragraph (b)(4) to Sec. 8.2.
        \4\ CAMELS is an acronym that stands for capital, assets, 
    management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk.
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        By linking assessments with the condition of the banks supervised, 
    the proposal ensures that a greater proportion of increased OCC costs 
    attributable to banks whose condition requires additional supervisory 
    resources is funded by those banks rather than by the national banking 
    system as a whole. If more banks were rated 3, 4, or 5, the OCC would 
    need additional and/or more specialized staff to monitor the efforts of 
    those banks to improve their condition. The proposal expands or 
    contracts assessment revenue automatically in a way that responds to 
    the changing demands on the OCC.
        The OCC considered the alternative of imposing a 50-percent 
    surcharge on banks that are rated 4 or 5.5 However, a 50-
    percent surcharge on UFIRS or ROCA 4-and 5-rated institutions would not 
    cover the increased costs of supervising all institutions rated 3, 4, 
    or 5. As a result, institutions rated 3 would be subsidized both by 
    healthier banks (who would, under the alternative approach, be paying 
    assessments at the same rate as 3-rated institutions even though the 
    healthier banks require less supervision) and by banks in worse 
    condition (who would be paying the assessment surcharge).
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        \5\ This is the approach taken by the Office of Thrift 
    Supervision in assessing savings institutions. See 12 CFR 502.1.
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        The OCC seeks comment on the approach set out in proposed 
    paragraphs (a)(7) and (b)(5) of Sec. 8.2. The OCC also seeks comment on 
    whether the ROCA rating is the appropriate
    
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    rating to use in imposing an assessment surcharge on Federal branches 
    and agencies, and, if not, whether some other rating or set of criteria 
    would be more appropriate.
    
    Assessments of a Bank That Owns Another Bank
    
        An issue has arisen concerning the proper method of calculating the 
    assessments of national banks that own other banks. This issue stems 
    from a recent change in the Call Report instructions 6 
    pursuant to which the assets of a subsidiary bank are reported on a 
    consolidated basis in the Call Report of its parent bank. Given that 
    the subsidiary bank also is required to file a Call Report, the current 
    assessment regulation, which bases assessments on assets reported in a 
    bank's Call Report, has the unintended effect of double-counting at 
    least some of the assets of the subsidiary bank.
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        \6\ See 62 FR 8078 (February 21, 1997).
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        The OCC seeks comment on methods that commenters believe would be 
    appropriate for calculating, for assessment purposes, the assets of a 
    national bank that owns another bank.
    
    Regulatory Flexibility Act
    
        Pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) 
    (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the regulatory flexibility analysis otherwise 
    required under section 603 of the RFA (5 U.S.C. 603) is not required if 
    the agency certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic 
    impact on a substantial number of small entities and the agency 
    publishes that certification and a short, explanatory statement in the 
    Federal Register along with its notice of proposed rulemaking.
        Pursuant to section 605(b) of the RFA, the OCC hereby certifies 
    that this proposal will not have a significant economic impact on a 
    substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule does not impose 
    any new reporting or recordkeeping requirement. While the proposal 
    would require national banks, Federal branches, and Federal agencies of 
    all sizes that receive a UFIRS or ROCA rating of 3, 4, or 5 to pay an 
    assessment surcharge, this will not create a significant or disparate 
    impact on small institutions. The assessments for the 58 national 
    banks, Federal branches, and Federal agencies with total assets of 
    under $100 million that currently are rated 3, 4, or 5 would increase, 
    in the aggregate, by approximately $287,204 per year, or approximately 
    $4,952 per institution. Accordingly, a regulatory flexibility analysis 
    under 603 of the RFA is not required.
    
    Executive Order 12866
    
        The OCC has determined that this proposal is not a significant 
    regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.
    
    Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    
        Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
    104-4 (2 U.S.C. 1532) (Unfunded Mandates Act), requires that an agency 
    prepare a budgetary impact statement before promulgating any rule 
    likely to result in a Federal mandate that may result in the 
    expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, 
    or by the private sector of $100 million or more in any one year. If a 
    budgetary impact statement is required, section 205 of the Unfunded 
    Mandates Act also requires an agency to identify and consider a 
    reasonable number of regulatory alternatives before promulgating a 
    rule. The OCC has determined that the proposed rule will not result in 
    expenditures by State, local, and tribal governments, or by the private 
    sector, of $100 million or more in any one year. Accordingly, the OCC 
    has not prepared a budgetary impact statement or specifically addressed 
    any regulatory alternatives. As discussed in the preamble, the 
    proposal, while increasing the annual assessments for institutions 
    receiving a UFIRS or ROCA rating of 3, 4, or 5, will, in the current 
    banking environment, increase assessments in the aggregate only by 
    approximately $0.7 million.
    
    List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 8
    
        Assessments, Fees, National banks.
    
    Authority and Issuance
    
        For the reasons set forth in the preamble, part 8 of chapter I of 
    title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended 
    as follows:
    
    PART 8--ASSESSMENT OF FEES; NATIONAL BANKS; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
    BANKS
    
        1. The authority citation for part 8 continues to read as follows:
    
        Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 481, 482, 3102, and 3108; 15 U.S.C. 
    78c and 78l; and 26 D.C. Code 102.
    
        2. Section 8.2 is amended by adding new paragraphs (a)(7) and 
    (b)(5) to read as follows:
    
    
    Sec. 8.2  Semiannual assessment.
    
        (a) * * *
        (7) The OCC shall adjust the semiannual assessment computed in 
    accordance with paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) of this section by 
    multiplying that figure by 1.25 for each bank that receives a rating of 
    3, 4, or 5 under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System at 
    its most recent examination.
        (b) * * *
        (5) The OCC shall adjust the semiannual assessment computed in 
    accordance with paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(4) of this section by 
    multiplying that figure by 1.25 for each Federal branch or Federal 
    agency that receives a ROCA rating (which rates risk management, 
    operational controls, compliance, and asset quality) of 3, 4, or 5 at 
    its most recent examination.
    
        Dated: October 15, 1997.
    Eugene A. Ludwig,
    Comptroller of the Currency.
    [FR Doc. 97-27829 Filed 10-20-97; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4810-33-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
10/21/1997
Department:
Comptroller of the Currency
Entry Type:
Proposed Rule
Action:
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
Document Number:
97-27829
Dates:
Comments must be received by November 20, 1997.
Pages:
54747-54748 (2 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. 97-20
RINs:
1557-AB60: Management Official Interlocks
RIN Links:
https://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/1557-AB60/management-official-interlocks
PDF File:
97-27829.pdf
CFR: (2)
12 CFR 8.2,3
12 CFR 8.2