98-28875. Prompt Corrective Action  

  • [Federal Register Volume 63, Number 209 (Thursday, October 29, 1998)]
    [Proposed Rules]
    [Pages 57938-57942]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 98-28875]
    
    
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    NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION
    
    12 CFR Chapter VII
    
    
    Prompt Corrective Action
    
    AGENCY: National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
    
    ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
    
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    SUMMARY: The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) requests 
    public comment on development of a system of ``prompt corrective 
    action'' to be taken by NCUA when a federally-insured credit union 
    becomes undercapitalized. A new provision of the Federal Credit Union 
    Act, as added by the Credit Union Membership Access Act, requires the 
    NCUA Board to adopt, by regulation, a system of prompt corrective 
    action indexed to each of five capital categories which the new 
    provision establishes for federally-insured credit unions. Much of the 
    system of prompt corrective action either is already prescribed by the 
    new provision itself or is required to be comparable with the system 
    Congress established for other federally-insured financial institutions 
    in 1991. However, Congress has left to NCUA the responsibility to 
    develop implementing regulations for certain components of the system 
    of prompt corrective action which are unique to credit unions. 
    Information and comments from interested parties on these specific 
    components will assist NCUA in carrying out its mandate to implement a 
    system of prompt corrective action.
    
    DATES: Comments must be received on or before January 27, 1999.
    
    ADDRESSES: Direct comments to Becky Baker, Secretary of the Board. Mail 
    or hand-deliver comments to: National Credit Union Administration, 1775 
    Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314-3428. Fax comments to (703) 
    518-6319. Please send comments by one method only.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Herbert S. Yolles, Deputy Director, 
    Office of Examination and Insurance, at the above address or telephone 
    (703) 518-6362; or Steven W. Widerman, Trial Attorney, Office of 
    General Counsel, at the above address or telephone (703) 518-6557.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    
    A. Background
    
        On August 7, 1998, Congress enacted the Credit Union Membership 
    Access Act (CUMAA), Pub. L. No. 105-219, 112 Stat. 913 (1998). Section 
    103 of CUMAA added a new section 216 to the Federal Credit Union Act 
    (FCUA), to be codified as 12 U.S.C. 1790d. New section 216(b)(1) 
    requires the NCUA Board to adopt by regulation a system of ``prompt 
    corrective action'' to be taken by NCUA when a federally-insured 
    ``natural person'' credit union becomes undercapitalized. Congress 
    requires NCUA's system of prompt corrective action to be ``comparable'' 
    to the system it prescribed for the other federally-insured financial 
    institutions in 1991 under section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
    Act (FDIA Sec. 38), 12 U.S.C. 1831o, as added by section 131 of the 
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
    242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
        Many of the regulations that will comprise NCUA's system of prompt 
    corrective action are not open to substantive discretion in rulemaking. 
    Section 216 (c) through (i) itself prescribes the substance of much of 
    NCUA's system of prompt corrective action. To satisfy the requirement 
    of ``comparability'' with FDIA Sec. 38, NCUA's regulations will 
    generally parallel those adopted by the other Federal banking agencies 
    pursuant to FDIA Sec. 38,\1\ to the extent such regulations are 
    applicable to credit unions. However, Congress has left to NCUA the 
    responsibility for originating implementing regulations for certain 
    components of the system of prompt corrective action which are unique 
    to credit unions and, thus, were not addressed in FDIA Sec. 38. New 
    Sec. 216 (b)(2) and (d). The components on which NCUA seeks comment 
    are:
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        \1\ The Federal banking agencies consist of the Federal Reserve 
    Board, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
    Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of Thrift 
    Supervision. New Sec. 216(o)(1) incorporating 12 U.S.C. 1813(z). 
    Their Joint Final Rule establishing a system of prompt corrective 
    action pursuant to FDIA Sec. 38 is published at 57 FR 44886 (Sept. 
    29, 1992).
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        1. The definition of a ``complex'' credit union;
        2. The design of a ``risk-based net worth requirement'' to apply to 
    ``complex'' credit unions;
        3. The design of an alternative system of prompt corrective action 
    for ``new'' credit unions (defined as less than 10 years old and having 
    less than $10 million in assets); and
        4. The criteria for an acceptable Net Worth Restoration Plan for 
    under-capitalized credit unions.
    
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        New Sec. 216 (b)(2)(d) and (f)(5). NCUA seeks comment on these 
    components. An opportunity to address all of the components of prompt 
    corrective action will be provided in 1999 when NCUA issues proposed 
    rules for comment.
    
    B. Timetable
    
        Congress has set a timetable for NCUA to propose for comment, and 
    to finally adopt, implementing regulations for section 216. For all 
    implementing regulations except those regarding the ``risk-based net 
    worth requirement'' for ``complex'' credit unions, NCUA is required to 
    propose rules no later than May 26, 1999, and to adopt final rules no 
    later than February 7, 2000, which would become effective August 7, 
    2000. CUMAA Sec. 301 (d)(1) and (e)(1).
        A different timetable applies to implementing regulations for a 
    single component of the prompt corrective action--the ``risk-based net 
    worth requirement'' for ``complex'' credit unions. Congress requires 
    NCUA to precede its proposed and final implementing rules with an 
    Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) soliciting public comment 
    on the ``risk-based net worth requirement'' only, to be published no 
    later than February 3, 1999. CUMAA Sec. 301(d)(2)(A). To fulfill that 
    requirement, NCUA publishes this ANPR soliciting public comment not 
    only on the ``risk-based net worth requirement'' for ``complex'' credit 
    unions, but also on other components of prompt corrective action, 
    unique to credit unions, for which Congress has directed NCUA to 
    originate implementing regulations. No date is prescribed for proposing 
    rules on the ``risk-based net worth requirement,'' but NCUA is required 
    to adopt final rules no later than August 7, 2000, which would become 
    effective January 1, 2001. CUMAA Sec. 301 (d)(2)(B) and (e)(2).
        Broad public input addressing these components will assist the NCUA 
    Board in tailoring a system of prompt corrective action that is 
    workable, fair and effective in light of the cooperative character of 
    credit unions. See S. Rep. No. 193, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1998) (S. 
    Rep.).
    
    C. Framework of Section 216
    
        Like FDIA Sec. 38, new section 216(c) establishes a framework of 
    five capital categories based on the ratio of a credit union's net 
    worth.\2\ New section 216(e) through (i) then mandates specific prompt 
    corrective actions indexed to each of the lower four categories. Most 
    such actions impose progressively more stringent restrictions and 
    requirements on credit unions; others permit or require NCUA to take 
    administrative action, including conservatorship and liquidation.
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        \2\ ``Net worth ratio'' is defined as the ratio of a credit 
    union's net worth to its total assets. New Sec. 216(o)(3). The ``net 
    worth'' of a credit union (other than a low-income credit union) is 
    defined as its retained earnings balance as determined under GAAP. 
    New Sec. 216(o)(2)(A). Under GAAP, retained earnings consists of 
    undivided earnings, statutory reserves, and other appropriations as 
    defined by management or regulatory authorities. AICPA, Audit & 
    Accounting Guide: Audits of Credit Unions at Sec. 11.01 (1998).
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        1. Well Capitalized. A credit union is ``well capitalized'' if it 
    has a net worth ratio of 7% or greater and, if it meets the definition 
    of a ``complex'' credit union, also satisfies an additional ``risk-
    based net worth requirement.'' New Sec. 216(c)(1)(A). A ``well 
    capitalized'' credit union is not subject to any type of prompt 
    corrective action under section 216.
        2. Adequately Capitalized. A credit union is ``adequately 
    capitalized'' if it has a net worth ratio of 6% or greater and, if it 
    meets the definition of a ``complex'' credit union, also satisfies an 
    additional ``risk-based net worth requirement.'' New Sec. 216(c)(1)(B). 
    To improve capital, an ``adequately capitalized'' credit union must 
    annually set aside as net worth an amount equal to at least 0.4% of its 
    total assets. New Sec. 216(e). This is the only prompt corrective 
    action required of a credit union that is ``adequately capitalized'' 
    but not ``well capitalized.''
        3. Undercapitalized. A credit union is ``undercapitalized'' if it 
    has a net worth ratio of less than 6% or, if it meets the definition of 
    a ``complex'' credit union, fails to satisfy an additional ``risk-based 
    net worth requirement.'' New Sec. 216(c)(1)(C). In addition to annually 
    setting aside as net worth an amount equal to at least 0.4% of its 
    total assets, an ``undercapitalized'' credit union also must timely 
    submit and implement a Net Worth Restoration Plan which is accepted by 
    the NCUA Board; must not allow its average total assets to increase 
    unless and at a rate permitted by its Plan; and cannot increase the 
    total amount of member business loans outstanding at any one time. New 
    Sec. 216(f)(1) and (g).
        4. Significantly Undercapitalized. A credit union is 
    ``significantly undercapitalized'' if it has a net worth ratio of less 
    than 4%. However, a credit union which has a net worth ratio of between 
    4% and 4.99%, and otherwise would be ``undercapitalized,'' will instead 
    be classified ``significantly undercapitalized'' if it has failed to 
    timely submit or implement a Net Worth Restoration Plan acceptable to 
    the NCUA Board (see infra section E.4.). New Sec. 216(c)(1)(D). A 
    ``significantly undercapitalized'' credit union is subject to all of 
    the same prompt corrective actions as one which is 
    ``undercapitalized.'' But in addition, NCUA is given the discretion to 
    conserve or liquidate that credit union if it finds no reasonable 
    prospect that it will become ``adequately capitalized.'' New 
    Secs. 206(h)(1)(F) and 207(a)(3)(A)(i) as added by CUMAA 
    Sec. 301(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (b)(2)(B).
        5. Critically Undercapitalized. A credit union is ``critically 
    undercapitalized'' if it has a net worth ratio of less than 2%. New 
    Sec. 216(c)(1)(E). A ``critically undercapitalized'' credit union is 
    subject to all of the same prompt corrective actions as one which is 
    ``significantly undercapitalized'' except that NCUA may now conserve or 
    liquidate that credit union regardless whether there is a reasonable 
    prospect that it will become ``adequately capitalized.'' New 
    Secs. 206(h)(1)(G) and 207(a)(3)(A)(ii) as added by CUMAA 
    Sec. 301(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (b)(2)(B). In addition, a ``critically 
    undercapitalized'' credit union is subject to a timetable that, absent 
    improvement in capital, leads to mandatory conservatorship or 
    liquidation. Within 90 days of becoming ``critically 
    undercapitalized,'' NCUA must either conserve or liquidate that credit 
    union or ``take such other action . . . [that] would better achieve the 
    purpose of [section 216], after documenting why the action would better 
    achieve that purpose.'' New Sec. 216(i)(1). NCUA's determination to 
    take ``such other action'' in lieu of conservatorship or liquidation 
    expires in 180 days. If that determination is not renewed, the credit 
    union must be conserved or liquidated. New Sec. 216(i)(2). If, after 
    two renewals (i.e., 18 months after first becoming ``critically 
    undercapitalized''), the credit union remains ``critically 
    underapitalized,'' on average, for a full calendar quarter, NCUA must 
    liquidate unless the credit union (i) has been complying with a Net 
    Worth Restoration Plan since the date it was approved; (ii) has 
    positive net income or a sustainable upward trend in earnings; and 
    (iii) is viable and not expected to fail. New Sec. 216(i)(3).
    
    D. Required Comparability With FDIA Section 38
    
    1. Comparability
    
        New section 216 is modeled on section 38 of the Federal Deposit 
    Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 1831o. Beginning in 1992, that provision 
    mandated a system of prompt corrective
    
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    action to apply to all FDIC-insured depository institutions. The 
    purpose of prompt corrective action for federally-insured credit unions 
    is to resolve problems at the least possible long-term loss to the 
    National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (the Fund). New 
    Sec. 216(a)(1). To carry out that purpose, Congress requires the NCUA 
    Board to adopt regulations establishing a system of prompt corrective 
    action that, in addition to being consistent with section 216, is 
    ``comparable to section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.'' \3\ 
    New 216(b)(1)(A); S. Rep. at 12; H.R. Rep. No. 472, 105th Cong., 2d 
    Sess. 23 (1998) (H.R. Rep. at 23).
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        \3\ To this end, in developing regulations to implement new 
    section 216, the NCUA Board is required to consult with the 
    Secretary of the Treasury, the other Federal banking agencies (which 
    apply prompt corrective action under FDIA Sec. 38), and State 
    officials having jurisdiction over State-chartered, federally-
    insured credit unions. CUMAA Sec. 301(c).
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        ``Comparable `` is defined as ``parallel in substance (though not 
    necessarily identical in detail) and equivalent in rigor.'' S. Rep. at 
    12. NCUA interprets this to mean that its implementing regulations for 
    section 216 should parallel those adopted by the Federal banking 
    agencies to implement FDIA Sec. 38, to the extent the latter 
    regulations apply to credit unions. Conversely, NCUA's regulations will 
    exclude prompt corrective actions under FDIA Sec. 38 which are 
    inapplicable to credit unions, such as requiring the sale of stock or 
    subordinated debt to recapitalize or undergo a merger or acquisition, 
    prohibiting the acceptance of deposits from correspondent institutions, 
    requiring a bank holding company to obtain approval before making a 
    capital distribution, and requiring divestiture of an institution. See 
    U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Credit Unions (Washington, D.C. 1997) at 76 
    (Treasury Rep.).
        NCUA invites commenters to identify the prompt corrective actions 
    under FDIA Sec. 38 which they believe do not apply to credit unions and 
    should be excluded from NCUA's implementing regulations, as well as to 
    address the components of prompt corrective action under section 216 
    which have no analog in FDIA Sec. 38.
    
    2. Report to Congress
    
        To the extent that NCUA's prompt corrective action regulations are 
    not parallel with an applicable provision of FDIA Sec. 38, the NCUA 
    Board is required to report that difference to Congress. The report to 
    Congress must ``specifically explain . . . how the regulations differ 
    from [FDIA Sec. 38], and the reasons for those differences.'' \4\ CUMAA 
    Sec. 301(f); S. Rep. at 19; H.R. Rep. at 23. The report to Congress 
    must be submitted either when the NCUA Board proposes its regulations 
    for all but the ``risk-based net worth requirement'' (on or before May 
    26, 1999), or when it finally adopts such regulations (on or before 
    February 7, 2000).
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        \4\ The Report to Congress also must explain how NCUA's 
    regulations take into account the cooperative character of credit 
    unions, i.e., that credit unions are not-for-profit cooperatives 
    that do not issue stock, must rely on retained earnings to build net 
    worth, and have boards of directors that consist primarily of 
    volunteers. New Sec. 216(b)(1)(B).
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    E. Components of Prompt Corrective Action Unique to Credit Unions
    
    1. Definition of a ``Complex'' Credit Union
    
        To be classified either ``well capitalized'' or ``adequately 
    capitalized,'' a credit union that is deemed ``complex'' must satisfy a 
    prescribed ``risk-based net worth requirement'' in addition to the 
    corresponding statutory net worth ratio. New Sec. 216(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 
    (B)(ii). Similarly, a credit union that is deemed ``complex'' will be 
    classified as ``undercapitalized'' if it fails to meet a prescribed 
    ``risk-based net worth requirement,'' regardless whether it meets the 
    corresponding statutory net worth ratio. New Sec. 216(c)(1)(C)(ii). To 
    set up this ``gateway'' for imposing the ``risk-based net worth 
    requirement,'' new section 216 requires the NCUA Board to define a 
    ``complex'' credit union ``based on the portfolios of assets and 
    liabilities of credit unions.'' New Sec. 216(d)(1).
        FDIA Sec. 38 gives no guidance in defining a ``complex'' credit 
    union because it draws no distinction between ordinary and complex 
    depository institutions; indeed, a ``risk-based capital requirement'' 
    applies to all such institutions in all but the ``critically 
    undercapitalized'' category. Joint Final Rule, 57 FR 44870 (Sept. 28, 
    1992). NCUA believes that the definition of a ``complex'' credit union 
    should incorporate objective, risk-related numerical standards, derived 
    from a credit union's balance sheet. This would serve the interests of 
    uniformity and efficiency in two ways. First, credit unions would not 
    be subject to unequal treatment as a result of subjective 
    ``complexity'' determinations by NCUA and State credit union 
    supervisors. Second, credit unions would be able to determine for 
    themselves where they stand with respect to being deemed ``complex'' or 
    not.
        NCUA encourages commenters to address possible criteria for 
    defining a credit union as ``complex'' according to the risk level of 
    its portfolio of assets and liabilities. The following might be 
    considered examples of such criteria:
        (i) Investments. Whether the credit union's securities portfolio is 
    subject to NCUA's 300 basis point ``shock test'' required when the sum 
    of the fair value of ``certain fixed and variable rate securities'' \5\ 
    the credit union holds exceeds its net capital, 12 CFR 703.90(b)-(c);
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        \5\ Such securities are defined as having embedded options; or 
    remaining maturities greater than three years; or coupon formulas 
    that are related to more than one index or are inversely related to, 
    or multiples of, an index. 12 CFR 703.90(b).
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        (ii) Lending. Whether the credit union's portfolio exceeds a 
    certain threshold ratio of fixed-rate real estate mortgages;
        (iii) Borrowing. Whether the credit union has exceeded a certain 
    threshold ratio of borrowed funds; and
        (iv) CAMEL Components. Whether the ``Capital'' and/or ``Asset'' 
    components of the credit union's CAMEL rating are rated ``4'' or ``5.''
    
    2. ``Risk-based Net Worth Requirements''
    
        For each of the top three capital categories--``well capitalized,'' 
    ``adequately capitalized'' and ``undercapitalized''--the NCUA Board is 
    required to establish a separate ``risk-based net worth requirement'' 
    that applies to credit unions that are deemed ``complex.'' New 
    Sec. 216(d)(1); compare 12 U.S.C. 1831o(c)(1)(A). The ``risk-based net 
    worth requirement'' must ``take account of any material risks against 
    which the [6% net worth ratio required to be ``adequately 
    capitalized''] may not provide adequate protection.'' New 
    Sec. 216(d)(2). To this end, NCUA will consider whether a credit union 
    having a 6% net worth ratio is adequately protected against interest 
    rate risk, market risks, credit risk, risks posed by contingent 
    liabilities, and other relevant risks. S. Rep. at 14. The design of the 
    risk-based net worth requirement will reflect a reasoned judgment about 
    the actual risks involved. Id.
        FDIA Sec. 38 required the Federal banking agencies to develop a 
    ``risk-based capital requirement'' to include among the ``relevant 
    capital measures'' used to classify insured institutions among the five 
    capital categories. 12 U.S.C. 1831o(c)(1). To fulfill that requirement, 
    the Federal banking agencies adopted two separate measures which are 
    independent of the ``leverage ratio'' (the equivalent of ``net worth 
    ratio'')--the ``ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets'' and 
    the ``ratio of
    
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    Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets.'' \6\ 57 FR at 44870.
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        \6\ The total risk-based capital ration is set at 500 basis 
    points above the leverage ration for the ``well capitalized'' 
    category, and at 400 basis points above the leverage ratio for the 
    ``adequately capitalized'' and ``undercapitalized categories. The 
    Tier-1 risk-based capital ratio is set at 100 basis points above the 
    leverage ratio for the ``well capitalized'' category, and at the 
    same level as the leverage ratio for the ``adequately capitalized'' 
    and ``undercapitalized'' categories. 57 FR at 44867.
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        NCUA is considering a ``risk-based net worth requirement'' that 
    consists of a basis points (b.p.) add-on to the existing statutory net 
    worth ratio for each of the ``well capitalized,'' ``adequately 
    capitalized'' and ``undercapitalized'' categories. The amount of the 
    add-on would not necessarily be the same for each category. For 
    example, a uniform 100 b.p. increase in the net worth ratio for each 
    category would be reflected as follows. An otherwise ``well 
    capitalized'' credit union (having a net worth ratio of 7% or greater) 
    that is deemed ``complex'' would be required to achieve a net worth 
    ratio of 8% or greater (7% statutory net worth ratio + 100 b.p. ``risk-
    based net worth requirement'') to be classified ``well capitalized.'' 
    An otherwise ``adequately capitalized'' credit union (having a net 
    worth ratio of 6% or greater) that is deemed ``complex'' would be 
    required to achieve a net worth ratio of 7% or greater (6% statutory 
    net worth ratio + 100 b.p. ``risk-based net worth requirement'') to be 
    classified ``adequately capitalized.'' Conversely, an otherwise 
    ``undercapitalized'' credit union (having a net worth ratio of less 
    than 6%) that is deemed ``complex'' still would be ``undercapitalized'' 
    unless it achieved a net worth ratio of 7% (6% statutory net worth 
    ratio + 100 b.p. ``risk-based net worth requirement'').
        NCUA invites comment on the concept of supplementing applicable 
    statutory net worth ratios, on the notion of establishing risk-weighted 
    ratios that are independent of the statutory net worth ratios, as well 
    as alternative designs for a ``risk-based net worth requirement.''
    
    3. Alternative Rules for ``New'' Credit Unions
    
        For ``new'' credit unions, the NCUA Board is required to prescribe 
    an alternative system of prompt corrective action to apply in lieu of 
    the system prescribed by section 216 for existing credit unions. New 
    Sec. 216(b)(2)(A); see also Treasury Rep. at 79. The alternative system 
    of prompt corrective action for ``new'' credit unions must be designed 
    to:
        (i) Carry out the purpose of section 216, i.e., to solve problems 
    at the least possible long-term loss to the Fund;
        (ii) Recognize that new credit unions initially have no net worth, 
    and give them reasonable time to accumulate net worth;
        (iii) Create incentives for new credit unions to become adequately 
    capitalized by the time they either have been in operation for more 
    than 10 years or have more than $10 million in total assets;
        (iv) Impose appropriate restrictions and requirements on new credit 
    unions that do not make sufficient progress toward becoming adequately 
    capitalized; and
        (v) Prevent evasion of the purpose of section 216 (e.g., an 
    existing credit union merges with a smaller, new credit union and 
    classifies itself as a ``new'' credit union to avoid the requirements 
    of section 216).
    
    New Sec. 216(b)(2)(B).
        Section 216(o)(4) defines a ``new'' credit union as having been in 
    operation for less than 10 years and having $10 million or less in 
    total assets. This is a significant expansion of the definition in 
    section 116 of the FCUA, which CUMAA repeals. CUMAA Sec. 301(g)(3). 
    Section 116 defined a ``new'' credit union as having been in operation 
    less than 4 years or having assets of less than $500,000. 12 U.S.C. 
    1762(a)(2).
        Under section 116, a ``new'' credit union was required to set aside 
    10% of gross income until its regular reserve (i.e., capital) reached 
    7.5% of total outstanding loans and risk assets, and thereafter to set 
    aside 5% of gross income until the regular reserve reached 10% of total 
    outstanding loans and risk assets. Id.; see also 12 CFR 702.2(a); U.S. 
    Dept. of Treasury, Modernizing The Financial System (Washington, D.C. 
    1991) at XIII-3. Under section 216(e), existing credit unions that are 
    less than ``well capitalized'' ordinarily are required to annually set 
    aside as net worth an amount equal to at least 0.4% of total assets 
    until attaining a net worth ratio of 7%.\7\ The conceptual distinction 
    between old section 116 and new section 216 is that under the former 
    the reserve transfer was calculated as a percentage of gross income, 
    under the latter it is calculated as a percentage of total assets.
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        \7\ Section 216(e)(2)(A) gives the NCUA Board the authority to 
    adjust the amount of the 0.4% reserve transfer, on a case-by-case 
    basis, if necessary to avoid a significant redemption of shares and 
    to further the purpose of section 216.
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        NCUA proposes to establish a graduated timetable to allow ``new'' 
    credit unions to build capital toward the statutory net worth level for 
    each capital category. NCUA solicits comment on whether to adopt the 
    same approach as section 216 now mandates for improving the capital of 
    existing credit unions--requiring a ``new'' credit union to annually 
    set aside as net worth a certain percentage total assets. New 
    Sec. 216(e). The percentage of the annual transfer to net worth might 
    be reduced progressively as the ``new'' credit union attains a higher 
    capital category.
    
    4. Net Worth Restoration Plan
    
        Any credit union which is ``undercapitalized'', ``significantly 
    undercapitalized'' or ``critically undercapitalized'' must, among other 
    prompt corrective actions, submit an acceptable Net Worth Restoration 
    Plan (the Plan) to the NCUA Board. New Sec. 216(f)(1). The Plan is 
    required to be submitted within a reasonable time prescribed by the 
    NCUA Board, which must act expeditiously to decide whether the Plan is 
    acceptable. New Sec. 216(f)(3). The NCUA Board may accept a Plan only 
    if it determines that the Plan ``is based on realistic assumptions and 
    is likely to succeed in restoring the net worth of the credit union.'' 
    New Sec. 216(f)(5). Apart from this standard, the NCUA Board needs to 
    establish criteria for credit unions to rely upon in preparing a Plan 
    that will be ``acceptable.''
        FDIA Sec. 38 requires an undercapitalized institution to submit a 
    ``capital restoration plan'' (capital plan) which specifies:
    
        (i) Steps the institution will take to become ``adequately 
    capitalized'';
        (ii) The levels of capital the institution expects to attain in 
    each year that the plan is in effect;
        (iii) How the institution will comply with the prompt corrective 
    action restrictions and requirements imposed under FDIA Sec. 38; and
        (iv) The types and levels of activities in which the institution 
    will engage.
        12 U.S.C. 1831o(e)(2)(B)(i). To be accepted, a capital plan must 
    meet the following statutory criteria:
        (i) Contain the statutorily-required information described 
    above;
        (ii) Be based on realistic assumptions and be likely to succeed 
    in restoring the institution's capital; and
        (iii) Would not appreciably increase risk (including credit 
    risk, interest rate risk, and other types of risk) to which the 
    institution is exposed.
        12 U.S.C. 1831o(e)(2)(C)(i). Although FDIA Sec. 38 authorized 
    the Federal banking agencies to adopt regulations requiring a 
    capital plan to include additional information, the agencies 
    declined to do so. 57 FR at 44878.
        Section 216(f)(5) prescribes for a Net Worth Restoration Plan 
    only one of FDIA Sec. 38's criteria--that the Plan be based on 
    realistic assumptions and be likely to succeed in
    
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    restoring a credit union's capital. NCUA seeks comment on whether to 
    add, by regulation, all or a combination of some of the other FDIA 
    Sec. 38 content prerequisites and acceptability criteria enumerated 
    above, and on the time frame for submitting and implementing a Net 
    Worth Restoration Plan. In addition, NCUA welcomes input on this 
    model generally, as well as on alternative and/or additional content 
    prerequisites and acceptability requirements for credit union Net 
    Worth Restoration Plans.
    
        By the National Credit Union Administration Board on October 22, 
    1998.
    Becky Baker,
    Secretary of the Board.
    [FR Doc. 98-28875 Filed 10-28-98; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7535-01-U
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
10/29/1998
Department:
National Credit Union Administration
Entry Type:
Proposed Rule
Action:
Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
Document Number:
98-28875
Dates:
Comments must be received on or before January 27, 1999.
Pages:
57938-57942 (5 pages)
PDF File:
98-28875.pdf