[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 190 (Monday, October 3, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-24343]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: October 3, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-440]
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Centerior Service
Company, Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania
Power Company, and, Toledo Edison Company; Exemption
I
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Centerior Service
Company, Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania
Power Company, and, Toledo Edison Company (the licensees) hold Facility
Operating License No. NPF-58, which authorizes operation of the Perry
Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), Unit No. 1. The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations
and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or
hereafter in effect. This facility is a boiling water reactor located
on the shore of Lake Erie in Lake County, Ohio, approximately 35 miles
northeast of Cleveland, Ohio, and approximately 23 miles southwest of
Ashtabula, Ohio.
II
Subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality Accident
Requirements,'' requires that each licensee authorized to possess
special nuclear material shall maintain in each area where such
material is handled, used, or stored, an appropriate criticality
monitoring system. In accordance with Subsection (a)(1) of 10 CFR
70.24, coverage of all such areas at PNPP, Unit No. 1, shall be
provided by two criticality detectors. However, exemptions may be
requested pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d), provided that the licensee
believes that good cause exists for the exemption. In particular,
Regulatory Guide 8.12, Revision 2, ``Criticality Accident Alarm
System,'' states that it is appropriate to request an exemption from 10
CFR 70.24 if an evaluation determines that a potential for criticality
does not exist, as for example where geometric spacing is used to
preclude criticality.
By letter dated February 28, 1992, the license requested an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. A previous exemption
from the provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 for the storage of special nuclear
material, including reactor fuel assemblies (maximum amount of 2,602 kg
of U-235 in uranium enriched to no more than 3.00 weight percent (w/
o)), was granted to PNPP in NRC Material License No. SNM-1928. The
materials license was issued on March 7, 1985, and expired upon
conversion of the construction permit to an operating license on
November 13, 1986. The bases for the current exemption request is the
same as for the original 1985 request. Specifically, the licensees
proposed to handle and store unirradiated fuel in the fuel handling
building in the new fuel pool without having a criticality monitoring
system with two separate criticality detectors as required by 10 CFR
70.24.
The bases for the exemption is that the potential for accident
critically is precluded because of the geometric spacing of fuel in the
storage pool and administrative controls imposed in fuel handling
procedures from the time the fuel is removed from approved shipping
containers, until it is placed in specially designed storage racks.
Administrative control encompass placing the assemblies in the fuel
inspection stand, receipt inspection activities, and lifting and
placement of the assemblies into specified locations into the new fuel
storage vaults. Design of the new fuel racks precludes criticality,
i.e., an effective multiplication factor of 0.95 or less in the normal
dry condition or abnormal completely water flooded condition.
Criticality during optimal moderation (foam, small droplets, spray, or
fogging) is precluded by storing new fuel assemblies in the new fuel
vaults in alternate rows and columns. Administrative controls will
prevent placement of each fuel assembly in adjacent storage cells.
Restrictions on this exemption ensure that personnel are trained,
equipment is operable, an assembly storage plan is developed, reviewed,
and approved, and verification is undertaken by the Reactor Engineer or
licensed Senior Reactor Operator at the completion of each fuel
assembly transfer to ensure criticality is precluded. These
restrictions are listed in the enclosure as items 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Restriction 5 requires performing and maintaining criticality analyses
documenting that the maximum effective multiplication factor for each
fuel assembly does not exceed 0.95 when optimally moderated and fully
reflected by water. Restriction 6 limits maximum fuel enrichment to 5
w/o of U-235 independent of the results of analyses performed in
accordance with Restriction 5. Fuel assemblies, when stored in their
shipping containers, shall be stacked no more than three containers
high (Restriction 7). No more than three fuel assemblies shall be
outside their shipping containers or storage racks at any one time
(Restriction 8). The minimum edge-to-edge distance between the group of
three fuel assemblies and all other fuel assemblies shall be 12 inches
(Restriction 9).
Based upon the information provided, there is reasonable assurance
that unirradiated fuel will remain subcritical because of the new fuel
pool design and administrative controls. The special circumstances for
granting an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 are met because criticality is
precluded with the present design configuration, Technical
Specification requirements, and the restrictions placed upon the
exemption. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee's request
for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for unirradiated
fuel in the fuel handling building is acceptable and should be granted.
This exemption is subject to the restrictions listed in the enclosure.
III
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
70.24, an exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or
property or the common defense and security and is otherwise in the
public interest.
Accordingly, the Commission hereby grants an exemption as described
in Section II above from 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality Accident
Requirements,'' such that the licensee is exempt from providing two
criticality detectors. This exemption is subjection to the restrictions
in the enclosure.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the
quality of the human environment (59 FR 47363).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, the 26th day of September 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jack W. Roe,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-24343 Filed 9-30-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
