[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 210 (Thursday, October 30, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58756-58758]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-28756]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 70-7002]
Notice of Amendment to Certificate of Compliance GDP-2 for the
U.S. Enrichment Corporation, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant,
Portsmouth, Ohio
The Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has
made a determination that the following amendment request is not
significant in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In making that
determination, the staff concluded that: (1) there is no change in the
types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may
be released offsite; (2) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative occupational radiation exposure; (3) there is no
significant construction impact; (4) there is no significant increase
in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from,
previously analyzed accidents; (5) the proposed changes do not result
in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident; (6) there is
no significant reduction in any margin of safety; and (7) the proposed
changes will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of
the plant's safety, safeguards, or security programs. The
[[Page 58757]]
basis for this determination for the amendment request is described
below.
The NRC staff has reviewed the certificate amendment application
and concluded that it provides reasonable assurance of adequate safety,
safeguards, and security and compliance with NRC requirements.
Therefore, the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, is prepared to issue an amendment to the Certificate of
Compliance for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS). The
staff has prepared a Compliance Evaluation Report which provides
details of the staff's evaluation.
The NRC staff has determined that this amendment satisfies the
criteria for a categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for this
amendment.
USEC or any person whose interest may be affected may file a
petition, not exceeding 30 pages, requesting review of the Director's
Decision. The petition must be filed with the Commission not later than
15 days after publication of this Federal Register Notice. A petition
for review of the Director's Decision shall set forth with
particularity the interest of the petitioner and how that interest may
be affected by the results of the decision. The petition should
specifically explain the reasons why review of the Decision should be
permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the
interest of the petitioner; (2) how that interest may be affected by
the Decision, including the reasons why the petitioner should be
permitted a review of the Decision; and (3) the petitioner's areas of
concern about the activity that is the subject matter of the Decision.
Any person described in this paragraph (USEC or any person who filed a
petition) may file a response to any petition for review, not to exceed
30 pages, within 10 days after filing of the petition. If no petition
is received within the designated 15-day period, the Director will
issue the final amendment to the Certificate of Compliance without
further delay. If a petition for review is received, the decision on
the amendment application will become final in 60 days, unless the
Commission grants the petition for review or otherwise acts within 60
days after publication of this Federal Register Notice.
A petition for review must be filed with the Secretary of the
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or may be
delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC, by the above date.
For further details with respect to the action see: (1) the
application for amendment and (2) the Commission's Compliance
Evaluation Report. These items are available for public inspection at
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L
Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the Local Public Document Room.
Date of amendment request: June 9, 1997.
Brief description of amendment: The proposed amendment, in
accordance with a commitment made in the USEC certificate application,
revises Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) 2.1.3.5 entitled ``Autoclave
Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown,'' to account for the added
capability to separately test inner and outer loop containment valves
on autoclaves in buildings X-342, X-343, and X-344.
The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant uses thirteen autoclaves in
buildings X-342, X-343 and X-344 to feed, transfer and sample
UF6. These autoclaves were designed and constructed in
accordance with ASME Section VIII and are utilized to confine
UF6 and any reaction products in the event of a major
UF6 release inside an autoclave. Steam used to heat a
UF6 cylinder within an autoclave is typically controlled at
approximately 5 psig. However, if a large UF6 release occurs
inside an autoclave, its internal pressure could rise to as high as 90
psig very rapidly. To ensure that the contents of a release are
confined inside the autoclave, except for that which is released due to
the proper operation of the autoclave pressure relief system (rupture
disc rated at near 150 psig and relief valve), each line which
penetrates the autoclave boundary is equipped with at least two valves
that can serve as isolation valves. These close automatically to
isolate the autoclave in the event of high internal pressure; the
actuation pressure being less than or equal to 15 psig.
As noted in the Description of Noncompliance for Issue 3 of the
``Plan for Achieving Compliance with NRC Regulations at the Portsmouth
Gaseous Diffusion Plant'' Revision 3 (Compliance Plan) dated July 9,
1996, the capability to pressure decay test the autoclave containment
valves (i.e., inner and outer loop valves) separately did not exist.
According to item 1 of the Plan of Action and Schedule (POA) for Issue
3 of the Compliance Plan, USEC was committed to providing this
capability before July 1, 1997, and submitting to the NRC, a revised
TSR to reflect the new autoclave containment valve configuration. In
addition, the POA stated that until the capability to separately test
the inner and outer loop containment valve is provided, the applicable
TSR requirement will be to declare an autoclave inoperable and taken
out of service when, in any mode of operation, either containment valve
is determined to be inoperable or, in the heating mode, either pressure
instrument channel is determined to be inoperable. According to USEC's
certificate amendment request, since this capability has been provided,
the Action conditions of TSR 2.1.3.5 should allow completion of the
current operating cycle if only one instrument channel, or one
containment isolation valve on one or more autoclave penetrations, is
operable. However, if both instrument channels or all containment
isolation valves on any one autoclave penetration are inoperable, then
TSR 2.1.3.5 requires USEC to shut down the autoclave within one hour.
Basis for Finding of No Significance
1. The proposed amendment will not result in a change in the types
or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite.
Each line penetration for the thirteen autoclaves at PORTS, has at
least two valves, that when actuated, would isolate the autoclaves. In
addition, each autoclave has, as part of the autoclave shell high
pressure containment shutdown system, two independent high pressure
containment actuation channels. The proposed change to TSR 2.1.3.5
allows completion of the current autoclave operating cycle if one
instrument channel, or one containment isolation valve on one or more
autoclave penetrations, is inoperable. It is noted that the proposed
TSR 2.1.3.5 still requires at least two channels and two isolation
valves on each autoclave penetration to be operable prior to initiating
a new operating cycle. Allowing an autoclave cycle to be completed,
with one instrument channel and one containment valve operable, instead
of requiring it to be shut down within one hour, will not result in a
change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any
effluents that may be released offsite for the reasons given in the
following paragraph.
The UF6 containment boundaries provided by the cylinder,
pigtail and valves inside an autoclave, and steam and UF6
reaction product confinement boundaries provided by the autoclave shell
and piping and valves out to and
[[Page 58758]]
including the second containment valve, are designated as ``Q''
systems. As such, USEC is required to apply the highest level of
quality control (ASME NQA-1) to ensure that the pressure boundaries
within these systems are maintained. Taking into consideration the
applicable safety features (administrative and installed hardware) for
preventing and mitigating UF6 releases associated with
autoclaves, and past operational history at PORTS, the staff concludes
that a major accidental release of UF6 inside an autoclave
is highly unlikely. The probability of inoperability of a containment
valve or an instrument channel during an operating cycle is also low
(none have been reported since March 3, 1997). According to the
surveillance requirements of TSR 2.1.3.5, these containment valves are
required to be calibrated semiannually at or below 15 psig, and to be
quarterly functionally tested and separately pressure decay tested at
90 psig with an acceptable leak rate of 10 psig/hour or 12 standard
cubic feet per minute. It should be noted that requiring an autoclave
to prematurely shut down prior to completing an operating cycle could
introduce added risk by necessitating additional handling of cylinders
containing liquid UF6 for feed, sampling and transfer
autoclaves, or by introducing cascade process upsets for feed
autoclaves.
The staff has concluded that since completing the current operating
cycle following inoperability of one instrument channel or one
containment valve on an autoclave penetration will not significantly
increase the risk of a UF6 release, this amendment will not
result in a significant change in the types or significant increase in
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
2. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase
in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a
UF6 release. Therefore, allowing an autoclave cycle to be
completed, instead of requiring it to be shut down within one hour
after discovery of one inoperable instrument channel or containment
valve, will not result in a significant increase in individual or
cumulative occupational radiation exposures.
3. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant
construction impact.
The proposed amendment does not involve any construction,
therefore, there will be no construction impacts.
4. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase
in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from,
previously analyzed accidents.
For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a
UF6 release. Therefore, allowing an autoclave cycle to be
completed, instead of requiring it to be shut down within one hour
after discovering one inoperable instrument channel or containment
valve, will not significantly increase the potential for, or
radiological or chemical consequences from, previously analyzed
accidents.
5. The proposed amendment will not result in the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident.
Based on the staff's review of the proposed amendment, no new or
different accidents were identified.
6. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant
reduction in any margin of safety.
For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a
UF6 release. Based on the staff's review of the proposed
amendment, the staff concludes that there will be no significant
reduction of any margin of safety.
7. The proposed amendment will not result in an overall decrease in
the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards, or security
programs.
For similar reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a
UF6 release. In addition, the staff has not identified any
criticality related implications from the proposed amendment. Based on
the staff's review of the proposed amendment, the staff concludes that
there will be no decrease in the effectiveness of the overall plant's
safety program.
The staff has not identified any safeguards or security related
implications from the proposed amendment. Therefore, the proposed
amendment will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness
of the plant's safeguards, or security programs.
Effective date: The amendment to GDP-2 will become effective 60
days after issuance by NRC.
Certificate of Compliance No. GDP-2: Amendment will revise the
Technical Safety Requirements.
Local Public Document Room location: Portsmouth Public Library,
1220 Gallia Street, Portsmouth, Ohio 45662.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23d day of October 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carl J. Paperiello,
Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 97-28756 Filed 10-29-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
