[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 191 (Tuesday, October 4, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-24412]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: October 4, 1994]
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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
[Recommendation 94-3]
Rocky Flats Seismic and Systems Safety
AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
ACTION: Notice; recommendation.
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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a
concerning Rocky Flats seismic and systems safety. The Board requests
public comments on this recommendation.
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation are due on or before November 3, 1994.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole C. Morgan, at the address above or
telephone (202) 208-6400.
Dated: September 28, 1994.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[Recommendation 94-3]
Rocky Flats Seismic and Systems Safety
Dated: September 26, 1994.
In its Recommendation 90-5, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (Board) recommended that a site-wide Systematic Evaluation
Program be conducted at the Rocky Flats Plant (now the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site), to determine if safety upgrades should
be instituted to enable the defense nuclear buildings and facilities to
meet current safety requirements. The mission of the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site has changed since the issuance of
Recommendation 90-5, and the Implementation Plan for the Recommendation
has been revised to more directly address the current mission of the
Site.
The Board has been informed in briefings by the Department of
Energy (DOE) that Building 371 is considered to be structurally the
best on-site facility for the storage of plutonium, and that steps are
therefore scheduled that in time will move the major part of the Site's
plutonium inventory into storage in this building. As a result,
Building 371 will assume a unique role as the storehouse which contains
the largest single accumulation of plutonium in the DOE complex. It
follows that potential health and safety issues associated with this
proposed use of the building also assume very high importance.
Accordingly, the Board has been reviewing potential public health
and safety issues at Building 371, and in particular, the building's
capacity to provide reasonable assurance of protection of public health
and safety should it be subjected to external forces from natural
phenomena (earthquakes, extreme winds, and floods). The Board has
observed that DOE's ongoing studies in the Systematic Evaluation
Program to better identify the potential hazards from natural phenomena
at Building 371 and to establish means of protecting against them are
not well integrated. An effective systematic Evaluation Program
requires a more thorough application of the systems engineering
process. The Board has concluded that activities currently underway in
this respect, to prepare Building 371 for its extended role in storage
of plutonium, are not logically structured and are not sufficiently
encompassing in either detail or scope to assure that the health and
safety of the public will be adequately protected.
Therefore, the Board recommends:
1. That an Integrated Program Plan be formulated to address the
civil-structural-seismic safety issues and evaluations related to the
planned use of Building 371 for storage of plutonium and related
functions. This plan needs to be founded on the principles of systems
engineering and realistic schedules. Several studies, pertinent to such
a plan, are geologic fault investigations, groundmotion studies,
dynamic building analyses, and soil-structure interaction analyses.
These studies and other elements need to be combined with the building
mission and any other functional criteria using systems engineering
principles to develop the Integrated Program Plan.
2. That the above plan address and explain any requirements for
changes to the current Safety Analysis Report and how such changes will
be accomplished. This includes effects from earthquakes, extreme winds,
and floods.
3. That a comprehensive document be completed describing in detail
the structural analysis methodology and standards for the building
analysis. This includes explaining analytical methods used and their
applicability to the configuration of Building 371.
4. That the integrated program plan use both deterministic and
probabilistic methods to establish the vibratory groundmotion criteria
that will be used in the structural evaluation of Building 371. This
includes a rationale for reconciling differences between the two
methods. Moreover, these criteria should incorporate the results of a
carefully planned and executed site geological faulting investigations.
5. That a hazard classification be selected for Building 371 which
is supported by rational analysis. This requires consideration of the
mission, period of intended use, and importance of the building.
6. That the Integrated Program Plan, consistent with the hazard
classification, include the plan for classification of safety systems
on a rational basis consistent with the mission, life, and importance
of Building 371. Issues associated with hazard classification and
classification of safety systems are discussed in the Board's April 29,
1994, letter to Under Secretary Curtis.
7. That any standards used in evaluating hazards from natural and
man-made phenomena be comparable to those used in commercial nuclear
practice.
8. That the Program Plan and the results of its activities be used
to specify building upgrade and improvements consistent with the
mission of Building 371.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
September 26, 1994.
The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC 20585.
Dear Secretary O'Leary: On September 26, 1994, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 2286a(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 94-3 which is
enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 94-3 deals with
Rocky Flats Seismic and Systems Safety.
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by
you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in
the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board
believes the recommendation contains no information which is
classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this
recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2161-68, as amended,
please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file
in your regional public reading rooms.
The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal
Register.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 94-24412 Filed 10-3-94; 8:45 am]
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