[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 4, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51918-51921]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-24664]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Army
32 CFR Part 505
Privacy Program
AGENCY: Department of the Army, DOD.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Department of the Army system of records notice A0381-
45cDAMI was deleted October 4, 1995. Therefore, the exemption rule is
being deleted with this action.
In addition, the Army is amending three existing exemption rules to
reflect the exemptions taken in the system of records notices. The
amendments to the existing rules change the system identifiers and
provide the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which the system of
records may be exempt, and the reasons therefore. The system
identifiers are A0381-20bDAMI, entitled Counterintelligence Operations
Files; A0614-115DAMI, entitled Department of the Army Operational
Support Activities; and A0318-100aDAMI, entitled Intelligence
Collection Files.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 4, 1995.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Pat Turner at (602) 538-6856 or
DSN 879-6856.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Order 12866
The Director, Administration and Management, Office of the
Secretary of Defense has determined that this proposed Privacy Act rule
for the Department of Defense does not constitute 'significant
regulatory action'. Analysis of the rule indicates that it does not
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; does not
create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action
taken or planned by another agency; does not materially alter the
budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs
or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; does not raise
novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the
President's priorities, or the principles set forth in Executive Order
12866 (1993).
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
The Director, Administration and Management, Office of the
Secretary of Defense certifies that this Privacy Act rule for the
Department of Defense does not have significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities because it is concerned only with
the administration of Privacy Act systems of records within the
Department of Defense.
[[Page 51919]]
Paperwork Reduction Act
The Director, Administration and Management, Office of the
Secretary of Defense certifies that this Privacy Act proposed rule for
the Department of Defense imposes no information requirements beyond
the Department of Defense and that the information collected within the
Department of Defense is necessary and consistent with 5 U.S.C. 552a,
known as the Privacy Act of 1974.
The Department of the Army system of records notice A0381-45cDAMI
was deleted October 4, 1995. Therefore, the exemption rule is being
deleted with this action.
In addition, the Army is amending three existing exemption rules.
The amendments to the existing rules change the system identifiers and
provide the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which the system of
records may be exempt, and the reasons therefore. The system
identifiers are A0381-20bDAMI, entitled Counterintelligence Operations
Files; A0614-115DAMI, entitled Department of the Army Operational
Support Activities; and A0318-100aDAMI, entitled Intelligence
Collection Files.
List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 505
Privacy.
Accordingly, 32 CFR part 505 is amended as follows:
1. The authority citation for 32 CFR part 505 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat 1896 (5 U.S.C.552a).
2. Section 505.5, is amended by revising the text of paragraphs
(e)ac, (e)ad, and (e)af, and removing and reserving paragraph (e)ae as
follows:
Sec. 505.5 Exemptions.
* * * * *
(e) Exempt Army records. * * *
ac. System identifier: A0381-20bDAMI.
(1) System name: Counterintelligence/Security Files.
(2) Exemption: All portions of this system of records may be exempt
from the provisions of subsections (c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5),
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f) of 5 U.S.C. 552a.
(3) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
(4) Reasons: (a) From subsection (c)(3) because disclosing the
agencies to which information from this system has been released could
inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal violation, or intelligence operation or investigation; or the
existence of that investigation or operation; of the nature and scope
of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities or of
the identify of confidential sources, witnesses, and intelligence
personnel and could provide information to enable the subject to avoid
detection or apprehension. Granting access to such information could
seriously impede or compromise an investigation; endanger the physical
safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel, and
their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the
destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose
investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, granting access
to such information could disclose classified and sensitive sources,
information, and operational methods and could constitute an
unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others.
(b) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access
to records in this system of records could inform the subject of a
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or
investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence
obtained as to his/her activities; or of the identity of confidential
sources, witnesses and intelligence personnel and could provide
information to enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension.
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or
compromise an operation or investigation; endanger the physical safety
of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel and their
families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the
destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose
investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, the agency is
required to protect the confidentiality of sources who furnished
information to the Government under an expressed promise of
confidentiality or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied
promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence.
This confidentiality is needed to maintain the Government's continued
access to information from persons who otherwise might refuse to give
it.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to
detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early
stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are
often questions of judgement and timing, an it is only after the
information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such
information can be established. In addition, during the course of the
investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information
which is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative
jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be
segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or
operation, the investigator may obtain information concerning
violations of laws other than those which are within the scope of his/
her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective intelligence operations
and law enforcement, military intelligence agents should retain
information, since it an aid in establishing patterns of criminal or
intelligence activity and provide valuable leads for other law
enforcement or intelligence agencies.
(d) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this
system or records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act,
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual
to have access to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of
records.
(e) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect
the confidentiality of the sources of information, to protect the
privacy and physical safety of confidential sources and witnesses and
to avoid the disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures.
Although the system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published such a notice in broad,
generic terms.
ad. System identifier: A0614-115DAMI.
(1) System name: Department of the Army Operational Support
Activities.
(2) Exemption: All portions of this system of records that fall
within the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be
exempt from subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5),
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f).
(3) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
(4) Reasons: (a) From subsection (c)(3)because disclosing the
agencies to which information from this system has
[[Page 51920]]
been released could reveal the subject's involvement in a sensitive
intelligence or counterintelligence operation or investigation of an
actual or potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or
investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation.
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or
compromise an investigation or operation; endanger the physical safety
of participants and their families, confidential sources, witnesses,
intelligence personnel, and their families; and lead to the improper
influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the
fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and
procedures.
(b) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access
to records could inform the subject of an intelligence or
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or
investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence
obtained, or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and
intelligence personnel. Granting access to such information could
seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger
the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence
personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of
witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony;
disclose investigative techniques and procedures; invade the privacy of
those individuals involved in intelligence programs and their families;
compromise and thus negate specialized techniques used to support
intelligence programs; and interfere with and negate the orderly
conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations and
investigations. In addition, the agency is required to protect the
confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government
under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September
27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source
would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain
the Government's continued access to information from persons who
otherwise might refuse to give it.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to
detect the relevance of specific information in the early stages of an
investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are often questions
of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is
evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be
established. In addition, during the course of the investigation or
operation, the investigator or operative may obtain information which
is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of
another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated.
Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or operation, the
investigator may obtain information concerning violations of law other
than those which are within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the
interest of effective intelligence operations and law enforcement,
military intelligence agents should retain information, since it is an
aid in establishing patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and
provides valuable leads for other law enforcement or intelligence
agencies.
(d) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this
system or records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act,
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual
to have access to all or a portion os his/her records in this system of
records.
(e) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect
the confidentiality of sources of information, to protectthe privacy
and physical safety of participants and their families, confidential
sources, and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of specialized
techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this
requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published
such a notice in broad, generic terms.
ae. [Reserved.]
af. System identifier: A0381-100aDAMI.
(1) System name: Intelligence/Counterintelligence Source Files.
(2) Exemption: All portions of this system of records that fall
within the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be
exempt from subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5),
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f).
(3) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
(4) Reasons: (a) From subsection (c)(3)because disclosing the
agencies to which information from this system has been released could
reveal the subject's involvement in a sensitive intelligence or
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or
potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or
investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation.
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or
compromise an investigation or operation; endanger the physical safety
of participants and their families, confidential sources, witnesses,
intelligence personnel, and their families; and lead to the improper
influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the
fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and
procedures.
(b) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access
to records could inform the subject of an intelligence or
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or
investigation; or the nature and scope of the information and evidence
obtained, or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and
intelligence personnel. Granting access to such information could
seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger
the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence
personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of
witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony;
disclose investigative techniques and procedures; invade the privacy of
those individuals involved in intelligence programs and their families;
compromise and thus negate specialized techniques used to support
intelligence programs; and interfere with and negate the orderly
conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations and
investigations. In addition, the agency is required to protect the
confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government
under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September
27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source
would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain
the Government's continued access to information from persons who
otherwise might refuse to give it.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to
detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early
stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are
often questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the
information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such
information can be established. In
[[Page 51921]]
addition, during the course of the investigation or operation, the
investigator or operative may obtain information which is incidental to
the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of another agency.
Such information cannot readily be segregated. Furthermore, during the
course of the investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain
information concerning violations of law other than those which are
within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective
intelligence operations and law enforcement, military intelligence
agents should retain information, since it is an aid in establishing
patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and provides valuable
leads for other law enforcement or intelligence agencies.
(d) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this
system of records is being exempt from subsection (d) of the Act
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of
staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual
to have access to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of
records.
(e) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect
the confidentiality of sources of information, to protect the privacy
and physical safety of participants and their families, confidential
sources, and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of specialized
techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this
requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published
such a notice in broad generic terms.
* * * * *
Dated: September 28, 1995.
L. M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 95-24664 Filed 10-3-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-F
