[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 5, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
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From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-24604]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: October 5, 1994]
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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
[Recommendation 94-4]
Deficiencies in Criticality Safety at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant
AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
ACTION: Notice; recommendation.
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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a
concerning deficiencies in criticality safety at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
The Board requests public comments on this recommendation.
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments, concerning this
recommendation are due on or before November 4, 1994.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole C.
Morgan, at the address above or telephone (202) 208-6400.
Dated: September 30, 1994.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[Recommendation 94-4]
Deficiencies in Criticality Safety at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant
Dated: September 27, 1994.
The Defense nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has issued a
number of recommendations concerning formality of operations, including
Recommendation 92-5, Discipline of Operations in a Changing Defense
Nuclear Facilities Complex. In that recommendation, the Board stated
that facilities schedule for continued operations should develop a
style and level of conduct of operations which is comparable to that
achieved at commercial nuclear facilities. Recommendation 92-5 further
noted that, prior to achieving an acceptable level of formality, major
improvements were required in a number of areas, including safety
analysis reports, limiting conditions of operation, and training and
qualification of personnel.
The Board and its staff have been monitoring the Department of
Energy's (DOE) efforts to implement an acceptable level of conduct of
operations at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is
scheduled for continued operations. The Board has forwarded a number of
reports to DOE during the last two years indicating the existence of
safety-related concerns regarding operations at Y-12. DOE and its
operating contractor, Martin-Marietta Energy Systems (MMES), have taken
some actions to correct deficiencies; however, a number of recent
events have led the Board to the conclusion that more aggressive and
comprehensive management actions are required to bring the level of
conduct of operations at Y-12 to a satisfactory level.
The Board notes that during the past four months a number of
violations of Operational Safety Requirements and other safety limits
have occurred at the Y-12 Plant. Most recently, the Board's staff
identified a substantial violation of nuclear criticality safety limits
within a special nuclear material storage vault at Y-12. When the staff
identified this deficiency to on-site personnel, including a senior
MMES manager, an MMES nuclear criticality safety specialist, and one of
DOE's facility representatives, immediate corrective actions that were
required by Y-12 procedures were not taken. In fact, proper corrective
actions that were required by Y-12 procedures were not taken. In fact,
proper corrective actions were not taken until the Board's staff
informed the DOE Y-12 Site Manager. Subsequently MMES curtailed a
number of operations at the Y-12 Plant. Reviews of compliance with
nuclear criticality safety limits at the Y-12 Plan revealed that a
widespread level of noncompliance exists.
In its Annual Report to Congress (February 1994) the Board noted
that personnel and procedures are complementary elements in
implementing conduct of operations. The report stated, ``The health and
safety of the public and workers rest on a properly trained workforce
accomplishing tasks in a formal deliberate fashion in accordance with
reviewed and approved procedures.'' In responding to the Board's
Recommendation 93-6, Maintaining Access to Nuclear Weapons Experience,
DOE is evaluating the impact of expertise presently being lost through
ongoing staff reductions on their ability to perform nuclear weapons
dismantlement at Y-12.
The Board recognizes that DOE and MMES management have begun taking
aggressive actions to correct the specific problems of adherence to
nuclear criticality safety limits, since the nuclear criticality safety
occurrence referred to above. However, the Board believes that more
remains to be done. According, the Board recommends that:
(1) DOE determine the immediate actions necessary to resolve the
nuclear criticality safety deficiencies at the Y-12 Plant, including
actions deemed necessary before restarting curtailed operations and any
compensatory measures instituted. These actions should be documented,
along with an explanation of how the deficiencies remained undetected
by MMES and DOE (line and oversight).
(2) DOE perform the following for defense nuclear facilities at the Y-
12 Plant:
(a) An evaluation of compliance with Operational Safety Requirements
and Criticality Safety Approvals (CSAs), including a determination of
the root case of any identified violations. In performing this
assessment, DOE should use the experience gained during similar review
at the Los Alamos plutonium facility and during the recent
``maintenance mode'' at the Pantex Plant.
(b) A comprehensive review of the nuclear criticality safety program at
the Y-12 Plant, including: the adequacy of procedural controls, the
utility of the nuclear criticality safety approvals, and a root case
analysis of the extensive level of non-compliance found in recent
reviews.
(c) A comparison of the current level of conduct of operations to the
level expected by DOE in implementing the Board's Recommendation 92-5.
(d) Development of plans, including schedules, to address any
deficiencies identified in the analyses conducted above.
(3) DOE evaluate the experience, training, and performance of key DOE
and contractor personnel involved in safety-related activities at
defense nuclear facilities within the Y-12 Plan to determine if those
personnel have the skills and knowledge required to execute their
nuclear safety responsibilities (in this regard, reference should be
made to the critical safety elements developed as part of DOE's
response to the Board's Recommendation 93-1).
(4) DOE take whatever actions are necessary to correct any deficiencies
identified in (3) above in the experience, training, and performance of
DOE and contractor personnel.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
Appendix--Transmittal Letter to Secretary of Energy
September 27, 1994.
Hon. Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary O'Leary: On September 27, 1994, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 2286a(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 94-4 which is
enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 94-4 deals with
Deficiencies in Criticality Safety at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by
you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in
the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board
believes the recommendation contains no information which is
classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this
recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2161-68, as amended,
please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file
in your regional public reading rooms.
The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal
Register.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 94-24604 Filed 10-4-94; 8:45 am]
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