[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 193 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-24761]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: October 6, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[IA 94-024]
Larry D. Wicks; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed
Activities (Effective Immediately)
I
Larry D. Wicks is the President and Radiation Safety Office for
Western Industrial X-Ray Inspection Company, Inc. (WIX), Evanston,
Wyoming. WIX holds License No. 49-27356-01 issued by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Parts 30
and 34. The license authorizes the licensee to possess sealed sources
of iridium-192 in various radiography devices for use in performing
industrial radiography in accordance with the conditions of the
license. The license was suspended by NRC Order on June 16, 1994, and
remains suspended while a hearing requested by the licensee is pending.
II
The suspension of License No. 49-27356-01 was based on the results
of NRC staff inspections and Office of Investigations (OI)
investigations of WIX conducted in April 1993 and in January and March
1994. These inspections and investigations identified numerous
violations of NRC's radiation safety requirements, including some
violations that were found to have recurred after being identified in
previous inspections and some which were found to have been committed
deliberately by Mr. Wicks and other employees of WIX. These violations
were described in inspection reports 030-232190/93-01 and 030-32190/94-
01 issued on May 12, 1993, and were the subject of an enforcement
conference held April 1, 1994 in Arlington, Texas, during which Mr.
Wicks was given the opportunity to provide additional information
concerning each violation. In Investigation Report 4-93-017R, issued
August 2, 1993, OI found three deliberate violations and in Report 4-
93-049R, issued July 8, 1994, OI found four deliberate violations.
Based on its review of all available information, the NRC concludes
that Mr. Wicks violated the provisions of 10 CFR 30.10 which prohibits
individuals from deliberately causing a licensee to violate NRC
requirements and from deliberately providing materially incomplete or
inaccurate information to the NRC or to a licensee of the NRC.
Specifically, as discussed below in more detail, the NRC concludes
that: (1) Mr. Wicks deliberately failed to send an employee's
thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) in for immediate processing after he
learned of a radiography incident that occurred on July 31, 1993, a
violation of 10 CFR 34.33(d); (2) Mr. Wicks deliberately failed to
perform an evaluation of the same employee's radiation exposure after
becoming aware of the incident, a violation of 10 CFR 20.201; (3) Mr.
Wicks deliberately provided inaccurate information to NRC investigators
about the July 31, 1993, incident and his follow-up to the incident, a
violation of 10 CFR 30.10; and (4) During March, April, and July of
1993 and January 1994, Mr.Wicks deliberately failed to ensure that
calibrated alarm ratemeters were provided and used by WIX radiography
personnel, a violation of 10 CFR 34.33(f)(4).
The first three violations above are directly related to the July
31, 1993, radiography incident. That incident, which was reported to
Mr. Wicks on the date it occurred, by the two WIX employees who were
involved in it, involved a radiation source in a radiographic exposure
device not being properly returned to its shielded position before the
device was moved by one of the employees. This resulted in the self-
reading pocket dosimeter of one of the employees, a radiographer's
assistant, going off-scale, indicating that the radiographer's
assistant received a radiation exposure beyond the range of the pocket
dosimeter.\1\ When the pocket dosimeter of someone engaged in
radiography is discharged beyond its normal range, NRC regulations in
10 CFR Parts 34 and 20, respectively, require: (1) That the licensee
send the individual's TLD in for immediate processing to determine the
individual's radiation exposure; and (2) that the licensee perform
evaluations as necessary, whether or not a TLD reading is available, to
determine the individual's radiation exposure and to ensure compliance
with NRC exposure limits. In this case, the NRC concludes that Mr.
Wicks deliberately did neither and that he has not been truthful in
providing information about this incident to NRC personnel and others.
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\1\Later reenactments of the incident resulted in an estimate
that the radiographer's assistant received 6 rems, and exposure in
excess of the NRC occupational quarterly limit of 3 rems in effect
at the time of the incident.
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When the NRC began its investigation of this incident in January
1994, Mr. Wicks had no record of the radiographer's assistant's
exposure for the day or month in question. Mr. Wicks stated during the
investigation and at the enforcement conference that after learning of
the incident he sent all TLDs worn by company personnel during the
month of July 1993 in one package to Landauer, Inc., the company that
processes TLDs for WIX, and that he included a note requesting
immediate processing of the TLD worn by the radiographer's assistant.
However, a representative of Landauer, Inc., stated to NRC personnel
that while it had received TLDs from WIX for other employees for the
month of July 1993, it had no record of receiving a TLD for the
radiographer's assistant for that month and no record of receiving a
request from Mr. Wicks for expedited processing of any TLDs sent in for
that month. In fact, exposure records for the month of July 1993 and
quarterly records for the months of July-September 1993 which were
mailed by Landauer to WIX and retained by WIX contain no information
regarding the radiographer's assistant's exposure for the month of July
1993 (her exposure records for all other months are available).\2\
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\2\Mr. Wicks claims that he was unaware of this fact until the
NRC questioned him in January 1994.
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Mr. Wicks told NRC investigators that he had never provided an
exposure estimate to the rediographer's assistant because he had none
to give her, i.e., he did not have a report from Landuer. However, this
is inconsistent with statements by: (1) The radiographer's assistant--
that she persisted in trying to obtain from Mr. Wicks the exposure for
the month of July and that Mr. Wicks eventually--about three weeks
after the incident--told her she had received 350 millirem, (2) the
radiographer involved in the incident that Mr. Wicks had informed him
that ``everything was OK'' and that the radiographer's assistant had
received 600 millirem for the quarter, and (3) the assistant's husband,
also a WIX employee, that Mr. Wicks had called his wife two to three
weeks after the incident and had given her a number ``which was lower
and we were happy.''
Mr. Wicks contended during the enforcement conference that he had
been misled by the employees involved in the incident into believing
that the incident was not serious. While both employees admit to
providing Mr. Wicks false accounts of the incident in an attempt to
cover up their own mistakes, the radiographer's assistant and her
husband both told NRC investigators that Mr. Wicks was informed when
the reports were turned in on July 31, 1993, that the reports were
false and that Mr. Wicks was told that the radiographer involved in the
incident had been asleep in the truck instead of supervising the
radiographers assistant (as required by NRC regulations). Mr. Wicks
denied having been told that the reports were false.
Mr. Wicks also told NRC personnel during the enforcement conference
that he did not realize that Landauer had not provided him a July 1993
exposure record for the radiographer's assistant and had not called
Landauer until the NRC began its investigation in January 1994. The
only explanation Mr. Wicks has offered for not pursuing the question of
the radiographer's assistant's July 1993 exposure is that he was very
busy. However, the following events raise significant questions about
Mr. Wicks' credibility:
1. In August 1993, Mr. Wicks received Landauer's report for the
month of July 1993 which, as indicated earlier, contained no monthly
exposure record for the radiographer's assistant. Despite, according to
Mr. Wicks, having requested immediate processing of the assistant's
badge from Landauer, Mr. Wicks told the NRC investigator that he didn't
read the monthly report.
2. Mr. Wicks stated at the enforcement conference that he placed
the assistant on limited duty as soon as he was informed of the
incident pending the receipt of a report from Landauer and that she was
limited to working in the darkroom and ``completely away from any
shooting area'' from July 31, 1993, until she left WIX toward the end
of September 1993.\3\ Mr. Wicks stated that having an employee in a
restricted status for nearly two months did not remind him of the fact
that he had never received a response to his request for immediate
processing of her July 1993 TLD.
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\3\The NRC notes that the radiographer's assistant disputes Mr.
Wicks' account, stating that she was permitted to resume work
involving exposure to radiation about three weeks after the incident
when Mr. Wicks called her and told her that her exposure was 350
millirems.
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3. On October 1, 1993, Mr. Wicks provided a summary of the
radiographer's assistant's radiation exposure history, including the
period in question (July 1993), to her new employer, and NRC licensee.
In doing so, Mr. Wicks relied not on Landauer records, even though
records were available for all months but July and September 1993, but
by adding up daily dosimeter records, which were blank for July 31,
1993. Despite making these calculations for the radiographer's
assistant, Mr. Wicks stated at the enforcement conference that he was
not reminded of the fact that he had never received a response to his
request for immediate processing of her July 1993 TLD.
4. Later in October 1993, Mr. Wicks responded to a request from the
NRC for the radiation exposure reports of terminated employees, as
required by 10 CFR 20.408(b) In responding to this request, Mr. Wicks
did not provide a report for the radiographer's assistant despite
having provided one for her husband, whose termination date occurred
five days after hers. Mr. Wicks had not provided the NRC a termination
report for the radiographer's assistant when the NRC began its
investigation in January 1994.
Moreover, Mr. Wicks is an experienced radiographer and has been
trained on the significance of overexposures. Considering that this
appears to be the first time that his firm had the potential for an
overexposure warranting immediate processing of the assistant's badge
and assuming that the badge was sent as he states, them it is not
credible that he would not have followed up on it. The NRC also does
not consider credible Mr. Wicks' statement that he sent the TLD in for
processing. According to Landauer, the incidence of TLDs being lost in
delivery is very small. In this case, the loss of the radiographer's
assistant's TLD in the mail is not an issue because Mr. Wicks has
indicated on a number of occasions that he packaged all WIX TLDs
together for shipment to Landauer and Landauer received the package.
Landauer representatives have informed the NRC staff that all TLDs are
electronically scanned upon receipt, and the Landauer employs the use
of a data base to verify that TLDs which are scanned after processing
match those which are scanned upon receipt. The process is designed to
alert Landauer to situations in which a TLD is lost during processing.
Landauer's automated reporting system includes controls to flag and TLD
number which was canned upon receipt and was not scanned again after
processing. Lost TLDs are noted on dosimetry reports provided to
Landauer customers.
Based on its review of the evidence gathered during its
investigation, as well as the information obtained during the
enforcement conference, the NRC concludes that Mr. Wicks did not send
the radiographer's assistant's TLD in for processing; that Mr. Wicks
deliberately failed to conduct an evaluation of this individual's
radiation exposure from the incident; and that Mr. Wicks deliberately
provided false information regarding the incident to the NRC and false
information regarding the individual's radiation exposure history to
another licensee of the NRC.
In addition, with regard to the NRC's requirement that all
radiography personnel be equipped with alarm ratemeters that have been
calibrated at periods not to exceed one year, the NRC's investigations
found that Mr. Wicks repeatedly failed to ensure that this requirement
was met. This violation was first discovered and discussed with Mr.
Wicks following an inspection and investigation in April 1993. When the
NRC conducted its investigation beginning in January 1994, this same
violation was found to have occurred in July 1993, two months after it
was first discussed with Mr. Wicks, and again in January 1994 when Mr.
Wicks could not produce current calibration records for alarm
ratemeters worn by either of two radiography personnel on January 18,
1994. When questioned by NRC investigators, Mr. Wicks provided
conflicting statements as to whether he had even supplied ratemeters to
his radiographers but he said he understood it was his responsibility
to ensure that alarm ratemeters were calibrated. Given the repetitive
nature of this violation and Mr. Wicks' knowledge of this requirement,
the NRC concludes that Mr. Wicks deliberately caused licensee to
violate this requirement.
III
Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that Larry D. Wicks,
President and Radiation Safety Office for WIX, has engaged in
deliberate misconduct that has caused the Licensee to be in violation
of 10 CFR 34.33(d), 34.33(f)(4), and 20.201. It further appears that
Mr. Wicks has deliberately provided to NRC personnel and to another
licensee of the NRC information that he knew to be incomplete or
inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC, in violation of 10 CFR
30.10. The NRC must be able to rely on the Licensee and its employees
to comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide
information that is complete and accurate in all material respects. Mr.
Wicks' actions in causing the Licensee to be in deliberate violation of
radiation safety requirements and his misrepresentations to the NRC
have raised serious doubts as to whether he can be relied upon to
comply with NRC requirements and to provide complete and accurate
information to the NRC. NRC confidence in Mr. Wicks' conducting NRC-
licensed activities safely and in compliance with NRC requirements is
further eroded by the fact that he was the President of the company and
the Radiation Safety Officer when he engaged in deliberate misconduct.
In both of these positions, particularly in his role as the Radiation
Safety Officer, Mr. Wicks is relied upon by the NRC to ensure that all
radiation safety requirements are met. Conduct of this nature cannot
and will not be tolerated by the NRC.
Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the
Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public
will be protected, if Mr. Wicks were permitted at this time to engage
in NRC-licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and
interest require that Larry D. Wicks be prohibited from engaging in
NRC-licensed activities (including any supervising, training, or
auditing) for either an NRC licensee or an Agreement State licensee
performing licensed activities in areas of NRC jurisdiction in
accordance with 10 CFR 150.20 for a period of five (5) years from the
date of this Order. Furthermore, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that
the significance of the violations and conduct described above is such
that the public health, safety and interest require that this Order be
immediately effective.
IV
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 81, 161b, 161i, 182 and 186 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR 30.10, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THAT:
1. Larry Dale Wicks is prohibited for five years from the date of
this Order from engaging in NRC-licensed activities, except as provided
in item 3, below. NRC-licensed activities are those activities that are
conducted pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the NRC,
including but not limited to, those activities of Agreement State
licensees conducted pursuant to the authority by 10 CFR 150.20.
2. The first time Mr. Wicks is employed in NRC-licensed activities
following the five-year prohibition, he shall notify the Director,
Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
D.C. 20555 and the Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV, at least five
days prior to the performance of licensed activities (as described in 1
above). The notice shall include the name, address, and telephone
number of the NRC or Agreement State licensee and the location where
the licensed activities will be performed. The notice shall be
accompanied by a statement that Mr. Wicks is committed to compliance
with regulatory requirements and the basis why the Commission should
have confidence that he will now comply with applicable NRC
requirements.
3. Mr. Wicks is permitted to conduct licensed activities only as
necessary to maintain licensed material in the possession of Western
Industrial X-Ray Inspection Company in safe storage and transfer the
material to an authorized recipient.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Wicks of
good cause.
V
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Mr. Wicks must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within 20 days of the
date of this Order. The answer may consent to this Order. Unless the
answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing and under
oath or affirmation, specifically admit or deny each allegation or
charge made in this Order and shall set forth the matters of fact and
law on which Mr. Wicks or other person adversely affected relies and
the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. Any answer
or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Chief, Docketing and Service
Section, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the
Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and
Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional Administrator, NRC
Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, and
to Mr. Wicks if the answer or hearing request is by a person other than
Mr. Wicks. If a person other than Mr. Wicks requests a hearing, that
person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his or
her interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).
If a hearing is requested by Mr. Wicks or a person whose interest
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be
sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. Wicks, or any other person
adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding a
hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding
officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the
ground that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness,
is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded
allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for hearing, the provisions specified
in Section IV above shall be final 20 days from the date of this Order
without further order or proceedings. AN ANSWER OR A REQUEST FOR
HEARING SHALL NOT STAY THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORDER.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 27th day of September 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr.,
Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Materials Safety, Safeguards and
Operations Support.
[FR Doc. 94-24761 Filed 10-5-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
