[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 193 (Tuesday, October 6, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53646-53648]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-26753]
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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
[Recommendations 98-1]
Integrated Safety Management and the Department of Energy (DOE)
Facilities
AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
ACTION: Notice recommendations.
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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a
concerning integrated safety management and the Department of Energy
(DOE) facilities.
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation are due on or before November 5, 1998.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or
telephone (202) 208-6400.
[[Page 53647]]
Dated: October 1, 1998.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[Recommendation 98-1]
Integrated Safety Management and the Department of Energy (DOE)
Facilities
Dated: September 28, 1998.
On October 11, 1995, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board) issued to the Secretary of Energy its Recommendation 95-2,
entitled Safety Management. The Recommendation proposed adoption by
the Department of Energy (DOE) of a concept termed ``Integrated
Safety Management'' (ISM) as a means of improving assurance of
safety at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The Secretary of Energy
provided an implementation plan for the Recommendation on April 18,
1996, which the Board accepted in turn. In accordance with the
implementation plan, DOE issued its Policy Statement 450.4 to be the
basis for initiation and conduct of ISM at its facilities.
DOE and its contractors are making good progress in implementing
the concept of ISM at defense nuclear facilities. One of the central
functions of ISM called out both in the Recommendation and the
implementation plan is ``feedback and improvement.'' That function
is exercised both in planning work and establishing safety controls
at the outset, and in subsequent assessment of the diligence in
application and the success in achievement of safety.
DOE has established through its directives system its
expectation of actions by both the federal work force and contractor
management in assessing the effectiveness of its safety management
programs as they are practiced. Such safety assessments include both
observance of work and determination of long term trends. They are
accomplished principally through two major kinds of assessments for
feedback and improvement.
Self-assessment by the contractor of site/facility/
activity programs responsive to DOE Policy 450.5, and parallel
oversight by DOE line managers and facility representatives
responsible for the missions and contractor performance. This is
assessment by line management.
Corporate level assessments by DOE safety specialists
(ES&H), independent of the line, responsible for capturing and
sharing lessons learned, preparing trend analyses, performing
special investigations and otherwise performing corporate-level
reviews in support of the Secretarial Offices. This is independent
assessment.
These assessments and the corrective actions taken in response
to them are important elements of the internal safety management
program of DOE.
In the course of its oversight of DOE's safety management
program, the Board has noted considerable variability in
implementation and effectiveness of the feedback and improvement
function as performed by the numerous federal and contractor
entities. There appears to be much collection of data (about 30 DOE
directives drive the process) but less evidence of follow-up. To
facilitate a closer examination of the matter, the Board in a March
20, 1998, letter stated its observations, and requested a report on
how the function was being performed at defense nuclear facilities.
DOE, by letter dated June 3, 1998, provided such report. The report
and the matter in general were the subject of discussions with
representatives of DOE and its contractors at a public meeting held
by the Board in Washington, DC, on June 24, 1998.
The outcome of these exchanges to date has been a mutual
understanding of a number of improvements that are merited. An
action plan presented to the Board in DOE's letter of June 3, 1998,
proposes to focus on four areas:
Accelerating implementation of DOE Policy 450.5,
Improving DOE's tracking and follow-on processes,
Improving DOE's lessons Learned processes, and
Improving implementation of the Functions,
Responsibilities, Accountability Manual (FRAM) relative to feedback
and improvement.
The Board commends DOE for these initiatives. As worthy as they
are, however, they are not, in the Board's view, sufficient to cover
all aspects of DOE's feedback and improvement of its safety
management programs. The Board has noted that the initiatives for
improvement, particularly DOE's actions on findings, are limited to
results of oversight by line operations. They do not address
deficiencies in feedback and improvement based on results of
independent oversight by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Environment, Health and Safety (EH)--more specifically that of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oversight (EH-2). The purpose of this
recommendation is to address that matter.
For many years, it has been commonplace for DOE's Headquarters
to conduct independent assessments of safety management by the field
offices and their contractors, in relation to performance of DOE's
hazardous work. This parallels a normal practice of headquarters of
commercial hazardous industries which have multiple product lines
and facilities and which therefore delegate primary responsibility
for doing work safely to officials of a facility or a product line.
But assessment of safety is not sufficient. To be effective, the
constructive criticisms must be brought to the attention of
corporate management. There they must be evaluated, and course
corrections must be directed, if the benefits of assessment are to
be achieved. This is especially true where resource issues are
involved and allocation or re-allocation of funds is required.
Recognizing that at times there is a need for Secretarial
involvement at levels above the program offices and the corporate
role of the independent assessors, in September 1989 Secretary
Watkins established the Office of Nuclear Safety (ONS), reporting
directly to him as described in SEN-6E-92. That led to Secretarial
review of all findings of ONS, and an opportunity for response at
the Secretarial level if necessary. With the change in
Administration in 1994, this Office was assigned to report to the
Assistant Secretary for ES&H, and it was redesignated as EH-2 with
direction by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. In that capacity, EH-2,
according to the DOE Manual of Safety Management Functions,
Responsibilities, and Authorities (DOE M411.1-1), performs corporate
level assessments, independent of the safety management programs as
implemented by DOE program offices and associated contractors.
Evaluations are provided to the Secretary of Energy, Congress,
Cognizant Secretarial Offices, Field Managers and Contractors.
However, under this organizational arrangement, most of the
assessments and findings by EH-2 are treated largely as advisories.
Such follow-up actions as are taken are no longer subjected to a
deliberative process involving, when appropriate, the Office of the
Secretary of Energy (Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary).
Rather, they become discretionary to lower levels of DOE line
management (such as cognizant Secretarial Officers and Field
Managers). An exception to this general discretionary pattern occurs
when an accident results in death or serious injury of workers, or
threatens the public. For example, Type A accident investigations
require, among other things, corrective action plans (CAPs),
approval of the CAPs by the cognizant secretarial officer, and
completion of corrective actions subject to independent
verification. These requirements, in DOE Order 225.1A, Accident
Investigations, November 26, 1997, and supporting guidance
effectively close the loop on accident investigations.
EH-2 does make a practice of requesting a CAP after submission
of a report on other types of investigation, and usually receives
one from the cognizant party. Proposed corrective actions in these
CAPs are frequently incomplete and are sometimes only loosely
related to findings in the oversight report. Some CAPs are no more
than commitments to provide a CAP in the future. The Department of
Energy has not identified criteria for adequate CAPs, nor has DOE
authorized EH-2 to require adequate CAPs which are responsive to
evaluation reports. As a result, problems identified as accident
precursors are not handled with the same rigor as accidents
themselves. The end effect is that corrective action under the
current system is reactive rather than proactive.
Nothing prevents EH-2 from elevating safety issues via its
management (Assistant Secretary for ES&H), but the process of
evaluation is now ad hoc, not institutionalized and protocol driven.
There is a natural tension between those charged with doing work
safely and those tasked by management to monitor and evaluate how
well the doers perform. There is also a natural resistance to having
to reallocate resources when deficiencies are found. Such factors
cause outcomes to depend highly on the forcefulness of the
personalities involved. It is precisely at this interface between
the Secretarial Program offices and the independent reviewers of
safety performance (EH-2) that DOE's safety management program
merits additional attention. The need for an institutionalized
protocol for content and treatment of a CAP, and for
[[Page 53648]]
addressing and resolving differences are the central points of
issue.
The Board is of the opinion that the Department of Energy should
take additional action with respect to its program for improvement
of feedback and safety for defense nuclear facilities by
establishing clearer lines of authority and responsibility for
resolution of safety findings of its internal, independent safety
organization. Towards such end, the Board recommends that the
Department of Energy:
1. Establish by policy statement, directives, or other
protocols, the manner in which the Secretary expects Cognizant
Program Secretarial Officers (Assistant Secretaries) and Field
managers to address and resolve findings of its independent internal
corporate safety organization (Assistant Secretary for ES&H). In so
doing, consideration should be given to direction and guidance for
the following:
Establishing authority and responsibility for
conducting and responding to independent oversight, preparing and
approving corrective action plans, reporting on progress toward
timely and adequate closure of findings, and subsequent closure,
including independent verification of closure.
Elevating cases of inadequate or untimely response to
findings to the Office of the Secretary for resolution.
Describing the purpose and content of corrective action
plans responsive to oversight findings (e.g., cause identification,
actions, to correct immediate problem, lessons learned, actions to
prevent recurrence).
Scheduling the time frames within which the evaluation and
process activities must occur.
Periodically reporting the status of corrective actions
by the responsible entity.
Tracking findings and corrective actions to closure
with a system accessible to DOE line management and the independent
oversight organization.
2. Make explicit the Secretarial Officer or designee assigned
the resolution function.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
September 28, 1998.
The Honorable Bill Richardson,
Secretary of Energy,
1000 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, DC 20585-1000
Dear Secretary Richardson: On September 28, 1998, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), in accordance with 42
U.S.C. Sec. 2286a(a)(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 98-1,
which is enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 98-1 deals
with Integrated Safety Management and the Department of Energy (DOE)
facilities.
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by
you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in
DOE's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the
recommendation contains no information which is classified or
otherwise restricted. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.
Secs. 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have this
recommendation promptly placed on file in your regional public
reading rooms.
The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal
Register.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
c: Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr..
[FR Doc. 98-26753 Filed 10-5-98; 8:45 am]
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