[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 193 (Wednesday, October 6, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54474-54481]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-26037]
[[Page 54473]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part V
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Research and Special Programs Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
Tennessee Hazardous Waste Transporter Fee and Reporting Requirements;
Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 193 / Wednesday, October 6, 1999 /
Notices
[[Page 54474]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Research and Special Programs Administration
[Docket No. RSPA-98-3665]
Preemption Determination No. 21(R); Tennessee Hazardous Waste
Transporter Fee and Reporting Requirements
AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of administrative determination of preemption by RSPA's
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety.
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Applicant: Association of Waste Hazardous Materials Transporters
(AWHMT).
Local Laws Affected: Tennessee Code 68-212-203(a)(6); Tennessee
Rules and Regulations 1200-1-11-.04(4)(a)4, 1200-1-13-.03(1)(e).
Modes Affected: Highway and Rail.
SUMMARY: Federal hazardous material transportation law preempts
Tennessee's requirement for hazardous waste transporters to pay a $650
per year remedial action fee because that fee is not fair and it is not
used for purposes related to transporting hazardous material. Federal
hazardous material transportation law also preempts Tennessee's
requirement for a transporter to submit a written report of a discharge
of hazardous waste during transportation because that requirement is
not substantively the same as RSPA's requirement in the Hazardous
Materials Regulations.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Frazer C. Hilder, Office of the Chief
Counsel, Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department
of Transportation, Washington, DC 20590-0001 (Tel. No. 202-366-4400).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
In March 1998, AWHMT applied for a determination that Federal
hazardous material transportation law preempts Tennessee statutory and
regulatory requirements that transporters of hazardous waste pay a
remedial action fee and file written reports of any discharge of
hazardous waste within the State.
Tennessee requires a transporter to hold a permit in order to pick
up or deliver hazardous waste within the State. Tennessee Code 68-212-
108(a)(1); Rule 1200-1-11-.04(2) of the Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation (DEC). In addition to the initial
application and annual renewal fees to obtain this permit, which are
not challenged by AWHMT, the transporter must also pay a $650
``remedial action fee'' each year, under Tennessee Code 68-212-
203(a)(6) and DEC Rule 1200-1-13.03(1)(e). (This fee had been set at
$550 for the 1994-95 fiscal year and $600 for the 1995-96 fiscal year.
Id.) The remedial action fees paid by transporters are deposited into a
``special agency account . . . known as the 'hazardous waste remedial
action fund.' '' Tennessee Code 68-212-204(a). The monies in this fund
may be used for a number of purposes, including identifying,
investigating, cleaning up and monitoring ``inactive hazardous
substance sites''; matching funds provided by the United States to
clean up hazardous substance sites; providing on-site technical
assistance to hazardous waste generators; taking additional measures to
reduce the generation of hazardous waste within the State; and
preparing an annual report to the Tennessee Legislature. Tennessee Code
68-212-205.
Tennessee also requires a transporter to submit to DEC, ``[w]ithin
fifteen days of occurrence,'' a written report ``on each hazardous
waste discharge during transportation that occurs in the state.'' DEC
Rule 1200-1-11-.04(4)(a)4. The Note to this section states that a copy
of DOT form F 5800.1, as required by 49 CFR 171.16, ``shall suffice for
this report provided that it is properly completed and supplemented as
necessary to include the information required'' in subsection (a)3 with
respect to immediate notification of any discharge of hazardous waste.
AWHMT contends that Tennessee's remedial action fee is preempted
because the proceeds are not used exclusively for purposes related to
transporting hazardous material, including enforcement and planning,
developing, and maintaining a capability for emergency response. AWHMT
also maintains that this is a ``flat fee'' that is preempted because it
has no relation to the transporter's operations within the State. In
addition, AWHMT argues that Tennessee's requirement to submit written
reports of any hazardous waste discharge is preempted because it is not
substantively the same as DOT's requirements in 49 CFR 171.16.
The text of AWHMT's application was published in the Federal
Register, and interested parties were invited to submit comments. 63 FR
17479 (April 9, 1998), correction, 63 FR 18964 (April 16, 1998).
Comments were submitted by DEC, the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), and the Hazardous Materials Advisory Council (HMAC). Rebuttal
comments were submitted by AWHMT, DEC, and AAR. In its rebuttal
comments, DEC asked RSPA to reopen the comment period to allow
commenters to respond to rebuttal comments. RSPA denied that request
but called DEC's attention to RSPA's procedural regulations providing
that ``Late-filed comments are considered so far as practicable.'' 49
CFR 107.205(c). Accordingly, in the event that a commenter raises a new
issue in rebuttal comments, or there is a change in the facts or law
involved in a preemption application, an interested party may always
bring these matters to RSPA's attention. No late-filed comments were
received.
II. Federal Preemption
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) was enacted in
1975 to give the Department of Transportation greater authority ``to
protect the Nation adequately against the risks to life and property
which are inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in
commerce.'' Pub. L. 93-633 Sec. 102, 88 Stat. 2156, presently codified
as revised in 49 U.S.C. 5101. The HMTA ``replace[d] a patchwork of
state and federal laws and regulations * * * with a scheme of uniform,
national regulations.'' Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 909 F.2d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1980). On July 5, 1994, the HMTA
was among the many Federal laws relating to transportation that were
revised, codified and enacted ``without substantive change'' by Public
Law 103-272, 108 Stat. 745. The Federal hazardous material
transportation law is now found in 49 U.S.C. Chapter 51.
The HMR are currently issued under the direction in 49 U.S.C.
5103(b)(1) that DOT ``shall prescribe regulations for the safe
transportation of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and
foreign commerce.'' The term ``hazardous material'' specifically
includes hazardous wastes. 49 CFR 171.8; see also Sec. 171.1(a)(1).
A statutory provision for Federal preemption was central to the
HMTA. In 1974, the Senate Commerce Committee ``endorse[d] the principle
of preemption in order to preclude a multiplicity of State and local
regulations and the potential for varying as well as conflicting
regulations in the area of hazardous materials transportation.'' S.
Rep. No. 1102, 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 37 (1974). More recently, a Federal
Court of Appeals found that uniformity was the ``linchpin'' in the
design of the HMTA, including the 1990 amendments that expanded the
preemption provisions.
[[Page 54475]]
Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1575 (10th Cir.
1991).
The 1990 amendments to the HMTA codified the ``dual compliance''
and ``obstacle'' criteria that RSPA had applied in issuing
inconsistency rulings before 1990.1 The dual compliance and
obstacle criteria are based on U.S. Supreme Court decisions on
preemption. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield, Inc., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). As now set forth in 49 U.S.C.
5125(a), these criteria provide that, in the absence of a waiver of
preemption by DOT under 49 U.S.C. 5125(e) or unless it is authorized by
another Federal law, ``a requirement of a State, political subdivision
of a State, or Indian tribe'' is explicitly preempted if
\1\ While advisory in nature, RSPA's inconsistency rulings were
``an alternative to litigation for a determination of the
relationship of Federal and State or local requirements'' and also a
possible ``basis for an application * * * [for] a waiver of
preemption.'' Inconsistency Ruling (IR) No. 2, Rhode Island Rules
and Regulations Governing the Transportation of Liquefied Natural
Gas and Liquefied Propane Gas, etc., 44 FR 75566, 76657 (Dec. 20,
1979).
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(1) complying with a requirement of the State, political
subdivision or tribe and a requirement of this chapter or a
regulation issued under this chapter is not possible; or
(2) the requirement of the State, political subdivision, or
Indian tribe, as applied or enforced, is an obstacle to the
accomplishing and carrying out this chapter or a regulation
prescribed under this chapter.
In the 1990 amendments to the HMTA, Congress also added additional
preemption provisions on certain ``covered subject'' areas and with
regard to fees imposed by a State, political subdivision, or Indian
tribe on the transportation of hazardous material. The covered subject
areas include ``the written notification, recording, and reporting of
the unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material,'' 49
U.S.C. 5125(b)(1)(D); unless it is authorized by another Federal law or
a DOT waiver of preemption, a non-Federal requirement on this subject
matter is preempted when it is not ``substantively the same as a
provision of this chapter or a regulation prescribed under this
chapter.'' 49 U.S.C. 5125(b)(1). RSPA has defined ``substantively the
same'' to mean ``conforms in every significant respect to the Federal
requirement. Editorial and other similar de minimis changes are
permitted.'' 49 CFR 107.202(d).
In addition, 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(1) provides that a State, political
subdivision, or Indian tribe may
impose a fee related to transporting hazardous material only if the
fee is fair and used for a purpose relating to transporting
hazardous material, including enforcement and planning, developing,
and maintaining a capability for emergency response.
Under 49 U.S.C. 5125(d)(1), any directly affected person may apply
to the Secretary of Transportation for a determination whether a State,
political subdivision or Indian tribe requirement is preempted. The
Secretary of Transportation has delegated to RSPA the authority to make
determinations of preemption, except for those concerning highway
routing (which have been delegated to FHWA). 49 CFR 1.53(b). Under
RSPA's regulations, preemption determinations are issued by RSPA's
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety. 49 CFR
107.209(a).
Section 5125(d)(1) requires that notice of an application for a
preemption determination be published in the Federal Register.
Following the receipt and consideration of written comments, RSPA will
publish its determination in the Federal Register. See 49 CFR
107.209(d). A short period of time is allowed for filing petitions for
reconsideration. 49 CFR 107.211. Any party to the proceeding may seek
judicial review in a Federal district court. 49 U.S.C. 5125(f).
Preemption determinations do not directly address issues of
preemption arising under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
except that, as discussed in more detail in Section III.B.2., below,
RSPA considers that Commerce Clause standards are relevant to a
determination whether a fee related to the transportation of hazardous
material is ``fair'' within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(1).
Preemption determinations also do not address statutes other than the
Federal hazardous material transportation law unless it is necessary to
do so in order to determine whether a requirement is authorized by
another Federal law. A State, local or Indian tribe requirement is not
authorized by another Federal law merely because it is not preempted by
another Federal statute. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Harmon, above,
951 F.2d at 1581 n.10.
In making preemption determinations under 49 U.S.C. 5125(d), RSPA
is guided by the principles and policy set forth in Executive Order No.
12612, entitled ``Federalism'' (52 FR 41685, Oct. 30, 1987). Section
4(a) of that Executive Order authorizes preemption of State laws only
when a statute contains an express preemption provision, there is other
firm and palpable evidence of Congressional intent to preempt, or the
exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of
Federal authority.2 Section 5125 contains express preemption
provisions, which RSPA has implemented through its regulations.
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\2\ On August 4, 1999, the President signed ``Federalism''
Executive Order No. 13132 which becomes effective on November 2,
1999. Although this replaces Executive Order No. 12612, it continues
the policy that a Federal agency should find preemption ``only where
the [Federal] statute contains an express preemption provision or
there is some other clear evidence that the Congress intended
preemption of State law, or where the exercise of State authority
conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal
Statute.'' Sec. 4(a), 54 FR 43255, 43257 (Aug. 10, 1999).
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III. Discussion
A. Standing
In its initial comments, DEC questioned whether AWHMT ``has
standing to pursue this petition.'' DEC asserted that AWHMT had not set
forth sufficient facts in its application ``to know if the Association
has any members that have standing.'' DEC stated that its remedial
action fee ``does not apply to the universe of hazardous materials * *
* but only to the subset of hazardous waste as defined by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),'' 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., and
that
the fee only applies to persons who `transport hazardous waste to or
from locations within Tennessee.' TDEC Rule 1200-1-11-.04(2)(b)(1)
in the Applicant's Attachment C. The fee does not apply to a
transporter who passes through the State. [Footnote omitted]
With its rebuttal comments, AWHMT submitted affidavits of two of
its members, Environmental Transport Group, Inc., of Flanders, New
Jersey, and Tri-State Motor Transit Co., Inc., of Joplin, Missouri.
Officials of each of these companies stated that their companies
handled numerous shipments of hazardous waste every year that
originate, terminate or are temporarily stored during the normal course
of transportation in Tennessee. This is sufficient to allow AWHMT to
petition for an administrative determination of preemption on behalf of
its members. As stated in PD-2(R), Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency's Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest, 58 FR 11176, 11182 (Feb. 23,
1993),
if [an association's] members do not comply with the IEPA Uniform
Hazardous Waste Manifest requirements, they are subject to State
enforcement action and to delays of their shipments. Thus, [the
association's] members are ``directly affected'' by the Uniform
Hazardous Waste Manifest system, and [the association] has standing
to apply for this preemption determination.
[[Page 54476]]
Accord, PD-6(R), Michigan Marking Requirements for Vehicles
Transporting Hazardous and Liquid Industrial Wastes, 59 FR 6186, 6189
(Feb. 9, 1994) (an association has standing to apply for a
determination that Michigan requirements on the transportation of
hazardous waste are preempted when its ``members include those who
transport hazardous waste in or through Michigan by motor vehicle'').
RSPA finds that AWHMT has standing to apply for a determination
that Federal hazardous materials transportation law preempts Tennessee
requirements that apply to AWHMT's members that transport hazardous
waste within Tennessee.
B. Remedial Action Fee
1. The Fee and its Uses
According to DEC, the remedial action fee mandated by Tennessee
Code 68-212-203(a)(6) and DEC Rule 1200-1-13-.03(1)(e) is ``part of the
Tennessee superfund program.'' DEC stated that these fees are paid by
generators of hazardous waste, transporters of hazardous waste, and
facilities that treat or dispose of hazardous waste.3 DEC
indicated that its Division of Superfund collected more than $2.5
million in remedial action fees in 1996, and almost $2.9 million in
1997. In both years, more than 90% of the fees were paid by generators
and treatment and disposal facilities; transporters paid $176,800
(about 7% of the fees collected) in 1996, and $168,700 (about 6%) in
1997.
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\3\ It appears that the amount of fees paid by generators
depends upon the amount of hazardous waste generated within the
year. DEC Rule 1200-1-13-.03(1)(b). In addition, generators who ship
hazardous waste offsite for treatment of disposal also pay an
additional fee, also based on the amount of hazardous waste shipped.
DEC Rule 1200-1-13-.03(1)(c). Although this additional ``off-site
shipping fee'' may be a ``fee related to transporting hazardous
material,'' 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(1), no directly affected person has
asked RSPA to determine whether Federal hazardous material
transportation law preempts this separate fee imposed on generators.
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DEC stated that the remedial action fees paid by generators,
transporters and treatment and disposal facilities are credited to the
Hazardous Waste Remedial Action Fund,4 which is ``distinct
from the state general fund and any unencumbered balance does not
revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year.'' DEC also
advised that, besides these fees, the Hazardous Waste Remediation Fund
receives criminal fines and civil penalties for violations of the
Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management Act, and the State appropriates $1
million to this fund each year. See Tennessee Code 68-212-203(d), (e).
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\4\ Although DEC stated initially that this fund is ``officially
named the Hazardous Waste Remediation Fund,'' it later referred to
the ``Hazardous Waste Remedial Action Fund,'' which is the name
specified in Tennessee Code 68-212-204.
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DEC stated that ``the primary use [of monies in the fund] is as a
mechanism for the Department to investigate, contain and clean up
`inactive hazardous substance sites' * * * where disposal of hazardous
substance has occurred.'' According to DEC, ``hazardous substance'' has
the same meaning as in the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 49 U.S.C. 9601(14), so that
this term includes more than hazardous wastes.
DEC indicated that disposal can include ``[a]ny spilling,
discharge, or leaking such as can occur during an accident during
transportation or during loading and unloading.'' DEC stated that it
``accomplishes these activities through the use of contractors when the
liable parties do not do it themselves.'' It indicated that it has
separate contracts for emergency response, investigation and
engineering, and for remediation. However, according to DEC, ``[t]here
has not been a major spill in a transportation-related incident that we
have had to address with the superfund.'' It mentioned that, in 1996,
it ``used the fund and the emergency response contractor to address
incidents on highways,'' at a total cost of $4,300. DEC also referred
to two train derailments that resulted in the release of significant
amounts of hazardous substances. It stated that, in these latter two
cases, the rail transporter paid the direct costs of response and
clean-up, and DEC incurred oversight costs that totaled slightly more
than $10,000 for both incidents.
In its application, AWHMT challenges Tennessee's remedial action
fee on the grounds that it is not ``fair'' and that it is not being
used for purposes that are related to the transportation of hazardous
material.
2. The Fairness Test
Both AWHMT and DEC have referred to the Commerce Clause as
providing the standards for a determination whether the Tennessee
remedial action fee is ``fair'' within the meaning of 49 U.S.C.
5125(g)(1). AWHMT contends that, because the remedial action fee is set
at a ``flat rate'' for all transporters who pick up or deliver
hazardous wastes within Tennessee, it fails to meet the ``internal
consistency'' test discussed in American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266, 97 S.Ct. 2829 (1987). AWHMT cited the Scheiner case, 483
U.S. at 290-291, as holding that ``because they are unapportioned, flat
fees cannot be said to be `` `fairly related' to a feepayer's level of
presence or activities in the fee-assessing jurisdiction.'' It cited
four State court decisions in cases also brought by the American
Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) that ``strike down, enjoin, or escrow
flat hazardous materials taxes and fees'': Wisconsin, 556 N.W.2d 761
(Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 560 N.W.2d 274 (1996); Massachusetts,
613 N.E.2d 95 (1993); Maine, 595 A.2d 1014 (1991); and New Jersey, No.
11562-92 (N.J. Tax. Ct., March 11, 1998).5
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\5\ After remand by the New Jersey Supreme Court, 713 A.2d 497
(1998), the Appellate Division reversed and remanded this case with
directions to the State to apply to DOT for a determination on the
fairness of New Jersey's hazardous waste transporter registration
fee. Docket No. A-6334-97T3F (June 15, 1999). RSPA understands that
the Appellate Division has denied motions for reconsideration of its
June 15, 1999 decision and that both ATA and the State of New Jersey
have appealed this decision to the New Jersey Supreme Court. AWHMT
is affiliated with ATA.
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AWHMT also asserted that the DEC remedial action fee is inherently
``unfair'' because of the possible cumulative effect if other
jurisdictions charge similar fees:
Some motor carriers, otherwise in compliance with the HMRs, will
inevitably be unable to shoulder multiple flat fees, and thus will
be excluded from some sub-set of fee-imposing jurisdictions. If the
State's flat fee scheme is allowed to stand, similar fees must be
allowed in the Nation's other 30,000 non-federal jurisdictions. The
cumulative effect of such outcome would be not only a generally
undesirable patchwork of regulations necessary to collect the
various fees, but the balkanization of carrier areas of operation
and attendant, unnecessary handling of hazardous materials as these
materials are transferred from one company to another at
jurisdictional borders. The increased transfers would pose a serious
risk to safety, since ``the more frequently hazardous material is
handled during transportation, the greater the risk of mishap.''
6
\6\ The quoted language is from Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Railroad
Comm'n of Texas, 671 F. Supp. 466, 480-81 (W.D. Tex.)
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HMAC also argued that a
flat fee of $650 per year * * * is clearly unfair to interstate
carriers. If such fees were to be enacted by other States or
jurisdictions, it would lead to assessments on interstate carriers
many times the rates paid by local carriers for the same number of
miles. A fee of this magnitude applied by 50 States would result in
a cost to a single carrier of more than $32,000.
DEC has asserted that its remedial action fee is not unreasonably
high because in 1997 transporters paid only about 6% of the total fees
collected. DEC stated that its fee does not differentiate between
interstate and intrastate
[[Page 54477]]
carriers, because both pay the same $650 amount per year. Although not
``conced[ing] that the fee is a flat fee,'' DEC does ``acknowledge that
all of the persons in the small subset of payers who are transporters
of hazardous waste all pay the same amount.'' It contended that the
Scheiner case is not dispositive, regardless of whether the remedial
action fee is considered a ``tax'' or a regulatory ``fee.''
DEC stated that, because this fee is not used to pay the
government's ``general debts and liabilities,'' it is not a tax, but
rather a ``fee'' which is ``charged by the government in connection
with the exercise of its police function to help defray costs of the
government's provision of a specific service.'' This fee, DEC stated,
helps ``defray the State's costs in the establishment and maintenance
of a fund used to identify, investigate and remediate sites where there
is a release or threatened release of hazardous substances,'' including
``'maintaining a capability for emergency response'' when the actual or
threatened release results from the transport of hazardous materials.''
It contended that the decisions in V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dept. of
Public Safety, 131 F.3d 1415 (10th Cir. 1997), and Interstate Towing v.
Cincinnati, 6 F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1993), hold that uniform fees that
are used to perform inspections of LPG facilities (in V-1 Oil) or tow
trucks (in Interstate Towing) do not discriminate against interstate
commerce. DEC also referred to Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 717, 92 S.Ct. 1349, 1355 (1972), as
approving a $1.00 charge for each departing passenger on both
interstate and intrastate flights as ``a fair, if imperfect,
approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are
imposed.''
DEC argued that ``tax cases such as Scheiner'' do not invalidate
its remedial action fee. It stated that ``Tennessee's fee provision
does not explicitly treat out-of-state interests differently,'' and
that only transporters who pick up or deliver hazardous waste in the
State must pay the fee, not all ``truckers who merely enter the
State.'' In addition, DEC asserted that there should be no ``concern
about burdensome multiple taxation,'' because ``If all the states were
to adopt a law identical to Tennessee's, the highest number of them
that would assess the fee on a particular shipment would be two, the
beginning and terminating states.'' DEC cited Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 115 S.Ct. 1331 (1995), and
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 109 S.Ct. 582 (1989), as situations
where two States might permissibly impose taxes on the same interstate
transaction, i.e., a telephone call between persons in different States
(Goldberg) or the purchase of a bus ticket from one State to another
(Jefferson Lines). DEC maintained that Scheiner has not ``invalidated
all flat taxes, but rather focused on ``the methods by which the flat
taxes are assessed.'' DEC also argues that the remedial action fee ``is
apportioned, as much as it can be,'' because
there is no relation between miles driven and the potential cost of
clean up if there is an accident. One of the most significant
factors in the expense of a clean-up is the location of the spill,
e.g., the proximity to a stream or the nature of the subsurface
conditions and whether they impede the migration into ground water.
* * * These cases [Scheiner and Goldberg] show that the commerce
clause does not require the adoption of an apportionment formula
that does not make sense.
In its rebuttal comments, AWHMT disagreed with each of DEC's
arguments. AWHMT stated that the amount of the Tennessee remedial
action fee is not reasonable because, except for one other State, it is
the highest ``flat, unapportioned'' fee imposed on transporters of
hazardous materials, and it is excessive when compared to ``the level
of the transporter's instate activity'' or the ``DEC clean-up costs,
even if transportation-related.'' AWHMT asserted that mileage ``is
plainly relevant to the risk imposed upon the DEC, or the State for
that matter, by the transportation of hazardous waste.'' Citing the
decisions in the Maine (595 A.2d at 1017) and Massachusetts (613 N.E.2d
at 103) cases, AWHMT argued that the factors cited by DEC do not vary
between interstate and intrastate carriers and that Scheiner requires a
State to apportion its fees based on mileage that the interstate
carrier travels within the State, unless it is impracticable to do so.
AWHMT also noted that RSPA takes into account the number of high
mileage transportation corridors in a State in allocating grants under
the Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) grants program,
carried out in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5116. AWHMT stated that
Tennessee received more than $500,000 from RSPA under the HMEP grant
program between 1993 and 1996 (and a total of $19.4 million over the FY
'92--FY '96 period in Federal assistance for preparing and responding
to transportation emergencies, according to a Department of Energy
report).
AWHMT stressed that the remedial action fee is an annual fee, which
is the same regardless of the number of shipments into or from
Tennessee, and that an interstate carrier is potentially exposed to a
cumulative burden of $32,500 if every State adopted a similar fee. It
is because the fee is set on an annual basis, rather than per shipment,
AWHMT stated, that the fee discriminates against the interstate carrier
who ``would pay a fee up to 49 times higher than the intrastate carrier
for the same level of total covered operations.''
AWHMT also asserted that the same Commerce Clause standards apply,
whether Tennessee calls the remedial action fee a tax or a fee, and
that these fees are ``wholly unlike'' the user fees in the Evansville-
Vanderburgh case and the inspection charges in V-1 Oil and Interstate
Towing because they are not related to the usage of a facility or the
services provided by the State. It stated that any language in
Evansville-Vanderburgh sanctioning ``flat, annual user charges'' (which
were not involved in that case) cannot be relied on following the
Scheiner case. And it disputed DEC's argument that the ``internal
consistency'' test should not apply to Tennessee's remedial action fee,
stating:
An interstate carrier faced with the prospect of paying $650
plus permit fees in advance of any contract for at least a single
delivery or pickup of waste in Tennessee is subject to pressure to
avoid the State altogether. By the same token, if every State
implemented a system like the DEC remedial action, Tennessee
transporters would be pressured to stay out of interstate commerce.
The DEC remedial action fee thus runs squarely afoul of the
fundamental Commerce Clause principle that ``revenue measures must
maintain state boundaries as a neutral factor in economic decision-
making.'' [Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 283]
AWHMT also disagreed with DEC's argument that the remedial action
fee is justified because the State regulates hazardous waste more
closely than it does hazardous substances. According to AWHMT, both
must be transported in accordance with the HMR, which requires the use
of the Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest for hazardous wastes (but not
other hazardous materials) and refers to the Environmental Protection
Agency's requirement that a transporter of hazardous waste clean up any
release during transportation. See 49 CFR 171.3 (note), 172.205; 40 CFR
Part 263. AWHMT asserted that, ``[i]f environmental protection fee were
in fact the goal, this fee would apply to all hazmat carriers, not just
hazwaste transporters picking up or delivering hazardous waste in the
State.''
In Evansville-Vanderburgh, the Supreme Court found that a state or
[[Page 54478]]
local ``toll'' would pass muster under the Commerce Clause so long as
it ``is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use, .
. . and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor
excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred.'' 405
U.S. at 716-17, 92 S.Ct at 1355. In that case, the Court also indicated
that ``a State may impose a flat fee for the privilege of using its
roads, without regard to the actual use by particular vehicles, so long
as the fee is not excessive.'' 405 U.S. at 715, 92 S.Ct. at 1355.
However, in Scheiner, the Court limited the application of this latter
proposition to those situations where a flat tax is ``the only
practicable means of collecting revenues from users and the use of a
more finely graduated user-fee schedule would pose genuine
administrative burdens.'' 483 U.S. at 296, 107 S.Ct. at 2847. More
recently, the Court stated that ``a levy is reasonable under Evansville
if it (1) is based on some fair approximation of the use of the
facilities, (2) is not excessive in relation to the benefits conferred,
and (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce.'' Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 367-68, 114 S.Ct. 855, 864
(1994).
As a fixed annual fee, regardless of the number of pick-ups or
deliveries of hazardous waste within the State, Tennessee's remedial
action fee differs from the per-trip fees in Evansville-Vanderburgh and
from the sales or gross receipts taxes on specific interstate
transactions in the Jefferson Lines and Goldberg cases. It is also
different from the fees charged to offset inspections performed by the
State in the V-1 Oil and Interstate Trucking decisions, where the cost
of performing a required inspection would be expected to the same
amount for both interstate and intrastate companies. There is an
absence of any evidence that Tennessee's $650 annual fee has any
approximation to transporters' use of roads or other facilities within
the State, or that ``genuine administrative burdens'' prevent the
application of a more finely graduated user fee to transporters who
pick up or deliver hazardous waste within the State. Accordingly,
Tennessee's remedial action fee fails the test of ``reasonableness'' in
Evansville-Vanderburgh.
This test appears to be the most appropriate one for interpreting
the fairness requirement in 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(1). RSPA notes that the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce first used the word
``reasonable'' in referring to this requirement, H.R. Report No. 101-
444, Part 1, p. 49 (1990), although this evolved into ``equitable'' in
the 1990 amendments, Pub. L. 101-615, Sec. 13, 104 Stat. 3260, and then
to ``fair'' in the 1994 codification of the Federal hazardous material
transportation law. Pub. L 103-272, 108 Stat. 783. As noted by AWHMT,
Senator Exon subsequently stated in floor debate that, ``even though
the recodification refers to fees that are `fair' rather than
`equitable,' the usual constitutional commerce clause protections
remain applicable and prohibit fees that discriminate or unduly burden
interstate commerce.'' Cong. Rec. S11324 (Aug. 11, 1994).
RSPA notes that it is not simply a potential for multiple fees, but
the lack of any relationship between the fees paid and the respective
benefits received by interstate and intrastate carriers, that
establishes discrimination against interstate commerce. As the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in the case brought by ATA
challenging that State's hazardous waste transporter fee:
[as] viewed from the perspective of the user, as it must be, it is
apparent that the fee does not vary on any ``proxy for value''
obtained from the Commonwealth. An interstate hazardous waste
transporter which travels just one time in the Commonwealth must pay
the same fee as a local hazardous waste transporter. It is therefore
apparent that the ``privilege'' of using the compliance program is
more valuable to local transporters so that the practical effect of
apportioning total costs on a per vehicle basis is to discriminate
against interstate commerce.
415 Mass. at 347, 613 N.E.2d at 102. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
discussed the difference between a tax on ``services provided by
disposal facilities'' within the State, which
would be constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause
because the tax would be imposed on the delivery of services within
the state. Chapter SERB 4 fees are not related to the services
provided by in-state disposal facilities to interstate transporters
but to carriers who cross the state line to use a facility in
Wisconsin. Such fees are not ``apportioned'' in that they are
unrelated to the extent of the mileage traveled within the state.
Such a flat tax or fee clearly violates the spirit of the Commerce
Clause to avoid the economic Balkanization that plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation.
556 N.W.2d at 766-67.
The statutory provisions directing DOT to issue Federal regulations
governing uniform forms and procedures for State registration and
permitting of persons who offer or transport hazardous materials (to be
based on the recommendations of a working group) specifically provide
that DOT's regulations may ``not define or limit the amounts of a fee a
State may impose or collect.'' 49 U.S.C. 5119(c)(1). RSPA ``has never
relied on the potential cumulative effect of a [fee] requirement as a
basis for finding inconsistency,'' IR-17, Illinois Fee on
Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 51 FR 20926, 20934 (June 9,
1986), although RSPA has previously acknowledged the ``impact of
widespread adoption of such fees [may be] relevant to Commerce Clause
litigation.'' IR-17, Action on Appeal, 53 FR 36200, 36201 (Sept. 25,
1987). Here, there is no showing that the potential for other States to
adopt fees, by itself, makes the Tennessee remedial action fee unfair.
Because Tennessee's remedial action fee imposed on hazardous waste
transporters is not based on some fair approximation of the use of the
facilities and discriminates against interstate commerce, it is not
fair and violates 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(1) and is preempted by Federal
hazardous material transportation law.
3. The ``Used For'' Test
DEC acknowledged that ``many of the situations the fund is used for
are not related to transportation,'' but argued that it should not have
to create ``two sub-funds, one for transportation incidents and one for
everything else.'' If so, DEC claimed, there would be greater total
costs for the additional ``staff to administer the program [and] it is
quite likely that the transporters would have to pay a much larger fee
to support a fund capable of paying the costs of a significant removal
and remediation effort at a hazardous substance site.''
DEC refused to concede that ``any money paid by a transporter has
actually been paid for any of these other situations or purposes
because the fund has not been below $170,000 in the time period of
concern.'' It also stated that ``Congress clearly authorized fees such
as Tennessee's'' because
The Hazardous Waste Remedial Action Fund is the only source of
funds available to the Department of Environmental Conservation, or
the State of Tennessee, which can be used to hire contractors to
address emergencies caused by spills of hazardous waste resulting
from transportation accidents.
DEC argued that even though it has spent less than $15,000 from
this fund in cleaning up highway and rail incidents, ``[i]t just
happens that the liable party is doing that work rather than the
state's contractor.'' DEC asserted that the fund provides the
capability for emergency response, including developing, implementing,
[[Page 54479]]
and supervising contracts, and that it is inappropriate to compare
receipts and costs in any single year. It stated that ``Sec. 5125(g)
does not require that we look into what events occur in what years with
the possible result that the fee would be preempted in some years and
not in others.''
DEC contrasts its remedial action fee with the fees charged by Los
Angeles County which RSPA found to be preempted in PD-9(R), 60 FR 8774,
8784 (Feb. 15, 1995), petition for reconsideration pending. It stated
that the fees considered in PD-9(R) paid for administration of a
requirement that businesses plan for emergency response to hazardous
materials not in transportation, rather than the State's own capability
for emergency response to a transportation incident. DEC also argued
that ``what the fees are actually spent on is irrelevant,'' under the
Evansville-Vanderburgh case and New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n v.
Flynn, 751 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1984). These cases, according to DEC, show
that ``it is permissible under the commerce clause and the HMTA to
combine the purposes of a fund.''
In its application, AWHMT asserted that Tennessee's remedial action
fee is preempted because none of the uses of the Hazardous Waste
Remedial Action Fund ``address enforcement and emergency response for
transportation of hazardous materials within the meaning of 49 U.S.C.
5125(g)(1).'' In rebuttal comments, AWHMT questions whether ``inactive
hazardous substance sites'' properly include the location of a
hazardous material transportation incident, because the carriers are
known parties from which the State can recover clean-up costs. It also
questioned whether the `` `clean up' after an emergency has been abated
is `transportation-related' within the meaning of 49 U.S.C.
5125(g)(1).'' AAR agreed that none of the purposes listed in Tennessee
Code 68-212-205, for which the fund may be used, ``target
transportation activities.'' HMAC stated that, while these monies may
be used ``for many worthwhile purposes * * * the use of funds for these
activities is not related to the transportation of hazardous material,
as required by Federal statute, and therefore not permitted.''
AAR also stated in its rebuttal comments that a ``separate
transportation program'' for use of the remedial action fees would not
necessarily involve greater costs because ``Tennessee can create a
separate program with shared administrative costs.'' AAR argued that,
because there is no segregation of the fees paid by transporters of
hazardous waste, it is impossible to find that these fees are being
used only for transportation purposes, as required by Sec. 5125(g)(1).
AAR pointed out that the transporters themselves, rather than the
State, have paid the cost of cleaning up train incidents.
With respect to DEC's statement that the Hazardous Waste Remedial
Action Fund is the only source of funds available to clean up spills of
hazardous waste in transportation, AAR contended that, even if correct,
this point is irrelevant:
Congress did not add a qualification that a State fee would not
be preempted if it were the only source of funds for a particular
purpose. * * * [T]here is nothing to prohibit Tennessee from
developing an emergency response capability utilizing a fee that
does not violate the dictates of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5125(g).
AWHMT referred to the responsibility of transporters to respond to an
incident and the Federal financial responsibility requirements in 49
CFR Part 387 to cover environmental damage. It also pointed to Federal
assistance, including grants by RSPA under the HMEP program.
In response to DEC's arguments that it had not actually used fees
collected from transporters for non-transportation purposes, AWHMT
addressed several points. It argued that the fact that the funds are
commingled in a single fund precludes a claim of ``non-use,'' that the
State may not properly collect fees on transportation and hold them
indefinitely because Sec. 5125(g)(1) requires that they be ``used'' for
transportation-related activities, and that the total amount collected
from transporters is at least $500,000, rather than the $170,000 just
for 1996.
CERCLA was enacted ``to provide for a national inventory of
inactive hazardous waste sites'' and to authorize EPA ``to take
emergency assistance and containment actions with respect to such
sites,'' finances by a ``Superfund.'' H.R. Report No. 96-1016, Part I,
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, p. 17 (May 16, 1990), as
reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, pp.
6119-20. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA to provide additional funding
``to clean up the Nation's worst abandoned hazardous waste sites and
uncontrolled leaking underground storage tanks.'' H.R. Report No. 99-
253, Part I, Energy and Commerce Committee, p. 54, as reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, p. 2836. While an
``inactive'' or ``abandoned'' waste site could result from a release in
transportation, it is clear that the primary purpose of the Superfund
was not to provide for the cleanup of transportation incidents.
Tennessee acknowledges that the primary purpose of its remedial
action fund is similarly to clean up ``inactive hazardous substance
sites.'' The State argues that the fund is also available (and is the
only source for) cleaning up a release of a hazardous substance in
transportation, but it admits that it has spent less than $15,000 in
supervising cleanup activities conducted by transporters--out of the
approximately $170,000 it collects each year. Without providing
specific figures, Tennessee seems to claim that the unspecified excess
that has been built up since 1994 is simply being kept in reserve for
possible future transportation incidents.
This does not satisfy the requirement in 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(1) that
hazardous material transporter fees must be ``used for a purpose
related to transporting hazardous material, including enforcement and
planning, developing, and maintaining a capability for emergency
response.'' If the State prefers not to create and maintain a separate
fund for fees paid by hazardous materials transporters, then it must
show that it is actually spending these fees on the purposes permitted
by the law. In this area where only the State has the information
concerning where these funds are spent, more specific accounting is
required. Under section 5125(g)(2)(B), upon RSPA's request, a State
must report on ``the purposes for which the revenues from the fee are
used.'' In the April 6, 1998 public notice, RSPA asked Tennessee to set
forth in detail how much it collected and how it used the fees it
collected in fiscal year 1996-97. Although DEC's comments included
information on the amounts of remedial action fees collected, the State
accounted for less than $15,000 in expenditures. Although it claims
that the current balance in the remedial action fund exceeds the amount
collected from transporters in any one year, DEC has failed to
demonstrate that none of the fees collected from transporters were
spent for non-transportation purposes. Nor has it justified imposing
fees on transporters of hazardous waste simply to create a large
surplus for the future.
Because Tennessee is not using the remedial action fees paid by
hazardous waste transporters for purposes related to transporting
hazardous material, that fee violates 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(1) and is
preempted by Federal hazardous material transportation law.
[[Page 54480]]
C. Written Notification of Incidents
The HMR require a carrier to submit to RSPA, ``within 30 days of
the date of discovery,'' a written report of certain incidents that
occur during the course of transportation, including any
``unintentional release of hazardous materials from a packaging
(including a tank) or [when] any quantity of hazardous waste has been
discharged during transportation.'' This report must be submitted on
DOT Form F 5800.1 and, when it pertains to a discharge of hazardous
waste, a copy of the hazardous waste manifest must be attached, and
``[a]n estimate of the quantity of the waste removed from the scene,
the name and address of the facility to which it was taken, and the
manner of disposition of any removed waste must be entered in Section
IX of the report form.'' 49 CFR 171.16(a).
Section 171.16 was added to the HMR in 1970 in response to a
recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board that DOT
develop and establish a uniform system for reporting incidents in the
transportation of hazardous materials by all modes. Final Rule, Reports
of Hazardous Materials Incidents, 35 FR 16836, 16837 (Oct. 31, 1970);
see also RSPA's notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 34 FR 17450 (Oct.
29, 1969). In the NPRM, RSPA stated that:
The information derived from these reports will be used by the
Department: (1) As an aid in evaluating the effectiveness of the
existing regulations; (2) to assist in determining the need for
regulatory changes to cover changing transportation safety problems;
and (3) to determine the major problem areas so that the attention
of the Department may be more suitably directed to those areas.
Id. In 1989, the time for submitting written incident reports was
increased from 15 days to 30 days after the carrier's discovery of the
incident, and DOT Form F 5800.1 was revised. Final Rule, Detailed
Hazardous Materials Incident Reports, 54 FR 25806, 25813 (June 19,
1989). RSPA has recently begun a new rulemaking proceeding to evaluate
the need for any change in the reporting requirements and consider
changes to DOT Form F 5800.1 to obtain more useful information and
reduce the burdens on the carriers who are required to submit these
reports. See RSPA's advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 64 FR 13943
(March 23, 1999).
Under DEC Rule 1200-1-11-.04(4)(a)4, a carrier must also send a
written report to DEC ``on each hazardous waste discharge during
transportation that occurs in'' Tennessee. This written report must be
submitted ``[w]ithin fifteen days of occurrence,'' and must include
specified information about the discharge, ``a discussion of the cause
of the emergency, and a summary of the emergency response (including
the treatment or disposition of any spilled waste or contaminated
material).'' A copy of the hazardous waste manifest must be included
with the report. The note to DEC Rule 1200-1-11.-04(4)(a)4 indicates
that a copy of DOT Form F 5800.1 ``shall suffice for this report
provided that it is properly completed and supplemented as necessary to
include all information required by this paragraph.''
Although AAR contended that DEC requires ``more information [to] be
provided'' than on DOT Form F 5800.1, and DEC admitted that its
requirement calls for ``additional information to be submitted besides
what is required on DOT form 5800.1,'' no party specified what
additional information is required. Conceding that its written incident
notification requirement is preempted, DEC stated that its ``[s]taff
has been advised to amend those rules accordingly.'' In rebuttal
comments, AWHMT asserted that DEC has not clarified whether it intends
to eliminate its written incident notification requirement or revise
that requirement to either be more ``consistent with the data sets on
DOT form 5800.1 or otherwise require carriers to provide to the DEC a
copy of the DOT form 5800.1.'' DEC Rule 1200-1-11-.04(4)(a)4 has not
been revised in the current (March 1999) version of DEC's rules
available on the State of Tennessee internet homepage.
Aside from the differing time periods in which the reports must be
filed, and issues concerning the information that must be included,
AWHMT refers to RSPA's prior holdings that Federal hazardous material
transportation law preempts a State requirement for the carrier to
directly submit a copy of the incident report form that it must send to
RSPA. HMAC states that ``Federal law does not require localities to
receive written reports when hazardous waste releases occur within
their jurisdiction.''
In IR-2, RSPA contrasted State requirements for submission of
follow-up written reports with the separate need for local emergency
responders to have immediate oral or telephonic notification of an
transportation incident involving hazardous materials. RSPA stated
that:
The written notice required to be supplied to [DOT] pursuant to
49 CFR 171.16 precludes the State from requiring additional written
notice directed to hazardous materials carriers. * * * In light of
the Federal written notice requirement, however, it is inappropriate
for a State to impose an additional written notice requirement to
apply solely to carriers already subject to the Hazardous Materials
Regulations. The detailed hazardous materials incident reports filed
with [DOT] are available to the public.
44 FR at 75568, affirmed on appeal in IR-2(A), 45 FR 71881, 71884 (Oct.
30, 1980), and in National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 535 F.
Supp. 509 (D.R.I. 1982), aff'd, 698 F.2d 559 (1st Cir. 1983).
In IR-3, Boston Rules Governing Transportation of Certain Hazardous
Materials Within the City, 46 FR 18918, 18924 (Mar. 26, 1981), RSPA
referred to its earlier decision in IR-2 and the procedures for RSPA to
provide to a ``designated State agency'' copies of the written reports
required by 49 CFR 171.16. RSPA reiterated its ruling that a State or
locality may not require a carrier to directly submit a copy of the DOT
Form F 5800.1:
Subsequent written reports required within 15 days by DOT are
not necessary to local emergency response. These reports themselves
are publicly available, and [RSPA] is prepared to routinely send
copies of written reports to a designated State agency on request.
Copies of written reports required by DOT * * * may not be required
by [the City's ordinance].
46 FR at 18924. In response to an administrative appeal submitted by
the City of Boston, RSPA further explained that:
the information in a written incident report * * * will very often
be of only limited usefulness, is not time-sensitive, and in any
event can be obtained by the City [from RSPA] with only a minimum of
effort. If the City in fact intends to make serious use of the
information in DOT incident reports, the effort to obtain it from
[RSPA] rather than the carrier should not be significant.
Accordingly, we reaffirm our previous conclusion that Boston's
requirement that carriers submit written reports is redundant,
unnecessary, and inconsistent with the HMTA and HMR.
IR-3(A), 47 FR 18457, 18462 (Apr. 29, 1982). Accord, IR-31, Louisiana
Statutes and Regulations on Hazardous Materials Transportation, 55 FR
25572, 25582 (June 21, 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 57 FR 41165
(Sept. 9, 1992), where RSPA found that
the provisions of State law which require the submission of written
accident/incident reports are redundant with Federal requirements
(particularly 49 CFR 171.16), tend to undercut compliance with the
HMR requirements, and thus are inconsistent. [citations] This
rationale also applies to requirements to provide copies of the
incident reports filed with [RSPA]; as indicated in IR-3, supra,
such a requirement is inconsistent, but [RSPA] is prepared to
[[Page 54481]]
routinely send copies of those reports to a designated state agency
on request.
In the 1990 amendments to the HMTA, Congress provided that non-
Federal requirements on written incident notification are preempted
unless they are substantively the same as in the HMR. 49 U.S.C.
5125(b)(1)(D). In H.R. Report No. 101-444, Part I, at 34-35 (1990), the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce set forth its belief that
uniform requirements for written notices and reports describing
hazardous materials incidents will allow for the development of an
improved informational database, which in turn may be used to assess
problems in the transportation of hazardous materials. Without
consistency in this area, data related to hazardous materials
incidents may be misleading and confusing. Additional State and
local requirements would also be burdensome on those involved in
such incidents and may lead to liability for minor deviations.
DOT has long encouraged States to adopt and enforce requirements
for transporting hazardous materials that are consistent with the HMR.
Under its Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, see 49 CFR Part 350,
FHWA provides grants to States that adopt and enforce requirements that
are compatible with both the HMR and the FHWA's Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (FMCSR) at 49 CFR Parts 390-399.
Tennessee has adopted the HMR, including 49 CFR 171.16, as State
law, Rule 1200-2-1-.32.7 The State received more than $1.8
million in fiscal year 1999 from DOT to enforce the HMR and the FMCSR.
Accordingly, Tennessee may require a carrier to file a written incident
report with RSPA, under the same conditions specified in 49 CFR 171.16,
and it may impose penalties on a carrier that fails to file the
required written incident report with RSPA. Tennessee may also obtain
from RSPA copies of incident reports filed by carriers in order to
enforce this filing requirement and to conduct follow-up investigations
of incidents occurring within the State. In each of these respects,
Tennessee is acting ``substantively the same as'' Federal law. However,
Tennessee may not require a carrier to file a copy of the DOT Form F
5800.1 report, or a separate incident report, directly with the State.
This last requirement is substantively different from the HMR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Tennessee Code 68-212-107(d) also provides that
``Regulations providing requirements for the transportation,
containerization, and labeling of hazardous waste shall be
consistent with those issued by the United States department of
transportation * * *''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEC Rule 1200-1-11.-04(4)(a)4 is preempted because it is not
substantively the same as 49 CFR 171.16.
IV. Ruling
Federal hazardous material transportation law preempts:
1. Tennessee Code 68-212-203(a)(6) and Rule 1200-1-13.03(1)(e),
requiring a transporter who picks up or delivers hazardous waste within
the State to pay a remedial action fee, currently set at $650 per year.
2. Tennessee Rule 1200-1-11-.04(4)(a)4, requiring a transporter of
hazardous waste to submit a written report on a discharge of hazardous
waste during transportation.
IV. Petition for Reconsideration/Judicial Review
In accordance with 49 CFR 107.211(a), ``[a]ny person aggrieved'' by
this decision may file a petition for reconsideration within 20 days of
publication of this decision in the Federal Register. Any party to this
proceeding may seek review of RSPA's decision ``in an appropriate
district court of the United States * * * not later than 60 days after
the decision becomes final.'' 49 U.S.C. 5125(f).
This decision will become RSPA's final decision 20 days after
publication in the Federal Register if no petition for reconsideration
is filed within that time. The filing of a petition for reconsideration
is not a prerequisite to seeking judicial review of this decision under
49 U.S.C. 5125(f).
If a petition for reconsideration of this decision is filed within
20 days of publication in the Federal Register, the action by RSPA's
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety on the petition
for reconsideration will be RSPA's final decision. 49 CFR 107.211(d).
Issued in Washington, D.C. on September 30, 1999.
Alan I. Roberts,
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety.
[FR Doc. 99-26037 Filed 10-5-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P
