96-25625. Wisconsin Public Service Company, Wisconsin Power and Light Company and Madison Gas and Electric Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration ...  

  • [Federal Register Volume 61, Number 195 (Monday, October 7, 1996)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 52472-52475]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 96-25625]
    
    
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    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    [Docket No. 50-305]
    
    
    Wisconsin Public Service Company, Wisconsin Power and Light 
    Company and Madison Gas and Electric Company; Notice of Consideration 
    of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
    Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
    Hearing
    
        The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
    considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. 
    DPR-43 issued to Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Wisconsin Power 
    and Light Company, and Madison Gas and Electric Company (the licensee), 
    for operation of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, located in Kewaunee 
    County, Wisconsin.
        The proposed amendment would change Technical Specification (TS) 
    requirements related to the low temperature overpressure protection 
    (LTOP) system. Specifically, the LTOP curve would be modified to define 
    10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G pressure temperature limitations for LTOP 
    evaluation through the end of operating cycle (EOC) 33. In addition, 
    the LTOP enabling temperature and the temperature required for starting 
    a reactor coolant pump would be changed consistent with the design 
    basis for the LTOP system. Finally, the TS bases would be changed 
    consistent with the changes described above.
        In a letter dated September 27, 1996, the licensee requested that 
    this amendment application be treated exigently. The current LTOP curve 
    is applicable through EOC 21 or 18.40 effective full-power years 
    (EFPY). The startup for cycle 22 is scheduled for October 22, 1996. Due 
    to time constraints, sufficient time is not available to permit the 
    customary public notice in advance of this action. This proposed 
    amendment supersedes a previously submitted proposed amendment on this 
    subject dated April 30, 1996, which was published in the Federal 
    Register on May 22, 1996 (61 FR 25714). The new submittal was necessary 
    in order to address NRC concerns with the original submittal.
        Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
    will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
    amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
        Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under 
    exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment 
    request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
    Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
    the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
    involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
    accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
    or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
    or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
    required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
    the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
    below:
    
        The proposed change was reviewed in accordance with the 
    provisions of 10 CFR 50.92 to show no significant hazards exist. The 
    proposed change will not:
        1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
    consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
        The LTOP setpoint, revised enabling temperature, and revised P/T 
    [pressure/temperature] limits reflected in proposed Figure TS 3.1-4 
    ensure that the Appendix G pressure/temperature limits are not 
    exceeded, and therefore, help ensure that RCS [reactor coolant 
    system] integrity is maintained. The changes do not modify the 
    reactor coolant system pressure boundary, nor make any physical 
    changes to the facility design, material, construction standards, or 
    setpoints. The LTOP valve setpoint remains at  500 psig. 
    The LTOP enabling temperature based on Figure TS 3.1-4 is 355  deg.F 
    and is consistent with BTP RSB 5-2 guidance of RTNDT + 90 
    deg.F. The revised enabling temperature is greater than the 338 
    deg.F value in the current TS. A higher enabling temperature ensures 
    that the LTOP system is available for the prevention of non-ductile 
    failure over a larger operating window. The probability of a LTOP 
    event occurring is independent of the pressure-temperature limits 
    for the RCS pressure boundary and enabling temperature. Therefore, 
    the probability of a LTOP event is not increased.
        The calculation of pressure temperature limits in accordance 
    with approved regulatory methods provides assurance that reactor 
    pressure vessel fracture toughness requirements are met and the 
    integrity of the RCS pressure boundary is maintained. Similar 
    methodology was used in calculations to support approved amendment 
    120 to the Kewaunee Technical Specifications dated April 26, 1995. 
    The material property bases, including chemistry factor and initial 
    reference temperature for the unirradiated material (RTNDT), 
    and margin terms, used for this PA are more conservative than that 
    used in the current TS.
        The PT limits reflected in proposed Figure TS 3.1-4 are based on 
    the following criteria:
        (a) An initial RTNDT value of -56  deg.F. Drop weight 
    testing of Kewaunee surveillance material was performed by the 
    Westinghouse Electric Corporation and documented in WCAP 14042, 
    Revision 1, dated January 1995 with a resultant initial RTNDT 
    of -50  deg.F. Testing of sister plant surveillance material 
    resulted in an initial RTNDT of -30  deg.F. The mean value for 
    all Linde 1092 weld heats in -50.7  deg.F. Therefore, use of the 
    generic value of -56  deg.F (for welds made with Linde 1092 flux) 
    with a larger margin term was deemed more conservative and 
    acceptable for this evaluation.
        (b) Paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(A) of 10 CFR 50.61. Paragraph 
    (c)(2)(ii)(A) of 10 CFR 50.61 requires that licensees determine a 
    material-specific value of chemistry factor when the surveillance 
    data is deemed credible according to the criteria of paragraph 
    (c)(2)(I) of 10 CFR 50.61. Reference 3 documents WPSC's evaluation 
    which concludes that the KNPP surveillance capsule data satisfy the 
    credibility criteria. The calculated material-specific chemistry 
    factor value is 190.6  deg.F (based on KNPP surveillance capsule 
    data from capsules V, R, P, and S). Adjustment of this chemistry 
    factor has been accomplished by multiplying by 1.18, the ratio of 
    the best estimate chemistry factor for heat IP3571 to the chemistry 
    factor for the Kewaunee surveillance weld. This results in a 
    chemistry factor value of 224.9  deg.F.
        (c) Neutron fluence (E greater than 1 MeV) projections through 
    [the] end of operating cycle 33. The use of predicted fluence values 
    through the end of operating cycle 33 is appropriately considered 
    within the calculations in accordance with standard industry 
    methodology previously docketed under WCAP 13227 and WCAP 14279. The 
    neutron exposure projections utilized for calculation of the 
    reference temperature were multiplied by a factor of 1.11 to adjust 
    for biases observed between cycle specific calculations and the 
    results of neutron dosimetry for the four surveillance capsules 
    removed from the KNPP reactor. The factor of 1.11 was derived by 
    taking the average of the measured to calculation (M/C) flux ratios 
    obtained from the dosimetry results of capsules V, R, P, and S 
    removed from the KNPP reactor vessel. The resulting effect of using 
    predicted fluence values through the end of cycle 33 instead of 
    cycle 21 is to require the [plant to evaluate LTOP transients to 
    more limiting requirements].
        Additional conservatism from a more conservative material 
    property basis and higher projected fluence values is readily 
    illustrated by the increase in magnitude of EOCNDT1/4T from 
    212.94  deg.F (derived from the material property basis used in the 
    current TS) to 264.46oF used for this PA. The proposed PT limits are 
    shifted to a lower pressure and higher temperature, which is more 
    conservative.
        The changes do not adversely affect the integrity of the RCS 
    such that its function in the control of radiological consequences 
    is affected. In addition, the changes do not affect any fission 
    barrier. The changes do not degrade or prevent the response of the 
    LTOP relief valve or other safety-related systems to
    
    [[Page 52473]]
    
    previously evaluated accidents. In addition, the changes do not 
    alter any assumption previously made in the radiological 
    consequences evaluations nor affect the mitigation of the 
    radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 
    Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated will 
    not be increased.
        Thus, operation of KNPP in accordance with the PA does not 
    involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of 
    any accident previously evaluated.
        2. Create the possibility of a new or different type of accident 
    from an accident previously evaluated.
        The enabling temperature and Appendix G pressure temperature 
    limitations were prepared using methods derived from the ASME Boiler 
    and Pressure Vessel Code and the criteria set forth in NRC 
    Regulatory Standard Review Plan 5.3.2. The changes do not cause the 
    initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting 
    failure for safety-related systems and components. The changes do 
    not result in any event previously deemed incredible being made 
    credible. As such, it does not create the possibility of an accident 
    different than previously evaluated.
        The changes do not have any adverse effect on the ability of the 
    safety-related systems to perform their intended safety functions. 
    Since the enabling temperature is higher, the LTOP system is 
    available for prevention of non-ductile failure over a wide 
    operating window. The new LTOP operating window (i.e., less than or 
    equal to 355  deg.F) is within the existing band for the residual 
    heat removal system; operating procedures allow the LTOP system to 
    be placed into service at less than 400  deg.F. The proposed changes 
    do not make physical changes to the plant or create new failure 
    modes. Therefore, it will not create the possibility of a 
    malfunction of equipment important to safety different than 
    previously evaluated. Thus, the PA does not create the possibility 
    of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
    evaluated.
        The use of Paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(A) of 10 CFR 50.61, chemistry 
    factor ratio of 1.18, initial reference temperature of -56  deg.F, 
    and fluence values through EOC [end of cycle] 33 does not modify the 
    reactor coolant system pressure boundary, nor make any physical 
    changes to the LTOP setpoint or system design. Proposed Figure TS 
    3.1-4 was prepared in accordance with regulatory requirements and 
    requires evaluation of LTOP events to the more conservative material 
    property basis and more limiting requirements of neutron exposure 
    projections of 33.41 EFPY instead of 18.40 EFPY.
        Therefore, the PA does not create the possibility of a new or 
    different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
        3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
        The Appendix G pressure temperature limitations were prepared 
    using methods derived from the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
    and the criteria set forth in NRC Regulatory Standard Review Plan 
    5.3.2. These documents along with the calculational limitations 
    specified in 10 CFR 50.61 are an acceptable method for implementing 
    the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendices G and H. Inherent 
    conservatism in the P/T limits resulting from these documents 
    include:
        a. An assumed defect in the reactor vessel wall with a depth 
    equal to \1/4\ of the thickness of the vessel wall (\1/4\T) and a 
    length equal to 1\1/2\ times the thickness of the vessel wall.
        b. Assumed reference flaw oriented in both longitudinal and 
    circumferential directions and limiting material property. At KNPP, 
    the only weld in the core region is oriented in the circumferential 
    direction.
        c. A factor of safety of 2 is applied to the membrane stress 
    intensity factor.
        d. The limiting toughness is based upon a reference value 
    (KIR) which is a lower bound on the dynamic crack initiation or 
    arrest toughness.
        e. A 2-sigma margin term is applied in determining the adjusted 
    reference temperature (ART) that is used to calculate the limiting 
    toughness.
        Similar methodology was used in calculations to support approved 
    amendment 120 dated April 26, 1995. Beyond the conservatism 
    described above, WPSC [Wisconsin Public Service Corporation] has 
    incorporated the following additional margin in preparing this PA:
        a. The reactor coolant pump starting restrictions of TS 
    3.1.a.1.c reflect the more limiting LTOP enabling temperature of 355 
     deg.F consistent with the design basis for the LTOP system.
        b. The LTOP enabling temperature based on Figure TS 3.1-4 is 355 
     deg.F and is more conservative than the 338oF value in the current 
    TS.
        c. The calculated material-specific chemistry factor value of 
    190.6oF (based upon KNPP surveillance capsule data from capsules V, 
    R, P, and S) has been multiplied by 1.18 yielding an adjusted 
    chemistry factor value of 224.9oF to account for chemical 
    composition differences between the best estimate value for weld 
    heat IP3571 and the Kewaunee surveillance weld material. d. The 
    neutron exposure projections were multiplied by a factor of 1.11 to 
    adjust for biases observed between cycle specific calculations and 
    the results of neutron dosimetry for the four surveillance capsules 
    removed from the KNPP reactor. The factor of 1.11 was derived by 
    taking the average of the measured to calculation (M/C) flux ratios 
    obtained from the dosimetry results of capsules V, R, P, and S 
    removed from the KNPP reactor vessel. Additional conservatisms 
    beyond that described above but not used in development of the 
    proposed TS and Figure include: (a) A 2 inch diameter spring loaded 
    safety valve set at 480 psig located in the LTOP system. At 500 
    psig, the LTOP relief valve setpoint, the relieving capacity of this 
    smaller valve is 230 gpm. (b) The actual LTOP relief valve capacity 
    is at least 10% greater than the capacity used in the design and 
    setpoint analyses. This is in accordance with the requirements of 
    Section III NC-7000. (c) Assumptions in the overpressure transient 
    analyses are conservative relative to the actual Kewaunee reactor 
    coolant system (RCS) and operating practices:
        1. The RCS was assumed to be rigid with respect to metal 
    expansion.
        2. No credit was taken for the shrinkage effect caused by low 
    temperature safety injection water added to higher temperature 
    reactor coolant.
        3. No credit was taken for the reduction in reactor coolant bulk 
    modulus at RCS temperatures above 100 deg.F (constant bulk modulus 
    at all RCS temperatures).
        4. The entire volume of water of the steam generator secondary 
    was assumed available for heat transfer to the primary. In reality, 
    the liquid immediately adjacent and above the tube bundle would be 
    the primary source of energy in the transient.
        5. The overall steam generator heat transfer coefficient, U, was 
    assumed to be the free convective heat transfer coefficient of the 
    secondary, hsec. The forced convective heat transfer 
    coefficient of the primary, hpri and the tube metal resistance 
    have been ignored thus resulting in a conservative (high) 
    coefficient.
        6. The reactor coolant pump start time assumed in the heat input 
    analysis was 9-10 seconds; whereas, the Kewaunee pump startup time 
    is 25-30 seconds.
        An alternative methodology to the safety margins required by 
    Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 has been developed by the ASME Working 
    Group on Operating Plant Criteria. This methodology is contained in 
    ASME Code Case N-514. The Code Case N-514 provides criteria to 
    determine pressure limits during LTOP events that avoid certain 
    unnecessary operational restrictions, provide adequate margins 
    against failure of the reactor pressure vessel, and reduce the 
    potential for unnecessary activation of the relief valve used for 
    LTOP. Specifically, the ASME Code Case N-514 allows determination of 
    the setpoint for LTOP events such that the maximum pressure in the 
    vessel would not exceed 110% of the P/T limits of the existing ASME 
    Appendix G; and redefines the enabling temperature at a coolant 
    temperature less than 200 deg.F or a reactor vessel metal 
    temperature less than RTNDT + 50 deg.F, whichever is greater. 
    Code Case N-514, ``Low Temperature Overpressure Protection,'' has 
    been approved by the ASME Code Committee but not yet approved for 
    use in Regulatory Guide 1.147. The content of this code case has 
    been incorporated into Appendix G of Section XI of the ASME Code and 
    published in the 1993 Addenda to Section XI. It is expected that 
    next revision of 10 CFR 50.55a will endorse the 1993 Addenda and 
    Appendix G of Section XI. As stated above, this PA utilizes Appendix 
    G limits and an enabling temperature corresponding to a reactor 
    vessel metal temperature less than RTNDT + 90 deg.F, which is 
    more conservative than the alternative methodology contained in Code 
    Case N-514.
        The revised calculations meet the NRC acceptance criteria for 
    the LTOP setpoint and system design as described in NRC Safety 
    Evaluation Report (SER) dated September 6, 1985 which concluded that 
    ``the spectrum of postulated pressure transients would be mitigated 
    * * * such that the temperature pressure limits of Appendix G to 10 
    CFR 50 are maintained.''
        Use of the methodology set forth in the ASME Boiler and Pressure 
    Vessel Code, NRC
    
    [[Page 52474]]
    
    Regulatory Standard Review Plan 5.3.2, 10 CFR 50.61, and 10 CFR 50 
    Appendices G and H with the above additional margins ensures that 
    proper limits and safety factors are maintained. Thus, the PA does 
    not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
    
        The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
    this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
    satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
    amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
        The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
    determination. Any comments received within 15 days after the date of 
    publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
    determination.
        Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
    expiration of the 15-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
    change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
    way would result, for example, in preventing startup of the facility, 
    the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
    the 15-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
    the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
    determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
    Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
    Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
    after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
    action will occur very infrequently.
        Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and 
    Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications 
    Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
    Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page 
    number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be 
    delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
    Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
    Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public 
    Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
        The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
    intervene is discussed below.
        By November 6, 1996, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
    with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
    operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
    proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
    must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
    intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
    shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
    for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
    persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
    available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
    Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
    document room located at the University of Wisconsin, Cofrin Library, 
    2420 Nicolet Drive, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54311-7001. If a request for a 
    hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, 
    the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by 
    the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
    Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the 
    Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will 
    issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
        As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
    shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
    the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
    the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
    why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
    following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
    Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
    the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
    proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
    entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
    should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
    the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
    who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
    admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
    the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
    scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
    the specificity requirements described above.
        Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
    scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
    the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
    which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
    consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
    raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
    brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
    statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
    contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
    contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
    to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
    aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
    facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
    to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
    issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
    the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
    one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
    petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
    requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
    permitted to participate as a party.
        Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
    subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
    and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
    hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
    examine witnesses.
        If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
    determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
    final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
        If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
    no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
    amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
    request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
    of the amendment.
        If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
    significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
    before the issuance of any amendment.
        A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
    be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
    Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services 
    Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, 
    the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above 
    date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice 
    period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the 
    Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 
    248-5100 (in Missouri
    
    [[Page 52475]]
    
    1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram 
    Identification Number N1023 and the following message addressed to Gail 
    H. Marcus: petitioner's name and telephone number, date petition was 
    mailed, plant name, and publication date and page number of this 
    Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to 
    the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
    Washington, DC 20555, and to Bradley D. Jackson, Esq., Foley and 
    Lardner, P. O. Box 1497, Madison, Wisconsin 53701-1497, attorney for 
    the licensee.
        Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
    petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
    be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
    officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
    petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
    factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
        For further details with respect to this action, see the 
    application for amendment dated September 27, 1996, which is available 
    for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
    Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local 
    public document room located at the University of Wisconsin, Cofrin 
    Library, 2420 Nicolet Drive, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54311-7001.
    
        Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of October 1996.
    
        For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Richard J. Laufer,
    Project Manager, Project Directorate III-3, Division of Reactor 
    Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
    [FR Doc. 96-25625 Filed 10-4-96; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
10/07/1996
Department:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
96-25625
Pages:
52472-52475 (4 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. 50-305
PDF File:
96-25625.pdf