[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 213 (Friday, November 1, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56572-56573]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-28054]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316]
Indiana Michigan Power Company (D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1
and 2); Exemption
I
Indiana Michigan Power Company (IMPCo, the licensee) is the holder
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74 which authorize
operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,
respectively. The Cook facilities are pressurized water reactors
located at the licensee's site in Berrien County, Michigan. The license
provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all
rules, regulations, and
[[Page 56573]]
orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.
II
Subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality accident
requirements,'' requires that each licensee authorized to possess
special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain in each area where such
material is handled, used, or stored, an appropriate criticality
monitoring system.
In accordance with the Technical Specifications for D. C. Cook,
Units 1 and 2, the monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(2) are
applicable. Subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24 also requires that emergency
procedures be maintained for each area in which licensed SNM is
handled, used, or stored to ensure that all personnel withdraw to an
area of safety upon the sounding of the alarm. These procedures must
include the conduct of drills to familiarize personnel with the
evacuation plan, designation of responsible individuals for determining
the cause of the alarm, and placement of radiation survey instruments
in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. However,
exemptions may be requested pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d), provided that
the licensee believes that good cause exists for the exemption.
By letter dated April 8, 1996, the licensee requested an exemption
from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. A previous exemption from the
provisions of 10 CFR Part 70.24 for the storage of SNM, including
reactor fuel assemblies [maximum amount of 2313 kg of U-235 in uranium
enriched to no more than 3.15 weight percent (w/o)], was granted to
Indiana and Michigan Power Company for D.C. Cook Unit 2 in NRC
Materials License No. SNM-1753. The materials license was issued on
August 18, 1977. No similar exemption was issued for the Unit 1
materials license; however, the fuel storage facilities were common to
both units. The previously issued exemption expired when the materials
license expired upon conversion of the construction permit to an
operating license on December 23, 1977, for Unit 2. The basis for the
current exemption request is the same as for the original request.
Specifically, the licensee proposes to handle and store unirradiated
fuel without having a criticality monitoring system or emergency
procedures as required by 10 CFR 70.24.
The basis for the exemption is that inadvertent or accidental
criticality will be precluded through compliance with the Cook
Technical Specifications, the geometric spacing of fuel assemblies in
the new fuel storage facility and spent fuel storage pool, and
administrative controls imposed on fuel handling procedures.
Inadvertent or accidental criticality of SNM while in use in the
reactor vessel is precluded through compliance with the Cook Technical
Specifications, including reactivity requirements (e.g., shutdown
margins, limits on control rod movement), instrumentation requirements
(e.g., reactor power and radiation monitors), and controls on refueling
operations (e.g., refueling boron concentration and source range
monitor requirements). In addition, the operators' attention directed
toward instruments monitoring behavior of the nuclear fuel in the
reactor assures that the facility is operated in such a manner as to
preclude inadvertent criticality. Finally, since access to the fuel in
the reactor vessel is not physically possible while in use and is
procedurally controlled during refueling, there are no concerns
associated with loss or diversion of the fuel.
SNM as nuclear fuel is stored in one of two locations, the spent
fuel pool or the new fuel vault. The spent fuel pool is used to store
irradiated fuel under water after its discharge from the reactor. The
pool is designed to store the fuel in a geometric array that precludes
criticality. In addition, existing Technical Specification limits on
keff are maintained less than or equal to 0.95, even in the event
of a fuel handling accident. The new fuel vault design precludes
criticality by maintaining an effective multiplication factor less than
or equal to 0.95 when the racks are fully loaded and in the normal dry
condition or under full water density flooded conditions. The effective
multiplication factor is also less than or equal to 0.98 under optimum
moderation conditions. The new fuel vault is used to receive and store
new fuel in a dry condition upon arrival on site and prior to loading
in the reactor. Administrative controls encompass placing the
assemblies in the fuel inspection stand, performing inspection
activities, and lifting and placement of the assemblies into specified
locations in the new fuel vault.
The new fuel vault is protected from the effects of natural
phenomena, including earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and
external missiles. The auxiliary building which houses the new fuel
vault is designed to Seismic Class I by a dynamic analysis using
Response Spectrum and Modal Analysis Procedure to maintain structural
integrity after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) or following a
postulated hazard, such as fire, internal missiles, or pipe break. The
new fuel racks are designed to Seismic Class III by an analysis using
the procedures of the Uniform Building Code.
Both irradiated and unirradiated fuel is moved to and from the
reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool to accommodate refueling
operations. Also, unirradiated fuel can be moved to and from the new
fuel storage area. In addition, movements of fuel into the facility and
within the reactor vessel or within the spent fuel pool occur. Fuel
movements are procedurally controlled and designed to preclude
conditions involving criticality concerns. In addition, the Technical
Specifications specifically address the refueling operations and limit
the handling of fuel to ensure against an accidental criticality and to
preclude certain movements over the spent fuel pool and the reactor
vessel.
Based upon the information provided, there is reasonable assurance
that irradiated and unirradiated fuel will remain subcritical. The
circumstances for granting an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 are met because
criticality is precluded with the present design configuration,
Technical Specifications requirements, administrative controls, and the
fuel handling equipment and procedures. Therefore, the staff concludes
that the licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR 70.24 is acceptable and should be granted.
III.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Indiana
Michigan Power Company an exemption as described in Section II above
from 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality accident requirements,'' for D.C.
Cook, Units 1 and 2.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the
quality of the human environment (61 FR 39672).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of October 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-28054 Filed 10-31-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
