99-29474. Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 727 Series Airplanes Modified in Accordance With Supplemental Type Certificate SA1368SO, SA1797SO, or SA1798SO  

  • [Federal Register Volume 64, Number 218 (Friday, November 12, 1999)]
    [Proposed Rules]
    [Pages 61547-61554]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 99-29474]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    
    Federal Aviation Administration
    
    14 CFR Part 39
    
    [Docket No. 97-NM-233-AD]
    RIN 2120-AA64
    
    
    Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 727 Series Airplanes 
    Modified in Accordance With Supplemental Type Certificate SA1368SO, 
    SA1797SO, or SA1798SO
    
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
    
    ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
    
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    SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness 
    directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series 
    airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying 
    (``freighter'') configuration. This proposal would require, among other 
    actions, installation of a fail-safe hinge, redesigned main deck cargo 
    door warning and power control systems, and 9g cargo barrier. This 
    proposal is prompted by the FAA's determination that the main deck 
    cargo door hinge is not fail-safe; that certain main deck cargo door 
    control systems do not provide an adequate level of safety; and that 
    the main deck cargo barrier is not structurally adequate during an 
    emergency landing. The actions specified by the proposed AD are 
    intended to prevent structural failure of the main deck cargo door 
    hinge or failure of the cargo door system, which could result in the 
    loss or opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, 
    rapid decompression, and structural damage to the airplane; and to 
    prevent failure of the main deck cargo barrier during an emergency 
    landing, which could injure occupants.
    
    DATES: Comments must be received by December 27. 1999.
    
    ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation 
    Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, 
    Attention: Rules Docket No. 97-NM-233-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 
    Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location by 
    appointment only between the hours of 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through 
    Friday, except Federal holidays.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul Sconyers, Associate Manager, 
    Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ACE-117A, FAA, Small Airplane 
    Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, One Crown Center, 
    1895 Phoenix Boulevard, Suite 450, Atlanta, Georgia 30349; telephone 
    (770) 703-6076, fax (770) 703-6097.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    
    Comments Invited
    
        Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the 
    proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as 
    they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket Number 
    and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All 
    communications received on or before the closing date for comments, 
    specified above, will be considered before taking action on the 
    proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in 
    light of the comments received.
        Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, 
    economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All 
    comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing 
    date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested 
    persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with 
    the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.
        Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
    submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, 
    stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments 
    to Docket Number 97-NM-233-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and 
    returned to the commenter.
    
    Availability of NPRMs
    
        Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request 
    to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules 
    Docket No. 97-NM-233-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW, Renton, Washington 
    98055-4056.
    
    Discussion
    
        Supplemental Type Certificates (STC) SA1797SO and SA1368SO (held by 
    Aeronautical Engineers, Inc.) specify a design for a main deck cargo 
    door, associated cargo door cutout, and door systems. STC SA1798SO 
    (held by Aeronautical Engineers, Inc.) specifies a design for a Class 
    ``E'' cargo interior with a cargo barrier. As discussed in notice of 
    proposed rulemaking (NPRM), Rules Docket No. 97-NM-79-AD [the final 
    rule, AD 98-26-19, amendment 39-10962, was published in the Federal 
    Register on January 12, 1999 (64 FR 2016)], which is applicable to 
    certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes that have been converted from 
    a passenger to a cargo-carrying (``freighter'') configuration, the FAA 
    has conducted a design review of Boeing Model 727 series airplanes 
    modified in accordance with STC's SA1797SO and SA1798SO and has 
    identified several potential unsafe conditions. [Results of this design 
    review are contained in ``FAA Freighter Conversion STC Review, Report 
    Number 3, dated January 27, 1997,'' hereinafter referred to as ``the 
    Design Review Report,'' which is included in the Rules Docket for this 
    NPRM.] This NPRM proposes corrective action for three of those 
    potential unsafe conditions that relate to the following three areas: 
    Main deck cargo door hinge, main deck cargo door systems, and main deck 
    cargo barrier.
    
    Main Deck Cargo Door Hinge
    
        In order to avoid catastrophic structural failure, it has been a 
    typical industry approach to design outward opening cargo doors and 
    their attaching structure to be fail-safe (i.e., designed so that if a 
    single structural element fails, other structural elements are able to 
    carry resulting loads). Another potential design approach is safe-life, 
    where the critical structure is shown by analyses and/or tests to be 
    capable of withstanding the repeated loads of variable magnitude 
    expected in service for a specific service life. Safe-life is usually 
    not used on critical structure because it is difficult to account for 
    manufacturing or in-service accidental damage. For this reason, plus 
    the fact that none of the STC holders have provided data in support of 
    this approach, the safe-life approach will not be discussed further 
    regarding the design and construction of the main deck cargo door 
    hinge.
        Structural elements such as the main deck cargo door hinge are 
    subject to severe in-service operating conditions that could result in 
    corrosion, binding, or seizure of the hinge. These
    
    [[Page 61548]]
    
    conditions, in addition to the normal operational loads, can lead to 
    early and unpredictable fatigue cracking. If a main deck cargo door 
    hinge is not a fail-safe design, a fatigue crack could initiate and 
    propagate longitudinally undetected, which could lead to a complete 
    hinge failure. A possible consequence of this undetected failure is the 
    opening of the main deck cargo door while the airplane is in flight. 
    Service experience indicates that the opening of a cargo door while the 
    airplane is in flight can be extremely hazardous in a variety of ways 
    including possible loss of flight control, severe structural damage, or 
    rapid decompression, any of which, could lead to loss of the airplane.
        The design of the main deck cargo door hinge must be in compliance 
    with Civil Air Regulations (CAR) part 4b, including CAR part 4b.270, 
    which requires, in part, that catastrophic failure or excessive 
    structural deformation, which could adversely affect the flight 
    characteristics of the airplane, is not probable after fatigue failure 
    or obvious partial failure of a single principal structural element. 
    One common feature of a fail-safe hinge design is a division of the 
    hinge into multiple segments such that, following failure of any one 
    segment, the remaining segments would support the redistributed load.
        The main deck cargo door installed in accordance with STC's 
    SA1797SO and SA1368SO is supported by latches along the bottom of the 
    door and a two-segment hinge along the top. This two-segment hinge is 
    considered a critical structural element for these STC's. A crack that 
    initiates and propagates longitudinally along either segment of the 
    hinge will eventually result in failure of the entire hinge, because 
    the remaining segment of the hinge is unable to support the 
    redistributed loads. Failure of the entire hinge can result in the 
    opening of the main deck cargo door while the airplane is in flight.
        As discussed in the Design Review Report, an inspection of one 
    Boeing Model 727 series airplane modified in accordance with STC's 
    SA1797SO and SA1798SO revealed a number of fasteners with both short 
    edge margins and short spacing in the cargo door cutout external 
    doublers. Some edge margins were as small as one fastener diameter. 
    Fasteners that are placed too close to the edge of a structural member 
    or spaced too close to an adjacent fastener can result in inadequate 
    joint strength and stress concentrations, which may result in fatigue 
    cracking of the skin. If such defects were to exist in the structure of 
    the door or the fuselage to which the main deck cargo door hinge is 
    attached, the attachment of the hinge could fail, and consequently 
    cause the door to open while the airplane is in flight.
        Since unsafe conditions have been identified that are likely to 
    exist or develop on other products of this same type design, this 
    proposed AD would require, within 250 flight cycles after the effective 
    date of the AD, a one-time detailed visual inspection of the external 
    surface of the main deck cargo door hinge (both fuselage and door side 
    hinge elements) to detect cracks, and repair, if necessary. 
    Accomplishment of this inspection will ensure that the subject 
    airplanes are not in immediate risk of hinge failure.
        In addition, the proposed AD would require a detailed visual 
    inspection of the mating surfaces of both the hinge and the door skin 
    and external fuselage doubler underlying the hinge to detect cracks or 
    other discrepancies (e.g., double or closely drilled holes, corrosion, 
    chips, scratches, or gouges). The proposed AD also would require 
    installation of a main deck cargo door hinge that complies with the 
    applicable requirements of CAR part 4b, including fail-safe 
    requirements. Accomplishment of this detailed visual inspection will 
    ensure the integrity of the door and fuselage structure to which the 
    hinge is attached. The proposed compliance time for this inspection and 
    installation is within 36 months or 4,000 flight cycles after the 
    effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. The compliance time 
    is based on the FAA's assessment of the reasonable amount of time to 
    redesign, manufacture, and install a fail-safe hinge. This time is in 
    consideration of the 18-month time period estimated by the Boeing 727 
    industry working group, which includes operators, affected STC holders, 
    and engineering organizations, to develop FAA-approved redesigns. These 
    actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance with a 
    method approved by the FAA.
    
    Main Deck Cargo Door Systems
    
        In early 1989, two transport airplane accidents were attributed to 
    cargo doors coming open during flight. The first accident involved a 
    Boeing 747 series airplane in which the cargo door separated from the 
    airplane, and damaged the fuselage structure, engines, and passenger 
    cabin. The second accident involved a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 series 
    airplane in which the cargo door opened but did not separate from its 
    hinge. The open door disturbed the airflow over the empennage, which 
    resulted in loss of flight control and consequent loss of the airplane. 
    Although cargo doors have opened occasionally without mishap during 
    takeoff, these two accidents serve to highlight the extreme potential 
    dangers associated with the opening of a cargo door while the airplane 
    is in flight.
        As a result of these cargo door opening accidents, the Air 
    Transport Association (ATA) of America formed a task force, including 
    representatives of the FAA, to review the design, manufacture, 
    maintenance, and operation of airplanes fitted with outward opening 
    cargo doors, and to make recommendations to prevent inadvertent cargo 
    door openings while the airplane is in flight. A design working group 
    was tasked with reviewing 14 CFR part 25.783 [and its accompanying 
    Advisory Circular (AC) 25.783-1, dated December 10, 1986] with the 
    intent of clarifying its contents and recommending revisions to enhance 
    future cargo door designs. This design group also was tasked with 
    providing specific recommendations regarding design criteria to be 
    applied to existing outward opening cargo doors to ensure that 
    inadvertent openings would not occur in the current transport category 
    fleet of airplanes.
        The ATA task force made its recommendations in the ``ATA Cargo Door 
    Task Force Final Report,'' dated May 15, 1991 (hereinafter referred to 
    as ``the ATA Final Report''). On March 20, 1992, the FAA issued a 
    memorandum to the Director--Airworthiness and Technical Standards of 
    ATA (hereinafter referred to as ``the FAA Memorandum''), acknowledging 
    ATA's recommendations and providing additional guidance for purposes of 
    assessing the continuing airworthiness of existing designs of outward 
    opening doors. The FAA Memorandum was not intended to upgrade the 
    certification basis of the various airplanes, but rather to identify 
    criteria to evaluate potential unsafe conditions demonstrated on in-
    service airplanes. Appendix 1 of this AD contains the specific 
    paragraphs from the FAA Memorandum that set forth the criteria to which 
    the outward opening doors should be shown to comply.
        Applying the applicable requirements of CAR part 4b and design 
    criteria provided by the FAA Memorandum, the FAA has reviewed the 
    original type design of major transport airplanes, including Boeing 727 
    airplanes equipped with outward opening doors, for any design 
    deficiency or service difficulty. Based on that review, the FAA 
    identified unsafe conditions and issued, among others, the following 
    AD's:
    
    [[Page 61549]]
    
         For certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 series airplanes: 
    AD 89-11-02, amendment 39-6216 (54 FR 21416, May 18, 1989);
         For all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes: AD 90-09-06, 
    amendment 39-6581 (55 FR 15217, April 23, 1990);
         For certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 series airplanes: 
    AD 93-20-02, amendment 39-8709 (58 FR 471545, October 18, 1993);
         For certain Boeing Model 747-100 and -200 series 
    airplanes: AD 96-01-51, amendment 39-9492 (61 FR 1703, January 23, 
    1996); and
         For certain Boeing Model 727-100 and -200 series 
    airplanes: AD 96-16-08, amendment 39-9708 (61 FR 41733, August 12, 
    1996).
        Using the criteria specified in the ATA Final Report and the FAA 
    Memorandum as evaluation guides, the FAA conducted an engineering 
    design review and inspection of an airplane modified in accordance with 
    STC's SA1797SO and SA1798SO (held by Aeronautical Engineers, Inc.). The 
    FAA identified a number of unsafe conditions with the main deck cargo 
    door systems of these STC's. The FAA design review team determined that 
    the design data of these STC's did not include a safety analysis of the 
    main deck cargo door systems.
        For airplanes modified in accordance with STC SA1797SO, SA1798SO, 
    or SA1368SO, the FAA considers the following four specific design 
    deficiencies of the main deck cargo door systems to be unsafe:
    
    1. Indication System
    
        The main deck cargo door indication system for STC's SA1368SO and 
    SA1797SO uses warning lights at the door operator's control panel and a 
    light at the flight engineer's panel. These lights indicate the status 
    of the cargo door closed, latched and locked configurations. All three 
    conditions (i.e., door closed, latched, and locked) should be monitored 
    directly so that the door indication system cannot display either 
    ``latched'' before the door is closed or ``locked'' before the door is 
    latched. The latch and lock sensors are wired in parallel and are tied 
    to a single indicator light. This design can illuminate the ``locked 
    light'' on the control panel of the main deck cargo door even if the 
    latches are latched but not locked. If a sequencing error causes the 
    door to latch and lock without being fully closed, the subject 
    indication system, as designed, may not alert the door operator or the 
    flight engineer of this condition. As a result, the airplane could be 
    dispatched with the main deck cargo door unsecured, which could lead to 
    the cargo door opening while the airplane is in flight and possible 
    loss of the airplane.
        The light on the flight engineer's panel is labeled ``DOOR CARGO'' 
    and is displayed in red since it indicates an event that requires 
    immediate pilot action. However, if the flight engineer is temporarily 
    away from his station, a door unsafe warning indication could be missed 
    by the pilots. In addition, the flight engineer could miss such an 
    indication by not scanning the panel. As a result, the pilots and 
    flight engineer could be unaware of, or misinterpret, an unsafe 
    condition and could fail to respond in the correct manner. Therefore, 
    an indicator light should be located in front of and in plain view of 
    both pilots since one of the pilot's stations is always occupied during 
    flight operations.
        Based on the review of the electrical drawings of the door control 
    and door monitoring/annunication systems and observations from an 
    inspection of an airplane modified in accordance with the subject 
    STC's, the FAA concludes that latent failures (i.e., failures of system 
    components that are not monitored and would go undetected) in the 
    closed, latched, and locked functions may occur and lead to the main 
    deck cargo door opening during flight of the airplane.
        The FAA has determined that the main deck cargo door indication 
    system of STC's SA1368SO, and SA1797SO also does not meet the 
    improbable level of reliability regarding false indication that is 
    considered adequate for safe operation. Many components are exposed to 
    the environment during cargo loading operations and may be contaminated 
    by precipitation, dirt, and grease, or damaged by foreign objects or 
    cargo loading equipment. As a result, wires, switches, and relays can 
    fail, jam, or short circuit and cause a loss of indication or a false 
    indication to the door operator and flight crew. The design logic of 
    the indication system (i.e., lights which extinguish when the door is 
    locked) could, in the event of latent failures that would extinguish 
    the light, result in an erroneous ``safe'' indication regardless of 
    actual door status.
        STC's SA1368SO and SA1797SO lack a safety analysis of the main deck 
    cargo door systems. As a result, even though the light at the door 
    operator's control panel and the light at the flight engineer's panel 
    annunciate the status of closed, latched, and locked, a safety analysis 
    must be developed to show whether the design of the wiring of the main 
    deck cargo door monitoring system meets all FAA requirements.
    
    2. Means to Visually Inspect the Locking Mechanism
    
        The two view ports installed in accordance with STC's SA1797SO and 
    SA1368SO are located externally on the door for the purpose of viewing 
    locking pins at the No. 2 and No. 7 latch positions of the main deck 
    cargo door. These view ports are intended to allow the flight crew to 
    conduct a visual inspection of the cargo door locking mechanism to 
    determine whether the cargo door is closed, latched, and locked. The 
    view ports are used in conjunction with the door warning system and is 
    intended to provide a suitable back-up in the event that the main deck 
    cargo door warning system malfunctions.
        However, because of the location of these view ports on the main 
    deck cargo door, a visual inspection may not result in the detection of 
    certain failures (e.g., bending or shearing of locking pins), and 
    consequently the airplane could be dispatched with the main deck cargo 
    door unsecured. Therefore, the FAA finds that these view ports are not 
    a suitable back-up when the cargo door warning system malfunctions.
        As discussed in the ATA Final Report and the FAA Memorandum, there 
    must be a means of directly inspecting each lock or, at a minimum, the 
    locks at each end of the lock shaft of certain designs, such that a 
    failure condition in the lock shaft would be detectable.
    
    3. Means to Prevent Pressurization to an Unsafe Level
    
        Boeing 727-200 airplanes modified to install a cargo door in 
    accordance with STC SA1797SO are configured to utilize a mechanical 
    vent door for the purpose of preventing pressurization of the airplane 
    to an unsafe level in the event the main deck cargo door is not closed, 
    latched, and locked. However, Boeing 727-100 airplanes that have been 
    modified in accordance with STC SA1368SO do not have a vent door design 
    to prevent pressurization as part of the STC.
        The results of an FAA inspection of the vent door linkage revealed 
    that the linkage design could exhibit single failures that could cause 
    the vent door to malfunction. A complete safety analysis of the vent 
    door mechanical design is necessary to identify and correct all such 
    malfunctions. No single failure of the mechanisms can defeat the 
    intended function of the vent door system.
    
    4. Powered Lock Systems
    
        The main deck cargo door control system for STC's SA1368SO and
    
    [[Page 61550]]
    
    SA1797SO that utilizes electrical interlock switches is designed to 
    remove door control power (electrical and hydraulic) prior to flight 
    and to prevent inadvertent door openings. Failure modes have been found 
    in the electrical portion of the door control panel, which, in turn, 
    activates the door control hydraulics. The potential for the occurrence 
    of these failure conditions is increased by the harsh operating 
    environment of freighter airplanes. Door system components are 
    routinely exposed to precipitation, dirt, grease, and foreign object 
    intrusion, all of which increase the likelihood of damage. As a result, 
    wires, switches, and relays have a greater potential to fail or short 
    circuit in such a way as to allow the cargo door to be powered open 
    without an operator's command and regardless of electrical interlock 
    positions.
        A systems safety analysis would normally evaluate and resolve the 
    potential for these types of unsafe conditions. However, the FAA has 
    reviewed the design data for STC's SA1368SO and SA1797SO. The FAA finds 
    that the powered lock systems of the main deck cargo door do not comply 
    with criteria specified in Appendix 1 of this AD and considers the 
    design of these systems to be unsafe. The need for a system safety 
    analysis is identified in the ATA Final Report and the FAA Memorandum.
        Since unsafe conditions have been identified that are likely to 
    exist or develop on other products of this same type design, this 
    proposed AD would require, within 60 days after the effective date, 
    revising the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight 
    Manual (AFM) Supplement to provide the flight crew with procedures for 
    ensuring that the main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked 
    prior to dispatch of the airplane; and installing any associated 
    placards.
        In addition, the proposed AD would require, within 36 months after 
    the effective date of the AD, incorporation of redesigned main deck 
    cargo door systems (e.g., warning/monitoring, power control, view 
    ports, and means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the 
    main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked), including any 
    associated procedures and placards that comply with the applicable 
    requirements of CAR part 4b and design criteria of the ATA Final Report 
    and the FAA Memorandum. Design data provided in support of the door 
    systems re-design should include a Systems Safety Analysis and 
    Instructions for Continued Airworthiness that are acceptable to the 
    FAA. Accomplishment of the incorporation of redesigned main deck cargo 
    door systems will prevent rapid decompression and/or structural damage 
    to the airplane as a result of loss or opening of the cargo door while 
    the airplane is in flight. The compliance time is based on the FAA's 
    assessment of the reasonable amount of time to incorporate redesigned 
    main deck cargo door systems. This time is in consideration of the 18-
    month time period estimated by the Boeing 727 industry working group, 
    which includes operators, affected STC holders, and engineering 
    organizations, to develop FAA-approved redesigns.
        These actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance 
    with a method approved by the FAA.
    
    Cargo Barrier
    
        In order to ensure the safety of occupants during emergency landing 
    conditions, the FAA first established in 1934, a set of inertia load 
    factors used to design the structure for restraining items of mass in 
    the fuselage. Because the airplane landing speeds have increased over 
    the years as the fleet has transitioned from propeller to jet design, 
    inertia load factors were changed as specified in CAR part 4b.260. 
    Experience has shown that an airplane designed to this regulation has a 
    reasonable probability of protecting its occupants from serious injury 
    in an emergency landing. The 727 passenger airplane was designed to 
    these criteria which specified an ultimate inertia load requirement of 
    9g in the forward direction. These criteria were applied to the seats 
    and structure restraining the occupants, including the flight crew, as 
    well as other items of mass in the fuselage.
        When the 727 passenger airplane is converted to carry cargo on the 
    main deck, a cargo barrier is required, since most cargo containers and 
    the container-to-floor attaching devices are not designed to withstand 
    emergency landing loads. In fact, the FAA estimates that the container-
    to-floor attaching devices will only support approximately 1.5g's to 
    3g's in the forward direction. Without a 9g cargo barrier, it is 
    probable that the loads associated with an emergency landing would 
    cause the cargo to be unrestrained and impact the occupants of the 
    airplane, which could result in serious injury or death.
        The structural inadequacy of the cargo barrier was evident to the 
    FAA during its review in October 1997 of a Boeing 727 modified in 
    accordance with STC SA1798SO.
        The observations revealed that the design of the cargo barrier 
    floor attachment and circumferential supporting structure does not 
    provide adequate strength to withstand the 9g forward inertia load 
    generated by the main deck cargo mass, nor does it provide a load path 
    to effectively transfer the loads from the cargo barrier to the 
    fuselage structure of the airplane. These observations are supported by 
    data contained in ``ER 2785, Structural Substantiation of the 50k 9g 
    Bulkhead Restraint System in Support of STC SA1543SO PN 53-1292-401 for 
    the 9g Bulkhead 53-1980-300 Assembly with Upper Attachment Structure, 
    Lower Attachment Structure, Floor Shear Web Structure, Seat Track 
    Splice Fittings, Seat Tracks, and Seat Track Splices,'' dated September 
    29, 1996, by M. F. Daniel. Although this report was specific to STC 
    SA1543SO, the FAA has determined that the data are applicable to 
    airplane modified in accordance with STC ST00015AT because the design 
    principles for attachment of the barriers in both STC's are the same. 
    The report reveals that structural deficiencies were found in the net 
    attach plates and floor attachment structure of the cargo barrier. The 
    data show large negative margins of safety, which indicate that the 
    inertia load capability of the cargo barrier is closer to 2g than the 
    required 9g in the forward direction. From these analyses, it is 
    evident that the cargo barrier would not be capable of preventing 
    serious injury to the occupants during an emergency landing event with 
    the full allowable cargo load.
        Since unsafe conditions have been identified that are likely to 
    exist or develop on other products of this same type design, this 
    proposed AD would require installation of a main deck cargo barrier 
    that complies with the applicable requirements of CAR part 4b.
        Accomplishment of the installation will prevent serious injury to 
    the occupants in the event of an emergency landing. The proposed 
    compliance time for the installation is within 36 months or 4,000 
    flight cycles after the effective date of the AD, whichever occurs 
    first. This compliance time is based on the FAA's assessment of the 
    reasonable amount of time to redesign, manufacture, and install the 
    cargo barrier. This time is consistent with estimates by affected STC 
    holders and operators that necessary redesigns can by developed and 
    approved by the FAA within 12 to 18 months from August 1998.
    
    Regulatory Evaluation Summary
    
        The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct 
    effects on the States, on the relationship between the national 
    government and the States, or on the distribution of
    
    [[Page 61551]]
    
    power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. 
    Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined 
    that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to 
    warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
        This analysis examines the cost of this proposed AD that would 
    require the installation of a fail-safe hinge, redesigned main deck 
    cargo door warning and power control systems, and a 9g cargo barrier on 
    Boeing Model 727 series airplanes that have been modified in accordance 
    with STC's held by Aeronautical Engineers, Inc. (AEI). As discussed 
    above, the FAA has determined that the main deck cargo door hinge is 
    not fail-safe, that certain main deck cargo door control systems do not 
    provide an adequate level of safety, and that the main deck cargo 
    barrier is not structurally adequate during a minor crash landing.
        Approximately 72 U.S.-registered Boeing Model 727 series airplanes 
    would be affected by the proposed AD. The following discussion 
    addresses, in sequence, the actions in this proposed rulemaking and the 
    estimated cost associated with each of these actions. An analysis of 
    the cost is also available in Rules Docket No. 97-NM-233-AD.
    
    1. Main Deck Cargo Door Hinge
    
        Since unsafe conditions have been identified that are likely to 
    exist or develop on other modified Boeing Model 727 series airplanes, 
    paragraph (a) of the proposed AD would require, within 250 flight 
    cycles after the effective date of this AD, a one-time detailed visual 
    inspection to detect cracks of the external surface of the main deck 
    cargo door hinge. AEI estimates that this inspection would take 2 work 
    hours. At a mechanic's burdened labor rate of $60 per work hour, the 
    cost per airplane would be $120, or $8,640 for the 72 affected Boeing 
    Model 727 series airplanes.
        Paragraph (b)(1) of the proposed AD would require, within 36 months 
    or 4,000 cycles after the effective date of this AD, a detailed visual 
    inspection of the mating surfaces of both the hinge and the door skin 
    and external fuselage doubler underlying the hinge. The FAA estimates 
    that compliance with this inspection would take 200 hours at an 
    estimated cost of $12,000 per airplane, or $224,400 for the entire 
    affected fleet of 72 airplanes.
        Paragraph (b)(2) of the proposed AD would require installation of a 
    fail-safe door hinge. The compliance time for this installation also 
    would be 36 months, or 4,000 cycles after the effective date of this 
    AD. AEI estimates the cost to design and certificate such a hinge is 
    $25,000, that no parts for a fail-safe door hinge would be required, 
    and that the modification would take 50 hours. Total compliance costs 
    for this proposed provision for the affected fleet of 72 airplanes 
    would be $241,000.
        Paragraph (c) of the proposed AD would require that, if any cracks 
    or discrepancies are detected during the inspections required by 
    paragraph (a) or (b)(1) of the proposed AD, repairs must be made prior 
    to further flight. The cost of these repairs is not attributable to 
    this proposed AD.
        For purposes of this analysis, the FAA assumes an effective date of 
    July 1, 2000. The cost to comply with proposed paragraphs (a) through 
    (c) over the 36-month compliance period is $474,000 or $419,800 
    discounted to present value at 7 percent. The FAA assumes that the 
    installation of the main deck cargo door hinge [paragraph (b)(1)] would 
    be accomplished at the same time as the detailed visual inspection of 
    fastener holes [paragraph (b)(2)]. The FAA also assumes that the 
    affected carriers would perform these two activities uniformly 
    throughout the 36-month period. Finally, the certification cost for the 
    main deck cargo door hinge would be incurred within the first 6 months 
    after the effective date of the AD.
    
    2. Main Deck Cargo Door Systems
    
        Paragraph (d) of the proposed AD would require, within 60 days 
    after the effective date of this AD, a revision to the Limitations 
    Section of the FAA-approved AFM Supplement by inserting procedures to 
    ensure that the main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked 
    prior to dispatch of the airplane. In addition, paragraph (d) of the 
    proposed AD would require the installation of any associated placards.
        The FAA assumes that Boeing Model 727 series airplanes converted 
    under a AEI STC will have an acceptable pressurization vent door 
    installed, which operators could use to visually determine whether the 
    vent is in the proper position prior to dispatch, indicating that the 
    door is closed, latched, and locked. The FAA estimates that this 
    activity would take no more than 30 minutes. Assuming each affected 
    airplane flies one flight per day, 260 days per year, the estimated 
    cost per inspection would be $30, or $7,800 per airplane per year until 
    the door system is changed, a total of $982,800 over 36 months.
        Paragraph (e) of the proposed AD would require, within 36 months 
    after the effective date of this AD, incorporation of a redesigned main 
    deck cargo door system. The FAA estimates that the development and 
    certification of the system would cost $25,000. Modification parts 
    would cost $5,000 per airplane and labor costs would be $6,000 per 
    airplane for 100 hours. The FAA assumes that operators would 
    incorporate the redesigned main deck cargo door system during regularly 
    scheduled maintenance. The total costs of installing a redesigned main 
    deck cargo door system, including certification, parts, and labor would 
    be $817,000 over the 36-month period.
        The total estimated cost to comply with proposed requirements for 
    the main deck cargo door system is $1.8 million, or $1.7 million, 
    discounted to present value.
    
    3. Main Deck Cargo Barrier
    
        Paragraph (f) of the proposed AD would require, within 36 months or 
    4,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, installation 
    of a main deck cargo barrier that complies with the applicable 
    requirements of CAR part 4b. Ventura Aerospace holds an STC for an 
    approved 9g barrier, and the FAA estimates that operators whose 
    airplanes have been modified in accordance with AEI STC's would 
    purchase 9g barrier kits from Ventura Aerospace. The cost of a barrier 
    kit is $67,500. The FAA estimates that labor would cost $13,500 per 
    airplane and that an affected airplane would be out-of-service 3 
    additional days, at a cost of $15,000 per day, while this barrier is 
    installed.
        The FAA assumes that operators would install 9g barriers uniformly 
    over the 36-month compliance period. The total non-discounted cost to 
    comply with paragraph (g) of the proposed AD would be $9.1 million, or 
    $7.8 million discounted to present value.
    
    4. Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOC) and Special Flight Permits
    
        Paragraph (g) of the proposed AD would allow an AMOC or adjustment 
    of compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety if 
    approved by the Manager of the Atlanta ACO. The FAA is unable to 
    determine the cost of an AMOC, but assumes it would be less than the 
    cost of complying with the proposed provisions in paragraphs (a) 
    through (f) of the proposed AD.
        Paragraph (h) of the proposed AD would allow special flight permits 
    in accordance with the regulations to operate an affected airplane to a 
    location where the requirements of the proposed AD could be 
    accomplished.
    
    5. Total Cost of the Proposed AD
    
        The FAA estimates that the total compliance cost of the proposed AD
    
    [[Page 61552]]
    
    would be $11.3 million, or $10.0 million discounted to present value.
        The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 establishes ``as a 
    principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
    consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
    to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
    business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
    regulation. To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to 
    solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
    rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of small 
    entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and 
    small governmental jurisdictions.
        Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
    final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
    number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
    Agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
    the RFA. However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule 
    is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
    number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the 
    head of the agency may so certify and an RFA is not required. The 
    certification must include a statement providing the factual basis for 
    this determination, and the reasoning should be clear.
        The FAA estimates that 16 carriers operate airplanes that would be 
    affected by this proposed AD. Four of these operators are foreign 
    entities, 5 operators are large, and 7 operators are small, that is, 
    they employ fewer than 1,500 persons. The estimated total cost of the 
    proposed AD is $11.3 million, or approximately $157,600 for each of the 
    72 affected airplanes. Therefore, the FAA has determined that the 
    proposed rule would have a significant impact on a substantial number 
    of small entities and a regulatory flexibility analysis is required.
        Under Section 63(b) of the RFA, the analysis must address:
        1. Reasons why the agency is promulgating the rule;
        2. The objectives and legal basis for the rule;
        3. The kind and number of small entities to which the rule will 
    apply;
        4. The projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance 
    requirements of the rule; and
        5. All federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with 
    the rule.
    
    These elements of the RFA are addressed below.
    
    A. Reasons Why Agency Action Is Being Considered
    
        The FAA has determined that the main deck cargo door hinge is not 
    fail-safe; that certain main deck cargo door control systems do not 
    provide an adequate level of safety; and the main deck cargo barrier is 
    not structurally adequate during a minor crash landing. The actions 
    specified in the proposed AD are intended to prevent structural failure 
    of the main deck cargo door hinge or failure of the cargo door system, 
    which could result in the loss or opening of the cargo door while the 
    airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid decompression and/or 
    structural damage to the airplane; and to prevent failure of the main 
    deck cargo barrier during an emergency landing, which could injure 
    occupants.
    
    B. Statement of Objective and Legal Basis
    
        Under the United States Code (U.S.C), the FAA Administrator is 
    required to consider the following matter, among others, as being in 
    the public interest: assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and 
    security as the highest priorities in air commerce. [See 49 U.S.C. 
    Sec. 44101(d).] 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44701(a) provides broad rulemaking 
    authority to ``promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce.'' 
    Accordingly, this proposed AD will amend Title 14 of the Code of 
    Federal Regulations to require operators of Boeing Model 727 series 
    airplanes that have been converted from a passenger- to a cargo-
    carrying configuration to correct the identified unsafe condition.
    
    C. Kind and Number of Small Entities
    
        The RFA requires the FAA to determine whether or not a rule 
    significantly affects a substantial number of small entities. This 
    determination is typically based on small entity size and cost 
    thresholds that vary depending on the affected industry. The entities 
    affected by the rule are those operating U.S.-registered converted 
    Boeing Model 727 series airplanes. The FAA has determined that 
    approximately 7 of the 16 entities are small, i.e., employ fewer than 
    1,500 persons. These small entities operate between 1 and 9 affected 
    airplanes. Assuming the total costs of the proposed rule are divided 
    equally among the affected fleet of 62 airplanes, the costs per 
    airplane would be about $157,600. Therefore, the FAA has determined 
    that this proposed AD would significantly affect a substantial number 
    of small entities.
    
    D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
    Requirements
    
        With two minor exceptions, the rule will not mandate additional 
    reporting or recordkeeping. The proposed AD would require operators to 
    report results of the visual inspection of the main deck cargo door 
    hinge and the visual inspection of the fastener holes common to the 
    main deck cargo door hinge and underlying door and fuselage structure. 
    The cost of these reports is negligible.
    
    E. Overlapping, Duplicative, or Conflicting Federal Rules
    
        The rule will not overlap, duplicate, or conflict with existing 
    Federal rules.
    
    F. Analysis of Alternatives
    
        The FAA acknowledges that the rule will impose a financial 
    requirement on small entities. Therefore, the agency considered 
    alternatives to the proposed rule. These alternatives are:
         Exclude small entities; and
         Extend the compliance date for small entities.
        The FAA has determined that the option to exclude small entities 
    from the requirements of the rule is not justified. The unsafe 
    condition that exists on an affected Boeing Model 727 series airplane 
    operated by a small entity is as potentially catastrophic as that on an 
    affected Model 727 series airplane operated by a large entity.
        The FAA also considered options to extend the compliance period for 
    small operators. The Boeing 727 Freighter Industry Working Group, which 
    includes all affected U.S. operators (including small entities), 
    provided input on the incorporation of corrective actions for the door 
    hinge, door systems, and 9g barrier issues. The FAA initially proposed 
    a compliance time of 28 months, consistent with a related AD dealing 
    with the cargo floor structure on the same airplanes. The Industry 
    Working Group requested an extension to 36 months. Following review of 
    the Working Group's request, the FAA finds 36 months to be an 
    acceptable compliance time. Therefore, the FAA has, in fact, considered 
    and accepted this alternative and has accommodated small entity 
    concerns about compliance time.
        Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), 
    enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal 
    agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment 
    of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency 
    rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
    governments, in the aggregate, or by the
    
    [[Page 61553]]
    
    private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for 
    inflation) in any one year. Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 
    1534(a), requires the Federal agency to develop an effective process to 
    permit timely input by elected officers (or their designees) of State, 
    local, and tribal governments on a proposed ``significant 
    intergovernmental mandate.'' A ``significant intergovernmental 
    mandate'' under the Act is any provision in a Federal agency regulation 
    that would impose an enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal 
    governments, in the aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for 
    inflation) in any one year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, 
    which supplements section 204(a), provides that before establishing any 
    regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect 
    small governments, the agency shall have developed a plan that, among 
    other things, provides for notice to potentially affected small 
    governments, if any, and for a meaningful and timely opportunity to 
    provide input in the development of regulatory proposals.
        This proposed AD does not contain any Federal intergovernmental or 
    private sector mandate. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the 
    Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.
    
    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
    
        Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
    
    The Proposed Amendment
    
        Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
    Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 
    part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as 
    follows:
    
    PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
    
        1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
    
        Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
    
    
    Sec. 39.13  [Amended]
    
        2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new 
    airworthiness directive:
    
    Boeing: Docket 97-NM-233-AD.
    
        Applicability: Model 727 series airplanes that have been 
    converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying (``freighter'') 
    configuration in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 
    SA1368SO, SA1797SO, or SA1798SO; certificated in any category.
    
        Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the 
    preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been 
    otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the 
    requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, 
    altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of 
    this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an 
    alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (g) of 
    this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of 
    the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition 
    addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been 
    eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to 
    address it.
    
        Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
    previously.
        To prevent structural failure of the main deck cargo door hinge 
    or failure of the cargo door system, which could result in the loss 
    or opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, rapid 
    decompression, and structural damage to the airplane; and to prevent 
    failure of the main deck cargo barrier during an emergency landing, 
    which could injure occupants; accomplish the following:
    
    Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Door Hinge
    
        (a) Within 250 flight cycles after the effective date of this 
    AD, perform a detailed visual inspection of the external surface of 
    the main deck cargo door hinge (both fuselage and door side hinge 
    elements) to detect cracks.
    
        Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual 
    inspection is defined as: ``An intensive visual examination of a 
    specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to 
    detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is 
    normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at 
    intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such 
    as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning 
    and elaborate access procedures may be required.''
    
        (b) Within 36 months or 4,000 flight cycles after the effective 
    date of this AD, whichever occurs first, accomplish paragraphs 
    (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this AD.
        (1) Perform a detailed visual inspection of the mating surfaces 
    of both the hinge and the door skin and external fuselage doubler 
    underlying the hinge to detect cracks or other discrepancies (e.g., 
    double or closely drilled holes, corrosion, chips, scratches, or 
    gouges). The detailed visual inspection shall be accomplished in 
    accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft 
    Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. The 
    requirements of this paragraph may be accomplished prior to or 
    concurrently with the requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of this AD.
        (2) Install a main deck cargo door hinge that complies with the 
    applicable requirements of Civil Air Regulations (CAR) part 4b, 
    including fail-safe requirements, in accordance with a method 
    approved by the Manager, Atlanta ACO.
        (c) If any crack or discrepancy is detected during the detailed 
    visual inspection required by either paragraph (a) or (b)(1) of this 
    AD, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with a method 
    approved by the Manager, Atlanta ACO.
    
    Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Door Systems
    
        (d) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, revise 
    the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual 
    (AFM) Supplement by inserting therein procedures to ensure that the 
    main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked prior to 
    dispatch of the airplane, and install any associated placards. The 
    AFM revision procedures and installation of any associated placards 
    shall be accomplished in accordance with a method approved by the 
    Manager, Atlanta ACO.
        (e) Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD, 
    incorporate redesigned main deck cargo door systems (e.g., warning/
    monitoring, power control, view ports, and means to prevent 
    pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not 
    closed, latched, and locked), including any associated procedures 
    and placards, that comply with the applicable requirements of CAR 
    part 4b and criteria specified in Appendix 1 of this AD; in 
    accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Atlanta ACO.
    
        Note 3: The design data submitted for approval should include a 
    Systems Safety Analysis and Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
    that are acceptable to the Manager, Atlanta ACO.
    
    Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Barrier
    
        (f) Within 36 months or 4,000 flight cycles after the effective 
    date of this AD, whichever occurs first, install a main deck cargo 
    barrier that complies with the applicable requirements of CAR part 
    4.b, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Atlanta 
    ACO.
    
        Note 4: The maximum main deck total payload that can be carried 
    is limited to the lesser of the approved cargo barrier weight limit, 
    weight permitted by the approved maximum zero fuel weight, weight 
    permitted by the approved main deck position weights, weight 
    permitted by the approved main deck running load or distributed load 
    limitations, or approved cumulative zone or fuselage monocoque 
    structural loading limitations (including lower hold cargo).
    
        Note 5: Installation of a Ventura Aerospace Inc. cargo barrier 
    STC ST00848LA is an approved means of compliance with the 
    requirements of paragraph (f) of this AD.
    
        (g) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the 
    compliance time contained in this proposal that provides an 
    acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, 
    Atlanta ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an 
    appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add 
    comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO.
    
        Note 6: Information concerning the existence of approved 
    alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be 
    obtained from the Atlanta ACO.
    
        (h) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 
    sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
    CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to
    
    [[Page 61554]]
    
    a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
    
    Appendix 1
    
        Excerpt from an FAA Memorandum to the Director--Airworthiness 
    and Technical Standards of ATA, dated March 20, 1992.
        ``(1) Indication System:
        (a) The indication system must monitor the closed, latched, and 
    locked positions, directly.
        (b) The indicator should be amber unless it concerns an outward 
    opening door whose opening during takeoff could present an immediate 
    hazard to the airplane. In that case the indicator must be red and 
    located in plain view in front of the pilots. An aural warning is 
    also advisable. A display on the master caution/warning system is 
    also acceptable as an indicator. For the purpose of complying with 
    this paragraph, an immediate hazard is defined as significant 
    reduction in controllability, structural damage, or impact with 
    other structures, engines, or controls.
        (c) Loss of indication or a false indication of a closed, 
    latched, and locked condition must be improbable.
        (d) A warning indication must be provided at the door operators 
    station that monitors the door latched and locked conditions 
    directly, unless the operator has a visual indication that the door 
    is fully closed and locked. For example, a vent door that monitors 
    the door locks and can be seen from the operators station would meet 
    this requirement.
        (2) Means to Visually Inspect the Locking Mechanism:
        There must be a visual means of directly inspecting the locks. 
    Where all locks are tied to a common lock shaft, a means of 
    inspecting the locks at each end may be sufficient to meet this 
    requirement provided no failure condition in the lock shaft would go 
    undetected when viewing the end locks. Viewing latches may be used 
    as an alternate to viewing locks on some installations where there 
    are other compensating features.
        (3) Means to Prevent Pressurization: 
        All doors must have provisions to prevent initiation of 
    pressurization of the airplane to an unsafe level, if the door is 
    not fully closed, latched and locked.
        (4) Lock Strength: 
        Locks must be designed to withstand the maximum output power of 
    the actuators and maximum expected manual operating forces treated 
    as a limit load. Under these conditions, the door must remain 
    closed, latched and locked.
        (5) Power Availability: 
        All power to the door must be removed in flight and it must not 
    be possible for the flight crew to restore power to the door while 
    in flight.
        (6) Powered Lock Systems: 
        For doors that have powered lock systems, it must be shown by 
    safety analysis that inadvertent opening of the door after it is 
    fully closed, latched and locked, is extremely improbable.''
    
        Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 4, 1999.
    D. L. Riggin,
    Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
    Service.
    [FR Doc. 99-29474 Filed 11-10-99; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-U
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
11/12/1999
Department:
Federal Aviation Administration
Entry Type:
Proposed Rule
Action:
Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
Document Number:
99-29474
Dates:
Comments must be received by December 27. 1999.
Pages:
61547-61554 (8 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. 97-NM-233-AD
RINs:
2120-AA64: Airworthiness Directives
RIN Links:
https://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/2120-AA64/airworthiness-directives
PDF File:
99-29474.pdf
CFR: (2)
14 CFR 44101(d).]
14 CFR 39.13