[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 220 (Wednesday, November 13, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58257-58261]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-29007]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
All Power Reactor Licensees; Issuance of Final Director's
Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has
granted in part and denied in part a Petition, dated April 13, 1994,
submitted by Mr. Paul M. Blanch (Petitioner). The Petition requested
that the NRC take action with regard to all power reactor licensees,
concerning the potential failure of the fuel in the spent fuel pools
for all reactors in the United States. Specifically, the Petitioner
requested that the NRC: (1) immediately issue an information notice or
other appropriate notification forwarding all information in its
possession to all power reactor licensees regarding the potential
failure of fuel in spent fuel pools, and reminding licensees of their
responsibilities to perform timely operability determinations in
accordance with their technical specifications and NRC Generic Letter
91-18; (2) direct each licensee to immediately perform an evaluation of
this potential deficiency to determine compliance with its current
licensing basis; (3) deny all requests for license amendments for the
expansion of spent fuel pool capacity until these safety concerns are
fully resolved; and (4) after evaluation by each licensee, if the NRC
determines there is little or no risk to public health and safety, the
NRC may issue a Notice of Enforcement Discretion. Request (3) was
determined to be a request for a licensing action and so was beyond the
scope of 10 CFR 2.206.
The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
granted in part Requests (1) and (2) of the April 13, 1994, Petition.
With regard to Petitioner's Request (4), the Director has concluded
that there has been no need for issuance of NOEDs regarding potential
failure of fuel in spent fuel pools. The reasons for these decisions
are explained in the ``Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206''
(DD-96-18), the complete text of which follows this notice, and which
is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at
the local public document room for all power reactor licensees.
A copy of this Final Director's Decision has been filed with the
Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided in this
regulation, this Decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after the date of its issuance, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the Decision within
that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of November 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
By a Petition submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 on April 13, 1994,
Mr. Paul M. Blanch (Petitioner) requested that the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) take immediate action with regard to all
power reactor
[[Page 58258]]
Licensees, concerning the potential failure of the fuel in the spent
fuel pools for all reactors in the United States. Specifically, the
Petitioner requested that the NRC: (1) immediately issue an information
notice or other appropriate notification forwarding all information in
its possession to all power reactor Licensees regarding the potential
failure of fuel in spent fuel pools, and reminding Licensees of their
responsibilities to perform timely operability determinations in
accordance with their technical specifications and NRC Generic Letter
91-18; (2) direct each Licensee to immediately perform an evaluation of
this potential deficiency to determine compliance with its current
licensing basis; (3) deny all requests for license amendments for the
expansion of spent fuel pool capacity until these safety concerns are
fully resolved;1 and (4) after evaluation by each Licensee, if the
NRC determines there is little or no risk to public health and safety,
the NRC may issue a Notice of Enforcement Discretion which represents a
determination by the NRC not to enforce an applicable technical
specification or license condition.
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\1\ This request by Petitioner is not within the scope of the
2.206 process as it does not request enforcement action as is more
fully discussed in my letter transmitting this Director's Decision
to Petitioner. Accordingly, it will not be further addressed in this
Director's Decision.
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As a basis for his requests, the Petitioner asserted that
approximately 1\1/2\ years before the Petition was submitted, the NRC
was informed of a potential substantial nuclear safety hazard at the
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) operated by Pennsylvania
Power and Light Company (PP&L or Licensee) and that the NRC overlooked
the need to inform utilities of this potential problem. The Petitioner
claimed that this hazard involves a major design flaw such that, during
a design-basis loss-of-coolant-accident, the electrical power to the
fuel pool cooling system would be turned off, resulting in loss of
cooling for the spent fuel pool. Petitioner alleged that, as a result
of the loss-of-coolant-accident, radiation levels in the reactor
building would prohibit operators from entering the reactor building to
restart the system. Petitioner claimed that, if cooling is not
restored, the water in the spent fuel pool will boil, water will
evaporate and, since the valves which must be opened to provide
replacement water are located within the inaccessible reactor building,
replacement water cannot be provided. Petitioner postulated that this
would result in high onsite and offsite radiation levels and a failure
of the spent fuel in the pool and a consequent release of massive
amounts of airborne radioactivity outside of primary and secondary
containment. Petitioner alleged further that the residual heat removal
system could not cool the fuel pool under accident conditions, and that
if replacement water could be provided, temperature and humidity
conditions inside the reactor building would cause the emergency
systems to fail, resulting in additional fuel failure and failure of
the primary and secondary containment.
In a letter of May 5, 1994, the Director of the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation acknowledged receipt of the Petition and denied the
Petitioner's requests for immediate relief. In the acknowledgement
letter, he informed the Petitioner that the remaining requests were
being evaluated under 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations and
that action would be taken in a reasonable time.
The NRC staff's review of the issues related to spent fuel storage
pool safety raised in the April 13, 1994, Petition is now complete. As
explained below, the NRC staff has taken actions which, in part,
address Petitioner's requests. A discussion of these issues and the NRC
response to the Petitioner's requests follows.
II. Discussion
On November 27, 1992, a report was filed pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21
by two contract engineers at SSES, which notified the Commission of
potential design deficiencies in spent fuel pool decay heat removal
systems and containment systems at the Susquehanna Steam Electric
Station. The report noted that, under certain conditions, systems
designed to remove decay heat from the spent fuel pool would be unable
to perform their intended function and that, due to concurrent plant
conditions, it would not be possible for operators to place backup
systems in service or that backup systems would also otherwise be
unable to perform their intended function. The report contended that,
under such conditions, the spent fuel pool could reach boiling
conditions and that the adverse environment created by a boiling pool
would render systems designed to remove decay heat from the reactor
core and systems designed to limit the release of fission products to
the environment unable to perform their intended function. The ultimate
consequence of this condition would be the failure of fuel in both the
reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool and a substantial release of
fission products to the environment that would cause significant harm
to the public health and safety.
The NRC staff determined initially that the issues appeared to be
of low safety significance because of the low probability that the
necessary sequence of events would take place. Specifically, the NRC
staff observed that a loss-of-coolant accident followed by multiple
failures of emergency core cooling systems would be necessary to
achieve the adverse radiological conditions that would preclude
operator actions to ensure continued adequate decay heat removal from
the spent fuel pool. On this basis, the NRC staff determined that
immediate actions to assure public health and safety were not
warranted.
However, because of the complex nature of the issues raised in the
Part 21 report, the NRC staff undertook an extensive evaluation of the
matter which continued from November 1992 to June 1995. The NRC staff
review process included information-gathering trips to the Licensee's
engineering offices and to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
(SSES), public meetings with the Licensee, public meetings and written
correspondence with the authors of the Part 21 report, and numerous
written requests for information to the Licensee and corresponding
responses. The staff issued Information Notice 93-83, ``Potential Loss
of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident,'' on
October 7, 1993, which informed licensees of all operating reactors of
the nature of the issues raised in the Part 21 report.
The NRC staff reviewed and evaluated the plant design and expected
operation of plant equipment with respect to the various event
sequences described in the Part 21 report. The staff also evaluated the
response of plant equipment to a broader range of initiating events
than was identified in the Part 21 report. For example, the staff
considered the safety significance of a loss of spent fuel pool decay
heat removal capability resulting from loss of offsite power events,
from seismic events, and from flooding events. The staff considered the
potential for such events to lead to spent fuel pool boiling sequences
that could in turn jeopardize safety-related equipment needed to
maintain reactor core cooling. The NRC staff conducted both
deterministic and probabilistic evaluations to fully understand the
safety significance of the issues raised. In addition, the staff
evaluated the impact of certain modifications made by the Licensee
during the course of the NRC staff's review. Finally, the staff
examined
[[Page 58259]]
issues associated with the design of the spent fuel pool cooling system
to determine the extent to which the Licensee's design and operation
met the applicable regulatory requirements.
The NRC staff issued a draft safety evaluation addressing the
issues raised in the Part 21 report regarding SSES for comment on
October 25, 1994. After receiving comments from the Licensee, the
authors of the Part 21 report and the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards, the staff issued a final safety evaluation regarding the
issues raised in the Part 21 report for the Susquehanna Steam Electric
Station on June 19, 1995 (SSES SE).2
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\2\ Letter to R. Byram, PP&L, from J. Stolz, NRC, ``Susquehanna
Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation Regarding
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Issues'' (TAC NO. M85337), dated June 19,
1995.
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In the SSES SE, the staff documented the deterministic and
probabilistic evaluations regarding the spent fuel pool issues raised
in the Part 21 report and resulting conclusions. On the basis of the
deterministic analysis of the plant as it was configured at the time
the SSES SE was prepared, the NRC staff concluded that systems used to
cool the spent fuel storage pool are adequate to prevent unacceptable
challenges to safety-related systems needed to protect the health and
safety of the public during design-basis accidents.
On the basis of the probabilistic evaluation, the NRC staff
concluded that the specific scenario involving a large radionuclide
release from the reactor vessel, which was described in the Part 21
report, is a sequence of very low probability. The NRC staff's
evaluation concluded that, even with consideration of the additional
initiating events described above, ``loss of spent fuel pool cooling
events'' represented events of low safety significance at the time the
Part 21 report was submitted. However, the staff also concluded that
the plant modifications and procedural upgrades made during the course
of the staff's review, which included removal of the gates that
separate the spent fuel storage pools from the common cask storage pit,
installation of remote spent fuel pool temperature and level indication
in the control room, and numerous procedural upgrades, provided a
measurable improvement in plant safety and that these conclusions had
potential generic implications. In summary, with regard to loss of
spent fuel pool cooling events, the design of the SSES facility was
adequate to protect public health and safety.
The staff issued Information Notice 93-83, Supplement 1,
``Potential Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling After a Loss-of-Coolant
Accident or a Loss of Offsite Power,'' to all power reactor licensees
on August 24, 1995, in which the SSES SE was summarized. The
information notice also described the staff's plans to undertake an
action plan to evaluate the generic concerns raised in the SSES SE and
to address certain additional concerns arising from a special
inspection at a permanently shutdown reactor facility.3 The
generic action plan, entitled ``Task Action Plan for Spent Fuel Storage
Pool Safety'' (Task Action Plan) was issued on October 13, 1994, and
included the following actions: (1) a search for and analysis of
information regarding spent fuel storage pool issues, (2) an assessment
of the operation and design of spent fuel storage pools at selected
reactor facilities, (3) an evaluation of the assessment findings for
safety concerns, and (4) selection and execution of an appropriate
course of action based on the safety significance of the findings.
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\3\ On January 25, 1994, the licensee for Dresden Unit 1, a
permanently shutdown facility, discovered approximately 55,000
gallons of water in the basement of the unheated Unit 1 containment.
The water originated from a rupture of the service water system that
occurred due to freeze damage. The licensee investigated further and
found that, although the fuel transfer system was not damaged, there
was a potential for a portion of the fuel transfer system inside
containment to fail and result in a partial drain-down of the spent
fuel pool that contained 660 spent fuel assemblies. The NRC issued
Bulletin 94-01, ``Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate
Maintenance Practices at Dresden Unit 1,'' on April 8, 1994 to all
licensees with permanently shutdown reactors who had spent fuel
stored in spent fuel pools. The NRC requested that such licensees
take certain actions to ensure that spent fuel storage safety did
not become degraded.
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As part of its review under the Task Action Plan, the staff
performed assessment visits to four operating reactors. The staff also
reviewed operating experience, as documented in Licensee Event Reports
and other information sources, as well as in previous studies of spent
fuel pool issues. Finally, the staff gathered detailed design data for
every operating reactor and analyzed this data to identify potential
safety issues.
The NRC staff completed its work under the Task Action Plan in July
1996. The staff forwarded the results of its review to the Commission
on July 26, 1996.4 In the report, the staff concluded that
existing spent fuel storage pool structures, systems, and components
provide adequate protection for public health and safety. Protection is
provided by several layers of defense involving accident prevention
(e.g., quality controls on design, construction, and operation),
accident mitigation (e.g., multiple cooling systems and multiple makeup
water paths), radiation protection, and emergency preparedness. Design
features addressing each of these areas for spent fuel storage for each
operating reactor have been reviewed and approved by the staff. In
addition, the limited risk analyses available for spent fuel storage
suggest that current design features and operational constraints cause
issues related to spent fuel pool storage to be a small fraction of the
overall risk associated with an operating light-water reactor.
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\4\ Memorandum to the Commission, from J. Taylor, ``Resolution
of Spent Fuel Storage Pool Action Plan Issues,'' dated July 26,
1996.
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Notwithstanding the findings resulting from the Task Action Plan,
the NRC staff reviewed each operating reactor's spent fuel pool design
to identify strengths and weaknesses, and to identify potential areas
for safety enhancements. The NRC staff identified seven categories of
design features that reduce the reliability of spent fuel pool decay
heat removal, increase the potential for loss of spent fuel coolant
inventory, or increase the potential for consequential loss of
essential safety functions at an operating reactor. The NRC staff
determined that these design features existed at twenty-two sites.
As the staff has concluded that present facility designs provide
adequate protection of public health and safety, possible safety
enhancements will be evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3). The
analyses for possible safety enhancement backfits will consider whether
modifications to the plant design to address the plant-specific design
features identified by the NRC staff could provide a substantial
increase in the overall protection of public health and safety and
whether such modifications could be justified on a cost-benefit basis.
The NRC staff also identified three additional categories of design
features that may have the potential to reduce the reliability of spent
fuel pool decay heat removal, increase the potential for loss of spent
fuel coolant inventory, or increase the potential for consequential
loss of essential safety functions at an operating reactor. The NRC
staff preliminarily determined that these design features existed at
eleven sites. However, the staff has insufficient information at this
time to determine whether backfits pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3) are
warranted. For plants identified as having design features in these
three categories, the NRC staff will gather and evaluate additional
information prior to determining whether to require any backfits.
In addition to the plant-specific analyses described above for
twenty-two
[[Page 58260]]
sites which will address certain design features, the NRC staff plans
to address issues relating to the functional performance of spent fuel
pool decay heat removal, as well as the operational aspects related to
coolant inventory control and reactivity control, for all operating
reactors. The staff plans to expand the proposed, performance-based
rule for shutdown operations at nuclear power plants (10 CFR 50.67) to
encompass fuel storage pool operations to address these performance and
operational considerations.
The NRC staff has sent the July 26, 1996, report to all licensees.
For those licensees whose plants have one or more of the design
features which warrant an analysis of possible plant-specific safety
enhancements, the staff has provided an opportunity for licensees to
comment on (1) the accuracy of the NRC staff's understanding of the
plant design, (2) the safety significance of the design concern, (3)
the cost of potential modifications to address the design concern, or
(4) the existing protection from the design concern provided by
administrative controls or other means. In developing a schedule and
plans for conducting the plant-specific regulatory analyses, the NRC
staff will consider comments received from licensees.
III. Response to Petitioner's Requests
A. Issuance of Generic Communications to Licensees on Failure of Spent
Fuel
The NRC staff has issued three information notices on matters
related to adequate decay heat removal from the spent fuel pool.
Information Notice 93-83, ``Potential Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident,'' was issued on October 7, 1993, and
described the concerns raised in the November 27, 1992, Part 21 report.
Information Notice 93-83, Supplement 1, was issued on August 24, 1995,
to inform licensees of the results of the NRC review of the concerns at
SSES. Information Notice (IN) 95-54, ``Decay Heat Management Practices
During Refueling Outages,'' was issued on December 1, 1995. It
described recent NRC assessments of events at certain plants regarding
licensee control of refueling operations and the methods for removing
decay heat produced from the irradiated fuel stored in the spent fuel
pool during refueling outages. In IN 95-54, the NRC staff communicated
to licensees that the plant-specific events described in IN 95-54 and
the previous information notices illustrated the importance of assuring
that (1) planned core offload evolutions, including refueling practices
and irradiated decay heat removal, are consistent with the licensing
basis, including the Final Safety Analysis Report, technical
specifications, and license conditions; (2) changes are evaluated
through the application of the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, as
appropriate; and (3) all relevant procedures associated with core
offloads have been appropriately reviewed.
As described in Section II, the NRC staff also forwarded the July
26, 1996, report on spent fuel to all licensees. The NRC has determined
that these generic communications to power reactor licensees are
sufficient to provide licensees with information on spent fuel pool
cooling issues.
Petitioner's request that the NRC issue an information notice or
other appropriate notification forwarding all information in its
possession to all power reactor licensees regarding the potential
failure of fuel in spent fuel pools is granted to the extent that the
NRC staff has provided information on spent fuel storage safety issues
by way of the generic communications and correspondence described
above.
Petitioner's request that the NRC remind licensees of their
responsibilities to perform timely operability determinations in
accordance with their technical specifications is granted to the extent
that the NRC has communicated to licensees the importance of conducting
relevant spent fuel pool decay heat removal activities in accordance
with technical specifications and other plant-specific applicable
regulatory requirements in IN 95-54.
B. Licensee Evaluation of Compliance With the Licensing Basis
Petitioner requested that the staff direct each licensee to
immediately perform an evaluation of the potential failure of the fuel
in the spent fuel pool to determine compliance with the current
licensing basis. The NRC staff examined the issue of the conformance of
the existing plant design with the facility licensing basis in great
detail for SSES.5 As documented in the SSES SE, the NRC staff
concluded that neither operation of spent fuel pool cooling during
design-basis accident conditions nor mitigation of the effects of a
loss of spent fuel pool cooling during normal and design-basis accident
conditions could be considered part of the SSES licensing basis with
the exception of mitigation of loss of spent fuel pool cooling
following a design-basis seismic event. In general, the NRC staff's
conclusion is based on the fact that, with respect to operation of the
spent fuel pool cooling systems during normal and design-basis accident
conditions, the SSES operating license safety evaluation report 6
(SER) did not cite the applicable General Design Criteria (GDC) (GDC 44
and GDC 61 in its entirety) as the basis for finding the system
acceptable. With respect to the mitigation of the effects of a loss of
spent fuel pool cooling during normal and design-basis accident
conditions, in the SSES SE, the staff found no evidence that it
expected secondary containment systems to accommodate the added heat
and vapor loads that would follow a sustained loss of spent fuel pool
cooling for any design-basis event with the specific exception of a
design-basis seismic event.
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\5\ In the SSES spent fuel pool design review, the NRC staff
determined which regulations the licensee was required to comply
with. In addition, operational limitations were extracted from
plant-specific licensing documents including the Final Safety
Analysis Report, technical specifications, license amendments and
other docketed correspondence.
\6\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ``Safety Evaluation
Report Related to the Operation of Susquehanna Steam Electric
Station, Units 1 and 2,'' NUREG-0776, April 1981.
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The NRC staff's finding that mitigation of a loss of spent fuel
pool cooling following a design basis seismic event was part of the
licensing basis was based on specific statements in the SER that
acceptance of a non-seismic spent fuel pool cooling system was an
acceptable deviation from GDC 2, based, in part, on the existence of an
adequate standby gas treatment system. At the time of the original
licensing review, the staff did not attempt to extend the licensing
basis for loss of spent fuel pool cooling following a design basis
seismic event to any other design basis events.
During its review of spent fuel pool concerns at SSES, the NRC
staff raised its concerns to the Licensee regarding the ability to
mitigate a loss of spent fuel pool cooling following a seismic event.
As discussed in the SSES SE, the Licensee took certain actions,
including implementing routine operation of the adjacent spent fuel
pools in a cross-connected manner, that adequately addressed NRC staff
concerns. In summary, with regard to the spent fuel pool issues raised
by Petitioner, SSES design and operation conform to the facility
licensing basis.
As part of the Task Action Plan, the staff considered on a generic
basis the history of regulatory requirements related to spent fuel
pools as they were applied in plant licensing activities. The staff
observed that such regulatory requirements evolved since the first
nuclear power plants were licensed and
[[Page 58261]]
observed that specific regulatory guidance on the design of spent fuel
pool cooling systems was not issued until 1975 when the Standard Review
Plan was issued, after construction permits for most currently
operating reactors were issued. Because the regulatory requirements
were not constant during the era when the staff was conducting
licensing reviews for the current generation of operating reactors, the
staff observed that approved designs varied from plant to plant.
However, the staff did conclude, based on information available during
the recent review of spent fuel pool system design, that all operating
reactors had design features for spent fuel storage (addressing
accident prevention functions, accident mitigation functions, radiation
protection functions, and emergency preparedness functions) which had
been reviewed and approved by the staff and that these facility designs
were in compliance with the NRC requirements applied at the time of
licensing.
Although the NRC staff concluded that plants were in compliance
with the NRC design requirements applied at the time of licensing, the
NRC staff also recently reviewed certain operating practices at all
operating reactors to verify that the plants were being operated
consistent with the plant design described in the licensing basis.
7 Specifically, the staff reviewed refueling outage practices with
regard to offloading irradiated fuel into the spent fuel pool. The
staff concluded on the basis of the information collected and reviewed
and the specific licensee actions taken and commitments made during the
course of this review, core offload practices are currently consistent
with the spent fuel pool decay heat removal licensing basis for all
plants or will be prior to the next refueling outage. However, during
the course of the review, the staff determined that 9 sites (15 units)
needed to perform evaluations or make modifications, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.59 or 10 CFR 50.90, to ensure that their reload practices adhered to
their licensing basis. This is an indication that these plants may have
previously performed full core offloads inconsistent with their
licensing basis.
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\7\ Memorandum to the Commission, from J. Taylor, dated May 21,
1996.
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The staff has documented the details of its findings in recent NRC
inspection reports for each of the nine sites. The staff will take
regulatory action, as appropriate, to address these potential
operational non-conformances.
Petitioner requested that evaluations be performed of Petitioner's
concern regarding spent fuel pool cooling by licensees to determine
compliance with their licensing basis. This request is granted to the
extent that the NRC staff has performed evaluations of both the design
and operational aspects of spent fuel pool storage issues for all
operating reactors to the extent described above.
C. Issuance of Notices of Enforcement Discretion
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, (the Act) and the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, give NRC the authority to take
enforcement actions necessary to ensure compliance with certain
provisions of those Acts and with NRC regulations, orders, and
licenses. Licenses include specified license conditions and facility
technical specifications which are part of the license. The NRC's
enforcement policy is published in NUREG-1600, ``General Statement of
Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,'' July 1995
(Enforcement Policy).
The Enforcement Policy recognizes that, on occasion, circumstances
may arise concerning a licensee's compliance with a Technical
Specification Limiting Condition for Operation or with some other
license conditions which would involve an unnecessary plant transient
or the performance of plant testing that is inappropriate for the
specific plant conditions. For such occasions, the Enforcement Policy
provides a process, referred to as a Notice of Enforcement Discretion
(NOED), by which the NRC staff, upon request from the licensee, may
choose not to enforce compliance with the applicable technical
specifications or license conditions in limited circumstances. A NOED
will only be issued if the NRC staff is satisfied that the action is
consistent with public health and safety.
In Request 4, Petitioner seems to suggest that the exercise of
enforcement discretion by issuance of a NOED may be appropriate
concerning spent fuel pool issues raised in the Petition. As discussed
in Section B, with regard to potential failure of fuel in spent fuel
pools, the NRC staff has determined that spent fuel pools contain
design features which were reviewed and approved by the staff. In
addition, these facility designs have been found to be in compliance
with NRC requirements applied at the time of licensing. Based upon the
review of the information provided in the Petition, the NRC staff has
not identified any circumstances warranting the issuance of a NOED. If
a situation is presented to the staff involving a request for a NOED,
such a request will be considered in accordance with the Enforcement
Policy.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the NRC staff's evaluation described above, the NRC staff
has issued generic communications responsive to Petitioner's Request 1.
In addition, the NRC staff has reviewed the aspect of compliance of
NRC-licensed facilities in the area of spent fuel pool design
responsive in part to Petitioner's Request 2. To this extent, the
Petition is granted. With regard to Petitioner's Request 4, the NRC
staff has concluded that there has been no need for issuance of NOEDs
regarding potential failure of fuel in spent fuel pools.
A copy of this Final Director's Decision will be placed in the
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,
NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room for all
power reactor licensees.
A copy of this Final Director's Decision will also be filed with
the Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's Regulations. This Decision will become the
final action of the Commission 25 days after its issuance, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the Decision within
that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of November 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-29007 Filed 11-12-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
