[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 220 (Friday, November 14, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61099-61103]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-30005]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Savannah River Operations Office
Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River
Site
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Supplemental record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage certain nuclear
materials at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina,
until decisions on their future use or ultimate disposition are made
and implemented. Some of the particular materials considered in the EIS
could present
[[Page 61100]]
environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage
condition.
On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and
Notice of Preferred Alternatives, 60 FR 65300 (December 19, 1995), on
the interim management of several categories of nuclear materials at
the SRS. That ROD announced DOE's decision to stabilize plutonium and
uranium stored in vaults using a combination of four methods that were
fully analyzed in the Final EIS: (1) Improving Storage, (2) Processing
to Metal, (3) Processing to Oxide, and (4) Vitrification (F-Canyon).
DOE also announced a narrowing of alternatives under consideration for
the stabilization of plutonium-239 and neptunium-237 solutions in H-
Canyon, and obsolete neptunium targets in K-Reactor.
On September 6, 1996, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD (61 FR 48474,
September 13, 1996) to stabilize the H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions
to metal using the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities, and to stabilize
the H-Canyon neptunium-237 solution and obsolete neptunium targets
(stored in K-Reactor) to glass using the F-Canyon vitrification
capability.
Now, after further review of the plutonium and uranium materials
stored in vaults, and considering DOE's recent adoption of a phased
canyon strategy for current and potential nuclear material management
missions, DOE has decided to: (1) add an additional method, Processing
and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility
(DWPF), to those being implemented for the management of plutonium and
uranium stored in vaults; and (2) amend its September 6, 1996, ROD to
stabilize the plutonium-239 and neptunium-237 solutions stored in H-
Canyon and obsolete neptunium-237 targets stored in K-Reactor to oxide
forms using the H-Canyon facilities. These management methods were
fully analyzed in the Final EIS.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: This is the fourth ROD to be issued to
supplement the initial ROD for the interim management of nuclear
materials at the SRS. (See 61 FR 6633 (February 21, 1996); 61 FR 48474
(September 13, 1996); 62 FR 17790 (April 11, 1997).) For further
information on the interim management of nuclear materials at the SRS
or to receive a copy of the Final EIS, the initial ROD and Notice, or
the supplemental RODs contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA Compliance
Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office,
Building 773-42A, Room 212, Aiken, South Carolina 29802, (800) 881-
7292, Internet: drew.grainger@srs.gov.
For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy 1000
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or
leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared the final
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage certain nuclear
materials at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina,
until decisions on their future use or ultimate disposition are made
and implemented. Some of the particular materials considered in the EIS
could present environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their
current storage condition.
The Final EIS identified Improving Storage, Processing to Metal,
Processing to Oxide, and Vitrification (F-Canyon) using a combination
of the F-Canyon, FB-Line, H-Canyon, HB-Line, and the to-be-constructed
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) as the preferred
alternative for managing the plutonium and uranium stored in vaults.
The Final EIS identified Processing to Oxide, in conjunction with using
the APSF, as the preferred alternative for managing the plutonium-239
and neptunium-237 solutions and obsolete neptunium targets.
On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a ROD and Notice of Preferred
Alternatives (60 FR 65300) on the interim management of several
categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. DOE decided to stabilize
plutonium and uranium stored in vaults using a combination of four
management methods: (1) Improving Storage, (2) Processing to Metal, (3)
Processing to Oxide, and (4) Vitrification (F-Canyon). The amount of
materials stabilized using each of the methods would be dependent upon:
(a) the physical condition and chemical composition of the material
(which DOE will determine upon opening each of the containers or
packages inside a glove box in either FB-Line or HB-Line) and (b) the
availability of the required facilities.
On February 8, 1996, DOE issued a supplemental ROD (61 FR 6633) for
the stabilization of two of the remaining categories of nuclear
materials (Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets)
analyzed in the Final EIS.
After considering a DOE staff study and recommendation on canyon
facility utilization, DOE issued a second supplemental ROD on September
6, 1996 (61 FR 48474), for the stabilization of the neptunium-237
solution and obsolete neptunium targets, and plutonium-239 solutions.
On April 2, 1997, DOE issued a third supplemental ROD (62 FR 17790)
for the stabilization of the remaining Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR)
spent nuclear fuel (62 canisters, containing approximately 310 rods).
These fuel rods were believed to be stable when the Final EIS and
initial ROD were issued. However, given new evidence of apparent
cladding failure from at least two canisters, and the fuel's storage,
handling, and transportation history, DOE decided to stabilize in the
F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities the remaining TRR fuel in the same
manner as the original failed TRR fuel.
On July 17, 1997, the Secretary of Energy approved the adoption of
a new phased canyon strategy on the use of the SRS canyon facilities,
and DOE is now modifying the September 6, 1996 decision for the reasons
explained below.
Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS
The Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (IMNM) Final EIS
considered the interim management of certain nuclear materials at the
SRS. These materials included approximately 3,000 containers of
plutonium and uranium materials stored in vaults at the SRS,
approximately 34,000 liters (9,000 gallons) of plutonium-239 solutions
stored in the H-Canyon, approximately 6,100 liters (1,600 gallons) of
neptunium-237 solution stored in H-Canyon, and nine (9) obsolete
neptunium-237 targets for the production of plutonium-238 stored in K-
Reactor. A small fraction of the vault containers, about five percent
or 120 containers, contain a substantial fraction of the plutonium-238
isotope. Plutonium-238 is generally used as a heat source, and has been
used to provide energy for deep space exploratory missions.
The plutonium and uranium vault materials contain potentially
reactive compounds, plastics that can degrade and decompose, and
unknown constituents that make them unsuitable for interim to long-term
storage. The
[[Page 61101]]
plutonium and neptunium solutions are unsuitable for extended storage
because of the greater potential for abnormal events (e.g.,
criticality, leaks, spills) that could result in releases of
radioactive materials to the environment and exposure to workers and
the public. The continued storage of the obsolete neptunium targets
leads to increased worker radiation exposure that could be reduced if
DOE consolidated neptunium storage, thereby advancing DOE's radiation
protection policy of reducing radiation exposure to as low as
reasonably achievable levels.
The IMNM Final EIS evaluated the potential environmental impacts of
several alternatives for stabilizing SRS nuclear materials. For the
plutonium and uranium stored in vaults, these alternatives included
processing the materials to either a metal or an oxide form, processing
to a glass form in a new vitrification capability to be installed in
the F-Canyon facility, processing the material for vitrification
(conversion to glass) in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF),
and improving storage through heat treating, sorting, and repackaging.
For the plutonium-239 and neptunium-237 solutions and obsolete
neptunium targets, the alternatives included processing the materials
to an oxide form, processing to a glass form in the new vitrification
capability to be installed in the F-Canyon facility, and processing the
material for vitrification in the DWPF. Processing to metal, using the
F-Canyon/FB-Line facilities, was also evaluated for the plutonium-239
solutions. DOE also considered continued storage of the materials,
i.e., the ``No Action'' alternative. The IMNM Final EIS identified
Processing to Metal, Processing to Oxide, Vitrification (F-Canyon), and
Improving Storage as the preferred alternatives for managing the
plutonium and uranium vault materials, and Processing to Oxide as the
preferred alternative for managing the plutonium-239 and neptunium-237
solutions, and obsolete neptunium targets.
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
DOE performed evaluations of the potential impacts of managing all
SRS nuclear materials for each of the alternatives identified in the
IMNM Final EIS. For each alternative, the evaluations assumed all the
materials in each category (e.g., plutonium and uranium materials
stored in vaults [approximately 3,000 containers], H-Canyon plutonium-
239 solutions [approximately 34,000 liters], and neptunium-237 solution
[approximately 6,100 liters] and 9 obsolete neptunium targets) would be
managed using each alternative. Summaries of the potential impacts from
the alternatives were presented in the IMNM Final EIS [Table 2-5 (page
2-51) for the neptunium solution and targets, Table 2-6 (page 2-52) for
the plutonium-239 solutions, and Table 2-8 (page 2-54) for the
plutonium and uranium stored in vaults].
DOE has concluded that there would be minimal environmental impact
from the implementation of any of these alternatives in the areas of
geologic resources, ecological resources (including threatened or
endangered species), cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic
resources, noise, and land use. Impacts in these areas would be limited
because facility modifications or construction of new facilities would
occur within existing buildings or industrialized portions of the SRS.
DOE anticipates that the existing SRS workforce would support any
construction projects and other activities required to implement any of
the alternatives. As a result, DOE expects negligible socioeconomic
impacts from implementing any of the alternatives.
Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous
liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable
federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS
facilities. Similarly, high-level liquid waste, transuranic waste,
mixed hazardous waste and low-level solid waste generated by
implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing
waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are
within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities
for storage, treatment or disposal.
Environmentally Preferable Alternatives
As described in the IMNM Final EIS, certain management alternatives
are expected to result in lower environmental impacts than others.
However, a single alternative was rarely estimated to have lower
impacts for all environmental factors. DOE reviewed the potential
environmental impacts estimated for the alternatives evaluated for each
material category at the SRS, and identified the following as the
environmentally preferable alternatives:
Plutonium and Uranium Stored in Vaults
Improving storage for plutonium and uranium stored in vaults is
estimated to result in the lowest radiological dose to the offsite
public but a relatively higher dose to the SRS workers. This
alternative would result in the lowest level of air emissions with
comparable levels of water emissions; and would generate the least
amount of high-level (zero) and mixed waste, with comparable amounts of
transuranic and low-level waste as compared to the other alternatives.
The improving storage alternative reduces the quantity of materials
requiring chemical processing through the canyon facilities.
Plutonium-239 Solutions--Vitrification (F-Canyon)
Vitrification in F-Canyon of the H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions
is estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite
public and the SRS workers; result in comparable levels of hazardous
pollutant emissions to the air and water; and generate the least amount
of transuranic, mixed, and low-level waste, but comparable amounts of
high-level waste as compared to the other alternatives.
Neptunium-237 Solution and Obsolete Targets--Vitrification (F-Canyon)
Vitrification in F-Canyon for stabilizing the solution and targets
containing neptunium is estimated to result in slightly higher
radiological doses to the SRS workers but result in the lowest
radiological doses to the offsite public; result in higher airborne
emissions of hazardous pollutants with comparable levels of liquid
effluent emissions; and generate the least amount of high-level,
transuranic and mixed wastes, but comparable amounts of low-level waste
as compared to the other alternatives.
Decision
DOE has decided to supplement its previous decision for the
management of plutonium and uranium stored in vaults (60 FR 65300), and
amend its previous decision for the management of plutonium-239
solutions stored in H-Canyon, neptunium-237 solution stored in H-
Canyon, and obsolete neptunium targets stored in K-Reactor (61 FR
48474).
Plutonium and Uranium Stored in Vaults
DOE has decided to implement Processing and Storage for
Vitrification in the DWPF as an additional method for managing
plutonium and uranium stored in vaults. This method is being
implemented principally for a small quantity, approximately 10
kilograms, of plutonium-bearing materials containing plutonium-238.
Plutonium-238 is an isotope of plutonium used generally as a heat
source in National Aeronautics and Space Administration and other
[[Page 61102]]
national programs. Approximately five percent (120) of the 3,000
containers of plutonium and uranium stored in vaults are expected to be
managed using this method. The plutonium-238 material is unsuitable for
programmatic purposes without isotopic enrichment. The capability for
plutonium-238 isotopic enrichment does not exist within the DOE complex
and is not being developed. Other low-fissile content plutonium and
uranium vault materials, upon inspection, may also be managed in this
manner. The potential impacts from this action would be low and well
within the potential impacts identified in the IMNM Final EIS. (The
IMNM Final EIS considered the impacts of managing all of the plutonium
and uranium stored in vaults with this management method.)
This decision permits the stabilization and ultimate disposition of
scrap and residue material containing plutonium-238 in DWPF glass
canisters. Some additional small fraction of low-fissile content
plutonium and uranium vault materials may also, after inspection, be
managed in this manner. The fissile content of these materials, diluted
or poisoned as may be necessary, will not present criticality or waste
disposal concerns within the waste management system. This management
method involves minimal facility operations and can be initiated
quickly to alleviate the vulnerabilities of continued vault storage.
The remainder of the containers of plutonium and uranium stored in
vaults will be stabilized using one of the four previously selected
management methods (60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995).
The IMNM Final EIS (section 2.3.1, page 2-19) describes technical
challenges that must be overcome to stabilize plutonium and uranium
vault materials using the high-level waste system and the DWPF. The
most significant is control of potential nuclear criticality.
Plutonium-238 does not present a threat of inadvertent criticality
because, unlike plutonium-239 and uranium-235 (the principal nuclear
materials in the vault materials), very large quantities of plutonium-
238 would have to be assembled to result in a criticality. Quantities
of this magnitude would not occur in the high-level waste tanks.
However, this management method will also entail the transfer of
plutonium-239 mixed with the plutonium-238 (and potentially other vault
materials containing low concentrations of plutonium-239 and uranium-
235) to the high-level waste tanks. Therefore, dilution and/or neutron
poisoning of the transferred materials as considered in the IMNM Final
EIS may be required to ensure nuclear criticality safety requirements
are met.
DOE has determined that adding this method for managing a small
fraction of plutonium and uranium materials would be advantageous to
the overall materials stabilization program. The facility, HB-Line,
where plutonium-238 materials are processed, has completed plutonium-
238 processing activities for programmatic purposes and DOE has now
determined that HB-Line should be prepared for the stabilization of
other materials in order to complete the SRS materials stabilization
mission as soon as possible within existing resource and facility
limitations. Eliminating the purification and resulting solution
conversion processing of plutonium-238 at HB-Line enables this
capability to be used for the stabilization of other materials.
This decision also eliminates a need to store plutonium-238, not
expected to have any future programmatic use, in the new SRS storage
vault, the APSF. This will allow DOE to save associated design,
construction, and operating costs by eliminating the need for a cooled-
storage array module in the APSF.
Plutonium-239 Solutions
DOE has decided to stabilize the H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions
by processing them to oxide in the H-Canyon and HB-Line facilities. The
plutonium-239 solutions will undergo processing in H-Canyon as
necessary to remove impurities that would interfere with the
conversion-to-oxide process in HB-Line. The resulting stabilized
plutonium oxide will be stored in an existing vault at the SRS until
the new APSF is available. The stabilized plutonium will be stored
until DOE implements disposition decisions on this surplus weapons-
useable plutonium.
The SRS has an existing facility (HB-Line, Phase II) designed to
purify and convert plutonium-239 (and neptunium) to an oxide, but it
has never been operated. In the September 6, 1996 decision (61 FR
48474) for the stabilization of this plutonium-239, DOE had expected
that by not starting up the Phase II facility, substantial costs
associated with its future decontamination and decommissioning could be
avoided. After further consideration, however, it has become clear that
the facility, by virtue of its location within the H-Canyon structure
and its inter-connection with other HB-Line processes, has been
radioactively contaminated. The Department now believes that future
decontamination and decommissioning will be required whether or not the
HB-Line Phase II facility ever operates. Thus, operating the facility
to purify and convert plutonium-239 (and neptunium) to an oxide will
not add substantial costs to the facility's future decontamination and
decommissioning.
Processing the plutonium-239 solutions in H-Canyon and HB-Line also
will eliminate the need to transport 34,000 liters (9,000 gallons) of
this material from H-Canyon to F-Canyon. This will eliminate the need
to transport liquids containing fissile materials and associated
transfer costs. HB-Line processing also will permit operation of the
metal production part of the FB-Line, which was built in the early
1960's, to be terminated sooner.
The quantity of oxide produced (plus the metal to be produced as a
result of decisions made in the December 12, 1995 (60 FR 65300) and
April 2, 1997 (62 FR 17790) RODs) will constitute only a small fraction
of DOE's existing inventory of weapons-useable plutonium. DOE believes
that the addition of this small amount does not present new nuclear
proliferation concerns. DOE already has made a commitment that
plutonium from DOE's stabilization actions will not be used for nuclear
explosive purposes.
Neptunium-237 Solution and Obsolete Neptunium Targets
DOE has decided to stabilize the neptunium-237 solution and
obsolete neptunium targets to oxide in the H-Canyon and HB-Line
facilities. The nine obsolete targets will be transported from K-
Reactor to H-Canyon. At H-Canyon, the targets will be dissolved and
processed to separate the neptunium from other materials (principally
aluminum). These other materials will be sent to the high-level waste
tanks for eventual treatment through the Saltstone and DWPF facilities.
The existing neptunium solution and those generated from the obsolete
targets will be converted to an oxide in the HB-Line facilities after
purification in H-Canyon. In addition, neptunium separated from the
stabilization of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels (as announced in the
February 8, 1996 supplemental ROD (61 FR 6633) will be stabilized along
with the neptunium solution and targets. The resulting canisters
containing the neptunium oxide will be stored in either the H- or F-
Canyon facility or the new APSF, when constructed, until DOE implements
programmatic decisions on the future use of the neptunium.
DOE has selected processing to oxide in H-Canyon/HB-Line for
several reasons. The SRS has an existing facility
[[Page 61103]]
(HB-Line, Phase II) designed to purify and convert neptunium (and
plutonium-239) to an oxide. For the reasons discussed above regarding
the stabilization of plutonium-239 solutions, not operating the Phase
II line for neptunium stabilization would not save significant
decontamination and decommissioning costs. In addition, DOE could use
the HB-Line Phase III line, an operational facility, to allow neptunium
stabilization activities to begin sooner than previously scheduled. HB-
Line Phase III, however, has limited processing capacity. Relying
solely on HB-Line Phase III for neptunium conversion would extend
stabilization completion several years. Processing the neptunium-237
solution in H-Canyon and HB-Line, however, will eliminate the need to
transport 6,100 liters (1,600 gallons) of this material from H-Canyon
to F-Canyon. Furthermore, recent difficulties encountered in the
development program for vitrification of the americium and curium
solution indicate that the schedule and cost for vitrification of the
neptunium in F-Canyon were significantly underestimated.
To maintain the neptunium in a concentrated physical form, thus
preserving the potential for future use, DOE evaluated alternatives for
converting the neptunium to either an oxide or glass. Either form was
originally determined acceptable to support future use of the material,
if required. DOE has now determined that to best preserve the neptunium
for potential programmatic use (and to minimize associated future waste
generation) it should be converted to a stable oxide. Neptunium oxide
is the traditional form produced at the SRS and is the form used for
programmatic purposes (i.e., plutonium-238 production).
Issued at Washington, DC, October 31, 1997.
Alvin L. Alm,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 97-30005 Filed 11-13-97; 8:45 am]
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