[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 224 (Tuesday, November 19, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58900-58910]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-29584]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Biweekly Notice
Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses
Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
I. Background
Pursuant to Public Law 97-415, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular
biweekly notice. Public Law 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to
publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued,
under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants
the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective
any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the
Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards
consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a
request for a hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from October 28, 1996, through November 7, 1996.
The last biweekly notice was published on November 6, 1996.
Notice Of Consideration Of Issuance Of Amendments To Facility
Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
Determination, And Opportunity For A Hearing
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received
before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will
publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for
opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that
the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules
Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and
Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice.
Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint
North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15
p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be
examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L
Street, NW., Washington, DC. The filing of requests for a hearing and
petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.
By December 20, 1996, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public
document room for the particular facility involved. If a request for a
hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date,
the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by
the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the
Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will
issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first
[[Page 58901]]
prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended
petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and
Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington DC,
by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of
the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so
inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at
1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union
operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the
following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name
and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A
copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
and to the attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will
not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the
presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L
Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for
the particular facility involved.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket No. 50-247, Indian
Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Westchester County, New York
Date of amendment request: October 2, 1996
Description of amendment request: The amendment would change
Figures 3.1.A-1, 3.1.A-2, and 3.1.A-3, Section 3.1.B and its Bases,
Figures 3.1.B-1 and 3.1.B-2, and the Bases of Section 4.3 and Figure
4.3-1 of the Technical Specifications by providing new pressure/
temperature limit curves.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1)Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated?
Response:
Neither the probability nor the consequences of an accident
previously analyzed is increased due to the proposed changes. The
adjusted reference temperature of the most limiting beltline
material was used to correct the pressure-temperature (P-T) curves
to account for irradiation effects. Thus, the operating limits are
adjusted to incorporate both the initial fracture toughness
conservatism present when the reactor vessel was new and the effect
of fluence. The adjusted reference temperature calculations were
performed utilizing the guidance contained in RG [Regulatory Guide]
1.99, Revision 2. Overpressure Protection System (OPS) curves and
tables were regenerated to be consistent with the new P-T curves.
The updated curves provide assurance that brittle fracture of the
reactor vessel is prevented.
2) Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?
Response:
The updated P-T and OPS limits will not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident. The revised operating limits
merely update the existing limits by taking into account the effects
of radiation embrittlement, utilizing criteria defined in RG 1.99,
Revision 2. The updated curves are conservatively adjusted to
account for the effect of irradiation on the limiting reactor vessel
material.
No change is being made to the way the pressure-temperature
limits provide plant protection. No new modes of operation are
involved. Incorporating this amendment does not necessitate physical
alteration of the plant.
3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety?
Response:
The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety. The pressure-temperature operating limits
and OPS setpoints are designed to maintain an appropriate margin of
safety. The required margin is specified in ASME [American Society
of Mechanical Engineers] Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section
III, Appendix G and 10 CFR [Part] 50 Appendix G. The revised curves
are based on the latest NRC guidelines along with actual neutron
fluence data for the reactor vessel. The new limits retain a margin
of safety equivalent to the original margin when the vessel was new
and the fracture toughness was slightly greater. The new operating
limits account for irradiation embrittlement effects, thereby
maintaining a conservative margin of safety.
The removal of the pressure-temperature limits for criticality
does not reduce the plant safety margin because these limits are
conservatively encompassed and bounded by the requirements of the
proposed Technical Specification 3.1.C.2.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this
[[Page 58902]]
review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied.
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Local Public Document Room location: White Plains Public Library,
100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10610.
Attorney for licensee: Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq., 4 Irving Place,
New York, New York 10003.
NRC Project Director: S. Singh Bajwa, Acting
Duquesne Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412,
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Shippingport,
Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: September 6, 1996
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
revise Item 7.c of BVPS-1 Technical Specifications (TSs) Table 3.3-3
and Item 7.d of BVPS-2 TS Table 3.3-3 to reflect that a safety
injection (SI) signal starts all auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps. The
notation on BVPS-1 TS Table 3.3-5 would be revised to state that the
response time is for all AFW pumps on all SI signal starts. Items 7.d
of BVPS-2 TS Tables 3.3-4 and 4.3-2 would be revised to reflect that an
SI signal starts all AFW pumps.
The proposed amendments would also revise and reformat TSs 3/
4.7.1.2 to more closely resemble the wording contained in the NRC's
``Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants,'' (NUREG-1431,
Revision 1). These changes would require three AFW trains to be
operable and would provide what constitutes an operable train. The mode
applicability for these TSs would expand to include Mode 4 when the
steam generator(s) is relied upon for heat removal.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed revisions to reflect that a Safety Injection (SI)
signal starts the turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump, in
addition to both motor driven AFW pumps, will ensure that plant
operability requirements for the AFW system actuation signals are
maintained at a level consistent with current safety analyses. The
proposed revisions to Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2
will require that the AFW pumps and associated flow paths are
maintained operable to ensure that the AFW system can mitigate the
consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) with a loss of normal
feedwater. The addition of the Mode 4 applicability will ensure that
a safety related source of cooling water is available to remove
decay heat.
The proposed change will ensure that the plant is placed in Mode
4 when the number of operable feedwater injection headers is
insufficient to ensure that at least two steam generators are
supplied during a feedline break accident.
The proposed addition of footnote (2) to action statement ``c''
will limit plant thermal cycles following a refueling outage due to
turbine driven AFW pump inoperability. During the additional time
period provided by footnote (2) to reach Hot Shutdown, the two
remaining motor driven AFW pumps will provide sufficient flow to the
steam generators to mitigate the consequences of a DBA assuming no
single failures during this time period. Since there is negligible
decay heat following a refueling outage prior to entry into Mode 2,
the performance capabilities of the two remaining motor driven AFW
pumps to remove decay heat will not be challenged.
Changing the AFW pump surveillance test frequencies for Beaver
Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 to quarterly, as specified in
the Inservice Testing (IST) Program, will continue to assure that
the AFW system will be capable of performing its intended functions.
The proposed change to the current Surveillance Requirement
4.7.1.2, for BVPS Unit No. 2 only, will not lower the pump
performance operability criteria for the AFW pumps. The required
values for developed pump head and flow will continue to satisfy
accident mitigation requirements and will be maintained and
controlled in the BVPS Unit No. 2 IST Program. Future changes to the
AFW pump head and flow requirements will be made under the 10 CFR
50.59 process to ensure that the AFW design requirement to remove
sufficient decay heat continues to be met.
Based on the above factors, the probability of an accident
previously evaluated is not significantly increased.
The proposed changes do not affect the ability of the AFW system
to perform as assumed in the safety analyses. The proposed changes
will not result in any additional challenges to plant equipment.
Because the plant design limits will continue to be met, the fuel
and reactor coolant system pressure boundary integrity is not
challenged for the assumptions employed in the calculation of the
offsite radiological doses. The additional time to reach Mode 4 from
Mode 3 provided by footnote (2) does not result in increased
radiological consequences. The potential for a radioactivity release
due to the uncontrolled heatup of [the] reactor coolant system[s]
are enveloped by the releases postulated in the DBA Loss of Coolant
Accident (LOCA) analysis in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report. The DBA LOCA analysis assumes 102% power operation prior to
the event and assumes that core melt occurs. Therefore, there is no
increase in the radiological consequences as a result of allowing
additional time to repair/test the turbine driven AFW pump. Hence,
the consequences of a DBA previously evaluated is not significantly
increased.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change does not alter the method of operating the
plant. The AFW system is an accident mitigation system and is
normally in standby. System operation is initiated in response to a
DBA. The AFW pumps will continue to provide sufficient flow to
mitigate the consequences of a DBA. AFW operation continues to
fulfill the safety function for which it was designed and no changes
to plant equipment will occur. As a result, an accident which is new
or different than any already evaluated in the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report will not be created due to this change.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
The proposed changes will not affect the heat removal capability
of the AFW system to a value less than assumed in the safety
analysis. The proposed changes will not result in any additional
challenges to the plant equipment including the fuel and reactor
coolant system pressure boundary. The additional time period to
reach Hot Shutdown provided by footnote (2) will not significantly
reduce the decay heat removal capability provided by the AFW system.
The two remaining motor driven AFW pumps will continue to provide
sufficient flow to the steam generators as assumed in the safety
analysis to mitigate the consequences of a DBA assuming no single
failure during this time period. The plant will continue to operate
within the bounds of the safety analysis.
The AFW system will continue to be tested in a manner and at a
frequency which will ensure acceptable system performance should it
be relied upon to remove decay heat following a DBA.
The AFW pumps' performance requirements will continue to be
controlled in a manner to ensure safety analysis assumptions are
met.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Local Public Document Room location: B. F. Jones Memorial Library,
663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, PA 15001
[[Page 58903]]
Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.
NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz
Entergy Operations Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam
Electric Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: July 25, 1996
Description of amendment request: The proposed change modifies
Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.4 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) by
incorporating more restrictive fan operability requirements and lower
basin temperature. Several other administrative changes are
incorporated to improve the humanfactors associated with this TS.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this
proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No
The proposed change modifies the UHS TS by revising [Wet Cooling
Tower] WCT basin water temperature from less than or equal to 95
Degrees Fahrenheit to less than or equal to 89 Degrees Fahrenheit
and incorporating more restrictive cooling tower fan operability
requirements. These changes are necessary to adequately preserve the
assumptions and limits of the revised UHS design basis calculations.
These calculations conclude that the UHS is capable of dissipating
the maximum peak heat load resulting from the limiting design bases
accident (i.e., large break LOCA) and the most severe natural
phenomena (i.e., tornado event). Other changes are purely
administrative in nature. The proposed change does not directly
affect any material condition of the plant that could directly
contribute to causing an accident. The proposed change ensures that
the mitigating effects of the UHS will be consistent with the design
basis analysis. Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of any
accident previously evaluated.
2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this
proposed change create the possibility of a new or different type of
accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No
The proposed change modifies the UHS TS to be consistent with
revised design basis calculations. These new calculations adjust
margin to incorporate an additional allowance for fouling in the
[Component Cooling Water] CCW heat exchangers and more restrictive
UHS minimum fan requirements that were not adequately addressed in
the initial design basis. This change also incorporates
administrative changes that are intended to improve the application
and use of this specification. The proposed change will not alter
the operation of the plant or the manner in which the plant is
operated. Therefore, the proposed change will not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this
proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety?
Response: No
The proposed change modifies the UHS TS by revising WCT basin
water temperature from less than or equal to 95 Degrees Fahrenheit
to less than or equal to 89 Degrees Fahrenheit and incorporating
more restrictive cooling tower fan operability requirements.
Modifying the UHS meteorological design bases reduced WCT basin
temperature requirement for operability, thus, providing an
allowance for fouling in the CCW heat exchangers. The proposed
change better preserves the margin of safety by ensuring that the
UHS will maintain the CCW accident analysis temperature limit of 115
Degrees Fahrenheit. Increased cooling tower fan operability
requirements will ensure that the expected cooling efficiency is
actually available and not unknowingly degraded due to fouling.
Other changes requested herein are purely administrative in nature,
do no affect safety margins and intended to improve the use and
application of this specification. Therefore, the proposed change
will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Local Public Document Room location: University of New Orleans
Library, Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, LA 70122
Attorney for licensee: N.S. Reynolds, Esq., Winston & Strawn 1400 L
Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3502
NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner
Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal
Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos.
50-424 and 50-425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2,
Burke County, Georgia
Date of amendment request: October 4, 1996
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
incorporate the requirements necessary to change the basis for
prevention of criticality in the fuel storage pool. This change would
eliminate credit for Boraflex as a neutron absorbing material in the
fuel storage pool criticality analysis and would support the storage of
fuel with enrichments up to and including 5.0 weight percent U-235
rather than the current value of 4.5 weight percent U-235.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
There is no increase in the radiological consequences of
accidents previously evaluated in the Vogtle FSAR [Final Safety
Analysis Report] with the use of 5.0 weight percent U-235 fuel.
Increasing the enrichment up to and including 5.0 weight percent U-
235 affects the radiological source terms and subsequently the
potential releases both normal and accidental. Evaluations performed
(WCAP-12610-P-A, Reference 6) considered the source term, gap
fraction, normal operating plant releases and the accident doses for
a maximum fuel enrichment of 5.0 weight percent U-235. It was
concluded that operating with and storing fuel with 5.0 weight
percent U-235 enrichment may result in minor increases in the normal
annual releases of long half-life fission products that are not
significant. Also, the radiological consequences of accidents are
minimally affected due to the very small changes in the core
inventory and the fact that the currently assumed gap fractions
remain bounding.
The use of the slightly higher enrichment for VEGP [Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant] fuel will not result in burnups in excess
of those currently allowed for VEGP. The cycle design methods and
limits will remain the same as are currently licensed. Therefore the
use of fuel with the higher enrichment is not expected to result in
operating conditions outside those currently allowed for VEGP.
There is no increase in the probability of a fuel assembly drop
accident in the fuel storage pool when considering the presence of
soluble boron in the pool water for criticality control. The
handling of the fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool has always
been performed in borated water.
Fuel assembly placement will be controlled pursuant to approved
fuel handling procedures and will be in accordance with the spent
fuel rack storage configuration limitations in the COLR [Core
Operating Limit Report]. The consequences of a misplaced assembly
have been included in the analysis supporting this revision to the
Technical Specifications.
There is no increase in the consequences of the accidental
misloading of a spent fuel assembly into the fuel storage pool racks
because criticality analyses demonstrate that
[[Page 58904]]
the pool will remain subcritical following an accidental misloading
of an assembly even considering a dilution event. The proposed
Technical Specifications and COLR limitations will ensure that an
adequate fuel storage pool boron concentration will be maintained.
There is no increase in the probability of the loss of normal
cooling to the fuel storage pool water due to the presence of
soluble boron in the pool water for subcriticality control, because
a high concentration of soluble boron has been maintained in the
fuel storage pool water.
The loss of normal cooling to the fuel storage pool will cause
an increase in the temperature of the fuel storage pool water. This
will cause a decrease in water density which would normally result
in an addition of negative reactivity. However, since Boraflex is
not considered to be present, and the fuel storage pool water has a
high concentration of boron, a density decrease causes a positive
reactivity addition. The amount of soluble boron required to offset
this postulated accident was evaluated for the allowed storage
configurations. The amount of soluble boron necessary to mitigate
these accidents and ensure that the Keff will be maintained
less than or equal to 0.95 has been included in the fuel storage
pool boron concentration. Because adequate soluble boron will be
maintained in the pool water, the consequences of a loss of normal
cooling to the fuel storage pool will not be increased.
Therefore, based on the conclusions of the above analysis, the
proposed changes will not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.
The potential for criticality accidents in the fuel storage pool
are not new or different types of accidents. It has been reanalyzed
in the Criticality Analysis report (Enclosure 5 [of the proposed
amendment request]).
Because soluble boron has been maintained in the fuel storage
pool water, the possibility of a fuel storage pool dilution has
previously existed. Therefore, the implementation of Technical
Specification controls for the soluble boron will not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accidental pool dilution.
With credit for soluble boron now a major factor in controlling
criticality, an evaluation of fuel storage pool dilution events was
completed. A generic methodology was applied... to identify
potential events which would dilute the soluble boron contained in
PWR [pressurized water reactor] fuel storage pools, and to quantify
the frequency of those events. This methodology utilized a
probabilistic assessment of a composite plant model to calculate the
event frequency of a dilution event. The results of the assessment
concluded that the event frequency remained less than the NRC Safety
Goal Policy Statement target risk objective of IE-6/reactor year.
Differences between the composite plant described in WCAP-14181
and Vogtle relative to the potential sources of pool dilution were
addressed in an individual analysis of the Vogtle pool. This
analysis was conducted with methodology which closely paralleled
that employed in WCAP-14181. That analysis, found in Enclosure 6 [of
the licensee's proposed amendment request], concluded that the
frequency of pool dilution to the 0.95 Keff boron concentration
(1250 ppm) is on the same order of magnitude as reported in WCAP-
14181 and less than the NRC Safety Goal Policy Statement criterion
of 1.0E-6/reactor year.
Proposed Technical Specifications 3.7.17 and 3.7.18 which ensure
the maintenance of the fuel storage pool boron concentration and
storage configuration, do not represent new concepts. The actual
boron concentration in the fuel storage pool has been maintained at
a higher value than the proposed limits for the Unit 1 and 2 fuel
storage pools for refueling purposes. The criticality analysis
(Enclosure 5 [of the licensee's proposed amendment request])
determined that a boron concentration of 1,100 ppm (Unit 1) and,
1,250 ppm (Unit 2) results in a Keff<0.95 including="" all="" the="" calculational="" uncertainties="" and="" additional="" margin="" to="" compensate="" for="" the="" possibility="" of="" loss="" of="" cooling,="" or="" a="" misplaced="" assembly.="" there="" is="" no="" significant="" change="" in="" plant="" configuration,="" equipment="" design,="" or="" usage="" of="" plant="" equipment.="" the="" safety="" analysis="" for="" dilution="" accidents="" has="" been="" expanded;="" however,="" the="" criticality="" analyses="" assure="" that="" the="" pool="" will="" remain="" subcritical="" with="" no="" credit="" for="" soluble="" boron.="" therefore,="" the="" proposed="" changes="" will="" not="" create="" the="" possibility="" of="" a="" new="" or="" different="" kind="" of="" accident.="" 3.="" the="" proposed="" change="" does="" not="" result="" in="" a="" significant="" reduction="" in="" the="" margin="" of="" safety.="" proposed="" technical="" specifications="" 3.7.17="" and="" 3.7.18="" and="" the="" associated="" spent="" fuel="" boron="" concentration="" and="" storage="" limits="" in="" the="" colr="" will="" provide="" adequate="" safety="" margin="" to="" assure="" that="" the="" stored="" fuel="" assembly="" array="" will="" always="" remain="" subcritical.="" those="" limits="" are="" based="" on="" a="" plant="" specific="" criticality="" analysis="" (enclosure="" 5="" [of="" the="" licensee's="" proposed="" amendment="" request])="" performed="" in="" accordance="" with="" the="" westinghouse="" criticality="" analysis="" methodology...="" while="" the="" cricality="" analysis="" utilized="" credit="" for="" soluble="" boron,="" a="" storage="" configuration="" has="" been="" defined="" using="" maximum="" feasible="">eff calculations to ensure that the spent fuel rack Keff
will be less than 1.0 with no soluble boron under normal storage
conditions and assuming nominal fuel assembly parameters and fuel
rack dimensions. Soluble boron credit is used to offset
uncertainties, tolerances and off-normal conditions (such as a
misplaced assembly) and to provide subcritical margin such that the
fuel storage pool Keff is maintained less than or equal to
0.95.
The loss of a considerable amount of soluble boron in the fuel
storage pool which could lead to exceeding a Keff of 0.95
during accidents and under adverse conditions has been evaluated and
shown to be very improbable.
The combination of the probabilistic evaluation which shows that
the dilution of the fuel storage pool is a low probability
occurrence, the maximum feasible Keff calculation which shows
that the Keff will remain less than 1.0 when flooded with
unborated water and assuming nominal fuel assembly parameters and
fuel rack dimensions, and the unavailability of the large volumes of
water which are necessary to dilute the fuel storage pool, provide a
level of safety comparable to the conservative criticality analysis
methodology...
Therefore, the proposed changes in this license amendment will
not result in a significant reduction in the plant's margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Local Public Document Room location: Burke County Public Library,
412 Fourth Street, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830
Attorney for licensee: Mr. Arthur H. Domby, Troutman Sanders,
NationsBank Plaza, Suite 5200, 600 Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta,
Georgia 30308
NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: September 25, 1996
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would (1)
revise the required number of operable gaseous radioactivity monitoring
system channels and particulate radioactivity monitoring system
channels from one in each of the monitoring systems to one in either of
the monitoring systems, (2) allow both the gaseous radioactivity
monitoring system and the particulate monitoring system to be
inoperable for up to 30 days provided that grab samples are obtained
and analyzed at least once per 12 hours, and (3) add an action for the
loss of all reactor coolant system leakage detection systems (drywell
floor sump level monitoring system, gaseous radioactivity monitoring
system and particulate radioactivity monitoring system).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
[[Page 58905]]
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The function of the reactor coolant system leakage detection
systems is to detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure
boundary so that appropriate actions can be taken before the
integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary is impaired. In
the plant accident analysis, no credit for mitigation of an accident
is taken for the reactor coolant system leakage detection systems.
These proposed changes do not alter this function, therefore, these
changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated?
The function of the reactor coolant system leakage detection
systems is to detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure
boundary so that appropriate actions can be taken before the
integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary is impaired.
These proposed changes do not alter this function; therefore, these
changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident previously evaluated.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The change to allow both the gaseous and particulate
radioactivity monitoring systems to be inoperable at the same time
provided a grab sample is obtained and analyzed at least once per 12
hours is predicated on the availability of the primary leak
detection system (drywell floor sump level monitor system). Since
the gaseous and particulate radioactivity monitoring systems are
backups to the drywell floor sump level monitoring system, allowing
grab samples every 12 hours provides periodic information that is
adequate to detect leakage. The addition of the action to require an
orderly shutdown of the unit for the loss of all reactor coolant
system leakage detection systems does not affect the margin of
safety. Therefore, these proposed changes do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Local Public Document Room location: Osterhout Free Library,
Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701
Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts
and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037
NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz
Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-
311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem
County, New Jersey
Date of amendment request: October 24, 1996
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
change Technical Specification 3/4.7.1.2, ``Auxiliary Feedwater
System.'' The changes would revise the 18-month surveillances performed
on the system's pumps and valves because testing of the turbine driven
Auxiliary Feedwater pump (TDAFWP) can only be performed in higher modes
when there is sufficient secondary steam pressure.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The changes proposed on the testing of components in the AFW
[Auxiliary Feedwater] System do not affect the operation of the
equipment during conditions when they are required to perform their
safety function. No physical changes to the plant result from the
proposed changes made to the surveillance requirements. The AFW
System is used as a backup system upon loss of main feedwater which
is analyzed as a Condition II event in the UFSAR [Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report] and as such, does not impact the probability
of an accident.
Testing is being performed with the plant in the condition in
which the automatic initiation signals would result, that is, with
the plant in Hot Standby. The changes do not impact the availability
of the AFW System in providing feedwater to the steam generators.
The 24 hour duration to perform testing is sufficiently short that
it is considered unlikely that a condition requiring AFW initiation
would occur with the TDAFWP unable to feed the generators. For such
an occurrence, however, the motor driven AFW pumps would be
available to mitigate the consequences of the event. This time is
less than the 72 hour allowed outage time for an inoperable TDAFWP
in Modes 1-3.
Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated
are not significantly increased.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed changes do not involve any modifications to
existing plant equipment, do not alter the function of any plant
systems, do not introduce any new operating configurations or new
modes of plant operation, nor change the safety analyses. Testing of
the TDAFWP in Mode 3, Hot Standby, will not impact auxiliary
feedwater capability or impact the ability to maintain Reactor
Coolant temperature. The proposed changes will, therefore, not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
The changes to the valve surveillance does not decrease the
scope of the existing testing, but will clarify the automatic valves
to be included.
The time in which testing is performed, within 24 hours of
reaching 680 psig steam generator pressure, ensures that testing is
performed in a timely manner after attaining the required steam
pressure. This does not impose a significant safety impact since the
testing is performed within the plant at the zero load conditions
prior to increasing reactor power.
Elimination of the wording ``during shutdown,'' in reference to
the time in which the surveillance is performed, is considered
editorial and is proposed for consistency with the change made to
the pump surveillance requirement.
All changes are consistent with the intent of Salem's current TS
and with the 18 month surveillances specified in NUREG-1431,
Revision 1.
The proposed change, therefore, does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Local Public Document Room location: Salem Free Public library, 112
West Broadway, Salem, NJ 08079
Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-3502
NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz
Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301,
Point Beach Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks,
Manitowoc County, Wisconsin
Date of amendment request: September 30, 1996 (TSCR 192)
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would
revise Technical Specification (TS) Section 15.3.3, ``Emergency Core
Cooling System, Auxiliary Cooling Systems, Air Recirculation Fan
Coolers, and Containment Spray,'' TS 15.3.7, ``Auxiliary Electrical
Systems,'' and the TS Bases to reflect proposed changes to the limiting
conditions for operation, action statements, allowable outage times,
and design specifications for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) TS
associated with the containment
[[Page 58906]]
accident fan coolers, service water equipment, and normal and emergency
power supplies.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. Operation of this facility under the proposed Technical
Specifications will not create a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The probabilities of accidents previously evaluated are based on
the probability of initiating events for these accidents. Initiating
events for accidents previously evaluated for Point Beach include:
Control rod withdrawal and drop, CVCS [chemical volume and control
system] malfunction (Boron Dilution), startup of an inactive reactor
coolant loop, reduction in feedwater enthalpy, excessive load
increase, losses of reactor coolant flow, loss of external
electrical load, loss of normal feedwater, loss of all AC power to
the auxiliaries, turbine overspeed, fuel handling accidents,
accidental releases of waste liquid or gas, steam generator tube
rupture, steam pipe rupture, control rod ejection, and primary
coolant system ruptures.
This license amendment request proposes to change the limiting
conditions for operation, action statements, allowable outage times,
and design specifications for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Technical Specifications associated with the containment accident
fan coolers, service water equipment, and normal and emergency power
supplies.
These proposed changes do not cause an increase in the
probabilities of any accidents previously evaluated because these
changes will not cause an increase in the probability of any
initiating events for accidents previously evaluated. In particular,
these changes affect accident mitigation systems and equipment which
do not cause accidents.
The consequences of the accidents previously evaluated in the
PBNP FSAR [final safety analysis report] are determined by the
results of analyses that are based on initial conditions of the
plant, the type of accident, transient response of the plant, and
the operation and failure of equipment and systems. The changes
proposed in this license amendment request provide appropriate
limiting conditions for operation, action statements, and allowable
outage times for service water, containment cooling and normal and
emergency power supplies.
The proposed changes affect components that are required to
ensure the proper operation of engineered safety features equipment.
The proposed changes do not increase the probability of failure of
this equipment or its ability to operate as required for the
accidents previously evaluated in the PBNP FSAR. The proposed
changes that increase the allowed outage times for engineered safety
features equipment continue to provide appropriate limitations for
these conditions because sufficient equipment is still required to
be operable for accident mitigation and the proposed allowed outage
times are consistent with currently accepted time periods for these
situations.
Therefore, this proposed license amendment does not affect the
consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the Point Beach
Nuclear Plant FSAR, because the factors that are used to determine
the consequences of accidents are not being changed.
2. Operation of this facility under the proposed Technical
Specifications change will not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
New or different kinds of accidents can only be created by new
or different accident initiators or sequences. New and different
types of accidents (different from those that were originally
analyzed for Point Beach) have been evaluated and incorporated into
the licensing basis for Point Beach Nuclear Plant. Examples of
different accidents that have been incorporated into the Point Beach
licensing basis include anticipated transients without scram and
station blackout.
The changes proposed by this license amendment request do not
create any new or different accident initiators or sequences because
these changes to limiting conditions for operation, action
statements, allowable outage times, and design specifications for
service water, containment cooling and normal and emergency power
supplies will not cause failures of equipment or accident sequences
different than the accidents previously evaluated. Therefore, these
proposed Technical Specification changes do not create the
possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously
evaluated in the Point Beach FSAR.
3. Operation of this facility under the proposed Technical
Specifications change will not create a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The margins of safety for Point Beach are based on the design
and operation of the reactor and containment and the safety systems
that provide their protection.
The changes proposed by this license amendment request provide
the appropriate limiting conditions for operation, action
statements, allowable outage times, and design specifications for
service water, containment cooling and normal and emergency power
supplies. This ensure that the safety systems that protect the
reactor and containment will operate as required. The design and
operation of the reactor and containment are not affected by these
proposed changes. Therefore, the margins of safety for Point Beach
are not being reduced because the design and operation of the
reactor and containment are not being changed and the safety systems
and limiting conditions of operation for these safety systems that
provide their protection that are being changed will continue to
meet the requirements for accident mitigation for Point Beach
Nuclear Plant.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Local Public Document Room location: Joseph P. Mann Library, 1516
Sixteenth Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin 54241
Attorney for licensee: Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts,
and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037
NRC Project Director: John N. Hannon
NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES
During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice,
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set
forth in the license amendment.
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility
Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these
actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in
10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment,
it is so indicated.
For further details with respect to the action see (1) the
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as
indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L
Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document rooms for
the particular facilities involved.
[[Page 58907]]
Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-325 & 50-
324, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2, Brunswick County,
North Carolina
Date of amendment request: April 2, 1996 (BSEP 96-0123), as
supplemented by an earlier submittal dated November 20, 1995 (BSEP 95-
0535), and by subsequent submittals dated July 1, 1996 (BSEP 96-0242),
July 30, 1996 (BSEP 96-0287), August 7, 1996 (BSEP 96-0300), September
13, 1996 (BSEP 96-0340), September 20, 1996 (BSEP 96-0348), October 1,
1996 (BSEP 96-0362), October 22, 1996 (BSEP 96-0392), October 22, 1996
(BSEP 96-0403), and October 29, 1996 (BSEP 96-0412).
Brief description of amendment: The proposed amendment would modify
Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 and the Technical
Specifications (TS) for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and
2, respectively, to authorize an increase in the maximum power level
from 2436 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 2558 MWt.
Date of issuance: November 1, 1996
Effective date: November 1, 1996
Amendment No.: 183 (Unit 1); 214 (Unit 2)
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62: Amendment
revises
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 and the Technical
Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 22, 1996 (61 FR
25698) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 1, 1996.No significant
hazards consideration comments received: No.
Local Public Document Room location: University of North Carolina
at Wilmington, William Madison Randall Library, 601 S. College Road,
Wilmington, North Carolina 28403-3297.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket No. 50-247, Indian
Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Westchester County, New York
Date of application for amendment: August 5, 1994, as supplemented
by letters dated November 17, 1994, December 2, 1994, and August 1,
1996.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises surveillance
intervals for various systems, components and instruments to
accommodate a 24-month refueling cycle. These revisions are being made
in accordance with the guidance provided by Generic Letter 91-04,
``Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to
Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle.''
Date of issuance: October 30, 1996
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within
30 days.
Amendment No.: 187
Facility Operating License No. DPR-26: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 7, 1994 (59 FR
63117) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 30, 1996.No significant
hazards consideration comments received: No
Local Public Document Room location: White Plains Public Library,
100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10610.
Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255, Palisades Plant, Van
Buren County, Michigan
Date of application for amendment: December 11, 1995, as
supplemented by letters dated January 15, September 3, October 2,
October 18, and October 25, 1996.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the
Administrative Controls section of the TS by deleting or relocating
requirements that are adequately controlled by existing regulatory
requirements, adding requirements, and editorially restructuring the TS
to be consistent with NUREG-1432, ``Standard Technical Specifications,
Combustion Engineering Plants.'' In addition, containment leak rate
testing requirements are revised to allow the Type A integrated leak
rate test to be scheduled in accordance with Option B of 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix J. Review of several changes proposed by the licensee have
not yet been completed by the staff. The NRC will issue an evaluation
of these changes upon completion of staff review.
Date of issuance: October 31, 1996
Effective date: October 31, 1996
Amendment No.: 174
Facility Operating License No. DPR-20 Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 20, 1996 (61
FR 49493). The October 2, October 18, and October 25, 1996, letters
provided clarifying information and updated TS pages that were within
the scope of the initial application and did not affect the staff's
initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
Therefore, renoticing was not warranted.The Commission's related
evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated
October 31,1996. No significant hazards consideration comments
received: No.
Local Public Document Room location: Van Wylen Library, Hope
College, Holland, Michigan 49423
Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374, LaSalle
County Station, Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County, IllinoisDate of
application for amendments: April 8, 1996, as supplemented on
October 14, 1996.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise various
sections of the Technical Specifications (TS) to reflect the transition
of fuel supplier from General Electric (GE) to Siemens Power
Corporation (SPC). The amendments revise the definitions, limiting
conditions for operation, required actions, or surveillance
requirements related to the following fuel thermal limits: Linear Heat
Generation Rate, Critical Power Ratio, Minimum Critical Power Ratio,
and Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate. The previous GE
terminology is replaced with vendor independent terms and new, NRC-
approved methodologies are incorporated. The amendments also include
changes to Section 6.0 of the TS to include SPC references, relocate
the requirements for the traversing in-core probe system from the TS to
the Core Operating Limits Report, and revise the fuel description in TS
Section 5.0.
Date of issuance: October 29, 1996
Effective date: Immediately, to be implemented prior to startup of
Cycle 9 for Unit 1 and Cycle 8 for Unit 2.
Amendment Nos.: 116, 101
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18: The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 22, 1996 (61 FR
25699) The October 14, 1996, submittal provided additional clarifying
information that did not change the initial proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related
evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated
October 29, 1996.No significant hazards consideration comments
received: No
Local Public Document Room location: Jacobs Memorial Library,
Illinois Valley Community College, Oglesby, Illinois 61348.
Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304, Zion
Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Lake County, IllinoisDate of
application for amendments: August 16, 1996, as supplemented on
October 4, 1996.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the
definition of the F* distance by removing the uncertainty
[[Page 58908]]
term from the specified distance and removing the footnote which
specifies the time frame for which it is applicable.
Date of issuance: November 6, 1996
Effective date: Immediately, to be implemented within 30 days.
Amendment Nos.: 174, 161
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48: The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 11, 1996 (61
FR 47968) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 6, 1996No significant
hazards consideration comments received: No
Local Public Document Room location: Waukegan Public Library, 128
N. County Street, Waukegan, Illinois 60085.
Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304, Zion
Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2, Lake County, Illinois
Date of application for amendments: September 3, 1996
Brief description of amendments: The amendments incorporate revised
installation procedures for steam generator tube sleeves designed by
ABB Combustion Engineering (ABB/CE).
Date of issuance: October 29, 1996
Effective date: October 29, 1996
Amendment Nos.: 173 and 160
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48: The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 11, 1996 (61
FR 47966) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 29, 1996. No significant
hazards consideration comments received: No
Local Public Document Room location: Waukegan Public Library, 128
N. County Street, Waukegan, Illinois 60085.
Detroit Edison Company, Docket No. 50-341, Fermi-2, Monroe County,
Michigan Date of application for amendment: September 5, 1996 (NRC-
96-0075), as supplemented by letters dated October 14, October 23,
October 29, and October 31, 1996
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Technical
Specification (TS) 2.1.2 to incorporate cycle-specific safety limit
minimum critical power ratios (SLMCPRs) for the core that will be
loaded for Cycle 6. In addition, TS 3.4.1.1 is revised to delete the
specific SLMCPR number and replace it with a reference to TS 2.1.2.
Date of issuance: November 5, 1996
Effective date: November 5, 1996, with full implementation within
45 days
Amendment No.: 109
Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 Amendment revises the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 25, 1996 (61
FR 50342) The letters of October 14, 23, 29, and 31, 1996, provided
clarifying information and were not outside the scope of the initial
proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The
Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated November 5, 1996.No significant hazards
consideration comments received: No.
Local Public Document Room location: Monroe County Library System,
3700 South Custer Road, Monroe, Michigan 48161
Duke Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina
Date of application for amendments: December 14, 1995, as
supplemented by letters dated May 16 and August 29, 1996
Brief description of amendments: The amendments modify the
Technical Specifications for diesel generators to incorporate guidance
and recommendations contained in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 93-05, ``Line-
Item Technical Specifications Improvements to Reduce Surveillance
Requirements for Testing During Power Operation,'' GL 94-01, ``Removal
of Accelerated Testing and Special Reporting Requirements for Emergency
Diesel Generators,'' NUREG-1431, ``Revised Standard Technical
Specifications for Westinghouse PWRs,'' and NUREG-1366, ``Improvements
to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements.''
Date of issuance: October 30, 1996
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within
30 days
Amendment Nos.: 155 and 147
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52: Amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: June 19, 1996 (61 FR
31175) The August 29, 1996, submittal provided additional information
that did not change the scope of the December 14, 1995, application and
the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated October 30, 1996. No significant hazards
consideration comments received: No
Local Public Document Room location: York County Library, 138 East
Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730
Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287, Oconee
Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3, Oconee County, South
CarolinaDate of application for amendments: August 12, 1996, as
supplemented by letter dated September 10, 1996
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the
Technical Specifications associated with the containment leak-rate
tests by implementing 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, for Type A
leak-rate testing.
Date of issuance: October 30, 1996
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented 30
days from the date of issuance.
Amendment Nos.: 218, 218, 215
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55:
Amendments revise the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 28, 1996 (61 FR
44356) The September 10, 1996, letter provided additional information
that did not change the scope of the August 12, 1996, application and
the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated October 30, 1996.No significant hazards
consideration comments received: No
Local Public Document Room location: Oconee County Library, 501
West South Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina
GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey
Date of application for amendment: April 15, 1996 (TSCR No. 244)
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Specification
5.3.1.B to allow the shield plug and the associated lifting hardware to
be moved over irradiated fuel assemblies that are in a dry shielded
canister within the transfer cask in the cask drop protection system.
Date of Issuance: November 7, 1996, to be implemented within 30
days of issuance
Effective date: November 7, 1996
Amendment No.: 187
Facility Operating License No. DPR-16. Amendment revises the
Technical Specifications
[[Page 58909]]
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 8, 1996 (61 FR
20849) The Commission's related evaluation of this amendment and final
determination of no significant hazards consideration addressing
comments received on the proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated November 7,
1996.No significant hazards consideration comments received: Yes.
Local Public Document Room location: Ocean County Library,
Reference Department, 101 Washington Street, Toms River, NJ 08753
GPU Nuclear, Inc., Docket No. 50-320, Three Mile Island Nuclear
Station, Unit No. 2, (TMI-2), Dauphin County, Pennsylvania
Date of application for amendment: February 6, 1995
Brief description of amendment: This amendment revised the
Technical Specifications by extending the surveillance interval to
demonstrate operability of the containment airlocks from quarterly to
annually and to decrease the personnel exposure with implementing the
surveillance.
Date of issuance: October 24, 1996
Effective date: October 24, 1996
Amendment No.: 51Possession-Only License No. DPR-73: The amendment
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: June 5, 1996 (61 FR
28616) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 24, 1996.No significant
hazards consideration comments received: No.
Local Public Document Room location: Government Publications
Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Walnut Street and Commonwealth
Avenue, Box 1601, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105
Houston Lighting & Power Company, City Public Service Board of San
Antonio, Central Power and Light Company, City of Austin, Texas,
Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2,
Matagorda County, Texas
Date of amendment request: May 1, 1995, as supplemented by letters
dated June 22, August 28, November 22, and December 19, 1995, and
January 4, 8 (two letters), and 23, June 27, July 9, August 8, and
September 23, 1996.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments allowed extension
of the standby diesel generator allowed outage time to 14 days, and
extension of the essential cooling water loop and the essential chilled
water loop allowed outage times to 7 days. The amendments also added to
Administrative Controls a description of the Configuration Risk
Management Program (CRMP) used to assess changes in core damage
probability resulting from applicable plant configurations.
Date of issuance: October 31, 1996
Effective date: October 31, 1996, to be implemented within 30 days
Amendment Nos.: 85 and 72
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80. The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 31, 1996 (61 FR
40019) The additional information contained in the supplemental letters
dated August 8 and September 23, 1996, were clarifying in nature and
thus, within the scope of the initial notice and did not affect the
staff's proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.The
Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a
Safety Evaluation dated October 31, 1996.No significant hazards
consideration comments received: No
Local Public Document Room location: Wharton County Junior College,
J. M. Hodges Learning Center, 911 Boling Highway, Wharton, TX 77488
Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316,
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Berrien County,
Michigan
Date of application for amendments: February 22, 1996, and
supplemented July 22, 1996
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the
administrative controls section of the technical specifications to
change the operator license requirements for operations management.
Date of issuance: October 29, 1996
Effective date: October 29, 1996, with full implementation within
45 days
Amendment Nos.: 212 and 197
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74. Amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 27, 1996 (61 FR
13527) The July 22, 1996, submittal was more restrictive than the
original submittal and did not change the staff's original no
significant hazards consideration determination.The Commission's
related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety
Evaluation dated October 29, 1996.No significant hazards consideration
comments received: No.
Local Public Document Room location: Maud Preston Palenske Memorial
Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-336,
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London County,
ConnecticutDate of application for amendment: August 27, 1996
Brief description of amendment: The Technical Specification (TS)
amendment clarifies the limiting condition for operation and
surveillance requirements to ensure that the appropriate number of
charging pumps and high pressure safety injection pumps are operable
for reactivity control and reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup
requirements, while also limiting the number of operable pumps to
ensure that the low temperature overpressure limits will not be
exceeded in the event of a mass addition to the RCS during shutdown
conditions. The TS Bases remain unchanged as the result of this
amendment.
Date of issuance: October 25, 1996
Effective date: As of the date of issuance, to be implemented
within 30 days.
Amendment No.: 205
Facility Operating License No. DPR-65: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 20, 1996 (61
FR 49498) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 25, 1996No significant
hazards consideration comments received: No.
Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center,
Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike,
Norwich, CT 06360, and the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49
Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385
Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James
A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New YorkDate of
application for amendment: March 22, 1996, as supplemented October
11, 1996
Brief description of amendment: The amendment proposed changes to
the Technical Specifications to establish operability requirements for
avoidance and protection from thermal hydraulic instabilities to be
consistent with Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group long-term solution
Option I-D. Editorial changes are also made to support the revised
specifications, improve readability of Bases sections, and enhance the
presentation of requirements for single loop operation.
Date of issuance: October 30, 1996
[[Page 58910]]
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within
30 days.
Amendment No.: 236
Facility Operating License No. DPR-59: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 8, 1996 (61 FR
20854) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 30, 1996No significant
hazards consideration comments received: No
Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents
Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New
York 13126.
Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James
A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York
Date of application for amendment: May 30, 1996, as supplemented by
letter dated October 11, 1996
Brief description of amendment: The amendment proposes to eliminate
selected response time testing requirements for certain sensors and
specified loop instrumentation.
Date of issuance: October 28, 1996
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within
30 days.
Amendment No.: 235
Facility Operating License No. DPR-59: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 3, 1996 (61 FR
34896) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated October 28, 1996.No significant
hazards consideration comments received: No
Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents
Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New
York 13126.
Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-
311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem
County, New Jersey Date of application for amendments: July 12,
1996, as supplemented September 12, 1996
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise Technical
Specification Table 3.3-3, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
Instrumentation,'' to clarify the setpoint for the interlock designated
P-12.
Date of issuance: November 4, 1996
Effective date: Both units, as of date of issuance, to be
implemented within 30 days.
Amendment Nos. 185 and 167
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75. The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 23, 1996 (61 FR
38229) The supplemental letter provided clarifying information that did
not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination nor the Federal Register notice.The Commission's related
evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated
November 4, 1996.No significant hazards consideration comments
received: No
Local Public Document Room location: Salem Free Public Library, 112
West Broadway, Salem, NJ 08079
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of November 1996.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects - I/II,Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation
[FR Doc. 96-29584 Filed 11-18-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-F
