[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 226 (Friday, November 24, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58107-58108]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-28608]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-003 and 50-247]
Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1 and 2); Exemption
I
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., (the licensee) is
the holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 which authorizes
the operation of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 and
Provisional Operating License (POL) No. DPR-5 which authorizes the
operation of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1. The operating
authority of POL DPR-5 for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1
was revoked by Commission Order dated June 19, 1980. The operating
licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now and hereafter
in effect.
The facility comprises two pressurized-water reactors at the
licensee's site in Westchester County, New York.
II
The Code of Federal Regulations at 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for
physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors
against radiological sabotage,'' paragraph (a), in part, states that
``The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical
protection system and security organization which will have as its
objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special
nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security
and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and
safety.''
Paragraph (1), ``Access Requirements,'' of 10 CFR 73.55(d),
specifies that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and
vehicle access into a protected area.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires
that ``A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for
all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without
escort.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be
returned upon exit from the protected area * * *''
The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access
control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve
badges at the entrance into the protected area and would allow all
individuals with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when
departing the site.
An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow
contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite
instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated August
10, 1995, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements
of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.
III
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and
will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security,
and are otherwise in the public interest.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee
to provide alternative measures for protection against radiological
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall
level of system performance provides protection against radiological
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the
regulation.
Currently, employee and contractor identification badges/keycards,
are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and exit from
the protected areas of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1
and 2 site. Station security personnel are required to maintain control
of the badges/keycards while the individuals are offsite. This practice
has been in effect at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1 and 2
since the operating licenses were issued. Security personnel retain
each identification badge/keycard when not in use by the authorized
individual, within appropriately designed storage receptacles. An
individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued an
individual picture badge/keycard which allows entry into preauthorized
areas of the station. While entering the plant in the present
[[Page 58108]]
configuration, an authorized individual is ``screened'' by the required
detection equipment and by the issuing security officer. Having
received the picture badge/keycard, the individual proceeds to the
access portal, inserts the picture badge/keycard into the card reader,
and passes through the turnstile which unlocks if the preset criteria
are met.
This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel
are required to verify badges/keycards issuance, ensure badges/keycards
retrieval, and maintain the badges/keycards in orderly storage until
the next entry into the protected area. The regulations permit
employees to remove their badges/keycards from the site, but an
exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to
take their badges/keycards offsite instead of returning them when
exiting the site.
Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain
unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand
(hand geometry) recorded with their badge/keycard. Since the hand
geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry
screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge/keycard,
the requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep
their badges/keycards at the time of exiting the protected area. The
process of verifying badge/keycard issuance, ensuring badge/keycard
retrieval, and maintaining badges/keycards could be eliminated while
the balance of the access procedure would remain intact. Firearm,
explosive, and metal detection equipment and provisions for conducting
searches will remain as well. The security officer responsible for the
last access control function (controlling admission to the protected
area) will also remain isolated within a bullet-resistant structure in
order to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.
Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present
verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's
identity. Unlike the photograph identification badge/keycard, hand
geometry is nontransferable. During the initial access authorization or
registration process, hand measurements are recorded and the template
is stored for subsequent use in the identity verification process
required for entry into the protected area.
Authorized individuals insert their picture badges/keycards into
the card reader and the biometrics system records an image of the hand
geometry. The unique features of the newly recorded image are then
compared to the template previously stored in the database. Access is
ultimately granted based on the degree to which the characteristics of
the image match those of the ``signature'' template.
Since both the badges/keycards and hand geometry would be necessary
for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide
for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge/keycard
by an individual, as a result of taking the badge/keycard offsite,
would not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.
The access process will continue to be under the observation of
security personnel. The system of identification badges/keycards will
continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to
protected areas without escorts. Badges/keycards will continue to be
displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Addition
of a hand geometry biometrics system will provide a significant
contribution to effective implementation of the security plan at the
site.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which
would be provided by the regulation.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, Inc. an exemption from those requirements of 10
CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges/keycards
upon exit from the protected area such that individuals not employed by
the licensee, i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access
into the protected area, can take their badges/keycards offsite.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the
quality of the human environment (60 FR 56357). This exemption is
effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of November 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-28608 Filed 11-22-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
