[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 226 (Tuesday, November 24, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64977-64980]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-31337]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-213 (10 CFR 2.206); DD-98-12]
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (Haddam Neck); Director's
Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
On March 13, 1998, Mr. Jonathan M. Block submitted a petition
pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 2.206
(10 CFR 2.206) on behalf of the Citizens Awareness Network (Petitioner)
requesting that NRC (1) take immediate action to suspend Connecticut
Yankee Atomic Power Company's (CYAPCO's) license to operate the Haddam
Neck reactor and (2) investigate CYAPCO's intention to use an air
cooling method as a backup cooling method for spent fuel.
In support of his request, the Petitioner offers the following five
bases: (1) CYAPCO has not resolved longstanding failures to exercise
adequate radiological controls, (2) the nitrogen intrusion event of
August 1996 demonstrates that CYAPCO is unable to
[[Page 64978]]
maintain operations in a shutdown condition, (3) CYAPCO's plan to use
air cooling of the spent fuel pool (SFP) as a backup cooling method
would constitute an unmonitored, unplanned release into the
environment, (4) the proposal to use the air cooling method is a
violation of CYAPCO's license, and (5) the proposal to use the air
cooling method reveals CYAPCO's lack of comprehension of the defense-
in-depth approach to safety systems.
II. Background
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company is the holder of Facility
Operating License No. DPR-61, which authorizes the licensee to possess
the Haddam Neck Plant (HNP). The license states, among other things,
that the facility is subject to all the rules, regulations, and orders
of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC) now
or hereafter in effect. The facility consists of a pressurized-water
reactor located at the licensee's site in Middlesex County,
Connecticut. On December 5, 1996, CYAPCO submitted written
certifications of permanent cessation of operation and that all nuclear
fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor vessel. The
certifications were docketed on December 11, 1996, and therefore, in
accordance with Sec. 50.82(a)(2), the facility is permanently shut down
and defueled and is no longer authorized to operate or place fuel in
the reactor.
Additional background relevant to the five bases offered by the
Petitioner to support its requests is outlined below.
The Petitioner's first basis regarding the adequacy of the Haddam
Neck Plant's (HNP's) radiological controls program has been evaluated
by the NRC. The Petitioner notes that (1) in November 1996, the
licensee allowed two workers to become contaminated during an entry
into the fuel transfer canal, (2) in February 1997, the licensee
released contaminated equipment to an unlicensed facility, and (3) on
numerous occasions during the operating phase of the HNP, the licensee
released contaminated materials to unrestricted areas. The first two
items noted were included in the basis for issuing a confirmatory
action letter (CAL) to the licensee on March 4, 1997, which documented
the licensee's commitments to improve its radiation controls program.
Subsequently, on May 5, 1998, the NRC issued the results of an
inspection of the changes to the licensee's radiation controls program
and concluded that the licensee had met the commitments listed in the
CAL. The third item noted was addressed by the NRC in the Haddam Neck
Historical Review Team Report, dated March 1998. The report concluded,
that based on dose assessments completed thus far, radiation exposure
to members of the public from the release of contaminated materials to
offsite locations did not exceed the regulatory limits of 10 CFR Part
20.
The Petitioner's second basis, that CYAPCO is unable to maintain
operations in the shutdown condition, is based on an August 1996 event.
At that time, the reactor was shut down with the head in place and
contained a full core of fuel. However, operators allowed nitrogen to
collect in the reactor vessel, displacing water contained in the top of
the reactor vessel head. The NRC conducted an augmented inspection team
(AIT) review of the event and concluded that the event, in combination
with other events that took place at the same time, was safety
significant. However, there were no actual public health and safety
consequences. The AIT issued its report on October 30, 1996. A ``Notice
of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties--$650,000'' was
issued to the licensee by NRC on May 5, 1997, due, in part, to the
nitrogen intrusion event.
The Petitioner's third, fourth, and fifth bases pertain to
modifications to the HNP spent fuel cooling system. CYAPCO submitted
its Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) on August
22, 1997. The licensee plans to keep its spent fuel in wet storage in
the spent fuel pool (SFP) until it can be transferred to the Department
of Energy (DOE). In the interim period, the spent fuel building and
systems necessary to accomplish fuel cooling will remain on site,
separate from the rest of the site's mechanical and electrical systems.
This arrangement is referred to as the ``spent fuel pool island.'' On
March 11, 1998, at a public meeting at the Haddam Neck site, the
licensee reported on the status of establishing the SFP island, among
other items. The licensee stated that two trains of water cooling will
be installed to cool the SFP. Heat rejection will be changed from the
existing service water system to two new spray coolers to be mounted on
the roof of the spent fuel building. During the discussion, the
licensee stated that a backup cooling method, created by opening the
building's doors and roof hatch to establish natural circulation air
flow through the building, could be used to cool the spent fuel in the
event that all other cooling systems became unavailable. The licensee
did not present an evaluation of the dose consequences of radiological
releases through the roof hatch, if the air cooling method was actually
used. However, the licensee had not used the air cooling method and
considered it highly unlikely that conditions would arise that would
require its use.
In order to respond to the petition, the NRC requested information
from the licensee with respect to its plans to air cool the SFP if
other cooling methods were unavailable. The licensee responded by
letters dated June 29 and October 14, 1998.
III. Discussion of Petitioners' Requests
Each of the Petitioner's requests is discussed below. The five
bases presented by the Petitioner are considered for each request, and
determinations are made as to whether the bases support the request.
The Petitioner's first request is to immediately suspend CYAPCO's
operating license.
The first basis presented by the Petitioner, that the licensee has
not resolved failures to exercise adequate radiological controls, no
longer pertains to the first request, since the licensee has
implemented improvements, and the NRC has found them acceptable.
The second basis presented was the nitrogen intrusion event of
August 1996. Although the NRC took enforcement action in response to
the event, the basis no longer pertains to the first request since the
reactor vessel has been permanently defueled and no reactor accident
is, or ever will be, possible at HNP.
The third basis presented to support the request to suspend HNP's
operating license is that air cooling the spent fuel through the spent
fuel building roof hatch would constitute an unplanned, unmonitored
release of radioactivity to the environment. The Commission's
regulations require a licensee to monitor and control radioactive
releases. The Commission places a licensee under the authority of the
regulations by issuing a license with appropriate conditions. For
example, the HNP operating license imposes the requirements of 10 CFR
Part 20, ``Standards for Protection Against Radiation,'' and 10 CFR
Part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities,'' among others, on the licensee. 10 CFR Part 20 limits the
radiation exposure a licensee may allow a person to receive and
requires the licensee to demonstrate that it has controlled exposures
to levels less than the limits. 10 CFR Part 50 governs the operation
and decommissioning of a reactor facility, and, perhaps most
significantly in view of the third basis presented, requires a licensee
to limit
[[Page 64979]]
the release of radioactive materials in effluents to ``as low as
reasonably achievable'' (ALARA). Suspending the HNP license would not
relieve the licensee of its responsibility to adequately control the
use of radioactive materials in its possession, but could impede the
NRC's ability to enforce regulatory requirements. Since the license is
a mechanism through which the NRC holds the licensee to its
responsibility, the third basis presented does not support suspension
of the license.
The fourth basis presented to support the request to suspend the
license is that the licensee's proposal to air cool the SFP using a
flow path through the spent fuel building doors and roof hatch
constitutes a violation of the license conditions. However, the license
does not prohibit making proposals for alternate methods of operation
of a reactor facility. Since making a proposal to air cool the SFP does
not violate the license, the fourth basis does not support suspension
of the license.
The fifth basis presented to support the request to suspend the
license is that the air cooling proposal reveals that CYAPCO does not
understand the defense-in-depth approach to backing up safety systems.
Defense-in-depth, as applied at the system level, can be achieved by
providing redundant and diverse methods to accomplish a function. The
licensee described the normal and alternate SFP cooling systems. The
normal system consists of redundant components for the SFP cooling
system, the intermediate cooling loop, and the roof-mounted spray
coolers. These are closed loops and do not require outside water to
remain in operation, except for makeup water to the sprayers in hot
weather. The redundancy provided in the normal cooling system allows
several configurations to remove SFP heat. In addition, the SFP cooling
pumps are backed up by alternate pumps that can be used to circulate
river water through the normal system heat exchangers, which provides a
diverse heat sink for the normal system. The pumps may be powered from
offsite or onsite electrical power sources, and there is an engine-
powered pump available that does not require electrical power. Thus,
there are redundant and diverse sources of power for pumping. In the
event no heat exchange systems are available, makeup water could be
added to the SFP, and the cooling could be accomplished through
evaporation. The heat would then be removed by the building exhaust
fan, which is the normal release path. As evidenced by the components
and alternates listed above, redundant and diverse methods are
available to provide defense-in-depth for the SFP cooling function. The
air cooling method is not required. Thus, the fifth basis does not
support the request to suspend the license.
For the reasons stated above, the Petitioner's request to suspend
the licensee's operating license is denied.
The Petitioner's second request is to investigate CYAPCO's proposal
to air cool the SFP by opening the spent fuel building's doors and roof
hatch.
The first basis presented by the Petitioner, that the licensee has
not resolved failures to exercise adequate radiological controls, no
longer pertains to the second request, since the licensee has
implemented improvements, and the NRC has found them acceptable.
The second basis presented was the nitrogen intrusion event of
August 1996. Although the NRC took enforcement action in response to
the event, the basis does not pertain to the second request since the
reactor vessel has been permanently defueled and no reactor accident
is, or ever will be, possible at HNP.
The third basis presented by the Petitioner to support the request
to investigate the licensee's air cooling proposal is that the
licensee's plan to air cool the SFP by opening the spent fuel
building's doors and roof hatch would constitute an unplanned,
unmonitored release into the environment. The third basis concerns
actions that have not occurred, and that the licensee does not expect
to take. However, because the licensee plans to use the air cooling
method under certain circumstances, the NRC considers the Petitioner's
basis to be sufficient to grant the second request. A review of the
licensee's regulatory responsibilities is presented in Section IV
below.
The fourth basis presented to support the request for an
investigation is that the licensee's proposal to air cool the SFP using
a flow path through the spent fuel building doors and roof hatch
constitutes a violation of the license conditions. However, the license
does not prohibit making proposals for alternate methods of operation
of a reactor facility. Since making a proposal to air cool the SFP does
not violate the license, the fourth basis does not support the request.
The fifth basis presented to support the request to investigate the
licensee's proposal is that the air cooling proposal reveals that
CYAPCO does not understand the defense-in-depth approach to backing up
safety systems. As noted above, the system proposed by the licensee
achieves defense-in-depth by installing redundant and diverse
components, power supplies, and heat sinks. The air cooling method is
not required for defense-in-depth. Thus, the fifth basis does not
support the request.
The NRC has determined that the third basis presented by the
Petitioner is sufficient to grant the Petitioner's request to
investigate the licensee's proposal to air cool the SFP. The staff's
evaluation of the licensee's proposal is presented in Section IV below.
IV. Review of the Licensee's Proposal
The NRC requested information from the licensee with respect to its
plans to air cool the SFP if other cooling methods become unavailable.
The licensee responded by letters dated June 29 and October 14, 1998.
The NRC also reviewed the licensee's operating license, Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM).
By letter dated October 14, 1998, the licensee stated that the dose
consequence to an offsite member of the public from an airborne release
from the SFP if the doors and roof hatch were opened to cool the spent
fuel would be 0.254 mrem. The dose was calculated assuming that the air
cooling method would be in use for 2 weeks before returning to a water
cooling method and closing the doors and roof hatch. The dose is within
regulatory limits. The licensee stated that procedures are in place to
monitor a radioactive release from the roof hatch.
The licensee's October 14 letter contained a commitment to develop
procedural guidance regarding when to open and subsequently close the
spent fuel building (SFB) doors and roof hatch, in the event air
cooling becomes necessary. The procedure will also direct operators to
request airborne radioactivity surveys when the SFB doors and roof
hatch are opened.
The Facility Operating License limits gaseous effluents in
accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.11.2. That TS also
requires that if a dose rate exceeds the limit, the licensee must
decrease the release rate within 15 minutes to comply with the limits.
The UFSAR, Section 9.1.3, describes the SFP cooling system. Under
the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, a change to a system described in the
UFSAR requires the licensee to perform a safety evaluation and, if
necessary, obtain NRC approval before implementing the change. Using
the air cooling method would fall within the scope of 10 CFR 50.59.
Therefore, when the licensee revises its procedure to permit use of the
air cooling method, it must perform a safety evaluation.
[[Page 64980]]
The ODCM provides the parameters and methodology to be used to
calculate offsite doses and effluent monitor setpoints. Each effluent
pathway used by the licensee must be accounted for in the ODCM. The
licensee has procedures to monitor and quantify airborne releases,
although, at the time of this review, the ODCM did not contain
parameters or a methodology for a release path from the SFB roof hatch.
However, there is no requirement to develop that information until the
release path is used.
In summary, a release from the SFB doors and roof hatch from air
cooling the SFP is required to be within regulatory limits. Before the
air cooling method could be used, the licensee would have to perform a
safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and revise its ODCM.
In the event that the SFB doors and roof hatch are actually used for
cooling the SFP, the release path must be monitored and actions taken
to meet regulatory limits. However, there is no requirement to revise
the ODCM unless the licensee, in fact, uses the air cooling method.
V. Decision
For the reasons stated above, the petition is denied in part and
granted in part. The request to suspend the operating license is
denied. The request to investigate the licensee's proposal to air cool
the SFP is granted. The investigation is presented as the review in
Section IV above. The decision and the documents cited in the decision
are available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2210 L Street NW., Washington, D.C., and at
the Local Public Document Room for the Haddam Neck Plant at the Russell
Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this decision will be
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.
As provided for by this regulation, the decision will constitute the
final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision
within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of November 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-31337 Filed 11-23-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
