[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 227 (Friday, November 26, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 66442-66447]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-30741]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 61
[CC Docket Nos. 94-1 and 96-262; FCC 99-345]
Prescription of Local Exchange Carrier Price Cap Productivity
Offset (``X-Factor'')
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: This document seeks comment on the represcription of the
productivity offset, or ``X-factor,'' in the local exchange carrier
price cap formula. The X-factor of 6.5 percent prescribed by the
Commission in the 1997 Price Cap Performance Review Order was reversed
and remanded to the agency by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. Therefore, the Commission seeks comment on the retroactive
prescription of the X-factor for the period affected by the court's
remand, from July 1, 1997 to June 30, 2000, and on the prospective
prescription, from July 1, 2000 forward. The Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (``FNPRM'') identifies three studies on which the historical
component of the X-factor prescription may be based: the 1997 staff
total factor productivity (``TFP'') study relied upon in the 1997
order; a new 1999 staff TFP study; or a staff Imputed X study. This
document also seeks comment on whether a consumer productivity dividend
(``CPD'') should be included in the X-factor.
DATES: Comments are due on or before December 30, 1999, and reply
comments are due on or before January 14, 2000.
ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, S.W.,
Washington, DC 20554.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Aaron Goldschmidt, (202) 418-1520.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In 1997, the Commission represcribed the
amount by which it annually adjusts price caps for incumbent local
exchange carriers subject to the price cap rules (``price cap LECs'').
Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, 62 FR 31939,
June 11, 1997 (``1997 Price Cap Review Order''). The revised price cap
adjustment required price cap LECs to reduce inflation-adjusted prices
for interstate access services by an ``X-factor'' of 6.5 percent
annually. Pursuant to petitions for review of the Commission's order,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed and remanded the Commission's decision. USTA v. FCC, 188 F.3d
521 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The court has stayed issuance of its mandate
until April 1, 2000, to allow time for the Commission to conduct this
proceeding. USTA v. FCC, Nos. 97-1469 et al., (D.C. Cir. June 21,
1999).
In this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (``FNPRM'') we seek
comment on how we should represcribe an X-factor. More specifically, we
seek comment on prescribing two separate X-factors to address
retroactively the period affected by the court remand (July 1, 1997 to
June 30, 2000), and prospectively the period from July 1, 2000 forward,
or a single X-factor to cover the combined period. Specifically, we
seek comment on three possible bases for setting the historical
component of the X-factor: (1) by relying on the results of the 1997
staff TFP study used in the 1997 order; (2) by relying on the results
of a new 1999 staff TFP study that makes several adjustments to the
1997 staff study; or (3) by relying on the results of a new staff
Imputed X study that determines the X-factor that would have produced a
competitive level of capital compensation in the interstate
jurisdiction during the period between price cap performance reviews.
Further, we seek comment on resetting, on a forward-looking basis,
price cap LEC prices to a level that is consistent with any X-factor
prescription in order to rebalance the sharing of benefits of price
caps between LECs and their customers. This FNPRM is limited to issues
surrounding the setting of the X-factor, and does not include any
broader changes to our method of price cap regulation.
In a separate but related proceeding, the Commission is seeking
comment on a proposal submitted by the Coalition for Affordable Local
and Long Distance Services (``CALLS''). See Access Charge Reform, Price
Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Low-Volume Long
Distance Users, Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 64 FR
50527, September 16, 1999. The CALLS proposal would purportedly
eliminate the necessity of retrospectively adjusting the X-factor in
response to the court's remand. Instead, it would keep the X-factor at
6.5 percent, but would target X-factor reductions to the traffic-
sensitive price cap basket. Once local switching rates reached a
certain level, all price cap indices would be frozen. Adoption of the
CALLS proposal would also eliminate the need to prescribe an X-factor
on a going-forward basis. We seek comment in this proceeding on the
prescription of the X-factor because, in the event that the CALLS
proposal is not adopted, or not all price cap LECs become signatories
to the proposal, the Commission must be prepared to prescribe a new X-
factor before April 1, 2000.
Option 1: The 1997 Staff TFP Study
We seek comment on whether we should use only the results from the
1997 staff TFP study in setting the historical component of the X-
factor for the remand period. We seek comment on whether, in addressing
the court's remand, we are precluded from revising the X-factor using
any other methodology, or from supplementing the data in the 1997 staff
TFP study.
The court did not find fault with the 1997 staff TFP study, and did
not ask us to revisit it. Instead, the court limited its critique of
TFP to our selection of a value at the upper end of the reasonableness
range, and with the upward adjustment to the reasonable range.
In their responses to a 1998 request to refresh the record in our
Access Charge Reform proceeding, both USTA and AT&T used the
methodology in the 1997 staff TFP study to extend the calculation of
the X-factor through 1997. USTA has also calculated an X-factor for
1998. We seek comment on the legal and logical arguments supporting
consideration of data that have become available after the
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close of the record for the remanded prescription. We note that USTA
and AT&T did not agree with each other on the value of the historical
component for 1996 and 1997. We seek comment on USTA's and AT&T's
updates of the 1997 staff TFP study, and on their recommendations for
prescribing an X-factor.
If we set the X-factor by using the 1997 staff TFP study, the
court's remand requires that we justify our selection from within the
reasonable range. Within the reasonable range, should we use some
measure of central tendency, e.g., the mean or median, as the best
estimator of productivity? Could and should we consider prescribing
above the mean? If the reasonable range includes a statistically
meaningful trend, should this inform our choice? What other
justifications could be made for selecting above or below some measure
of central tendency? Should these justifications affect our selection
from the reasonable range, or are they more relevant to the selection
of a CPD?
Option 2: The 1999 Staff TFP Study
In comments filed with the Commission late last year, several
parties identified what they believe is a problem in the way in which
the 1997 staff TFP study employed the TFP methodology commonly used in
economic analysis to set an X-factor. The 1999 staff TFP study takes
this potential problem as a point of departure and attempts to correct
it. We seek comment on the 1999 staff TFP study, and on its premise
that the 1997 staff TFP study methodology may fail to calculate an X-
factor that is consistent with the objectives of our price cap plan.
The 1997 staff TFP study subtracts the cost of the labor and
material inputs from revenues, and the residual revenue is assumed to
be the cost of the capital input. The 1999 staff TFP study attempts to
capture the gains in productivity that would have been revealed in a
competitive marketplace by varying total capital compensation according
to a measure of the competitive capital compensation rate.
We seek comment on the following method for adjusting the capital
compensation in the 1997 staff TFP study. The first step is to identify
a competitive price index series to use as a surrogate for the annual
change for the cost of capital in a competitive market. The second step
is to assume LEC capital compensation in 1991, the first full year of
LEC price cap, was at a competitive level. Because price caps were
implemented in 1991, the 1999 staff TFP study assumes that LECs earned
a normal return in that year. The third step is to combine the
competitive price index and the 1991 LEC capital compensation rate to
create a competitive LEC capital compensation rate for the historical
period. The fourth step is to increase or decrease LEC capital
compensation based on this competitive LEC capital compensation rate.
The fifth step is to adjust LEC revenues, making appropriate allowance
for taxes, for the change in capital compensation. The final step is to
recalculate LEC historical TFP using these revised capital compensation
and revenue data.
In addition to updating the data for the period 1996-1998, the 1999
staff TFP study makes three other modifications to the 1997 staff TFP
study. First, the 1999 staff TFP study uses the recently revised Bureau
of Labor Statistics (``BLS'') series on multifactor productivity in
place of the antecedent series. Second, the 1999 staff TFP study uses
the number of dial equipment minutes, rather than the number of calls,
in calculating the local service output index. Third, the 1999 staff
TFP study recalculates the labor input to adjust for the fact that all
the costs, but only a fraction of the benefits, of the 1992-95 employee
buyouts have been recognized on the accounting books. We seek comment
on these modifications to the 1997 staff TFP study.
Several additional aspects of the 1997 staff TFP study may warrant
highlighting and comment. The 1999 staff TFP study does not make these
adjustments because they either are not easily quantified, or do not
make a significant impact on the level of the X-factor. We seek comment
on the decision of the 1999 staff TFP study to not make any of these
adjustments. We also seek comment on whether there are any additional
issues that necessitate adjusting the X-factor, how any such
adjustments would affect the X-factor, and how they should be made.
The court's remand requires that we justify our selection from
within a reasonable range. We seek comment on how we should determine
the reasonable range and how we should select from within this range.
In our determination of the reasonable range in the 1997 Price Cap
Review Order, we gave recent years more weight than more distant years.
Should we continue to discount more distant years? Should the period
under price cap regulation be given more weight than the period under
rate-of-return regulation? Given that price cap regulation may have
been anticipated by price cap LECs for some years before its
introduction, what years should be included in the price cap period?
We also seek comment on whether additional years of data should be
considered in the remand, or whether the X-factor we select should rely
on the same years of data as used in the 1997 Price Cap Review Order.
We seek comment on the legal and logical arguments supporting
consideration of data that have become available after the close of the
record for the remanded prescription. Would it be more responsive to
the court's remand to prescribe an X-factor based on data available in
1997 or to consider the additional data that has become available in
the interim in setting the X-factor on a going-forward basis?
Option 3: The Staff Imputed X Study
As an alternative to either of the TFP methodologies, the Bureau
staff also has performed a study, the staff Imputed X study, designed
to calculate the X factor that yields the aggregate revenues that would
have been generated in a competitive market. While price caps provide
incentives for cost reduction similar to those of competition, they do
not guarantee that revenues will follow a similar path. In a
competitive market, revenues on average will be equal to costs,
including compensation of capital at a competitive market level. This
method is intended to replicate the effects of a competitive market in
apportioning the gains from successful operation between carriers and
consumers. The approach used here differs from the TFP approach, inter
alia, in that it measures productivity growth by looking at aggregate
expense and revenue data rather than by weighting and aggregating
categories of physical inputs and outputs. In contrast to both of the
TFP approaches, this method appears to have modest data requirements
and to be computationally simple and easily understandable.
Nevertheless, this method should have the same incentive effects as the
TFP approach or any other method of calculating an X-factor.
The staff Imputed X study calculates the change in 1998 revenue and
operating income for each price cap LEC that would result from imposing
a hypothetical X-factor from the inception of price caps in 1991
through 1998. The results for all price cap LECs are aggregated, and
the X-factor required to produce revenues equal to costs, including a
competitive level of capital compensation in the aggregate for all
LECs, is calculated. The calculation was also performed for 1991
through 1995 for comparison with the original TFP study. The
calculation takes account of
[[Page 66444]]
the increase in the demand for service that would have resulted from
the lower price. Changes in the competitive cost of capital were
accounted for by adjusting the capital compensation found reasonable by
the Commission at the inception of price caps by an index of bond rates
over the period. The index is the same one used for the 1999 staff TFP
study to measure the price of capital. Moody's Baa corporate bond rate
was used. We noted above that, in a competitive capital market, indexes
of bond rates will agree closely. Further, in an efficient market,
there are no persistent arbitrage opportunities between different
financial instruments, so that we have no reason to expect that the
trend of bond rates would differ over time from that of the return on
an efficient diversified portfolio. Thus, applying any of several
published indices to the allowed rate at the beginning of the period
will yield approximately the same estimate of the end-period rate.
The data used for these estimates differ from those used for the
TFP calculations in that they are purely interstate in nature. The TFP
calculations used total company data because of the difficulty of
separating interstate and intrastate costs for the TFP calculations,
despite interstate data being conceptually more appropriate for
representing the services regulated by the Commission under price caps.
The data for the staff Imputed X study also include all price cap
carriers, whereas the TFP studies use data for the regional Bell
operating companies (``RBOCs'') only. The calculations assume that a
decrease in price would result in an increase in the quantity of
service purchased, while the TFP calculations necessarily reflect only
experience under the prices that were actually in effect. Finally, the
staff Imputed X study does not make an adjustment in expense data
comparable to the adjustment made in the 1999 staff TFP study to
compensate for the accounting treatment of employee buyouts. To provide
a check on the revised TFP calculations, the X-factor calculations
using the staff Imputed X study were repeated using data only for the
RBOCs and assuming no demand growth in response to lower prices. These
calculations were performed for both 1995 and 1998.
We note that the approach described here is similar to the Direct
Model proposed by AT&T, which the Commission has referred to as the
Historical Revenue Approach in the 1997 price cap performance review
proceeding. The staff Imputed X study differs from the approach
proposed by AT&T primarily in that the staff calculation includes an
adjustment to take account of likely demand stimulation resulting from
a lower price cap, and the calculation takes account of changes over
time in competitive return to capital. Data sources and calculations
also differ somewhat. In the Price Cap Performance Review for Local
Exchange Carriers, 60 FR 19526, April 19, 1995 (``1995 Price Cap Review
Order''), the Commission noted that the Historical Revenue Approach has
the advantage that it reflects performance in providing the interstate
services that are subject to price caps, and includes input cost
changes. In comments in the 1997 price cap performance review
proceeding, GSA supported the Historical Revenue Approach and noted
that it incorporates both TFP growth and the input price differential.
Most criticisms of AT&T's Historical Revenue Approach dealt with
the data and methodology used by AT&T in its calculations. Commenters
responding to AT&T's proposal pointed out that data reported under
Commission accounting, separations, and other rules may not accurately
track economic costs. In its comments in the 1997 price cap performance
review proceeding, NYNEX criticized use of the Historical Revenue
Approach on the grounds that accounting-based rules are a poor measure
of a firm's economic performance. We note that the Commission declined
to adopt the Historical Revenue Approach in the 1997 Price Cap Review
Order due to administrative concerns and incentive effects.
We seek comment on the validity of the staff Imputed X study for
estimating the appropriate level of the X-factor. Does the X-factor
estimated using these data and assumptions accurately represent the
productivity growth achievable by the price cap LECs over the period
examined? We request comment on the theoretical appropriateness of this
methodology. We also seek comment on the following questions: Is an
interstate-only calculation conceptually proper, and do the data allow
an accurate measure of interstate revenues, expenses, and investment?
Calculations reported in the staff Imputed X study show that X-factors
calculated on an annual basis appear to increase over time. Are there
explanations for the trend we see other than increasing efficiency?
Does this apparent trend suggest that an additional adjustment, such as
the CPD, is necessary in addition to revising the calculation of the X-
factor? Alternatively, is the CPD no longer necessary because the
approach described here sufficiently passes the benefits of increased
efficiency to ratepayers? What is the appropriate method for
determining the competitive cost of capital? Is applying an index of
bond rates to the rate of return used by the Commission to initialize
rates at the inception of price caps a reasonable approach? Would
taking account of the mix of debt and equity held by the LECs yield a
more accurate estimate of the trend in the cost of capital?
We request comment on the data and calculations used in the staff
Imputed X study. Are more appropriate data sources available, and can
adjustments be made that would improve the accuracy of the calculations
reported here? AT&T in its Historical Revenue Approach in 1994 used
Price Cap Indices (``PCIs'') from the Commission's Tariff Review Plan
data to measure actual changes in allowed rates. This approach includes
all changes that occurred in the price caps, including exogenous
changes not related to the operation of the X factor. Is such an
approach conceptually appropriate? Would use of PCIs rather than the X
factor in effect more accurately reflect price performance for purposes
of these calculations?
We also seek comment on whether, in responding to the remand, it is
appropriate to use data for the period that was available to us at the
time of the 1997 Price Cap Review Order, or whether we should make use
of the best information available to us now, including data for
subsequent years that have become available in the meantime. We seek
comment on the legal and logical arguments supporting consideration of
data that have become available after the close of the record for the
remanded prescription. Would it be more responsive to the court's
remand to prescribe an X-factor based on data contemporaneous with the
prescription and to consider the additional data in setting the X-
factor on a going-forward basis? In addition, the court's remand
requires that we justify our selection from within a reasonable range.
How should we determine a reasonable range for setting the X-factor
using the staff Imputed X study, and how we should select from within
that range?
Consumer Productivity Dividend
In Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 55 FR
42375, October 19, 1990 (``LEC Price Cap Order''), the Commission
included a CPD of 0.5 percent in the X-factor offset to ensure that
access customers received the first benefits of price caps in the form
of reduced rates. This CPD was also included in the X-factor in
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subsequent price cap review orders, including the 1997 Price Cap Review
Order, in which it was intended to offset the elimination of sharing
requirements. These requirements had compelled price cap LECs to share
a portion of their earnings above set percentages with access
customers. The sharing requirements were intended to protect consumers
against the possibility of an error in the establishment of the X-
factor. Pursuant to the court's remand, the Commission seeks comment on
whether to retain the CPD.
In remanding this issue to the Commission, the court specifically
questioned the quantification of the CPD. When the Commission made its
decision to include a CPD in the 1997 X-factor, the record included a
study by Strategic Policy Research (``SPR'') that addressed the effects
of eliminating the sharing requirements. The SPR study found that the
LEC price cap plan with sharing requirements produced less than 35
percent of the efficiency incentives of unregulated competition. Those
incentives decreased to 18 percent for price cap LECs whose earnings
were in the 50-50 sharing category for each year of the four-year
review cycle. The Commission discussed the SPR study in some detail in
the 1995 Price Cap Review Order. Although the Commission did not
determine whether the SPR study accurately quantified the effects of
sharing on productivity growth, it concluded that the study showed that
there ``are substantial gains in incentives that [sharing]
suppresses.'' 1995 LEC Price Cap Review Order. The results of the SPR
study were challenged by the Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee
(``Ad Hoc''), but Ad Hoc's own results indicated that sharing
substantially reduced efficiency incentives. Ad Hoc's more conservative
calculations indicated that elimination of sharing would increase
efficiency incentives by at least 17 percent for all LECs, and by 41
percent for LECs in the 50-50 sharing category. We seek comment on the
CPD amount justified on the basis of these studies to ensure that the
benefits of sharing elimination would be apportioned between LECs and
ratepayers. We also seek comment on additional methods for quantifying
a CPD designed to ensure that consumers get a reasonable portion of the
benefits from the elimination of sharing.
We also seek comment on whether a CPD should be included to reduce
rates and correct for prior years when the X-factor may have been set
too low. As noted above, the calculations used to set prior year X-
factors may have underestimated LEC productivity. This underestimation
may have caused rates to be set at too high a level. A mistake in the
X-factor may not be self-correcting, but instead may cause increasingly
erroneous prices over time. To obtain efficient prices in the future,
it may be necessary both to adjust the value of the X-factor and to
reset prices. Therefore, we seek comment on whether we should include
in the X-factor a CPD designed to reduce rates, either by a one-time
adjustment, or over a multi-year period, if we conclude that the X-
factor historically has been set too low. If the reduction occurs over
a multi-year period, should we account for the time value of money,
and, if so, how should we calculate the reduction?
Prescribing the X-Factor on a Going-Forward Basis
We seek comment on whether we should prescribe an X-factor that
would apply as of July 1, 2000 that is different from the retrospective
X-factor applicable to the period affected by the court's remand, or
whether the X-factor that we prescribe for the period beginning July 1,
1997 should continue in place until the next price cap performance
review. We also seek comment on whether to include a prospective CPD
adjustment in future X-factors to correct for any significant
divergences between historic LEC productivity and prior X-factors, and
on whether any such adjustment should be made at once or be phased in
over several years.
In this FNPRM we seek comment on prescribing a future X-factor
based on the results of the 1999 staff TFP study. In the alternative,
we could prescribe an X-factor based on the results of the staff
Imputed X study. Finally, we invite parties to comment on other
alternatives that could serve as a basis for a future X-factor.
We also seek comment on how the prescription of the X-factor would
affect smaller price cap LECs differently from other price cap LECs,
and whether there should be a separate X-factor calculated for smaller
price cap LECs.
In addition, we seek comment on how the Commission's proposed
adjustments to the price cap rate structure in Access Charge Reform, 64
FR 51258, September 22, 1999 (``Pricing Flexibility Order'') should
affect the annual reductions required by our price cap rules. We
proposed in the Pricing Flexibility Order to add a ``q'' factor to the
formulae used to adjust annually the price cap indices (``PCIs'') for
the baskets that contain the charges for local switching and tandem
switching. The q factor would reduce switching charges based on growth
in demand. The q factor would operate similarly to the g factor present
in the common line PCI formula. The g factor is used to share with IXCs
the benefits of demand growth that LECs receive from per-minute growth
per access line. As proposed, the affected baskets would be reduced
annually by both the X-factor and the q factor. The staff studies
attached herein, however, may capture in their X-factor estimates some
or all of the effect intended to be captured by the q factor. We seek
comment on whether a q factor is necessary if an X-factor is adopted
that captures its effect, and on how to remove any double counting that
might result from the application of both factors. For example, if the
X-factor reduction was $10, and the q factor reduction was $4, then we
could directly apply $4 to the baskets containing local and tandem
switching, and allocate the remaining $6 amongst all the baskets
according to our price cap rules.
We also proposed to adjust on a prospective basis for the past
absence of a q factor in the formulae that annually adjust the PCIs of
the baskets containing charges for local and tandem switching. We seek
comment on how any such adjustment should affect any proposed
adjustment to the PCIs for all price cap baskets to offset the
cumulative effect of past X-factors that may have been set below the
rate of cost reduction actually achieved by LECs. Should we apply the
logic suggested in the example of the previous paragraph? If so, should
the shift of switching ports to common line increase the common line
basket's share of any adjustment based on the past absence of a q
factor?
In addition to proposing a q factor, we proposed to increase the
``g'' factor that applies to certain revenues in the common line basket
from g/2 to a full g. We seek comment on whether any prospective
adjustment to our X-factor prescription would be appropriate to account
for this.
Finally, we proposed to replace the existing per-minute rate
structure for local switching and tandem switching with capacity
charges. We seek comment on whether replacing per-minute charges with
capacity charges affects future growth in LEC productivity. We seek
comment on whether any prospective adjustment to our X-factor is
required and on how we would quantify this adjustment.
Ex Parte Presentations
This proceeding shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose''
proceeding in accordance with 47 CFR 1.1206(b). Ex parte presentations
are permissible if disclosed in accordance with
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Commission rules, except during the Sunshine Agenda period when
presentations, ex parte or otherwise, are generally prohibited. Persons
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance
of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and
arguments presented generally is required. See 47 CFR 1.1206(b)(2).
Additional rules pertaining to oral and written presentations are set
forth in Sec. 1.1206(b).
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA''), 5 U.S.C.
603, the Commission has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (``IRFA'') of the possible significant economic impact on
small entities by the policies and rules proposed in this FNPRM. The
RFA, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., has been amended by the Contract With
America Advancement Act of 1996, Public Law 104-121, 110 Stat. 847
(1996) (``CWAAA''). Title II of the CWAAA is the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (``SBREFA''). Written
public comments are requested on this IRFA. Comments must be identified
as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for
comments on the FNPRM provided below. The Office of Public Affairs will
send a copy of the FNPRM, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. In addition, the FNPRM
and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal
Register. 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
Need for and Objectives of the Proposed Rules. The court has
remanded to the Commission the selection of a 6.5 percent productivity
offset, or X-factor, in the LEC price cap formula. In this FNPRM we
seek comment on how we should represcribe an X-factor. We seek comment
on prescribing one or more X-factors to address retroactively the
period affected by the court remand (July 1, 1997 to June 30, 2000),
and we seek comment on represcribing one or more X-factors from July 1,
2000 forward. Further, we seek comment on resetting, on a forward-
looking basis, price cap LEC prices to a level that is consistent with
any X-factor prescription in order to rebalance the sharing of benefits
of price caps between LECs and their customers.
Legal Basis. The proposed action is supported by sections 1, 4(i),
4(j), 201-205, and 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), (j), 201-205, and 303(r).
Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules Will Apply. The RFA directs agencies to provide a
description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small
entities that may be affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. 5
U.S.C. 603(b)(3). The RFA generally defines the term ``small entity''
as having the same meaning as the terms ``small business,'' ``small
organization,'' and ``small governmental jurisdiction.'' 5 U.S.C.
601(6). In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same meaning
as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business Act. 15
U.S.C. 632. A small business concern is one which: (1) is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business
Administration (``SBA''). 5 U.S.C. 601(3) (incorporating by reference
the definition of ``small business concern'' in 15 U.S.C. 632).
Pursuant to the RFA, the statutory definition of a small business
applies ``unless an agency, after consultation with the Office of
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity for
public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which
are appropriate to the activities of the agency and publishes such
definition(s) in the Federal Register.'' 5 U.S.C. 601(3). The SBA has
defined a small business for Standard Industrial Classification
(``SIC'') category 4813 (Telephone Communications, Except
Radiotelephone) to be an entity that has no more than 1,500 employees.
13 CFR 121.201.
We have included small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis. As
noted above, a ``small business'' under the RFA is one that, inter
alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a
telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer employees), and
``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' 5 U.S.C. 601(3). The
SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small
incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any
such dominance is not ``national'' in scope. See Letter from Jere W.
Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, to William E. Kennard,
Chairman, FCC (May 27, 1999). SBA regulations interpret ``small
business concern'' to include the concept of dominance on a national
basis. 13 CFR 121.102(b). Since 1996, out of an abundance of caution,
the Commission has included small incumbent LECs in its regulatory
flexibility analyses. See, e.g., Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 61 FR
45476, August 29, 1996. We have therefore included small incumbent LECs
in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that this RFA action has no
effect on Commission analyses and determinations in other, non-RFA
contexts.
The proposals in the FNPRM apply only to price cap LECs. At the
current time, there are 13 price cap LECs. Of these companies, 11 are
listed in the Commission's most recent Statistics of Communications
Common Carriers (``SOCC'') report as having more than 1,500 employees.
Consequently, we estimate that 2 or fewer providers of local exchange
service are small price cap LECs that may be affected by these
proposals.
Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other
Compliance Requirements. We expect that, on balance, the proposals in
this FNPRM will not change price cap LECs' administrative burdens or
cause price cap LECs to incur any additional costs associated with
proposed reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The studies would
establish new X-factors that price cap LECs would need to utilize in
their price cap calculations, but otherwise should not affect their
administrative burdens or costs.
Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered. The RFA requires
agencies to describe any significant alternatives that it has
considered in reaching its proposed approach, which may include the
following four alternatives: (1) the establishment of differing
compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small entities; (2) the
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance or
reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; (3) the use
of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption from
coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small entities. 5 U.S.C.
603(c)(1)-(4). In the instant proceeding we are seeking comment on the
prescription of the productivity offset, or X-factor, portion of the
price cap formula. Therefore, only the first and last possible
alternatives listed in section 603(c) of the RFA would be applicable.
In the FNPRM, we seek comment on how the prescription of the X-factor
would affect smaller price cap LECs differently from other price cap
LECs, and whether there should be a separate X-factor calculated for
smaller price cap LECs. We also do
[[Page 66447]]
not believe it would be appropriate to exempt small price cap LECs from
the application of an X-factor. We seek comment on these issues and
urge commenting parties to support their comments with specific
evidence and analysis.
Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules. None.
Filing of Comments and Reply Comments
Pursuant to 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file
comments on or before December 30, 1999 and reply comments on or before
January 14, 2000. Comments may be filed using the Commission's
Electronic Comment Filing System (``ECFS'') or by filing paper copies.
Comments filed through the ECFS can be sent as an electronic file
via the Internet to http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/ecfs.html>. In
completing the transmittal screen, commenters should include their full
name, Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket or
rulemaking number. Parties may also submit an electronic comment by
Internet e-mail. To get filing instructions for e-mail comments,
commenters should send an e-mail to ecfs@fcc.gov, and should include
the following words in the body of the message, ``get form .'' A sample form and directions will be sent in reply. Only
one copy of electronically-filed comments must be submitted.
Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and four
copies of each filing. All filings must be sent to the Commission's
Secretary, Magalie Roman Salas, Office of the Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, S.W., Room TW-B204,
Washington, D.C. 20554.
Parties who choose to file by paper should also submit their
comments on diskette. The diskette should be submitted to: Wanda
Harris, Federal Communications Commission, Common Carrier Bureau,
Competitive Pricing Division, 445 12th Street, S.W., Fifth Floor,
Washington, D.C. 20554. The submission should be on a 3.5 inch diskette
formatted in an IBM compatible format using WordPerfect 5.1 for Windows
or compatible software. The diskette should be accompanied by a cover
letter and should be submitted in ``read only'' mode. The diskette
should be clearly labeled with the commenter's name, proceeding
(including the docket number in this case), type of pleading (comments
or reply comments), date of submission, and the name of the electronic
file on the diskette. The label should also include the following
phrase: ``Disk Copy--Not an Original.'' Each diskette should contain
only one party's pleadings, preferably in a single electronic file. In
addition, commenters must send diskette copies to the Commission's copy
contractor, International Transcription Service, Inc., 1231 20th
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Comments and reply comments will
be available for public inspection during regular business hours in the
FCC Reference Center, 445 12th Street, S.W., Room CY-A257, Washington,
D.C. 20554.
Ordering Clauses
Pursuant to the authority contained in sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 201-
205, and 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 151, 154(i), (j), 201-205, and 303(r), Notice Is Hereby Given of
the rulemaking described above and that Comment Is Sought on those
issues.
The Commission's Office of Public Affairs, Reference Operations
Division, Shall Send a copy of this Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 61
Communications common carriers, Tariffs.
Federal Communications Commission.
Magalie Roman Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 99-30741 Filed 11-24-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
