[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 212 (Wednesday, November 3, 1999)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60068-60077]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-28616]
[[Page 60067]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part V
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Federal Aviation Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
14 CFR Part 139
Year 2000 Airport Safety Inspections; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 212 / Wednesday, November 3, 1999 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 60068]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 139
[Docket No. FAA-1999-5924; SFAR No. 85]
RIN 2120-AG83
Year 2000 Airport Safety Inspections
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This rule requires operators of certificated airports to
conduct one-time operational readiness checks of certain airfield
equipment and systems on, or shortly after, January 1, 2000, and report
the results of these checks to the FAA. In addition, this rule
temporarily revises the time period these airport operators have to
repair or replace certain emergency equipment. These temporary
requirements are needed to ensure that operators of certificated
airports maintain safety by identifying and addressing any unforeseen
problems with date-sensitive equipment and systems at the earliest
practical time after January 1, 2000.
EFFECTIVE DATES: January 1, 2000 to January 5, 2000.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert E. David, Airport Safety and
Operations Division (AAS-300), Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-
8721.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Availability of Final Rules
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Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a
request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking,
ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling
(202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the amendment number or
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Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future
rulemaking documents should request from the above office a copy of
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System, which describes the application procedure.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996, requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a
question regarding this document may contact their local FAA official.
Internet users can find additional information on SBREFA in the ``Quick
Jump'' section of the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov and may send
electronic inquiries to the following Internet address: 9-AWA-
[email protected]
Background
On January 1, 2000, many computer systems worldwide could
malfunction or shut down because of the year change from 1999 to 2000.
The problem, often referred to as the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem, is the
result of how computers and other microprocessors have traditionally
recorded and computed dates. Typically, these machines have used two
digits to represent the year, e.g., ``98'' for 1998, to save electronic
storage space and reduce operating costs. However, this format fails to
distinguish the year 2000 (represented as ``00'') from the year 1900.
Software and computer experts are concerned that this could cause
computers and equipment with internal microprocessors to malfunction in
unforeseen ways or to fail completely.
Many airport operators use computers or equipment with embedded
microprocessors to meet certain requirements of Title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 139, Certification and Operations:
Land Airports Serving Certain Air Carriers. For example, an operator of
a certificated airport may have computer systems that control when
airfield lighting is turned on, or that control access to the airfield
through vehicle and passenger gates. Safety and maintenance vehicles,
such firefighting trucks, and emergency communications systems may
likewise have computerized systems.
Since October 1998, the FAA has worked with operators of airports
certificated under part 139 to ensure that all airfield equipment and
systems used to comply with part 139 requirements are Y2K compliant, or
that the airport operator has developed an alternative means of
complying with the part 139 requirements. The FAA also formed an
internal Y2K airport team to contact operators of certificated airports
to monitor the Y2K status of each of these operator's systems that are
used to comply with part 139 requirements. This team will continue to
work with the operators of certificated airports throughout the
remainder of 1999 to ensure that the agency is kept informed of the Y2K
status at each part 139 airport.
Despite these efforts, the FAA is concerned that part 139
inspection and reporting requirements will not be adequate to address
the unique circumstances associated with the date rollover to January
1, 2000. Part 139 requires operators of certificated airports to
conduct daily inspections of their facilities to ensure compliance with
the regulation. Such inspections include a visual check of movement
areas (areas used by air carriers to land, takeoff, and taxi) and
operational tests of equipment and systems used to comply with part 139
requirements. As a matter of practicality, various elements of the
self-inspection are conducted throughout the day. As such, the existing
inspection requirements do not require inspections early on January 1,
2000, before most operations begin, and do not necessarily require the
kind of tests that would determine if there is a Y2K-related problem
that was not detected by pre-January Y2K validation testing.
In addition, part 139 provisions regarding the repair or
replacement of inoperative aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF)
vehicles, and associated reporting requirements, are not well adapted
to the unique circumstances of the possible Y2K disruption on
equipment. Emergency equipment required by part 139, unlike other
aviation systems, is intended for use only in an emergency, and under
the current requirement may not be tested and reported to the FAA until
an actual emergency or scheduled maintenance require it, both of which
may occur well after operations begin on January 1, 2000.
Part 139 also allows certain airport operators a 48-hour grace
period to repair or replace inoperative ARFF vehicles, with no effect
on the number and type of ARFF equipment an airport must provide,
commonly known as the ARFF index. The ARFF index for an airport is
determined by the size of the aircraft using the airport and the number
of daily departures. The index establishes the number and size of ARFF
trucks needed. Conversely, the ARFF equipment available determines
[[Page 60069]]
the index and, thereby, limits the size of the aircraft that the
airport may serve. The 48-hour provision is intended to allow airport
operators sufficient time to acquire parts to repair a required ARFF
vehicle, or to arrange for a replacement vehicle, without impacting air
carrier operations.
Under normal operations, this is an acceptable procedure as an
inoperative ARFF vehicle is a rare occurrence, and parts can be
obtained quickly. However, since some ARFF vehicles may have embedded
computer chips, a Y2K-related problem, while highly unlikely, is
possible. Since similar models of ARFF vehicles are widely used, a
failure of even one model of ARFF equipment could affect many airports.
As such, a delay in repairing a Y2K problem at a number of airports
could have a system-wide impact.
Alternatives
The FAA evaluated four alternatives to address Y2K issues. The FAA
first considered not making changes to part 139 for the January 1,
2000, date rollover. Under this alternative, operators of certificated
airports would continue to comply with current part 139 requirements.
Alternatively, the FAA then contemplated making the determination that
Y2K compliance is an ``unusual condition'' under Sec. 139.327(a)(2),
thus requiring all certificate holders to conduct an inspection within
a specified time period to identify and correct any deficiencies.
Further, the FAA considered requiring these inspections only at
airports holding an airport operating certificate (those certificate
holders serving scheduled operations of air carrier aircraft with more
than 30 passenger seats). In this alternative, operational readiness
checks would not have been required at airports holding a limited
airport operating certificate (those certificate holders serving
unscheduled air carrier operations).
Finally, the FAA considered, and ultimately pursued, mandating both
the self-inspections and reporting requirements, as well as the
suspension of the 48-hour grace period for repair of ARFF vehicles.
While this alternative is the most comprehensive and costly of the four
alternatives considered, the FAA has determined that associated costs
would be minimal and only marginally greater than the other
alternatives considered, and that the benefits of mandatory safety
inspections fully justify this approach.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
On July 8, 1999, the FAA published in the Federal Register a notice
of proposed rulemaking (64 FR 37026) that proposed to require operators
of airports certificated under part 139 to conduct one-time operational
readiness checks of certain airfield equipment and systems starting
January 1, 2000. In addition, this notice proposed to temporarily
revise the time period these airport operators have to repair or
replace certain emergency equipment.
In response to this proposal, the FAA received 14 comments from
industry associations, airport operators and owners, and one
individual.
Commenters were generally in favor of the SFAR but recommended
several modifications to and clarifications of certain testing and
reporting requirements. Two commenters (Airports Council International
and American Association of Airport Executives) recommended the FAA
rescind the proposal, claiming that existing part 139 requirements are
more than adequate to address any Y2K issues. In particular, both
associations strongly opposed the temporary revocation of the 48-hour
grace period for repair and replacement of inoperative ARFF vehicles.
Neither association provided operational and cost data to substantiate
their positions. All of these comments are discussed in detail in the
Section-by-Section analysis below.
Section-by-Section Discussion of Comments
General
After consideration of the comments received, the FAA has modified
the proposed SFAR and this final rule reflects those changes.
As noted above, comments received were generally supportive of the
proposal. Several airport operators noted that they already plan to
conduct readiness tests very similar to those proposed. Air carrier and
pilot organizations offered their support of system-wide testing to
ensure the safety and integrity of airports certificated under part
139.
While most commenters agreed with the FAA's conclusion that the
possibility of a systemic failure due to the date rollover to January
1, 2000, is small, a few commenters challenged the FAA's conclusion
that the date rollover is a significant event that warrants special
attention. The FAA disagrees with such comments and believes Y2K issues
present unique problems for part 139 airports.
One commenter stated that the SFAR is unnecessary since the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or Transport Canada
are not requiring similar Y2K tests. The FAA disagrees. ICAO does not
impose requirements, and in any event, the U.S. system of airports is
far larger and more complex than Canada's or most member countries of
ICAO. If by chance there is a system-wide problem resulting from the
date rollover, it will have a far greater impact on the U.S. aviation
system.
A majority of commenters further expressed the concern that the
testing required by the SFAR would be redundant to those tests airport
operators are currently conducting to ensure Y2K compliance. Many
airport operators noted that they have spent considerable time and
money testing part 139 systems and equipment, and obtaining
certification from vendors. As such, they would not support protracting
such tests. The FAA concurs and did not intend for this SFAR to require
a repeat of the extensive Y2K testing that certificated holders have
already completed.
Instead, the FAA intends that this SFAR merely require certificate
holders to conduct operational readiness checks to verify that certain
part 139 systems and equipment are functioning normally after the Y2K
date rollover. For the most part, this will require airport operators
to ensure a system, such as runway lighting, has turned on properly,
and that equipment is functioning adequately, e.g., vehicle radios turn
on and allow for communication between users.
The FAA believes that concerns about the burden of this SFAR are
due to the use of the term ``test'' throughout the SFAR. For clarity,
the term ``test'' has been replaced throughout the SFAR with the term
``operational readiness check.'' To further clarify this rule, the
systems and equipment that must be checked, and suggested methods for
completing such checks, are discussed in the Operational Readiness
Check Requirements section.
Also, many commenters expressed general confusion over the relation
of this SFAR to part 139. Unless otherwise noted, the requirements of
part 139 are still applicable during the duration of this SFAR. For
example, the notification requirements of Sec. 139.339 (Airport
condition reporting) will still be applicable from January 1 to January
5, 2000, even though airport operators will have additional reporting
requirements under the SFAR.
Finally, another commenter recommended that the FAA prohibit
[[Page 60070]]
airport operators from closing their facilities to conduct required
operational readiness checks. The FAA disagrees with this
recommendation. Even though an airport operator has the authority to
close its facility, or portions thereof, for safety reasons, the FAA
believes that closing an airport to conduct required operational
readiness checks will not be an issue. Typically, operators of these
airports are able to conduct part 139 self-inspections and accommodate
air carrier schedules without interruption of those schedules. However,
if an air carrier still is concerned that required Y2K operational
readiness checks will affect its operations, the FAA encourages the air
carrier to contact the airport operator as soon as possible.
Section 1: Operational Readiness Check Requirements
Paragraph 1(a)
As proposed, this paragraph defines the applicability of this SFAR.
Other than clarifying changes, this paragraph remains the same. Several
commenters recommended that the FAA revise this section to extend this
SFAR to operators of those airports that air carriers use as alternate
airports. The FAA disagrees with this recommendation. Under part 121
(Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations)
air carriers are required to operate at airports that are certificated
under part 139. Part 121 also requires that under certain conditions
air carriers designate an alternate airport as part of their required
flight planning. However, Sec. 121.590 permits an air carrier to
designate a required alternate airport that is not certificated under
part 139.
Since an air carrier could designate any airport as an alternate,
extending this SFAR to operators of alternate airports would
effectively extend its requirements to all airport operators. Yet, the
requirements of this SFAR are intended to check systems and equipment
specially required at airports certificated under part 139
(approximately 568 civilian airports). The FAA does not require
compliance with these safety standards at any other U.S. airport.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the FAA to require airport
operators to check systems and equipment that they are not required to
have, and in many instances, do not own or maintain.
In addition, the term ``unless otherwise authorized by the
Administrator'' has been added to this paragraph. Since the rule
language cannot be specific enough to address every unique circumstance
at all certificated airports, the FAA has determined that this change
will allow for alternative means of compliance. For example, some
airport operators will not be able to conduct the required operational
readiness checks of emergency communications with the air traffic
control tower prior to the first air carrier operation. Not all air
traffic control towers are in operation 24 hours a day and air carrier
operations may normally occur when the tower is closed. On a case-by-
case basis, the FAA will determine the appropriate compliance methods
to address such local issues.
Paragraph 1(b)
As proposed, this paragraph sets forth general descriptions of
those systems and equipment that needed to be checked for Y2K
compliance. A majority of commenters recommended that this paragraph be
expanded to identify all airport systems and equipment that the FAA
would require to be checked. The overall concern was that airport
operators needed more information to determine whether or not required
operational readiness checks could be accomplished within the specified
time frame and make adequate preparations. The FAA concurs that this
section needs clarification, and has expanded the section to specify
each part 139 system and piece of equipment that must undergo an
operational readiness check.
In addition, several commenters expressed concern over a reference
in the NPRM preamble regarding systems that control access by vehicles
and pedestrians to the airfield. This reference was interpreted to mean
that required operational readiness checks would include a
functionality test of access control systems required under 14 CFR part
107 (Airport security). This is not the case. Operational readiness
checks are only required of part 139 systems and equipment. The
reference to access control was intended to only illustrate possible
part 139 systems and equipment that may contain computers or
microprocessors that could be affected by the date rollover, including
those automated systems that control inadvertent entry to the movement
area by unauthorized personnel, as required under Sec. 139.335, Public
protection.
One commenter recommended that airport operators be required to
consult with their tenant air carriers when determining which part 139
systems and equipment will be checked. The FAA does not concur with
this recommendation. The certificate holder should already know what
systems and equipment to check since required operational readiness
checks cover the same systems and equipment as the daily checks
conducted by airport operators to comply with part 139 self-inspection
requirements. These checks should not affect air carrier operations any
differently than a daily airfield self-inspection. Further, if problems
arise as the result of operational readiness checks, the same
procedures airport operators use to notify their tenant air carriers of
airfield conditions under Sec. 139.339 still are applicable. Systemic
problems will be reported to air carriers on a national basis (see
discussion under Reporting Requirements). The FAA encourages any air
carrier that is uncertain as to an individual airport's notification
procedures to contact the airport operator as soon as possible for
clarification.
Based on comments received, the FAA also has modified proposed
paragraph 1(b)(5). Several commenters felt that this paragraph is so
broad that it would essentially allow the FAA to indiscriminately
require any type of system or equipment check. This was not the FAA's
intent. Instead, this paragraph of section 1 was included to ensure the
flexibility to accommodate local circumstances or address problems with
systems and equipment not discovered until after the publication of
this SFAR.
In the final rule, this proposed paragraph is renumbered as
paragraph 1(b)(9) and has been combined with proposed paragraph 1(d)
(notification information). This modification is intended to clarify
that the FAA will consult with an airport operator if additional
operational checks of part 139 systems or equipment are needed.
However, the final determination of any additional operational
readiness checks needed to ensure safety of air carrier operations will
remain with the FAA.
The FAA still will notify individual certificate holders to confirm
systems and equipment that will be checked, address any local or unique
issues, and provide specific details on reporting procedures, including
regional contact names and telephone numbers. In addition, this
notification will provide guidance on methods to conduct operational
checks to minimize the impact on operations. For example, certificate
holders will be advised that operational readiness checks of snow and
ice removal equipment need only involve the starting and operating of
each make and model of motorized equipment and corresponding
attachments, such as blades, blowers, and brooms.
One commenter suggested that the FAA complete this notification no
later than October 15, 1999. While the FAA
[[Page 60071]]
hopes to complete all such notifications as soon as possible after the
publication of the final rule, the FAA believes further time may be
needed to address any unforeseen delays and to finalize internal
reporting procedures.
Finally, commenters recommended that the FAA conduct operational
readiness checks of its own equipment located at part 139 airports,
such as navigation aides, and report the results of these checks to the
local airport operator. While the FAA concurs with this recommendation,
it is beyond the scope of this SFAR. However, to ensure such
notification occurs during the effective date of this SFAR, the FAA
will instruct managers of its air traffic control towers to meet with
airport operators prior to the date rollover and develop a mutually
acceptable notification procedure. This type of coordination already
exists at many airports certificated under part 139, but this
additional effort will help ensure there are no gaps in the information
flow. At airports where there are no air traffic control towers, the
FAA will use existing notification procedures to alert airport and
aircraft operators of equipment problems.
Paragraph 1(c)
As proposed, paragraph 1(c) would require that all ARFF vehicles
discharge fire extinguishing agents, regardless of the type of agent.
ARFF vehicles typically carry two types of fire extinguishing agents,
aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) that is dispensed with water and dry
chemical that is dispensed by pressured gas. Several airport operators
raised concerns regarding the operational readiness checks of ARFF
vehicles that carry dry chemical extinguishing agents. These commenters
pointed out that most dry chemical extinguishing agents are harmful to
the environment and special care must be taken to dispose of it once
discharged from an ARFF vehicle. They stated this would be difficult,
and possibly unsafe, to do during hours of darkness. Also, these
commenters noted that once a truck that carries dry chemical discharges
its agent, it takes more time to recharge pressurized gas tanks and
restore the truck to service than a truck that carries AFFF.
The FAA agrees that dispensing dry chemical agent is more
problematic than dispensing AFFF. Further, systems used to discharge
dry chemicals are mechanical and do not contain microprocessors. As
such, the FAA has determined that it is not necessary for certificate
holders to conduct an operational readiness check of systems that
dispense dry chemical or other similar secondary agents. Subsequently,
paragraph 1(c) has been modified to require certificate holders to
dispense only AFFF extinguishing agents. Regardless of the type of fire
extinguishing agent that these vehicles carry, the certificate holder
is still required to check the operation of all ARFF vehicles, i.e.,
starting the vehicle and driving it at speeds typically used to respond
to an emergency and verifying that radios and emergency communications
are operational.
Finally, this paragraph has been modified to clarify the extent of
operational readiness checks of ARFF vehicles. This change requires
that the certificate holder start vehicles and drive them at speeds
normally driven in an emergency, in addition to dispensing fire-
extinguishing agents. The FAA believes this change will eliminate any
confusion as to the extent of the operational readiness check required
for each ARFF vehicle.
Section 2: Schedule
Prior to the discussion of scheduling requirements, it should be
noted that the order of proposed section 2 (Reporting Requirements) and
section 3 (Test Schedule) have been reversed and renumbered. Section 2
is now titled Schedule, and section 3 is now titled Reporting
Requirements. This change is intended to present the requirements of
this SFAR in a more logical sequence.
Paragraph 2(a)(1)
This paragraph (proposed paragraph 3(a)) establishes schedules for
conducting operational readiness checks. This paragraph has been
modified based on comments received.
Some airport operators recommended that the certificate holders be
given additional time to complete required operational readiness
checks, particularly at those airports where air carrier operations are
scheduled before 1:00 a.m. on January 1, 2000. Suggestions ranged from
one to six additional hours to complete operational readiness checks.
The FAA believes these commenters based their concerns on the
assumption that operational readiness checks proposed in section 1 were
more extensive than the FAA intended (see above discussion under
Operational readiness checks). As such, it was difficult for these
commenters to determine whether or not required operational readiness
checks could be accomplished within the specified time frame. Even so,
the FAA has reevaluated time estimates for airport operators to
complete required operational readiness checks and concurs that an
additional hour is warranted, especially for those operators with early
morning operations on January 1, 2000.
Conversely, another commenter recommended that the FAA require
certificate holders to conduct all operational readiness checks within
two hours after midnight on January 1, 2000, regardless of when the
first flight is scheduled to occur. This commenter also suggested that
the FAA allow a certificate holder that can document no air carrier
operations within the first 48 hours of the date rollover additional
time to complete operational readiness checks so long as required
checks are completed 24 hours before the first scheduled operations.
While this approach would simplify the schedule for required checks by
requiring certificated holders with air carrier operations on the first
two days of the new year to complete operational readiness checks at
the same time, the FAA believes it would be unduly burdensome for most
certificate holders. In particular, for those certificate holders that
do not have scheduled air carrier operations until later in the day on
January 1, 2000, and would be required to make arrangements for staff
to be available at times other than their normal duty hours.
Many certificate holders have indicated to the FAA that, regardless
of the time of the first scheduled air carrier operation, they plan to
have operational and maintenance personnel on duty during the date
rollover, and will begin operational readiness checks immediately after
midnight on January 1, 2000. Not all certificate holders have such
staffing levels and the FAA believes that it is a more reasonable
approach to allow operational readiness checks to be conducted closer
to the time of the first scheduled operation when airport personnel are
routinely on duty.
Paragraph 2(b)
Proposed paragraph 3(b) that would require all operational
readiness checks to be completed by January 5, 2000, has been
renumbered 2(c). A new paragraph 2(b) has been added to allow those
certificate holders at airports that have scheduled air carrier
operations on January 1, 2000, some flexibility in completing
operational readiness checks of systems and equipment that are
operating and remain operational during the date rollover, but that may
pose a safety hazard if they are turned off and could not be returned
to operation.
A majority of commenters expressed concern that certain operational
readiness checks of systems that are operational at the time of the
date
[[Page 60072]]
rollover may inadvertently initiate a failure of these systems or
pieces of equipment. On the other hand, if these systems or pieces of
equipment were left alone, they would continue to work on January 1,
2000, until their normal shut down time. At that point, commenters
suggested they could be checked without adversely affecting air carrier
operations scheduled to occur in the early morning. The FAA concurs
with this recommendation.
A good example of such systems and equipment is runway and taxiway
lighting systems that automatically turn on at dusk and remain lit
until sunrise the following day. On the evening of December 31, 1999,
such a lighting system would automatically turn on, and if there is no
interruption in its power source, should remain lit until daybreak the
following morning. While unlikely, if such a system has a date
sensitive micro-processor it is most likely used to turn the system on
or off, and if it were to fail, this would probably occur when the
system switches on the evening of January 1, 2000.
A new paragraph 2(b) has been added to address systems and
equipment that are operational at the time of the date rollover to
January 1, 2000. Specifically, certificate holders that have scheduled
air carrier operations on January 1 will have until 1 p.m. that day to
check runway/taxiway lighting and lighted sign systems, and motorized
snow and ice removal equipment if such systems and equipment are
operational as of midnight on January 2000. In some instances, this
means a certificate holder whose first scheduled operation will occur
in the afternoon or evening of January 1 will be required to complete
operational readiness checks on these systems or pieces of equipment
earlier than other checks required by this SFAR.
Another commenter requested that the final rule clarify that times
required for conducting operational readiness checks be based on
published or scheduled times, not actual arrival or departure time of
the first air carrier operation. Without clarification, the commenter
worried that if a flight scheduled for departure on the evening of
December 31 is delayed until early the next morning, this flight could
be interpreted as the first air carrier operation scheduled for January
1, 2000, rather than a flight scheduled to depart later in the day.
The FAA agrees. Since it is difficult to plan for unforeseen delays
and other schedule problems, certificate holders should interpret the
phase ``first air carrier operation is scheduled to occur'' as meaning
required operational readiness checks shall be planned around the
departure or arrival time that is published or scheduled for first air
carrier operation after midnight on January 1, 2000, not actual arrival
or departure times.
In addition, comments were received suggesting that the schedule
for completing operational readiness checks be expanded to include
other possible problematic dates, such as February 29, 2000. The FAA
disagrees with this recommendation. During the duration of this SFAR,
the FAA believes problematic systems or equipment will be identified
during both operational readiness checks and routine operations. Based
on this experience, certificate holders can repair or replace such
systems and equipment in order to remain in compliance with part 139
safety standards during other similar date rollovers.
Section 3: Reporting Requirements
As noted above, the order of proposed section 2 (Reporting
Requirements) and section 3 (Test Schedule) has been reversed and those
sections have been renumbered. New section 3 is now titled, Reporting
Requirements. As proposed, this section establishes a deadline for
reporting the results of operational readiness checks. The FAA has
modified and reorganized the reporting requirements under new section 3
pursuant to comments received.
Several commenters requested clarification on the type of
information certificate holders are required to report and how this
information should be reported. Other commenters recommended that the
expansion of reporting requirements include any contingency measures
that are implemented, and additional reports once the airport has
returned to normal operations.
New paragraph (a) of this section requires all certificate holders
to report the results of required operational readiness checks, plus
report contingency measures implemented, and any changes that may
affect ARFF Index levels or air carrier operations. New paragraph (b)
of this section specifies when a certificate holder is required to
report. Finally, new paragraph (c) reminds certificate holders of their
obligations under part 139 to collect and disseminate airport condition
information to air carriers, including use of the Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) system.
The FAA believes these modifications will clarify the certificate
holder's reporting responsibilities under this SFAR. In addition, the
FAA will include reporting guidance that is specific to each airport in
the confirmation notice to be sent to each certificate holder (see
discussion of paragraph 1(b)). This guidance will include a reporting
form, airport-specific information on how and when to report, and
alternative means to contact the FAA in the event of a telephone system
failure.
Two commenters also recommended that the FAA amend the SFAR to
require certificate holders that experience no Y2K problems, and do not
implement any contingency measures, to report an ``all clear.'' These
commenters felt that this would eliminate any ambiguity regarding the
status of part 139 airports, and allow pilots and dispatchers as much
time as possible to take appropriate action. The FAA agrees, and has
modified proposed section 2 (new paragraph 3(a)) to clarify that all
certificate holders must report the results of required operational
readiness checks, even if these checks reveal no problems. Information
that an airport has experienced no Y2K problems with airfield safety
systems will be useful to the FAA, air carriers, other airport
operators, and the traveling public.
In addition, several commenters expressed concern about the FAA's
ability to gather and disseminate information reported by certificate
holders. One commenter went so far to remind the FAA of how many
airports it certificates and questioned the agency's ability to field
telephone calls from all of these airports.
The FAA does not agree with these comments. The FAA is satisfied
that the existing communication system established through the FAA's
Regional Airports Division Managers is adequate for reporting the
results of required operational readiness checks. Certificate holders
routinely report information regarding part 139 compliance to the
Regional Airports Division Manager using these established procedures.
These established communication procedures will be utilized to
report the results of operational readiness checks to the FAA. FAA
regional offices will then communicate these results to FAA
Headquarters for further dissemination. In addition, air carrier
operations occur at different times at each part 139 airport so
certificate holders will be contacting the FAA at various times between
January 1 and January 5, 2000, so the FAA does not anticipate a flood
of telephone calls at the same time.
As noted above, each certificate holder will be notified of
reporting procedures specific to its locality. This will include
procedures to notify the
[[Page 60073]]
FAA in the event of a failure of telephone systems. Working with its
telephone service providers, and air traffic control and flight service
systems, the FAA has developed several alternative communication
systems for both local and systemic telephone failures.
Finally, a commenter suggested that the results of operational
readiness checks be disseminated to airlines, airports, and other users
through FAA's Air Traffic Control System Command Center. The commenter
felt this would greatly assist all parties involved in taking timely
and adequate actions should problems arise.
The FAA concurs. As the FAA receives reports from airport
operators, those reports will be disseminated through the FAA's air
traffic control system and regional airports division offices. The
status report for each part 139 airport will either contain an ``all
clear;'' or include a brief description of changes to ARFF Index level,
failure of any part 139 systems and equipment, and a description of any
limitation or reduction in airport services, up to a notice of closure.
Again, such status reports required by this SFAR would be in addition
to local airport condition reporting, required under Sec. 139.339.
Section 4: Contingency Measures (New)
Comments were received from several airport operators that the
proposed SFAR was unclear as to what action a certificate holder would
be required to take if a system or equipment required to be checked
failed due to the date rollover to January 1, 2000. The FAA agrees and
has added this section to clarify certificate holders' obligations to
implement contingency measures.
The FAA assumed that certificate holders would revert to existing
contingency measures contained in the Airport Certification Manual
(Specifications) in the event of equipment or system failure. As noted
above, the requirements of part 139 are still applicable during the
duration of this SFAR (with the exception of certain ARFF vehicle
readiness requirements--see discussion under section 5, Vehicle
Readiness). Operators of part 139 certificated airports already have
developed and specified such contingency measures in their Airport
Certification Manual (Specifications) to address failure of part 139
systems and equipment.
However, to eliminate any possible confusion, the final SFAR
contains a new section 4, Contingency Measures. This section specifies
that a certificate holder will implement contingency measures to remain
compliant with part 139 in the event that a system or equipment
required to be checked fails to operate, or functions improperly due to
the date change to January 1, 2000.
This new section is not intended to allow part 139 certificate
holders to use their discretion in implementing contingency measures if
they believe that a system or equipment failure is not due to the date
rollover. If a required system or piece of equipment fails to operate,
or performs improperly after a required operational readiness check is
performed, the certificate holder must implement contingency measures
and sort out the cause of the problem later.
Section 5: Vehicle Readiness
This section (proposed section 4) temporarily rescinded the
requirements of Sec. 139.319(h)(3) pertaining to inoperative ARFF
vehicles. This section has been renumbered as section 5 and modified
based on comments received.
Most comments received concerned the proposed changes to the ARFF
vehicle readiness provisions of Sec. 139.319(h)(3). These comments
varied widely, ranging from suggestions to expand the proposal to
recommendations that it be rescinded.
Commenters that requested the FAA to reinstate the 48-hour grace
period to replace or repair ARFF vehicles felt the temporary
elimination of this provision of part 139 would increase the likelihood
of disruptions and do nothing to accelerate repair of ARFF equipment.
Instead, they suggested the FAA contact the manufacturers of ARFF
vehicle about the possibility of systemic failures, and then simply
require airport operators to arrange for adequate back up prior to the
date rollover.
The FAA disagrees. The FAA has contacted the manufactures of ARFF
vehicles and they have not provided adequate certification that all
components of their vehicles are Y2K compliant, particularly those
components that they did not manufacture. Without such assurances, the
FAA believes additional efforts must be made to address the
possibility, however small, of a system-wide failure of similar models
of ARFF vehicles. Part 139 provisions regarding the repair or
replacement of inoperative ARFF vehicles do not adequately address this
possibility.
Further, these same commenters seemed unclear as to the
applicability of part 139 during the effective dates of the SFAR or do
not have a clear understanding of the regulation. In particular, these
commenters questioned how many backup ARFF vehicles would be needed in
the event primary equipment become inoperable and were alarmed by the
language of this section that would require any inoperative equipment
to be replaced ``immediately with equipment having at least equal
capabilities.''
The only part 139 ARFF requirement that changes while the SFAR is
in effect is the time period for replacing or repairing inoperable ARFF
vehicles. Instead of 48 hours, the time period temporarily has been
reduced. Otherwise, certificate holders would comply with part 139 as
they do under normal conditions, including implementing contingency
measures in the event required ARFF equipment cannot be repaired or
replaced in the time specified. Such contingency measures may include
lowering the ARFF index (some airport operators maintain a higher Index
level than required), implementing mutual aid agreements with the local
community, bringing into service older vehicles that are no longer used
to meet the required ARFF Index, or closing the airport to certain air
carrier operations. Further, the requirement to replace inoperative
equipment immediately with the equivalent equipment is currently a
requirement of part 139 and would not change under this SFAR.
In addition, part 139 allows for some flexibility in the event the
certificate holder cannot maintain its ARFF index level, and this SFAR
will not change this. Specifically, part 139.315(c) allows the
certificate holder to serve up to four daily operations of an air
carrier aircraft requiring the next higher ARFF index level before the
operator is required to have more equipment or limit the operations of
these larger aircraft. Also, a certificate holder may temporarily
deviate from part 139 requirements in the event of an extreme emergency
situation, as described under Sec. 139.113.
Due to this confusion, a commenter interpreted the proposal to mean
that a certificate holder was required to provide duplicate ARFF
vehicles if a primary vehicle failed its operational readiness checks.
This commenter noted that it is unlikely that sufficient redundant
vehicles could be procured or leased at any price, and such new
vehicles would be more likely to contain hidden computer chips and be
more susceptible to Y2K problems. As such, the commenter disagreed with
the FAA's conclusion that because the probability of an ARFF vehicle
failing its operational readiness check is low, the expense of ARFF
backup is minimal. In actuality, this commenter felt, this section
would be more expensive than calculated because certificate holders
would be required to purchase backup
[[Page 60074]]
ARFF vehicles at an average cost of $200,000 each.
The FAA disagrees and believes these concerns are the result of the
commenter making an assumption that certificate holders must have ARFF
vehicle backup available the instant that an ARFF vehicle fails its
operational readiness check, and that an identical replacement to the
vehicle is required. As explained above, the FAA did not intend that
duplicate vehicles be idling next to the ARFF station during
operational readiness checks, rather that the certificate holder must
initiate contingency measures immediately. Several options are
available for contingency measures and are currently used by
certificate holders if a required ARFF vehicle becomes inoperative and
cannot be repaired or replaced within 48 hours.
These contingency measures would be used until the inoperative
vehicle is fixed or, in an extreme case, replaced. So the cost to
repair or replace an ARFF vehicle would eventually be incurred even if
the FAA did not implement this SFAR. However, if an ARFF vehicle were
to fail its operational readiness check, the certificate holder will
incur costs for implementing contingency measures that it would not
normally incur during the 48-hour grace period. Thus an assessment of
the expected cost that may be incurred should include the probability
of a Y2K failure even if this probability is small.
Two commenters supported the temporary suspension of the 48-hour
grace period but recommended that airport operators be required to make
arrangements with local governments to ensure that backup equipment
also remains operational. The FAA does not concur with this
recommendation. It would be unreasonable to require certificate holders
to conduct operational readiness checks on equipment that they do not
own. Such backup equipment is the property of local governments,
national guard units or the Department of Defense, all of which have
their own efforts underway to ensure such equipment is Y2K compliant
and remains operational after the date rollover to January 1, 2000.
Also, comments were received from individual operators of part 139
airports. These were very helpful in refining this section, and the FAA
has adopted a modified approach to vehicle readiness as a result of
their input. Primarily, these commenters were concerned that if no
grace period was allowed, then certificate holders could not comply
with the SFAR, as backup measures cannot be implemented immediately.
For example, certificate holders relying on assistance through a mutual
aid agreement need time to initiate this assistance, and emergency
personnel responding need time to assemble and reposition equipment to
the airport. Recommendations were made to allow certificate holders a
minimum of six to eight hours to implement their ARFF contingency
measures.
The FAA agrees with these concerns, and did not intend when it
proposed to eliminate the grace period to mean that backup personnel
and equipment must be on ready status as the certificate holder
conducts required operational readiness checks of primary equipment.
Instead, the FAA intended for certificate holders to implement
contingency measures immediately to ensure compliance with part 139
requirements. To remedy this, the final SFAR allows certificate holders
to repair or replace inoperative vehicles as soon as possible, but
within four hours of completion of operational readiness checks with
equipment having at least equal capabilities of inoperative equipment.
If the vehicle cannot be replaced within four hours (and is needed to
maintain the index for aircraft currently serving the airport), the
revised section requires the certificate holder to either implement
contingency measures required under new section 4 or lower the ARFF
index to that corresponding to the remaining operative equipment.
Another airport operator noted that the SFAR lacks a provision that
would allow certificate holders, during the effective period of the
SFAR, to revert to the 48-hour grace period for repairing or replacing
vehicles once these vehicles successfully pass their operational
readiness checks. For example, if a certificate holder successfully
conducts a operational readiness check of an ARFF vehicle on January 2
and reports this to the FAA but two days later the same vehicle breaks
down due to a mechanical problem. Under the proposal, this commenter
worried that such a mechanical problem would require immediate repair
or replacement even though the breakdown was not Y2K related. The FAA
agrees, and has added a new paragraph to this section (paragraph 5(b))
that allows the certificate holder, after complying with the section 3
reporting requirements, 48 hours to repair or replace aircraft rescue
and firefighting vehicles that subsequently become inoperative.
Finally, several airport operators also raised concerns regarding
the operational readiness checks of ARFF vehicles that carry dry
chemical extinguishing agents. These comments are addressed under
paragraph 1(c).
Section 6: Self-Inspection Requirements
Proposed section 5 (new section 6) has been shortened for clarity.
The requirements of the section did not change.
Section 7: Effective Times
Proposed section 6 (new section 7) specifies all times in the SFAR
are in local time at the airport.
Several comments were received regarding the requirements of this
section. Some commenters agreed with the use of local time, while
others recommended using Universal Time Coordinate (UTC). One commenter
even suggested that required checks should commence at 1:00 a.m. local
time at the International Dateline.
All these recommendations are valid. There are several different
times that time-sensitive equipment could be using. For example, a
date-sensitive micro-processor manufactured in California for worldwide
distribution may be set to the local, Pacific time zone. Conversely,
such a part manufactured for a specific airport may be set to the local
time of the airport. So the uncertainty of the functionality of unknown
date-sensitive systems and equipment is further complicated by the
uncertainty of which time such systems and equipment are set to.
To simplify matters, the FAA has determined the final rule will
continue to reference local time. At some airports, this may result in
certain time-sensitive systems or equipment making the date change to
January 1, 2000, prior to midnight local time, while at other airports
this event may take place well after midnight local time. Nevertheless,
the FAA believes using local time is the most reasonable approach for
certificate holders to comply with the requirements of this SFAR.
To lessen the potential impact of varying times, the FAA is
exploring the possibility of operators of certificated airports located
in the South Pacific voluntarily conducting additional operational
readiness checks to obtain information on the reliability of commonly
used systems and equipment as soon as possible after midnight at the
International Dateline. These airports will be the first part 139
certificated airports to experience the date rollover to January 1,
2000.
Such operational readiness checks will help alert the FAA, and
subsequently certificate holders, of equipment and systems that are
experiencing problems. Further, as the FAA receives reports from other
airport
[[Page 60075]]
operators, both domestic airports and international airports, this
information will be disseminated to those certificate holders still
waiting the date rollover (see discussion under Reporting Section).
Section 8: Expiration.
Proposed section 7 (new section 8) has been shortened for clarity.
The requirements of the section did not change.
Paperwork Reduction Act
Information collection requirements in the amendment to part 139
previously have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)), and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0063.
International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed regulations.
Regulatory Evaluation Summary
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second,
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the
economic effect of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the
Office of Management and Budget directs agencies to assess the effect
of regulatory changes on international trade. And fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to
result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in
the aggregate, or by private sector, or $100 million or more annually
(adjusted for inflation).
In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this
rulemaking does not meet the standards for a ``significant regulatory
action'' under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and under the
Department of Transportation's Regulatory Policies and Procedures for
Simplification, Analysis, and Review of Regulations (44 FR 11034,
February 26, 1979) and, therefore, is not subject to review by the
Office of Management and Budget. Additionally, this rule would not have
a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities, would
not constitute a barrier to international trade, and does not contain a
significant intergovernmental or private sector mandate.
If an agency determines that the expected impact is so minimal that
the rule does not warrant a full evaluation, a statement to that
effect, and the basis for it, is included in the preamble to the final
rule. The FAA has determined that the expected impact of this rule will
be so minimal as to not warrant a full regulatory evaluation.
In summary, this SFAR establishes a one-time operational readiness
check and reporting requirement that is essentially identical to the
existing self-inspection requirements. The SFAR requires that certain
airport operators arrange for backup ARFF services or implement
contingency measures, as currently required, but in a more timely
manner, if an ARFF vehicle fails its operational readiness check. Since
self-inspections and reporting are already required under
Sec. 139.327(a), this regulation imposes little additional costs on
airport operators. The FAA estimates that the operational readiness
checks required by this rule may be completed in less than two hours,
including reporting results to the FAA. In addition, the expense of
complying with the ARFF backup requirement in a more timely manner is
small and considered a low-probability event.
This SFAR requires airports certificated under part 139 to maintain
the current ARFF Index level, reduce their ARFF Index level, or
implement contingency measures, as currently required. Operators of
most certificated airports are required to maintain the required ARFF
Index to serve current scheduled air carrier operations. Many of these
operators already have in place an ARFF backup plan. Those that do not
have a backup plan can, on short notice, make such arrangements, at a
nominal cost. Such contingency measures may include lowering the ARFF
Index (some airport operators maintain a higher ARFF Index level than
required), implementing mutual aid agreements with the local community,
bringing into service older vehicles that are no longer used to meet
the required ARFF Index, or closing the airport to certain air carrier
operations. Further, the requirement to replace inoperative equipment
immediately with equivalent equipment is currently a requirement of
part 139 and would not change under this SFAR.
An economic impact could occur in the following scenario. For those
operators of certificated airports that are required to meet a
specified ARFF Index, this rule does not allow the currently permitted
48-hour grace period to repair or replace inoperative ARFF equipment.
Rather, this time period has been temporarily reduced to 4 hours in
which the certificate holders must implement ARFF backup measures, as
described above. Using this scenario, the rule could result in ARFF
costs equal to the 44-hour expense of providing these backup ARFF
measures.
In such an event, the cost of maintaining an airport's current ARFF
Index for 44 hours is very low in terms of overall airport expenses.
For such an expense to occur, all of the following conditions must be
met:
1. A vehicle necessary to maintain the ARFF Index does not pass the
Y2K operational readiness check.
2. No other ARFF equipment is readily available to maintain the
ARFF Index.
3. Air carrier aircraft serving the airport on that day do not
allow the airport operator to temporarily step down to a lower ARFF
Index.
The probability of a series of connected events in which each event
must occur is calculated by multiplying across all events the
probability assigned to each event. In this case, the probability of
the first event (a required ARFF vehicle does not pass the Y2K
operational readiness check) is multiplied by the probability assigned
to the second, and then multiplied by the probability of the third
event. If the probability of just two events each equal 10 percent, the
probability assigned to an airport incurring an ARFF expense resulting
from this rule cannot be higher than one percent. Thus, while an ARFF
expense can occur, the expected likelihood is thought to be very low.
The FAA has determined that it is unlikely that all three events
will occur. However, in the event an airport does incur the cost of
having backup ARFF vehicles available, only 44 hours of that cost is
attributable to this rule because the current rule imposes the same
requirement after a 48-hour grace period. The cost for an airport that
might need to provide a backup vehicle could be zero, if the vehicle is
obtained from other fire units of the airport owner, or from other
local governments through a mutual aid agreement. Accordingly, the
costs that an airport operator may incur to obtain the services of one
or more backup ARFF
[[Page 60076]]
vehicles is expected to be very small. Finally, if the ARFF Index level
is affected, an airport operator may choose to accept a lower ARFF
Index level temporarily, with no effect on scheduled service, if
aircraft currently used for scheduled service at the airport do not
require the higher index. Thus the FAA expects this element of the rule
to be minimal.
The benefit of the rule is that it provides assurances that airport
operator's preparations for the date rollover have been effective and
that compliance with part 139 requirements is not compromised due to
the January 1, 2000 date rollover. In the unlikely event that this date
rollover will interrupt systems that are used to comply with part 139,
the rule will ensure an early knowledge of such interruption and
facilitate immediate action to maintain safety.
Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (the Act), as amended,
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject
to regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the Act requires agencies
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and
small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the determination is that it would, the
agency must prepare a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (RFA) as
described in the Act. However, if an agency determines that a proposed
or final rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities, Sec. 605(b) of the Act provides
that the head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility
analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement
providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning
should be clear.
As detailed above in the regulatory evaluation summary there are
two costs that may be incurred. First, the inspection costs are
expected to be minimal as the expected inspection time is thought to be
two hours or less. Second, the probability that the requirement may
impose an ARFF cost is expected to be very low.
Of the 568 civilian certificated airports, 177 meet the criteria
for small entities. At least 135 of those 177 airports are approved for
air carrier operations using mutual aid, or have other arrangements
that do not require the airport operator to have ARFF equipment on the
airport to meet a particular index requirement. These airports will not
be financially affected by the reduction of the 48-hour ARFF grace
period. The remaining 42 airports that are considered small entities
must comply with ARFF Index requirements of part 139 and potentially
could be affected by the SFAR. The expected ARFF cost that this rule
could impose on these 42 airports is expected to be minimal.
The rule will allow airport operators only 4 hours, versus the
currently permitted 48-hour grace period, to repair or replace
inoperative ARFF equipment or implement contingency measures. Thus,
using this scenario, the rule could impose an ARFF cost equal to a 44-
hour expense to implement ARFF backup measures, as described above in
the Regulatory Evaluation Summary.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.
605(b), the Federal Aviation Administration certifies that this rule
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
International Trade Impact Statement
The rule will not constitute a barrier to international trade,
including the export of U.S. goods and services to foreign countries,
or the import of foreign goods and services into the United States.
Federalism Implications
The regulations herein will not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive
Order 12612, it is determined that this rule will not have sufficient
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a federalism
assessment.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act),
codified as 2 U.S.C. 1501-1571, requires each Federal agency, to the
extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment of the effects
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may
result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in
the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.
Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by
elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal
governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the Act is any
provision in a Federal agency regulation that would impose an
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year.
Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section
204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development
of regulatory proposals.
This rule does not contain a Federal intergovernmental or private
sector mandate that exceeds $100 million in any one year. Therefore,
the requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 do not apply.
Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement. In
accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this
rulemaking action qualifies for a categorical exclusion.
Energy Impact
The energy impact of the notice has been assessed in accordance
with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) P.L. 94-163, as
amended (43 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been determined
that the final rule is not a major regulatory action under the
provisions of the EPCA.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 139
Air carriers, Airports, Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
[[Page 60077]]
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends part 139 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations
as follows:
PART 139--CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: LAND AIRPORTS SERVING
CERTAIN AIR CARRIERS
1. The authority citation for part 139 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C 106(g), 40113, 44701-44706, 44709, and
44719.
2. Part 139 is amended by adding Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 85 to read as follows:
SFAR 85--YEAR 2000 AIRPORT SAFETY INSPECTIONS
1. Operational readiness check requirements. (a) Unless
otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each certificate holder
shall conduct an operational readiness check of each piece of
equipment and system described in paragraph (b) of this section to
verify that compliance with part 139 requirements has not been
affected by the date change to January 1, 2000. The operational
readiness checks shall demonstrate that the equipment and system is
sufficiently operational to continue to support the certificate
holder's compliance with the requirements of part 139.
(b) The operational readiness checks required by paragraph (a)
of this section shall include a check of--
(1) Each lighting system and lighted sign system;
(2) Each system used to notify aircraft rescue and firefighting
units during an emergency;
(3) Each aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicle identified in
the Airport Certification Manual or Airport Certification
Specifications;
(4) Each radio used to communicate with Air Traffic Control and
aircraft;
(5) Each radio used for communication between aircraft rescue
and firefighting vehicles and fire dispatch or command;
(6) Each system used by airport operations and maintenance
personnel for internal airport communications;
(7) Each piece of motorized equipment used to remove snow and
ice from movement areas;
(8) Each system used to transmit airfield condition information
to air carriers, including the system used to issue a NOTAM; and
(9) Any other system or piece of equipment that the
Administrator determines, after consultation with the certificate
holder, is used to support the holder's compliance with part 139
requirements, and is critical to the safety and efficiency of
aircraft operations.
(c) The operational readiness check of each aircraft rescue and
firefighting vehicle shall include starting the vehicle and driving
the vehicle at speeds typically used to respond to an emergency. In
addition, the operational readiness check of each vehicle that
carries AFFF and water fire extinguishing agent shall include
dispensing of this agent.
2. Schedule. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this
section, after midnight December 31, 1999, each certificate holder
shall complete the operational readiness checks required by section
1 of this SFAR, as follows:
(1) By 2:00 a.m. on January 1, 2000, if the first air carrier
operation is scheduled to occur at or before 3:00 a.m. on this date.
(2) At least one hour before the first air carrier operation is
scheduled to occur, if the operation is scheduled to occur after
3:00 a.m. on January 1, 2000.
(b) For an airport where air carrier operations are scheduled to
occur on January 1, 2000, each certificate holder shall have until
1:00 p.m. on January 1, 2000, to complete the required operational
readiness checks of lighting and lighted sign systems, and motorized
snow and ice removal equipment that are in use on 12:00 a.m. on
January 1, 2000.
(c) All required operational readiness checks shall be completed
before January 5, 2000, whether or not the airport has served air
carrier operations from January 1 through January 4, 1999.
3. Reporting Requirements. (a) Each certificate holder shall
report the results of its operational readiness checks to the
Regional Airports Division Manager. This report shall include--
(1) A confirmation that the systems and equipment specified
under section 1(b) are functioning as required under part 139;
(2) A description of any changes to ARFF Index level required
under Sec. 139.315;
(3) Any failure of part 139 systems and equipment specified
under section 1(b) and the subsequent contingency measure
implemented; and
(4) Any limitations or reductions in part 139 measures that
would place a restriction on air carrier operations, including a
notice of closure.
(b) The report required by paragraph (a) of this section shall
be submitted no later than one hour following the completion of
operational readiness checks required by section 1 of this SFAR. For
systems and equipment described in section 2(b), a report on the
required operational readiness checks shall be submitted no later
than one hour following the completion of those checks.
(c) This reporting requirement is in addition to the
notification requirements of part 139.
4. Contingency measures. Except as provided in section 5, the
certificate holder shall implement contingency measures, if
necessary, to remain compliant with part 139 in the event that a
system or piece of equipment required to be checked under this SFAR
becomes inoperative due to the date change to January 1, 2000.
5. Vehicle readiness. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
this section, until January 5, 2000, each vehicle required under
Sec. 139.317 that becomes inoperative shall be replaced as soon as
possible with equipment having at least equal capabilities,
notwithstanding Sec. 139.319(h)(3). A vehicle is considered
inoperative if it cannot perform as required by Sec. 139.319(h)(1).
In any event, the vehicle must be replaced with four hours of
failure to pass its operational readiness check. If the vehicle
cannot be replaced within four hours, the certificate holder shall--
(1) Implement contingency measures required under section (4);
or
(2) Limit air carrier operations on the airport to those
compatible with the ARFF Index corresponding to the remaining
operative rescue and firefighting equipment.
(b) Any ARFF vehicle that subsequently becomes inoperative after
the certificate holder complies with the reporting requirements of
section 3(a), may be replaced, as provided in Sec. 139.319(h)(3), if
the vehicle:
(1) Passed the operational readiness check required by section
1, or
(2) Is a replacement vehicle provided in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this section.
6. Self-inspection requirements. Operational readiness checks
conducted in compliance with this SFAR may be used to fulfill
applicable part 139 self-inspection requirements.
7. Effective times. All of the times described in this SFAR are
in the local time of the airport.
8. Expiration. This SFAR expires on January 5, 2000.
Issued in Washington, DC, on October 28, 1999.
Jane F. Garvey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 99-28616 Filed 11-2-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
