[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 216 (Wednesday, November 8, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56357-56359]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-27622]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-003 and 50-247]
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Indian Point
Nuclear Generating Units No. 1 and 2; Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its
regulations to Provisional Operating License (POL) No. DPR-5 and
Facility Operating License DPR-26, issued to Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, Inc. (the licensee), for operation of the Indian
Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located in Westchester
County, New York. The operating authority of POL DPR-5 for Indian Point
Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 was revoked by Commission Order dated
June 19, 1980.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's
application dated August 10, 1995, for exemption from
[[Page 56358]]
certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for physical
protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against
radiological sabotage.'' The exemption would allow implementation of a
hand geometry biometric system for site access control such that
combined picture badges/keycards for certain non-employees can be taken
offsite.
The Need for the Proposed Action
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph (a), the licensee shall
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and
security organization.
Paragraph (1) of 10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,''
specifies that ``licensee shall control all points of personnel and
vehicle access into a protected area.'' Paragraph (5) of 10 CFR
73.55(d) specifies that ``A numbered picture badge identification
system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to
protected areas without escort.'' Paragraph (5) of 10 CFR 73.55(d) also
states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e.,
contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort
provided the individual ``receives a picture badge upon entrance into
the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected
area * * * ''
Currently, employee and contractor combined identification badges/
keycards are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and
exit from the protected areas of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Unit Nos. 1 and 2 site. Station security personnel are required to
maintain control of the badges while the individuals are offsite. This
practice has been in effect at the Indian Point site since the
operating license was issued. Security personnel retain each
identification badge/keycard, when not in use by the authorized
individual, within appropriately designed storage receptacles inside a
bullet-resistant enclosure. An individual who meets the access
authorization requirements is issued an individual picture
identification card/keycard which allows entry into preauthorized areas
of the station. While entering the plant in the present configuration,
an authorized individual is ``screened'' by the required detection
equipment and by the issuing security officer. Having received the
badge/keycard, the individual proceeds to the access portal, inserts
the badge/keycard into the card reader and passes through the turnstile
which unlocks if the badge/keycard is valid.
This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel
are required to verify badge/keycard issuance, ensure badge/keycard
retrieval, and maintain the badges/keycards in orderly storage until
the next entry into the protected area. The regulations permit
employees to remove their badges from the site, but an exemption from
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their
badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
The Commission has completed its evaluation of the licensee's
application. Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to
gain unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their
hand (hand geometry) recorded with their badge/keycard number. Since
the hand geometry is unique to each individual and its application in
the entry screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a
badge/keycard, the requested exemption would allow employees and
contractors to keep their badges at the time of exiting the protected
area. The process of verifying badge/keycard issuance, ensuring badge/
keycard retrieval, and maintaining badges/keycards, could be eliminated
while the balance of the access procedure would remain intact. Firearm,
explosive, and metal detection equipment and provisions for conducting
searches will remain as well. The security officer responsible for the
last access control function (controlling admission to the protected
area) will also remain isolated within a bullet-resistant structure in
order to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.
Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present
verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's
identity. Unlike the combined photograph identification badge/keycard,
hand geometry is nontransferable. During the initial access
authorization or registration process, hand measurements are recorded
and the template is stored for subsequent use in the identity
verification process required for entry into the protected area.
Authorized individuals insert their badge/keycard into the card reader
and the biometrics system records an image of the hand geometry. The
unique features of the newly recorded image are then compared to the
template previously stored in the database. Access is ultimately
granted based on the degree to which the characteristics of the image
match those of the ``signature'' template.
Since both the badge/keycard and hand geometry would be necessary
for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide
for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge/keycard
by an individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not
enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.
The access process will continue to be under the observation of
security personnel. The system of identification badges/keycards will
continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to
protected areas without escorts. Badges/keycards will continue to be
displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Addition
of a hand geometry biometrics system will provide a significant
contribution to effective implementation of the security plan at the
site.
The change will not increase the probability or consequences of
accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that
may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the
allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant
radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed
action does involve features located entirely within the restricted
area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not effect nonradiological
plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the
Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable
environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any
alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be
evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff
considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application
would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action
are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2.
[[Page 56359]]
Agencies and Persons Consulted
In accordance with its stated policy, on September 26, 1995, the
staff consulted with the New York State official, Heidi Voelk of the
Energy Research and Development Authority, regarding the environmental
impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has
determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated August 10, 1995, which is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine
Avenue, White Plains, NY 10610.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of October 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Project Directorate I-1, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-27622 Filed 11-7-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
