[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 218 (Friday, November 8, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57914-57917]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-28742]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-245, License No. DPR-21]
Northeast Utilities Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1;
Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, has taken action with regard to a Petition dated
January 2, 1995, by Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petition for action under 10
CFR 2.206). The Petition pertains to Millstone Nuclear Power Station,
Unit 1.
In the Petition, the Petitioner asserted that (1) the Petitioner
was ``unjustly chastised'' by his first-line supervisor and department
manager about absenteeism, and his department manager threatened him in
a memorandum; (2) his first-line supervisor willfully falsified nuclear
documents in that he signed off on a surveillance of the gas turbine
battery as having met acceptance criteria when the requirements had not
been met; and (3) the Millstone Unit 1 organization failed to enter
into a 4-day Limiting Condition for Operation as required by the
Technical Specifications when the Operations Department was notified of
the failed surveillance, in violation of 10 CFR 50.5. In addition, the
Petitioner asserted that a number of violations have occurred in 1992
and 1993 related to the gas turbine battery, which have not been
handled appropriately by the NRC and Northeast Utilities, and that the
utility and NRC are engaged in an apparent ``cover-up'' of the
problems.
The Petitioner requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1)
assess a Severity Level II violation and a Severity Level III violation
against his department manager and his first-line supervisor for their
apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.7; (2) institute sanctions against his
first-line supervisor, Northeast Utilities, and the Millstone Unit 1
organization for engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10
CFR 50.5; and (3) remove his first-line supervisor from his position
until a ``satisfactory solution to the falsifying of nuclear
documents'' by this individual can be achieved.
The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
determined to deny the Petition. The reasons for this denial are
explained in the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-96-16),
the complete text of which follows this notice and is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich,
Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at
the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road,
Waterford, Connecticut.
A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this
regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on
its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of October 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ashok C. Thadani,
Acting Director. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[DD-96-16]
I. Introduction
On January 2, 1995, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a
Petition with the Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). In the Petition, the
Petitioner raised concerns regarding (1) employee harassment and
intimidation by Northeast Utilities (NU); (2) the falsification of
nuclear documents concerning the gas turbine battery; (3) failure to
enter a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
after a failed surveillance; and (4) his belief that numerous
violations have occurred in 1992 and 1993 regarding the gas turbine
battery. Because of these problems, the Petitioner alleges that the gas
turbine is still inoperable. In addition, the Petitioner asserts that
these problems have not been handled appropriately by the NRC and NU,
and that NU and the
[[Page 57915]]
NRC are engaged in an apparent ``cover-up'' of problems with
surveillances of the gas turbine battery.
The Petitioner requested that the NRC (1) assess a Severity Level
II violation and a Severity Level III violation against his department
manager and his first-line supervisor for their apparent violations of
10 CFR 50.7; (2) institute sanctions against the Petitioner's first-
line supervisor, NU, and the Millstone Unit 1 organization for engaging
in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5; and (3) remove
the Petitioner's first-line supervisor from his position until a
``satisfactory solution to the falsifying of nuclear documents'' by
this individual can be achieved.
On February 23, 1995, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition
had been referred to me pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's
regulations. I also informed the Petitioner that the NRC would take
appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific
concerns raised in the Petition. I also stated that the Petitioner's
allegations that the NRC has not been appropriately handling certain
violations and is engaged in a ``cover up'' of the problems related to
the gas turbine battery had been referred to the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG). Therefore, this Director's Decision does not
address that issue. On the basis of a review of the remaining issues
raised by the Petitioner, as discussed below, I have concluded that no
substantial health and safety issues have been raised that would
require the initiation of additional formal enforcement action.
II. Discussion
A. Background
The Petitioner alleges that during an annual surveillance of the
gas turbine battery on September 20, 1994, he identified that some of
the intercell bolted connections of the gas turbine battery were
greater than 65 micro-ohms, which was greater than the acceptance
criteria specified in Procedure SP 779.5, ``Gas Turbine Battery Annual
Inspection.'' The Petitioner alleges that although he notified the
Operations Department shift supervisor and his first-line supervisor,
his first-line supervisor signed the surveillance as ``yes,'' referring
to the ``acceptance criteria met,'' when clearly the requirements were
not met as specified by Procedure SP 779.5. The Petitioner alleges
further that, when the Operations Department was notified by him of the
failed surveillance, the Millstone Unit 1 organization willfully failed
to enter a four-day LCO as required by the Technical Specifications, in
order to keep the unit on-line to produce revenues. In addition, the
Petitioner asserts that about a week after this incident, he received
copies of the 1992 and 1993 annual gas turbine battery surveillances
that indicated a number of problems and violations which have not been
handled appropriately by NU and the NRC, and that the gas turbine is
still inoperable due to these problems. Finally, the Petitioner alleges
that he has been subjected to harassment and intimidation by his first-
line supervisor and department manager for raising these concerns.
B. Petitioner's Concern Regarding Falsification of Nuclear Documents
During an inspection held September 27 through November 15, 1994,
as documented in Inspection Report (IR) 50-245/94-31; 50-336/94-30; 50-
423/94-28 (IR 94-31), dated December 16, 1994, and an inspection held
May 15 through June 23, 1995, as documented in IR 50-245/95-22; 50-336/
95-22; 50-423/95-22 (IR 95-22), dated July 21, 1995, the NRC reviewed
gas turbine battery maintenance and surveillance activities at
Millstone Unit 1. The inspection determined that on September 20, 1994,
the date the Petitioner alleges the gas turbine battery failed the
surveillance, the licensee for Millstone Unit 1 (Northeast Nuclear
Energy Company--NNECO) performed the annual surveillance of the gas
turbine battery as specified by Procedure SP 779.5. This annual
preventive maintenance identified three intercell connection resistance
readings that did not meet the surveillance acceptance criterion in
that the resistance readings were greater than the accepted values. The
electricians notified the shift supervisor and the maintenance foreman
of the unsatisfactory readings and documented the results in the
surveillance procedure.
The NRC reviewed the completed surveillance and noted that the
``acceptance criteria met'' block was checked ``yes,'' indicating
satisfactory surveillance results; however, the resistance readings for
the three intercell connections were documented as unsatisfactory. The
inspection therefore confirmed that the classification of this
surveillance as acceptable was incorrect and, as a result, it bypassed
NNECO's administrative control procedures for system operability
1, and procedural review and approval. However, on the basis of
interviews and a review of the completed surveillance procedure, the
NRC determined that the first-line supervisor documented the high
resistance readings on the cover page of the surveillance, discussed
the issue with the Electrical Engineering Department to determine if
the high resistance readings affected operability of the battery and,
on the basis of the discussion with Engineering, determined that
Engineering had previously reviewed the effect of the high resistance
readings and had found the battery operable. Therefore, the first-line
supervisor concluded that the battery was acceptable as is 2.
Further, the inspection confirmed that the licensee's previous
operability evaluation was acceptable and that the gas turbine battery
was operable. As discussed below, the NRC took enforcement action
regarding a number of procedural violations associated with the gas
turbine battery surveillance. Therefore, based on the above, the NRC
has concluded that the first-line supervisor did not willfully falsify
documents.
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\1\ If the classification of the surveillance had been
determined to be ``unsatisfactory'' (``acceptance criteria block''
checked ``no''), a determination of operability would be performed
and the related Technical Specification LCO would be entered, if the
gas turbine battery was inoperable.
\2\ Although the first-line supervisor was technically correct
that the gas turbine battery was operable, the determination of
battery operability did not follow the licensee's administrative
controls as discussed above.
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C. Petitioner's Concern Regarding Failure To Enter Technical
Specification LCO
The inspection determined that the classification of the resistance
readings as ``unsatisfactory'' (``acceptance criteria block'' checked
``no'') would have ensured that a determination of operability would
have been performed by the licensee and the related Technical
Specification LCO would have been entered if appropriate. However,
since the first-line supervisor documented the high resistance
readings, discussed the readings with Engineering, and on the basis of
the discussion, determined that the battery was acceptable, the
licensee did not willfully fail to enter the LCO in that the licensee
determined that the previous operability determination was valid and,
therefore, that the surveillance procedure criteria had been met.
In response to the NRC IR results, the Millstone Unit 1 Director
issued a memorandum to Millstone Unit 1 personnel to reinforce the
expectation that if an acceptance criterion is not met, the ``no''
block must be checked. The Unit Director stated that he held
[[Page 57916]]
managers and supervisors personally accountable for ensuring that their
personnel understood the message in the memorandum. In addition, NNECO
held several management team meetings to ensure a full appreciation of
the type of performance characteristics that can lead to procedural
violations and to reinforce the licensee's expectation concerning the
``acceptance criterion met'' block. NNECO also revised the acceptance
criterion within Procedure SP 779.5 for the three connections that have
the intercell connection cables with higher resistance because of the
cable length. In addition, the official plant record was corrected for
the annual battery surveillance that was incorrectly marked as meeting
its acceptance criterion. In a subsequent inspection report, IR 50-245/
95-31, 50-336/95-31, 50-423/95-31 (IR 95-31), dated September 19, 1995,
the NRC reviewed the licensee's corrective actions in the above areas.
The NRC staff found the licensee's corrective actions to be timely and
thorough.
In summary, on the basis of the above information, the staff found
that the Petitioner's first-line supervisor did incorrectly mark the
acceptance criterion met block ``yes;'' however, he annotated the high
resistance readings on the cover page of the surveillance and marked
the block ``yes'' based on his determination that Engineering had
previously reviewed the issue and determined the battery to be
operable. Further, the staff found that since the licensee determined
that this was previously reviewed by Engineering and found acceptable,
the licensee erroneously did not follow its administrative control
procedures for determining operability and entering of appropriate
LCOs. Therefore, the NRC determined that (1) the Petitioner's first-
line supervisor did not willfully falsify nuclear documents or
deliberately violate NRC regulations or the Millstone Unit 1 operating
license; (2) neither he, Northeast Utilities, nor the Millstone Unit 1
organization violated the provisions of 10 CFR 50.5; (3) the requested
removal of the first-line supervisor is not warranted based on these
concerns; and (4) the licensee's corrective actions were acceptable. As
discussed below, the NRC took enforcement action regarding a number of
procedural violations associated with the gas turbine battery
surveillance.
D. Additional Concerns Regarding Inoperability of the Emergency Gas
Turbine
The Petitioner provides a number of examples of what he alleges
demonstrate inadequate procedural compliance by the licensee regarding
gas turbine battery surveillances which indicate that the gas turbine
is inoperable due to battery problems.3 In IR 94-31, the NRC
determined that during implementation of Procedure SP 779.5, there were
a number of examples (including the examples the Petitioner provided)
in which the Procedure SP 779.5 was not followed, nor was the job
stopped and the procedure revised to correct the identified errors. For
example, the procedure included a caution statement following step 6.19
that required the generation of a plant information report (PIR) and
subsequent determination of operability if the battery acceptance
criteria are not met. The PIR was not generated until this issue was
questioned by the NRC. Step 6.17 of the procedure requires that if any
resistance reading was greater than 65 micro-ohms, then the terminals
and straps must be cleaned. The licensee did not clean the terminal and
strap connections. Step 6.22 requires that the readings taken during
the surveillance be compared with previous battery surveillance
readings to determine if there is any deterioration of the battery
system. The licensee did not perform this review and evaluate the
battery for deterioration until the NRC raised the issue. The NRC
determined that these examples in which the procedure steps were not
implemented constituted a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1
and Procedure SP 779.5 and issued a Notice of Violation to the licensee
(categorizing this as a Severity Level IV Violation, Violation 50-245/
94-31-02). Further, the NRC noted in IR 94-31 that neither the
recognition of the procedure errors during two prior implementations of
this annual surveillance procedure (1992 and 1993) 4, nor the
biennial procedure review completed on December 8, 1993, resulted in
revisions to preclude the problems encountered during the 1994
surveillance. As discussed above, in IR 95-31, the NRC reviewed the
licensee's corrective actions for this violation and found them
acceptable.
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\3\ The Petitioner asserted that these problems have not been
handled by the NRC and NU, and that NU and the NRC are engaged in an
apparent ``cover-up'' of problems. As explained above, the ``cover-
up'' issue has been referred to the OIG.
\4\ The NRC noted similar examples in which the procedure was
not followed or corrected during the annual surveillance in 1992 and
1993.
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In IR 94-31, the NRC concluded that the previous operability
evaluation of the gas turbine battery was acceptable and, therefore,
that the gas turbine battery was operable at that time due to the
previous evaluation. The violation cited in the Notice of Violation
included the issues the Petitioner raised, specifically that NNECO
failed to perform an operability determination and subsequently did not
enter the Technical Specification LCO for the gas turbine. While the
NRC staff did not take the actions the Petitioner requested, the staff
did take enforcement action based on its findings. Therefore, since the
NRC found the licensee's determination of operability acceptable and
the NRC took enforcement action for the related violation described
above, the NRC has concluded that additional enforcement action is not
warranted.
E. Petitioner's Allegations Regarding Harassment and Intimidation
With regard to the Petitioner's assertion of harassment and
intimidation, the Petitioner alleges that (1) on October 7, 1994, he
was given a memorandum concerning absenteeism; (2) on October 27, 1994,
he was unjustly chastised by his first line supervisor and department
manager about absenteeism; and (3) on December 14, 1994, he was given a
memorandum that threatened him. The Petitioner further alleges that he
believes these actions by his supervision illustrate that NU management
harasses, intimidates, and retaliates against individuals who raise
safety concerns with outside agencies.
As indicated in a letter to the Petitioner dated November 28, 1995,
from the NRC Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Regional Operations and Research, the Petitioner has raised several
complaints since 1993 with the NRC or the Department of Labor (DOL)
concerning harassment, intimidation, or discrimination by individuals
at NU because the Petitioner raised safety concerns to NU or the NRC.
As explained in the letter, the NRC conducted investigations into some
of the harassment and intimidation allegations that the Petitioner had
raised. The NRC did not substantiate that the Petitioner suffered
discrimination for raising safety concerns. Further, of the complaints
of harassment and intimidation that the Petitioner raised that were
investigated by the DOL, none have been substantiated.
The staff has, in addition, reviewed the Petitioner's remaining
allegations of harassment and intimidation, including those in the
Petition, and has concluded that they do not present sufficient
information warranting further investigatory effort. Accordingly,
absent a finding of discrimination by the Secretary of Labor or an
Administrative Law Judge on any pending complaints, or significant new
evidence from the
[[Page 57917]]
Petitioner that would support the allegations that NU has harassed,
intimidated, or discriminated against him, the NRC staff plans no
further followup of the harassment and intimidation complaints. Based
on the above, no further action is warranted.
III. Conclusion
On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that some of
the Petitioner's concerns were substantiated and resulted in
appropriate enforcement action. Other concerns were not substantiated.
Therefore, no additional enforcement action is being taken in this
matter.
The Petitioner's request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is
denied. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.
This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25
days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion,
institutes review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of October 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ashok C. Thadani,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-28742 Filed 11-7-96; 8:45 am]
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