[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 231 (Friday, December 1, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61687-61692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-29313]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision; Safe Interim Storage of Hanford Tank Wastes,
Hanford Site, Richland, WA
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
ACTION: Notice of record of decision (ROD).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: DOE and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology)
have jointly prepared the Safe Interim Storage of Hanford Tank Wastes
Final Environmental Impact Statement (SIS EIS) (DOE/EIS-0212) to assess
the environmental and human health impacts associated with the
construction and operation of facilities and systems to continue the
safe management of high-level, mixed radioactive wastes stored in tanks
at the Hanford Site. After careful consideration of environmental
impacts, lifecycle costs, public, agency, and tribal comments, and
engineering evaluations, DOE has decided to implement most of the
actions of the preferred alternative evaluated in the Final SIS EIS and
are documenting this determination in this
[[Page 61688]]
ROD. The actions will involve the continued operation of the existing
cross-site transfer system (ECSTS) until replaced by the construction
and operation of a new replacement cross-site transfer system (RCSTS)
consisting of buried, double-wall, insulated pipes, and continued
operation of the mixer pump installed in Tank 101-SY to mitigate the
unacceptable accumulation of hydrogen and other flammable gases.
Pending resolution of a recently identified safety issue, DOE is
deferring a decision on the retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY, and
limiting the transfer of wastes through Tank 102-SY to non-complexed
wastes. Evaluation of this issue will be addressed under DOE's NEPA
procedures as necessary. DOE and Ecology have determined that new
storage tanks will not be necessary at the present time to mitigate the
flammable gas safety issue, based on the demonstrated success of the
mixer pump.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on DOE and
Ecology activities related to this project or copies of the Final SIS
EIS, please contact:
Carolyn Haass, U.S. Department of Energy, PO Box 550, MSIN S7-51,
Richland, WA 99352, (509) 372-2731
Geoff Tallent, Washington Department of Ecology, PO Box 47600, Olympia,
WA 98504-7600, (360) 407-7112
For further information on DOE's National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) process, please contact: Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of
NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585-0002, (202) 586-4600 or
(800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DOE has prepared this ROD pursuant to the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations for implementing the
provisions of NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA
regulations (10 CFR part 1021). The ROD is based on the analyses of
environmental impacts identified in the Final SIS EIS (DOE/EIS-0212);
consideration of project costs; compliance requirements for systems
involved in the handling, transport, and storage of high-level mixed
radioactive waste, and public, agency, and tribal comments.
Because NEPA and SEPA are very comparable in their purpose, intent,
and procedures, Ecology and DOE decided to prepare one EIS addressing
the requirements of both SEPA and NEPA. In February 1994, a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) was signed between the DOE, Richland Operations
Office and Ecology. The MOU called for the joint preparation of the SIS
EIS, the contents of which have been determined to satisfy both SEPA
and NEPA requirements.
Purpose and Need
DOE and Ecology identified the need to continue to provide safe
storage of high-level radioactive tank wastes while supporting tank
farm management and operations prior to implementing decisions made in
the ROD for the Tank Waste Remedial System (TWRS) EIS. The TWRS EIS is
evaluating the alternatives for permanent disposal of wastes currently
stored in tanks at the Hanford Site. To minimize the risk of managing
tank wastes prior to the TWRS ROD, a modern, safe, reliable, and
compliant replacement cross-site transfer capability is needed to move
wastes between the 200 West and 200 East Area tank farms. This transfer
capability is required because the 200 West Area has far less useable
double shell tank (DST) capacity than there is waste in single shell
tanks (SSTs).
The replacement waste transfer capability would provide the means
to move waste from the 200 West Area to the available DST capacity
located in the 200 East Area.
The ECSTS has been used to transfer wastes from the 200 West Area
to the 200 East Area for the past 40 years. This underground pipeline
system is at the end of its original design life. Currently, four of
six lines are out of service and unavailable to perform transfers due
to plugging. The two useable lines do not meet current engineering
standards such as, double containment and leak detection, required for
waste management facilities.
Based on current tank waste management and operation activities,
the SIS EIS addressed the need to do the following:
Remove Salt Well Liquids (SWLs) from older SSTs to reduce
the likelihood of liquid waste escaping from the corroded tanks into
the environment. Many of these tanks have leaked and new leaks are
developing in these tanks at a rate of more than one per year.
Provide ability to transfer the tank wastes via a
compliant system to mitigate any future safety concerns and use current
or future tank space allocations.
Provide adequate tank waste storage capacity for future
waste volumes associated with tank farm operations and other Hanford
facility operations.
Mitigate the flammable gas safety issue in Tank 101-SY.
Summary of Alternatives and Impacts
DOE and Ecology have identified four action alternatives in
addition to the no action alternative to satisfy the need to continue
to provide safe storage of high-level waste until decisions are made
based on the TWRS EIS. The alternatives consist of the preferred
alternative, truck transfer alternative, rail transfer alternative, and
new storage alternative. DOE evaluated the construction and operation
phases of each alternative to assess potential impacts to the following
environmental categories:
Geology, Seismology, Soils.
Population and Socioeconomics.
Water Resources and Hydrology.
Transportation.
Air Quality.
Land Use.
Radiation.
Cultural Resources.
Noise.
Health Effects.
Biological Resources.
The impact analysis showed that there would be no impacts related
to geology, seismology, water resources and hydrology, radiation,
noise, population and socioeconomics, or cultural resources for any of
the alternatives. Environmental categories where potential impacts were
identified are discussed under each alternative as applicable.
Preferred Alternative
The preferred alternative consists of the following components:
Construction and operation of the RCSTS for cross-site
transfer of SWLs, and 200 West Area Facility wastes from Tank 102-SY to
DSTs in the 200 East Area;
Construction of a waste retrieval system in Tank 102-SY to
retrieve solids;
Continued operation of a mixer pump in Tank 101-SY;
Transfer of liquid wastes through the ECSTS until the
proposed RCSTS becomes operational in 1998.
Transuranic solids from Tank 102-SY would be retrieved, transferred
via the RCSTS and consolidated in 200 East Area DSTs to provide space
for transfer of complexed SWLs. The consolidation of tank waste is an
ongoing tank farm management action evaluated under prior environmental
impact statements and a supplement (ERDA 1538, DOE/EIS-0063, DOE/EIS-
0113). Although such retrieval is addressed in the decisions resulting
from these NEPA documents, the retrieval of Tank 102-SY sludge was
discussed in the SIS EIS for a comprehensive consideration of impacts.
[[Page 61689]]
Impacts. Environmental effects identified under the preferred
alternative are primarily related to construction activities and
include impacts to soils, land use, and biological resources.
Construction of the RCSTS and associated facilities would disturb
approximately 30 hectares (74 acres) of land, none of which are
considered to be prime or unique farmland. Fugitive dust emissions are
anticipated during earth moving activities, but would be mitigated by
dust suppression measures.
Of the 30 hectares (74 acres) of land that would be disturbed while
constructing the RCSTS, approximately 9 hectares (23 acres) would be
mature sagebrush/cheatgrass habitat, a State designated Priority
Habitat and important habitat for the loggerhead shrike, a Federal and
State candidate species; the sagebrush lizard, a Federal candidate
species; and the sage sparrow, a State candidate species. The 9
hectares (23 acres) represents 0.01 percent of the total sagebrush
habitat at Hanford. The preferred alternative would include
establishing habitat restoration sites to mitigate the disturbance of
native soil and removal of vegetation in the construction area.
Truck Transfer Alternative
This alternative includes truck transfer of all wastes listed under
the preferred alternative, with the exception of solids from Tank 102-
SY which would not be retrieved under this alternative. Mitigation of
the Tank 101-SY safety issue by continued operation of the mixer pump
would also occur under the truck transfer alternative. The alternative
would transfer SWL from interim stabilization of 200 West Area SSTs and
200 West Area facility wastes to DSTs in the 200 East Area by truck,
without using Tank 102-SY as a staging tank for complexed wastes. The
SIS EIS evaluated the 3,800 liters (1,000 gallons) LR-56(H) truck and a
hypothetical 19,000 liter (5,000 gallon) tanker truck. The alternative
would utilize existing roadways and include construction and operation
of a new load facility in 200 West Area and an unload facility in 200
East Area, including underground transfer piping to and from the
facilities, and some additional roadway segments.
Impacts. Environmental effects from implementing the truck transfer
alternative include impacts to soils, transportation, and worker
health, due to the construction of load and unload facilities and
roadway segments, and operation of the truck transfer system.
Construction of the load and unload facilities and roadways would
disturb approximately 2 hectares (5 acres) of land, none of which is
considered to be prime or unique farmland, or mature sagebrush habitat.
During construction activities, dust suppression measures would be
implemented to reduce fugitive dust emissions.
The truck transfer alternative would use existing Hanford Site
roadways and new onsite road extensions to transport approximately 1.9
million liters (5 million gallons) of radioactive waste. Using the LR-
56 truck (3,800 liters (1,000 gallons) capacity), approximately 4,691
truck trips would be required over 1,564 working days assuming three
trips per day. If the 19,000 liters (5,000 gallons) capacity truck is
used, approximately 938 truck trips over 313 working days would be
required, assuming three trips per day. Potential traffic circulation
impacts could occur from barricaded roads, speed limitations, escorts,
and other administrative controls. However, based on a frequency of
three truck trips per day, shipping during off-peak hours, and
providing advanced notice of truck shipments, no significant adverse
traffic circulation impacts are anticipated.
Operators and health physics technicians would be exposed to
radiation within acceptable limits during operation of the load and
unload facilities. However, estimates for radiation dose to the truck
driver yielded an unacceptably high dose. Additional shielding analysis
or restrictions on the quantities of radioactive materials would be
necessary to ensure that radiation exposures would be as low as
reasonably achievable for the drivers.
Rail Transfer Alternative
This alternative includes rail transfer of all wastes listed under
the preferred alternative, with the exception of solids from Tank 102-
SY which would not be retrieved under this alternative. Mitigation of
the Tank 101-SY safety issue by continued operation of the mixer pump
would also occur under the rail transfer alternative. The alternative
would transfer salt well liquids from interim stabilization of SSTs,
and 200 West Area facility wastes by a hypothetical 38,000 liter
(10,000 gallon) rail car. The alternative includes use of existing
Hanford Site rail lines, construction and operation of some additional
onsite rail line segments, as well as construction and operation of a
new load facility in 200 West Area and a new unload facility in 200
East Area.
Impacts. Environmental effects associated with the rail transfer
alternative include impacts to soils and transportation. Construction
of the load and unload facilities and rail spurs would disturb
approximately 2 hectares (5 acres) of land, none of which is considered
to be prime or unique farmland, or mature sagebrush habitat. During
construction activities, dust suppression measures would be implemented
to reduce fugitive dust emissions.
Approximately 470 train trips, assuming one tank car per trip,
would be required to transfer the subject waste. Assuming 2 train trips
per day, 235 days would be required to transfer the wastes. The two
additional daily trips would not impact existing rail operations.
Significant impacts to road traffic from road closures during rail
transport are not expected because of advance notice of shipments,
restricting shipments to off-peak hours, and the short duration of road
closures.
New Storage Alternative
This alternative includes mitigation of the Tank 101-SY flammable
gas safety issue by dilution and retrieval of the waste. Facilities
constructed and operated to accomplish this action would include a new
tank facility (NTF), including two new DSTs and associated facilities,
a waste retrieval system in Tank 101-SY, a waste retrieval system in
Tank 102-SY, and the RCSTS. This alternative also includes transfer of
waste from Tank 102-SY, SWL from interim stabilization of SSTs in the
200 West Area, and transfer of 200 West Area facility wastes as
described for the preferred alternative. This alternative would provide
additional storage capacity that could be used for other future waste
management needs.
Impacts. Environmental effects identified under the new storage
alternative are primarily related to construction activities and
include impacts to soils, land use, biological resources, and worker
exposure. Construction of the RCSTS and NTF would disturb approximately
30 hectares (74 acres) and 20 hectares (50 acres) of land,
respectively, none of which are considered to be prime or unique
farmland. Fugitive dust emissions are anticipated during earth moving
activities, but would be mitigated by dust suppression measures. The 50
hectares (124 acres) of land would be a small incremental addition of
land committed to waste management at Hanford.
Approximately 30 hectares (74 acres) of mature sagebrush/cheatgrass
habitat would be disturbed from constructing the RCSTS and NTF. The new
storage alternative would include establishing habitat restoration
sites to mitigate the disturbance of native soil and removal of
vegetation in the construction area.
[[Page 61690]]
No health effects are anticipated for routine operation of any
facilities under the new storage alternative.
No Action Alternative
This alternative would not construct any new tanks, tank retrieval
systems, or cross-site transfer systems. The flammable gas safety issue
in Tank 101-SY would be managed through continued operation of the
existing mixer pump. The remaining supernatant in Tank 102-SY, SWLs
from interim stabilization of SSTs, and liquid waste from 200 West Area
facilities would be transported from the 200 West Area to the 200 East
Area via the ECSTS.
Impacts. There are no environmental impacts associated with normal
operations of the no action alternative. However, due to lack of
secondary containment and poor leak detection capabilities of the aging
ECSTS, leaks to the environment are considered more likely than under
the other alternatives evaluated in the SIS EIS. To avoid environmental
impacts from a failure of the ECSTS during waste transfer, operational
controls prior to waste transfers such as, pressure testing at levels
in excess of operational pressures, would be used to confirm the
integrity of the ECSTS before waste is introduced into the system.
Environmentally Preferred Alternative
Normal operations under the no action alternative would not result
in the loss of State-designated Priority Habitat, would not result in
the generation of additional contaminated materials requiring
decommissioning and disposal, and would not cause additional worker
exposures over existing levels, as would occur under the preferred,
truck transfer, rail transfer, and new storage alternatives. Therefore,
the no action alternative is considered the environmentally preferred
alternative under normal operating conditions.
However, because the existing cross-site transfer system is over 40
years old, there is a higher probability of system failure or an
accident than under the other transfer alternatives evaluated in the
Final SIS EIS. Additionally, because the existing transfer system is
not compliant with current engineering standards requiring double
containment and leak detection systems, there is a higher likelihood of
a release to the environment under accident conditions than would be
anticipated under the other transfer alternatives.
Other Considerations
In addition to the assessment of environmental impacts provided by
the SIS EIS, DOE and Ecology considered costs, comments on the Final
SIS EIS, and nuclear criticality safety in determining a course of
action to meet the need for interim management of Hanford tank wastes.
Costs
Comparative analysis of construction, operation, and
decommissioning costs among the alternatives was generated for an
interim period of five years and lifecycle operations till 2028. The
analysis was based on a comparable set of baseline assumptions
regarding waste volumes and transfer schedules, and accurately reflects
relative costs among alternatives. However, the estimates may not
accurately represent the true cost of implementing a specific
alternative once final decisions are reached on waste transfers. Based
on the unresolved criticality safety issues described below, retrieval
costs for solids removal from Tank 102-SY have been excluded from the
preferred and new storage alternatives. The results of the analysis are
as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interim Lifecycle
costs costs b
Alternative (1995 (1995
dollars in dollars in
millions) millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred...................................... a $105.2 $243
Truck transfer................................. 125.9 632.8
Rail transfer.................................. 113.7 491.8
New storage.................................... a 328.1 589.6
No action...................................... 48.9 NA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Excludes costs for retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY as proposed in
the SIS EIS.
b Includes costs for retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY under all
alternatives.
The lifecycle costs for the no action alternative were not
estimated because the ECSTS could not meet waste transfer requirements
beyond the interim time period. All alternatives include a $36 million
decontamination and decommissioning cost for the ECSTS.
Comments Received
DOE and Ecology received comments from two individuals on the Final
SIS EIS.
Comment. One individual agreed with continued operation of the
mixer pump in Tank 101-SY to mitigate flammable gas accumulation.
Response. DOE will continue the operation of the mixer pump in Tank
101-SY.
Comment. ``The fundamental assumption is that the best way to
maintain Safe storage is to suck liquid waste out of single shell tanks
and then move it to a safer double shell tank. Why is that safer? A lot
of things can go wrong when you pressurize the waste and move it that
can't happen if you leave it in the single shell tanks. Look at the
spray leaks from your ITRS and PPSS that can kill hundreds of people.
Compare that to the lack of impacts to people if you leave the waste in
the single shell tanks as laid out in the Hanford EIS that produced the
empty grout vaults and the unbuilt vitrification plant. [Assumed DOE/
EIS-0113] Those facilities weren't needed either and the Department
rushed to the wrong decision spending millions of dollars
unnecessarily.''
Response. In the Record of Decision based on the Final
Environmental Impact Statement for the Disposal of Hanford Defense
High-Level, Transuranic, and Tank Wastes (HDW-EIS) (53 FR 12449), and
again in the Finding of No Significant Impact for an environmental
assessment for the Waste Tank Safety Program (DOE/EA-0915), DOE decided
to continue to safely store the SST waste prior to making a decision on
the disposal of this waste. The decision on the final disposition of
the SST waste will be made by the Department in the TWRS EIS. The SST
interim stabilization program is an ongoing program initiated in late
1970s to reduce the potential for release of high-level wastes into the
environment and allow continued safe storage of the high-level sludge,
salt cake, and non-pumpable liquid waste. Although no adverse
radiological impacts were postulated by the HDW-EIS for leaking SSTs,
including the ultraconservative 40,000 m\3\ (10.5 million gallons)
release scenario evaluated, DOE policy is to reduce the potential for
any liquid release whenever practicable [DOE/EIS-0113]. Further, all
retrievals and waste transfers will occur at subcritical levels in
accordance with existing procedures. There are currently 67 SSTs which
have been declared confirmed or assumed leakers. These SSTs have
released 2.3 to 3.4 million liters (600,000 to 900,000 gallons) of
waste to the environment. Therefore, it is DOE's policy that the
continued safe storage of the SST waste pending a final disposal
decision requires the continuation of the SST interim stabilization
program, which is scheduled to be completed by the year 2000.
The postulated spray releases from Initial Tank Retrieval System
(ITRS) and Past Practice Sluicing System (PPSS) evaluated in the Final
SIS EIS have a probability of extremely unlikely to incredible or 10-5
to 10-7 per year. When compared to the almost certain release to the
environment if liquid wastes are left in SSTs, DOE has determined that
the risks of transfer are
[[Page 61691]]
acceptable and that the risks to the environment from suspension of the
interim stabilization program are unacceptable.
Comment. ``What are the true impacts of leaving the waste in the
single shell tanks? Are they any greater now than they were in the old
EIS?''
Response. The SIS EIS is an interim action EIS which considers only
near term actions required to safely manage tank wastes until disposal
decisions are made through the TWRS ROD. Leaving waste in the SSTs is
beyond the scope of the SIS EIS. The TWRS EIS is currently re-
evaluating the consequences which would result from leaving wastes in
single shell tanks.
Comment. ``How much money will you waste this time on an action
that isn't needed?''
Response. The costs of the alternative actions are specified above.
DOE believes that the action is needed and the costs are justified.
Comment. ``Your purpose and need statement basically says you need
it because the State told you to do it in the TPA. So you already made
the decision in a fundamentally flawed way without regard to NEPA. Once
again the NEPA process at DOE is a sham . . . The bottom line is that
the DOE NEPA process is a sham, and now the State is a part of it. You
make decisions and then try to justify them with EISs.''
Response. This EIS was prepared to comply with the requirements of
NEPA. An EIS document identifies and evaluates the environmental
impacts of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives. The Tri
Party Agreement defines the schedules and milestones for taking certain
cleanup actions at the Hanford Site. The Tri Party Agreement is
annually revisited and can be changed if new information arises or
situations change. For example, the Tri Party Agreement had milestones
for the six new double shell tanks which were identified in Draft SIS
EIS. Public comments received on the Draft SIS EIS as part of the NEPA
process and new studies indicated that six new double shell tanks were
not needed. As a result, an adjustment to DOE's preferred alternative
was made in the Final SIS EIS and the Tri Party Agreement was modified
to delete the milestones for construction of new double shell tanks.
Comment. ``Even if you absolutely had to move some waste you
already have an existing pipeline system that can move liquids. This
year you moved over 400,000 gallons of waste through it. Why can't you
use it for more transfers? In fact your EIS says you plan to do just
that. For this EIS most of the waste is planned to go through the
existing pipelines. Why can't you send a few more transfers through the
existing lines? This would undoubtedly be cheaper and less damaging to
the environment. Before the last transfer the line was pressured tested
to make sure it would be safe. Why not just do that every time? You
could take very little risk by doing this and you'd save the people of
this country tens of millions of dollars.''
Response. The existing lines are planned to be used for liquid
waste transfers as indicated in the comment. However, due to the age of
the lines and likelihood of failure of these lines, DOE believes it is
prudent to replace these lines with a modern, safe, reliable and
compliant waste transfer system. This will provide DOE with a more
certain ability to meet its need for cross-site waste transfers.
Comment. ``A new line isn't needed just to move the amount of
liquid waste specified in this EIS. The State is making DOE build this
line to service the TWRS planned mission of vitrifying all the waste in
the tanks. If that's the true need, then this action needs to be
covered in the TWRS EIS where there might be a real need. Building it
for this trumped up need will prejudice the TWRS decision (which
already seems to have been made.)''
Response. DOE has a need to move waste cross-site prior to
implementing decisions based on the TWRS EIS. This need exists
independent of the decisions that may be reached based on the TWRS EIS.
The replacement cross site transfer system could become a component of
the TWRS, but DOE does not believe that its existence would be
prejudicial to any of the alternatives being considered within the TWRS
EIS.
Comment. ``How in the world can you be privatizing TWRS if you
haven't already made the decision?''
Response. Privatization of TWRS is not an action that was
considered in this EIS.
Tank Farm Criticality Control
Through an ongoing safety evaluation process, DOE recently
revisited its operational assumptions regarding the potential for the
occurrence of a nuclear criticality event during waste storage and
transfers. Changes to the Tank Farm Authorization Basis for Criticality
that were approved in September 1995, were rescinded by DOE in October
1995, pending the outcome of a criticality safety evaluation process
outlined for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) on
November 8, 1995. Until these criticality safety evaluations are
completed, Hanford will operate under the historic limits which
maintain reasonable assurance of subcritical conditions during tank
farm storage and transfer operations. Of the actions evaluated in the
Final SIS EIS, only the retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY is
affected by the technical uncertainties regarding criticality. Based on
the quantities of plutonium in Tank 102-SY sludge, retrieval of the
solids falls within the scope of the criticality safety issues which
will be evaluated over the next few months. As a result, a decision on
retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY is being deferred in this ROD.
Tank 101-SY mixer pump operations, interim operation of the ECSTS,
operation of the RCSTS, SWL retrievals, and 200 West Area Facility
waste generation, would all occur within the applicable criticality
limits and would be subcritical.
Decision
Based on the consideration of environmental impacts, cost,
engineering standards, criticality safety, and comments received on the
Final SIS EIS, DOE will construct and operate the RCSTS on the proposed
route identified in the Final SIS EIS, continue operating the mixer
pump in Tank 101-SY, and transfer waste from the interim stabilization
program and other facility waste in the 200 West Area. During
construction of the RCSTS, SWLs and 200 West Area facility wastes will
be transferred through the ECSTS to DST storage in the 200 East Area.
These actions will provide safe, compliant, and reliable high-level
waste transfer capabilities and will operate with wastes at subcritical
levels under the existing Hanford Tank Farm Interim Safety Basis, until
final disposal decisions are made under the TWRS EIS.
The RCSTS will provide Hanford with a waste transfer capability
that meets current engineering standards for double containment and
leak detection. As compared to other transfer alternatives, the RCSTS
will:
More effectively minimize worker exposures and meet ALARA
requirements through remote operations and underground transfers;
Cost less during both the interim time period and less
over a lifecycle operation than the other action alternatives;
Provide greater operational flexibility by conducting
transfers that are independent of weather or site traffic;
More efficiently manage the transfer of millions of
gallons of wastes required in the near term and potentially required in
the future.
[[Page 61692]]
The RCSTS will be built on the proposed route identified in the
Final SIS EIS. Alternative routes evaluated in the EIS would have
environmental impacts identical to the proposed route except with
respect to impacts on Priority Habitat. The western segment optional
route would reduce habitat impacts by only 0.6 hectares (1.6 acres) but
at a significant cost increase. The eastern option would result in an
increase in habitat loss by 2.1 hectares (5.3 acres) over the proposed
route. Because habitat impacts will be mitigated, engineering siting
criteria are more favorable, and construction costs would be less, the
proposed RCSTS route is selected.
The continued operation of a mixer pump in Tank 101-SY is selected
to mitigate the flammable gas safety issue in that tank. The mixer pump
has been proven to be effective mitigation during more than one year of
operations. A replacement pump is available and will be maintained as a
contingency should the existing pump fail. Dilution as a mitigation was
not selected due to the success of the mixer pump, and because it would
increase waste volumes requiring new tanks for storage and generate
more waste for future disposal.
DOE will continue to use the ECSTS until the RCSTS is operational
to provide access to 200 East Area DSTs for storage of 200 West Area
facility wastes and retrieved SWLs. SWL retrievals will continue to
reduce the risk to the environment from leaking SSTs. Operational
procedures will assure the integrity of the ECSTS prior to any waste
transfers. The current planning base estimates that the ECSTS will
operate for approximately 625 hours during five transfers before the
RCSTS is operational.
Based on the new information available to DOE, since the issuance
of the Final SIS EIS, regarding nuclear criticality safety concerns
during retrieval, transfer, and storage actions, DOE has decided to
defer a decision on the construction and operation of a retrieval
system in Tank 102-SY. Pending the outcome of the technical initiative
to resolve the tank waste criticality safety issue, transfers of wastes
through Tank 102-SY will be limited to non-complexed wastes.
Mitigation
All practical means to avoid or mitigate environmental impacts from
the actions to be implemented by this ROD have been adopted by DOE.
With the exception of habitat losses and dust generation from
construction activities, and the potential to encounter cultural
resources during subsurface disturbance, all potentially significant
impacts have been avoided.
Construction of the RCSTS will result in impacts that can be either
avoided or minimized through the implementation of mitigation measures.
The surface and subsurface disturbance required for the installation of
the RCSTS, a 10 kilometer (6.2 mile) double-wall pipeline, has the
potential to affect biota, dust emissions, and cultural resources.
Biota will be displaced due to the loss of habitat. Particulate
emissions in the form of dust releases from exposed soils will occur if
not mitigated. Cultural resources may be encountered during subsurface
excavations necessitating mitigation actions.
Impacts to biota resulting from the loss of habitat will be
mitigated through a program of transplantation of mature sagebrush from
the RCSTS construction corridor to a mitigation site located in close
proximity to the impacted area. In addition, tublings will be
cultivated and transferred to the mitigation site. For the 9 hectares
(23 acres) of mature sagebrush lost to the RCSTS construction, 27
hectares (69 acres) of sagebrush habitat will be planted.
Dust emissions will be mitigated by a combination of watering and
reseeding of disturbed areas. In areas of active construction, water
will be applied at frequencies sufficient to prevent unacceptable
releases of dust. After RCSTS construction is completed, those areas
not required for routine access or maintenance will be reseeded with
native grass species.
No archaeological or historical sites were identified in the
corridor to be disturbed by RCSTS construction. However, one potential
archaeological site was identified within the compensation area to be
utilized for habitat mitigation. Impacts to this site will be mitigated
through avoidance. All ground-disturbing actions that occur during
RCSTS construction or habitat mitigation activities will be monitored.
A qualified archaeologist identified by DOE will assess the
significance of any resources uncovered. The archaeologist will
coordinate with DOE to initiate consultation with the State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO) and the appropriate tribal representatives,
including members of the Wanapum People, Yakama Indian Nation,
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and Nez Perce
Tribe. To the extent possible, all materials determined significant
will be avoided during subsequent activities and will be left in place.
If this is not possible, removal will be conducted in consultation with
DOE, the SHPO, and appropriate tribal representatives.
In accordance with Sec. 1021.331(a) of the DOE regulations
implementing NEPA (10 CFR part 1021), a Mitigation Action Plan (MAP)
will be prepared that addresses mitigation actions associated with the
course of action directed by this ROD.
Issued
The State of Washington concurred on this Record of Decision via
letter to the Department of Energy on November 21, 1995. This Record of
Decision for the Safe Interim Storage of Hanford Tank Wastes is issued
by the Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland,
Washington on November 21, 1995.
John D. Wagoner,
Manager, DOE Richland Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 95-29313 Filed 11-30-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
