[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 230 (Tuesday, December 1, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66136-66146]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-32011]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision on Management of Certain Plutonium Residues
and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of Decision.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to prepare the
categories of plutonium residues and scrub alloy listed below for
disposal or other disposition as specified in the Preferred Alternative
contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on Management of
Certain Plutonium Residues and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-0277F, August
1998). The material categories covered by this Record of Decision are:
(1) Sand, slag and crucible residues, (2) Direct oxide reduction salt
residues (low plutonium concentration), (3) Combustible residues, (4)
Plutonium fluoride residues, (5) Ful Flo filter media residues, (6)
Glass residues, (7) Graphite residues, (8) Inorganic (metal and other)
residues, and (9) Scrub alloy.
Additional Copies: Copies of the Final EIS and this Record of
Decision are available in the public reading rooms and libraries
identified in the Federal Register Notice that announced the
availability of the Final EIS (63 FR 46006, August 28, 1998), or by
calling the Center for Environmental Management Information at 1-800-
736-3282 (toll free) or 202-863-5084 (in Washington, DC).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the management of
plutonium residues and scrub alloy currently stored at the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site, contact: Ms. Patty Bubar, Acting
Director, Rocky Flats Office (EM-64), Office of Nuclear Material and
Facility Stabilization, Environmental Management, U.S. Department of
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585,
Telephone: 301-903-7130.
For information concerning development of the Final EIS or this
Record of Decision, contact: Mr. Charles R. Head, Senior Technical
Advisor, Office of Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization (EM-60),
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585, Telephone: 202-586-5151.
For information on DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
process, contact: Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy
and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585 Telephone: 202-586-4600, or leave a
message at 1-800-472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Synopsis of the Decision
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced issuance of the Final
Environmental Impact Statement on Management of Certain Plutonium
Residues and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-0277F) on August 28, 1998 (63
FR 46006, August 28, 1998). In the Final EIS, DOE considered the
potential environmental impacts of a proposed action to prepare certain
plutonium residues and scrub alloy currently stored at the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) near Golden, Colorado, for
disposal or other disposition. After consideration of the Final EIS,
including public comments submitted on the Draft EIS, and public
comments submitted following issuance of the Final EIS, DOE has decided
to implement the Preferred Alternative specified in the Final EIS for
the following categories of material: (1) Sand, slag and crucible
residues, (2) Direct oxide reduction salt residues (low plutonium
concentration), (3) Combustible residues, (4) Plutonium fluoride
residues, (5) Ful Flo filter media residues, (6) Glass residues, (7)
Graphite residues, (8) Inorganic (metal and other) residues, and (9)
Scrub alloy.
Implementation of the Preferred Alternative will involve the
following:
1. Up to approximately 6,587 kg of plutonium residues (containing
up to approximately 351 kg of plutonium) will be processed at Rocky
Flats and packaged in preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. These residues consist of direct
oxide reduction salt residues containing low concentrations of
plutonium, combustible residues, Ful Flo filter media residues, glass
residues, graphite residues and inorganic (metal and other) residues.
The processed residues will remain in storage at Rocky Flats until they
are shipped to WIPP for disposal.
2. Approximately 3,377 kg of sand, slag and crucible residues and
plutonium fluoride residues (containing approximately 271 kg of
plutonium), and approximately 700 kg of scrub alloy (containing
approximately 200 kg of plutonium) will be packaged and shipped to the
Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, where these materials
will be stabilized in the F-Canyon by chemically separating the
plutonium from the remaining materials in the residues and scrub alloy.
The separated plutonium will be placed in safe and secure storage,
along with a larger quantity of plutonium already in storage at the
Savannah River Site, until DOE has completed the Surplus
[[Page 66137]]
Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0283,
under preparation, draft issued in July 1998; see Section VII. A. 2,
below, for additional discussion of the plutonium disposition topic)
and made final decisions on the disposition of the separated plutonium.
Transuranic wastes generated during the chemical separations operations
will be sent to WIPP for disposal. Other wastes generated during the
chemical separations operations will be disposed of in accordance with
the Savannah River Site's normal procedures for disposing of such
wastes.
The actions summarized above are scheduled to take place at Rocky
Flats between 1998 and 2004, and at the Savannah River Site between
1998 and 2002.
As specified in Section 1.4.2 of the Final EIS, DOE will issue a
second Record of Decision in the near future regarding the remaining
categories of plutonium residues within the scope of the Final EIS,
after consideration of any comments submitted during an additional
public comment period from August 28, 1998 through October 12, 1998.
The material categories to be covered by the second Record of Decision
are: (1) Incinerator ash residues, (2) Graphite fines residues, (3)
Inorganic ash residues, (4) Molten salt extraction/electrorefining salt
residues, (5) Direct oxide reduction salt residues (high plutonium
concentration), (6) High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter media
residues, and (7) Sludge residues.
II. Background
During the Cold War, DOE and its predecessor agencies conducted
various activities associated with the production of nuclear weapons.
Several intermediate products and wastes were generated as a result of
those operations, some of which are still in storage at various DOE
sites, including Rocky Flats. Now that the Cold War is over and the
United States has ceased production of fissile nuclear weapons
materials, DOE is conducting activities to safely manage, clean up, and
dispose of (where appropriate) the intermediate products and wastes
from prior nuclear weapons production activities. Among the
intermediate products and wastes requiring proper management and
preparation for disposal or other disposition are approximately 106,600
kg of plutonium residues and 700 kg of scrub alloy currently stored at
Rocky Flats.
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (the Board) in its
Recommendation 94-1, addressed health and safety concerns regarding
various materials at Rocky Flats, including the plutonium residues and
scrub alloy. The Board concluded that hazards could arise from
continued storage of these materials in their current forms and
recommended that they be stabilized as expeditiously as possible.
Approximately 64,400 kg of the plutonium residues in storage at Rocky
Flats contain very low concentrations of plutonium and are currently
being stabilized and prepared for disposal under the Solid Residue
Treatment, Repackaging, and Storage Environmental Assessment/Finding of
No Significant Impact (DOE/EA-1120, April 1996). However, the remaining
42,200 kg of plutonium residues, which contain higher concentrations of
plutonium, and all 700 kg of scrub alloy still require processing for
stabilization and to prepare them for disposal or other disposition.
These materials are addressed in the Final EIS.
The approximately 42,200 kg of plutonium residues consist of nine
heterogeneous categories of materials (e.g., ashes, salts, combustible
materials, sludges, pieces of glass, pieces of graphite). On average,
the plutonium residues contain about 6% plutonium by weight, although a
small amount of the plutonium residues contains well above the average
percentage of plutonium by weight. For example, the 315 kg of plutonium
fluoride residues (less than 1 percent of the material addressed in the
Final EIS) contains approximately 45% plutonium by weight. The
approximately 700 kg of scrub alloy (less than 2 percent of the
material addressed in the Final EIS) consists primarily of a metallic
alloy of magnesium, aluminum, americium, and plutonium, containing
approximately 29% plutonium by weight.
Although the average concentration of plutonium in the 42,200 kg of
residues is small, there is still enough plutonium present (about 2,600
kg) to subject the residues to a special set of requirements (referred
to as ``safeguards and security'' requirements) to maintain control of
the materials and ensure that the plutonium in them is not stolen or
diverted for illicit use, perhaps in a nuclear weapon. The 700 kg of
scrub alloy, with its greater plutonium concentration, is also subject
to safeguards and security requirements. Prior to disposal or other
disposition of the residues and scrub alloy, action must be taken to
reduce the plutonium concentration in the materials, make the plutonium
more difficult to remove from the materials, or otherwise implement
steps to ensure that the plutonium would not be stolen or diverted for
illicit purposes. This process is referred to as ``termination of
safeguards'' or ``meeting safeguards termination limits.''
Accordingly, the Purpose and Need for Agency Action addressed in
the Final EIS was to evaluate action alternatives for processing the
approximately 42,200 kg of plutonium residues and 700 kg of scrub alloy
currently in storage at Rocky Flats to address the health and safety
concerns regarding storage of the materials, as raised by the Board in
its Recommendation 94-1, and to prepare the materials for offsite
disposal or other disposition (including termination of safeguards,
when appropriate). The action alternatives evaluated would be
implemented in a manner that supports closure of Rocky Flats by 2006
and limits worker exposure and waste production. Disposal or other
disposition would eliminate the health and safety concerns associated
with indefinite storage of these materials.
Subsequent to completion of the Final EIS, DOE has completed its
compliance process under the requirements of the Endangered Species
Act. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act provides Federal agencies
with the authority to determine whether a proposed Federal action may
affect protected species or habitats and, if the agency determines that
it will not (i.e., makes a ``no effect'' determination), then no
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service is required. Rather
than specifying a ``no effect'' determination, the Final EIS concludes
that the proposed processing of plutonium residues and scrub alloy is
not likely to adversely affect threatened or endangered species or
critical habitats in areas involved in this proposal. Although
indicating some effect on threatened or endangered species, a ``not
likely to adversely affect'' determination falls short of a
determination that a species or critical habitat is likely to be
adversely affected overall by the proposed action.
Upon further review of the likely impacts of the proposed
processing, DOE concludes that a ``no effect'' determination would have
been more appropriate in this case because DOE does not believe that
the proposed processing will affect protected species or critical
habitats overall. Therefore, no consultation with the Fish and Wildlife
Service is required.
The decision process reflected in this Record of Decision complies
with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42
U.S.C., Sec. 4321 et seq.) and DOE's NEPA implementing regulations at
10 CFR Part 1021. Further, Section 308 of the Fiscal Year 1999 Energy
and Water
[[Page 66138]]
Development Appropriations Act (Public Law 105-245) specifies that
``None of the funds in this Act may be used to dispose of transuranic
waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant which contains concentrations
of plutonium in excess of 20 percent by weight for the aggregate of any
material category on the date of enactment of this Act, or is generated
after such date.'' The decisions specified in this Record of Decision
comply with the requirements of Pub. L. 105-245.
III. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS
DOE evaluated the following alternatives for management of the
Rocky Flats plutonium residues and scrub alloy covered by this Record
of Decision:
III.A. Alternative 1 (No Action--Stabilize and Store)
This alternative consists of stabilization or repackaging to
prepare the material for interim storage as described in the Rocky
Flats Solid Residue Environmental Assessment (Solid Residue Treatment,
Repackaging, and Storage Environmental Assessment/Finding of No
Significant Impact, DOE/EA-1120, April 1996). Under this alternative,
further processing to prepare the material for disposal or other
disposition would not occur. Since scrub alloy was not addressed in the
Rocky Flats Solid Residue Environmental Assessment, the ``No Action''
alternative for scrub alloy has been defined as continued storage at
Rocky Flats with repackaging, as necessary. Under this alternative,
approximately 40 percent of the Rocky Flats plutonium residues and all
of Rocky Flats scrub alloy would be left in a form that would not meet
the requirements for termination of safeguards, thus making these
materials ineligible for disposal. Thus, while implementation of this
alternative would address the immediate health and safety concerns
associated with near-term storage of the materials, the health and
safety risks associated with potential long-term storage of these
materials would remain.
III.B. Alternative 2 (Processing Without Plutonium Separation)
Under this alternative, the materials would be processed to convert
them into forms that would meet the requirements for termination of
safeguards. The materials would be ready for shipment to WIPP in New
Mexico for disposal.
The technologies evaluated for use under this alternative for the
material categories covered by this Record of Decision are listed in
Table 1.
Table 1.--Alternative 2 Processing Technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Material category Processing technology
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sand, slag and crucible residues....... Calcination/vitrification, or
blend down.
Direct oxide reduction salt residues Blend down.
(low plutonium concentration).
Combustible residues................... Blend down, catalytic chemical
oxidation, or sonic wash.
Plutonium fluoride residues............ Blend down.
Ful Flo filter media residues.......... Blend down or sonic wash.
Glass residues......................... Calcination/vitrification,
blend down, or sonic wash.
Graphite residues...................... Cementation, calcination/
vitrification, or blend down.
Inorganic (metal and other) residues... Calcination/vitrification, or
blend down.
Scrub alloy............................ Calcination/vitrification.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of the technologies specified in Table 1 would be implemented
onsite at Rocky Flats. The blend down technology referred to in Table 1
would consist of mixing the plutonium residues within the scope of the
Final EIS with other, lower plutonium content residues that are also
planned for disposal in WIPP, or with inert material, so that the
resulting mixture would be below the safeguards termination limits.
III.C. Alternative 3 (Processing With Plutonium Separation)
Under this alternative, the plutonium residues and scrub alloy
would be processed to separate plutonium from the material and
concentrate it so that the secondary waste would meet the requirements
for termination of safeguards and be ready for disposal, while the
separated and concentrated plutonium would be placed in safe and secure
storage pending disposition in accordance with decisions to be made
under the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement
(DOE/EIS-0283, under preparation, draft issued in July 1998). DOE would
not use this plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes.
The technologies evaluated for use under this alternative for the
material categories covered by this Record of Decision are listed in
Table 2. These technologies would be implemented at the sites specified
in Table 2.
Table 2.--Alternative 3 Processing Technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Processing
Material category technology Processing site
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sand, slag and crucible residues Purex processing.. Savannah River
Site.
Direct oxide reduction salt Acid dissolution/ Los Alamos
residues (low plutonium plutonium oxide National Lab
concentration). recovery, or. Salt scrub at
Salt scrub Rocky Flats,
followed by Purex Purex at the
processing, or. Savannah River
Site.
Water leach, or... Rocky Flats
Water leach....... Los Alamos
National Lab.
Combustible residues............ Mediated Rocky Flats.
electrochemical
oxidation.
Plutonium fluoride residues..... Purex processing, Savannah River
or. Site
Acid dissolution/ Rocky Flats.
plutonium oxide
recovery.
Ful Flo filter media residues... Mediated Rocky Flats.
electrochemical
oxidation.
Glass residues.................. Mediated Rocky Flats.
electrochemical
oxidation.
[[Page 66139]]
Graphite residues............... Mediated Rocky Flats
electrochemical Savannah River
oxidation, or. Site.
Mediated
electrochemical
oxidation.
Inorganic (metal and other) Mediated Rocky Flats
residues. electrochemical Savannah River
oxidation, or. Site.
Mediated
electrochemical
oxidation.
Scrub alloy..................... Purex processing.. Savannah River
Site.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. D. Alternative 4 (Combination of Processing Technologies)
Under this alternative, the residues would be stabilized and
blended down, if necessary, and repackaged in preparation for shipment
of the material to WIPP. Termination of safeguards would be
accomplished through use of a variance to the safeguards requirements.
A variance is the record of a review process whereby DOE's Office of
Safeguards and Security approves a proposal by another part of DOE to
terminate safeguards on specific quantities of safeguarded materials
because of special circumstances that make the safeguards controls
unnecessary. The variance to safeguards termination limits that is
required to allow implementation of this alternative was approved by
the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security after conducting a detailed
review and extensive vulnerability assessment regarding the alternative
mechanisms that would be used to protect and control access to the
material. The Office of Safeguards and Security concluded that the
nature of the residues, the relatively low concentration of plutonium
in the residues after blend down (if necessary), and the waste
management controls that would be in effect during the transportation
to and staging at WIPP prior to disposal would be sufficient to provide
a level of protection for the materials comparable to that required by
safeguards.
The plutonium fluoride residues and the scrub alloy were not
analyzed under this alternative because their higher plutonium content
would make application of a safeguards termination limit variance
impractical. In addition, the Ful Flo filter media residues were not
analyzed under this alternative because they had not been identified in
the Draft EIS as materials for which a variance to the safeguards
termination requirements had been requested. Accordingly, application
of a variance to these materials was not considered in the Final EIS.
III. E. Strategic Management Approaches
Theoretically, it would be possible to process all of the residues
using only one of the alternatives listed above (e.g., all the
materials would be processed under a single alternative, except for
certain material categories for which there is no processing technology
under that alternative). Nevertheless, in practice, DOE recognized in
preparing the EIS that the most appropriate technologies were likely to
be chosen separately for each material category by selecting from among
the technologies in all the alternatives. However, there are too many
combinations of material categories, processing technologies and
processing sites to address each individual combination in the EIS in a
manner that would be easily understandable. As a result, in addition to
individually evaluating technologies that could be used to implement
the alternatives for each material category, DOE also evaluated several
``Strategic Management Approaches''. These approaches involve
compilations of sets of processing technologies which would allow a
specific management criterion to be met. The management criteria
addressed in the Strategic Management Approaches are as follows:
1. No Action (i.e., Alternative 1 discussed above)
2. Preferred Alternative (Discussed in more detail in Section III.
F. below)
3. Minimizing Total Processing Duration at Rocky Flats
4. Minimizing Cost
5. Conducting all Processing at Rocky Flats
6. Conducting the Fewest Actions at Rocky Flats
7. Processing with the Maximum Amount of Plutonium Separation
8. Processing without Plutonium Separation
The decisions on which technology to implement have been made
separately for each material category covered by this Record of
Decision; the Strategic Management Alternatives were merely
illustrative. Nevertheless, evaluation of the Strategic Management
Approaches allowed presentation of the environmental impacts of the
proposed action as one set of data, instead of separate sets of data
representing the impacts from management of each of the material
categories individually. Examination of the various Strategic
Management Approaches also allowed DOE and the public to determine
whether there are any significant differences between the impacts that
would result from implementation of one Strategic Management
Alternative as compared to any other.
III. F. Preferred Alternative
The preferred alternative was constructed by selecting a preferred
technology for each material category from among the action
alternatives (i.e., Alternatives 2, 3 and 4) described above.
The technologies that comprise the Preferred Alternative for the
material categories covered by this Record of Decision are listed in
Table 3 (the bases for selection of these technologies are discussed in
Section 2.4 of the Final EIS, and again in Section VII. of this Record
of Decision). These technologies would be implemented at the sites
specified in Table 3.
Table 3.--Preferred Alternative Processing Technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Processing
Material category technology Processing site
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sand, slag and crucible residues Purex processing Savannah River
(Alternative 3). Site.
Direct oxide reduction salt Repackage Rocky Flats.
residues (low plutonium (Alternative 4).
concentration).
Combustible residues............ Stabilize, if Rocky Flats.
necessary, and
repackage
(Alternative 4)
(see Note 1).
Plutonium fluoride residues..... Purex processing Savannah River
(Alternative 3). Site.
Ful Flo filter media residues... Blend down Rocky Flats.
(Alternative 2).
[[Page 66140]]
Glass residues.................. Stabilize (i.e., Rocky Flats.
neutralize and
dry) and
repackage
(Alternative 4).
Graphite residues............... Repackage Rocky Flats.
(Alternative 4).
Inorganic (metal and other) Repackage Rocky Flats.
residues. (Alternative 4).
Scrub alloy..................... Purex processing Savannah River
(Alternative 3). Site.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1--Aqueous contaminated residues would be stabilized by
neutralizing and drying. Organic contaminated residues would be
stabilized by thermal desorption/steam passivation.
IV. Other Factors
In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing
the various alternatives, DOE also considered other factors in reaching
the decisions announced here. These other factors included issues
raised by comments received during scoping, or on the Draft and Final
versions of the EIS. The other factors considered are briefly
summarized in the following paragraphs.
IV.A. Nonproliferation
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been a fundamental
national security and foreign policy goal of the United States since
1945. The current U.S. policy is summarized in the White House Fact
Sheet on Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, dated September
27, 1993. This policy makes it clear that the United States does not
encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself
engage in plutonium reprocessing (that is, separation of plutonium from
spent nuclear fuel) for either nuclear power or nuclear explosives
purposes. In addition, it is U.S. policy to seek to eliminate where
possible the accumulation of stockpiles of plutonium.
The alternatives analyzed in the Final EIS, including plutonium
separation alternatives, would result in varying levels of risk
associated with potential use of the plutonium in nuclear weapons,
either by the U.S. or an adversary. None of the alternatives would
eliminate the plutonium from the current inventory. Nevertheless, as
discussed in Section 4.1.9 of the Final EIS, all of the action
alternatives would result in appropriate management of the plutonium
residues and scrub alloy to ensure that they are not stolen or diverted
for illicit purposes. Furthermore, all of the action alternatives set
the stage for ending the proliferation risk posed by the plutonium in
the plutonium residues and scrub alloy by preparing these materials for
disposal or other disposition in a form that is proliferation resistant
(i.e., a form which contains very little plutonium per unit weight,
from which the plutonium would be especially difficult to extract, or
for which other measures are taken to ensure sufficient security). In
addition, because of the potential concern regarding any processing and
consolidating of plutonium that might be accomplished by DOE, the
Secretary of Energy has committed that any separated or stabilized
plutonium-239 would be prohibited from use for nuclear explosive
purposes (Secretarial Action Memorandum approved December 20, 1994).
This prohibition would apply to plutonium-239 separated as a result of
actions implemented under this Record of Decision.
IV.B. Technology Availability and Technical Feasibility
DOE considered technology availability and technical feasibility in
identifying processing technologies to be evaluated in the Final EIS
and in making the decisions specified in Section VI of this Record of
Decision. DOE considered the extent to which technology development
would be required and the likelihood of success of such endeavors. All
of the technologies evaluated in the Final EIS are technically
feasible. In general, however, the more that processing technologies
vary from the historical processes and facilities used by DOE, the
greater the technical uncertainty and extent to which new facilities or
modifications to existing facilities would have to be made (as
discussed in Section 4.17.7 of the Final EIS).
IV.C. Timing
DOE considered the degree to which the various technologies that
could potentially be used in management of the plutonium residues and
scrub alloy would support DOE's plans for cleanup of the radioactive,
chemical and other hazardous wastes left after 50 years of nuclear
weapons production by the United States, as outlined in the document
titled Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure (DOE/EM-0362, June 1998),
including the goal of closing Rocky Flats by 2006.
IV.D. Cost
In reaching decisions on processing technologies, an important
consideration for DOE was cost. DOE evaluated the costs of implementing
the various processing technologies for each material category on both
an individual basis and collectively. DOE estimates it would cost from
approximately $428 Million to $814 Million to implement the Strategic
Management Approaches (other than No Action) analyzed in the Final EIS.
An even larger expenditure (approximately $1.1 Billion) would be
required to pay for continued storage of the nuclear materials if DOE
chose to implement the No Action alternative. On the other hand, DOE
expects that the annual costs of operating and maintaining Rocky Flats
facilities will decrease as nuclear materials are removed from the
site. DOE expects further reductions in costs as the Rocky Flats
facilities are deactivated.
V. Comments on the Final EIS
After issuing the Final EIS, DOE received two letters commenting on
the preferred alternative, one from Alternatives in Action, and the
other from the Environmental Evaluation Group. In addition, while DOE
was in the process of distributing the Final EIS, DOE received a copy
of a letter from the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research to
the South Carolina State Department of Health and Environmental Control
commenting on an issue that is relevant to this Record of Decision.
Finally, during consultations conducted after completion of the Final
EIS, DOE received a comment on the Final EIS from the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior. DOE's responses to
these comments are as follows:
V.A.
The letter from Alternatives in Action (signed by Virginia Dollar
and dated September 23, 1998) expressed a
[[Page 66141]]
preference for implementation of the No Action alternative because it
would not involve separation of plutonium; would reduce the number of
people who would move, handle, treat and repackage the materials; and
would result in management of the materials close to their point of
origin. The No Action alternative is fully evaluated in the Final EIS,
along with the action alternatives. Section VII. of this Record of
Decision specifies the technologies that DOE has decided to implement
for each material category addressed in the Final EIS and explains why
DOE chose those technologies. DOE did not choose to implement the No
Action alternative for any material category because implementation of
the No Action alternative would leave the plutonium residues and scrub
alloy in forms that could not be disposed of or otherwise
dispositioned. Such an action would only postpone eventual action
necessary to terminate storage of these materials and would result in
continuation of the risks and costs associated with their indefinite
storage.
V.B.
The letter from the Environmental Evaluation Group \1\ (signed by
Robert H. Neill and dated October 6, 1998) contained several comments
on two topics, (1) safeguards termination limits, and (2) treatment of
ash residues and other residues containing fines or powder. DOE's
responses to the Environmental Evaluation Group comments are provided
below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Environmental Evaluation Group is an independent group
established in 1979 as a part of the New Mexico Institute of Mining
and Technology with funds provided to the State of New Mexico by
DOE. Pursuant to Pub.L. 100-456, the Environmental Evaluation Group
conducts an independent technical evaluation of WIPP to assist in
ensuring protection of the environment and the public health and
safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V.B.1. Safeguards Termination Limits
The Environmental Evaluation Group letter raised several issues
that relate to ``safeguards termination limit variances''. The comments
requested more details regarding the process used to review and approve
applications for variances, and raised issues relating to the basis for
any variances.
The Office of Safeguards and Security is the organization within
DOE that is responsible for determining when special nuclear materials
(such as plutonium) must be subject to physical safeguards to prevent
theft or diversion. To that end, the Office of Safeguards and Security
has established concentrations of plutonium that DOE organizations use
to determine which materials containing plutonium must be safeguarded
and which can be held or disposed of without maintaining physical
safeguards. However, the Office of Safeguards and Security recognizes
that there are circumstances under which the threat of theft or
diversion would be very small even if these concentrations were
exceeded. Accordingly, it has a procedure under which a DOE site may
petition for a variance from the safeguards termination limits. To
obtain a variance, the site must demonstrate that `` given the nature
of the materials, their plutonium concentrations, and the other
management controls that would be in effect during their transportation
and storage--safeguards controls would not be needed to adequately
ensure that the material would not be stolen or diverted for illicit
purposes. This process was discussed in Section 1.3.1 of the Final EIS.
The Environmental Evaluation Group letter states that some of the
residues are above the Economic Discard Limits for plutonium. With the
termination of plutonium production in the United States, the Economic
Discard Limit concept has become obsolete and has been replaced by
criteria that comprise DOE's current plutonium disposition methodology.
These criteria include consideration of security and nonproliferation,
waste minimization and costs. All of these criteria were satisfied in
the development of the safeguards termination limit variance associated
with Alternative 4, the Combination Alternative analyzed in the Final
EIS (see Section III. D.).
The Environmental Evaluation Group letter also refers to the Office
of Safeguards and Security Version 1.2 formula supposedly used to
calculate safeguards termination limits. The Version 1.2 formula was a
draft proposal developed in 1995 that was not used in the development
of the safeguards termination limits established in 1996. After
detailed technical evaluations of the Version 1.2 formula, DOE
concluded that the formula had no relationship to actual capability to
recover plutonium from plutonium residues and other plutonium bearing
materials. Therefore, the formula is not pertinent to making decisions
regarding the plutonium contained in the Rocky Flats plutonium residue
inventory.
Current DOE policies allow a variance to safeguards termination
limits to be approved for materials containing plutonium above the
limits when vulnerability assessments conclude that no additional
significant risk would occur by approving a variance. To support a
variance request for certain categories of plutonium residues, Rocky
Flats conducted vulnerability (or risk) assessments. The vulnerability
assessments for the residues and their disposition paths were conducted
to evaluate risks and determine acceptable protection measures needed
to mitigate any unacceptable risks. These vulnerability assessments
were thoroughly reviewed by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security
and were a primary basis for DOE's decision to grant the safeguards
termination limit variance for the Rocky Flats plutonium residues.
These assessments included consideration of all design based threats
and adversary capabilities for diversion, theft and sabotage, not only
at Rocky Flats, but also during transportation and final staging and
disposal at WIPP.
The Environmental Evaluation Group opposes granting a variance to
safeguards termination limits until there is a review by affected state
technical oversight agencies of the Rocky Flats application, the Office
of Safeguards and Security review and decision, and the vulnerability
assessments. Normally DOE does not involve outside organizations,
including state government agencies, in the nuclear safeguards and
security vulnerability review process. Furthermore, the governments of
states potentially impacted by the issuance of safeguards termination
limit variances have expressed no concerns on this matter to DOE.
Moreover, the Office of Safeguards and Security received a letter from
the Director of the State of Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment, dated December 30, 1997, that strongly endorsed DOE's
approval of Rocky Flats request for variances to safeguards termination
limits. The letter states that ``* * * approval of the proposal [a
Safeguards Termination Limit (STL) variance] would result in processing
which is strictly designed to stabilize residue material and meet the
WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria rather than requiring further processing
only to meet STLs.'' Comments on the Draft EIS from the State of New
Mexico Environment Department (see Chapter 9 of the Final EIS) include
no mention of variances to safeguards termination limits.
V.B.2. Treatment of Residues Containing Fines and Powders
The Environmental Evaluation Group recommends that certain residues
that contain fines and powders be ``fixed'' to minimize dispersibility
in the event of accidents, reduce their attractiveness for diversion,
or improve short and long term performance in WIPP. The Environmental
Evaluation Group specifically identifies incinerator ash,
[[Page 66142]]
graphite fines, inorganic ash, molten salt extraction salt/
electrorefining salts, sludges and HEPA filter residues as being
subject to this comment and mentions cold ceramification and
vitrification as potential fixation processes.
DOE's decisions on future management of each material category
covered by these comments will be included in the second Record of
Decision, as discussed in Section I of this Record of Decision (above).
Nevertheless, DOE is responding to these comments in this Record of
Decision, thus making the responses available to the public sooner, and
addressing the comments in the same document that addresses the
preceding comment on safeguards termination limits.
DOE considers that the actions recommended by the Environmental
Evaluation Group to control dispersibility in the event of accidents
under the preferred alternative are not necessary. As stated in Section
2.6.1 of the Final EIS, the residues would be packaged in multiple
layers of sealed packages specifically to preclude dispersion if an
accident were to occur. The residues would first be packaged in either
metal containers or plastic bags. They would then be placed in
stainless-steel pipe components, as appropriate, which in turn would be
placed inside 55-gallon drums. When ready for transport to WIPP, the
drums would be placed into TRUPACT-II containers, which are Type B
shipping packages, certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
approved by the Department of Transportation. The multiple containment
afforded the residues would virtually eliminate the possibility for
their dispersion into the environment, even in the unlikely event of an
accident.
Concerning the improvement of short and long term performance in
WIPP, the specific residues identified by the Environmental Evaluation
Group (and certain other residues) do not require further stabilization
prior to repackaging to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria (WIPP
WAC), except that some of the sludges would have to be filter-dried and
some of the HEPA filters neutralization-dried prior to being repackaged
in order to meet the WIPP WAC. This is discussed in Section 2.1 of the
Final EIS. Compliance with the WIPP WAC would demonstrate that
requirements for disposal at WIPP have been met. While ``fixing'' some
of the residues, as evaluated in the Final EIS under several of the
Alternative 2 technologies, could improve performance at WIPP, the
improvement would be modest, and would be accompanied by additional
costs, delays in the time when the residues would be ready to leave
Rocky Flats, and additional hazards to workers who would perform the
``fixing'' process. Although the ``fixing'' would make extraction of
the plutonium from these residues more difficult, DOE's analyses (see
Section V. B. 1, above) demonstrate that the residues are suitable for
termination of safeguards (including consideration of the potential for
diversion of the material) without such additional processing.
Furthermore, conducting the operations necessary to ``fix'' the
residues would subject workers to unnecessary radiation exposure.
Nevertheless, DOE will consider all of the alternatives evaluated for
these material categories in the Final EIS in the process of preparing
the second Record of Decision.
V. C.
The letter from the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
(signed by Brian Costner and dated September 24, 1998) questioned
whether the proposal in the Draft EIS to ship the plutonium fluoride
residues from Rocky Flats to the Savannah River Site for processing
through the canyons is consistent with the requirements of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and asserted that the public has
been largely excluded from the decision making process in this matter.
DOE's management of the plutonium fluoride residues will comply
with all applicable RCRA requirements. DOE will transport the plutonium
fluoride residues to the Savannah River Site in compliance with RCRA
transportation requirements, and will store them there pursuant to RCRA
storage requirements prior to processing. The applicability of RCRA
requirements to the processing of the plutonium fluoride residues in
the canyons is the subject of ongoing discussions between DOE and the
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control.
DOE currently is in the process of preparing the Surplus Plutonium
Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0283), which
addresses the extent to which two surplus plutonium disposition
approaches (immobilization and use in mixed oxide fuel [MOX]) would be
implemented. Even after completion of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Environmental Impact Statement, currently scheduled for early 1999, DOE
does not expect to make decisions about which, if any, of the plutonium
to be separated in the canyons would be used in MOX fuel until shortly
before the material would be transferred to a MOX fabrication facility.
Those decisions are not expected to be made until the plutonium
separation operations under this Record of Decision have been
completed.
DOE does not believe that the public has been excluded from the
decision making process regarding the management of the plutonium
fluorides. The public was provided an opportunity to comment on
management of the plutonium fluoride residues through this NEPA
process. The Draft EIS discussed processing of the plutonium fluorides
in the Savannah River Site canyons, followed by either immobilizing the
separated plutonium or using it in MOX fuel.
V. D.
The comment from the Fish and Wildlife Service (from Craig Miller
of the Fish and Wildlife Service office in Lakewood, Colorado on
September 4, 1998) pertained to the listing of Federal threatened,
endangered and candidate species that may be found on or in the
vicinity of Rocky Flats, as provided in Section 3.1.6, Table 3-6 of the
Final EIS. During discussions on the Final EIS between DOE and the Fish
and Wildlife Service office in Lakewood, Colorado, the Fish and
Wildlife Service requested that DOE update the list of Federal
threatened, endangered and candidate species in Table 3-6 as follows
(new entries are marked with an *, other changes are noted in italics):
Revise the list of Federal Endangered Species to read as follows:
American peregrine falcon
whooping crane*
eskimo curlew*
black-footed ferret*
Revise the list of Federal Threatened Species to read as follows:
bald eagle
pawnee mountain skipper*
Mexican spotted owl*
Preble's meadow jumping mouse
greenback cutthroat trout*
utes ladies-tress orchid*
Colorado butterfly plant (proposed)* [moved from ``Candidate
Species'' list]
Canada lynx (proposed)*
Revise the list of Federal Candidate Species to read as follows:
mountain plover
boreal toad*
swift fox*
[the Southwest willow flycatcher has been deleted from this list]
[[Page 66143]]
VI. New Information
Since the Final EIS was issued, DOE has improved its estimate of
the number of shipments that would be required to transport certain
residues off-site for processing. While the amount of residues (and the
amount of plutonium in the residues, both measured in terms of their
weight) that would be shipped under the Preferred Alternative has not
changed, the number of shipments that would be required to implement
the Preferred Alternative is now projected to be greater than the
number discussed in the Final EIS (Chapter 2, ``Alternatives'').
Specifically, routine characterization of the sand, slag and
crucible residues that was conducted in parallel with preparation of
the Final EIS found these residues to be less dense (i.e., they occupy
more volume per unit mass) than had been assumed during preparation of
the Final EIS. As a result, less sand, slag and crucible residues could
be placed in any shipping container, resulting in a projected increase
in the number of shipments that would be required from Rocky Flats to
the Savannah River Site.
In addition, the precise radiation levels being emitted by the
plutonium fluoride residues are not known at the present time. If the
radiation level emitted by the plutonium fluoride residues is found to
be higher than had been assumed during preparation of the Final EIS,
then the amount of plutonium fluoride residues that could be included
in any shipment would have to be reduced to avoid exceeding a
transportation regulatory limit, thus also requiring the number of
shipments to be increased. The actual radiation levels being emitted by
the plutonium fluoride residues would not be known until they were
repackaged for shipment. To avoid unnecessary radiation exposures to
workers, DOE has deferred taking these measurements until the
repackaging operation, when personnel would have to be near the
material in any case.
Finally, if it becomes necessary to change from use of the 6M
shipping container, the container assumed in the Final EIS, to the 9975
shipping container, the number of scrub alloy shipments could also
increase. This is due to the fact that, after the 9975 container is
certified, DOE will phase out use of the 6M containers as sufficient
numbers of 9975 containers become available, and the 9975 container can
hold less scrub alloy than the 6M container could.
Overall, the changes in the number of shipments, as discussed
above, increase shipments that might be made under the Preferred
Alternative from 39, as estimated in the Final EIS, to a current
estimate of between 60 and 90 shipments.
DOE has considered the environmental implications of this increase
in the estimated number of shipments that would be necessary to
implement the Preferred Alternative and has concluded that there would
be no significant change to the small impacts as estimated in the Final
EIS for the following reasons:
VI. A.
First, the estimate of the incident free radiological impacts from
each individual shipment would remain the same as in the Final EIS.
Such impacts were calculated under a simple, but conservative,
assumption that all shipments emit radiation at the regulatory limit.
Accordingly, the total of the incident free radiological impacts for
all shipments would increase, in proportion to the increased number of
shipments. However, the incident free radiological impacts would remain
low. For example, the highest incident free radiological impact (that
of the transportation crew for 90 shipments) would be 0.0055 latent
cancer fatalities (as opposed to 0.0024 latent cancer fatalities as
estimated in the Final EIS).
VI. B.
Second, the radiological impacts associated with accidents would
remain unchanged because the increased likelihood of an accident (due
to the increased number of shipments) is offset by the decrease in the
amount of radioactive material that would be present in an accident
\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Note that the radiological impacts of incident free
transportation and transportation accidents are calculated
differently. As noted above, incident free impacts are calculated
under the simplifying assumption that all shipments contain enough
radioactive material to cause them to emit radiation at the
regulatory limit. This assumption overstates impact estimates for
some shipments, but more precise calculations were not needed in
this case to estimate the nature of the impacts. Accident impacts,
however, are estimated based on the likely contents of the shipping
containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VI. C.
Third, although the nonradiological impacts (incident free and
accident) would be increased in proportion to the increased number of
shipments, the estimate remains small (approximately 0.0012 emission
related latent cancer fatalities and approximately 0.010 traffic
accident related fatalities for the new shipment values, as opposed to
0.00051 and 0.0039, respectively, as estimated in the Final EIS).
In summary, the transportation impacts from the current estimated
number of shipments from Rocky Flats to the Savannah River Site would
be small, and the current impact estimates differ insignificantly from
corresponding estimates presented in the Final EIS.
VII. Decision
DOE has decided to implement the proposed action in the manner
described in this section. The alternatives that DOE has decided to
implement are presented separately below for each material category
because the decisions on the selected technology were based on
considerations that are unique to the chemical and physical
characteristics of the individual material categories. Furthermore,
these decisions are independent of one another and are not connected to
the decisions to be made in the upcoming second Record of Decision.
Although alternative technologies analyzed in the EIS might use certain
common facilities or personnel, sufficient facility capacity and
personnel are available to allow use of any technology without
interfering with any other.
For clarity and brevity, this section also includes the discussion
of the environmentally preferable alternative (as required by CEQ
regulations [40 CFR 1505.2]) and the basis for selection of the
alternative to be implemented.
The analysis of alternative technologies presented in the Final EIS
indicates that all of the alternative technologies, including those in
the Preferred Alternative and the No Action alternative, would have
only small impacts on the human environment on or around the DOE
management sites and on the populations along transportation routes
(see Sections 4.23 and 4.24 of the Final EIS). Using conservative
assumptions (i.e., assumptions that tend to overestimate risks), the
potential risks from incident-free operations and postulated accidents
that are of most interest would be (1) Those associated with radiation
exposure to workers performing processing operations on the plutonium
residues and scrub alloy or near loaded transportation containers, and
(2) radiation risks to the general public in and around the DOE
management sites and along the transportation routes. The Final EIS
also estimates (1) the risks from incident-free operations and
postulated accidents associated with chemical releases and
transportation accidents; (2) the amounts of various wastes and other
materials that would result from implementation of the various
alternative technologies; (3) the cost of implementing the various
[[Page 66144]]
alternative technologies; (4) the effect on nuclear weapons
nonproliferation; and (5) air quality impacts.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative--Although there are
differences among the estimated impacts for the various alternatives,
the impacts would be small for any of the alternative technologies, and
the magnitude of the differences in potential impacts between
alternatives is small. In addition, the nature of the potential impacts
is such that comparing them is a very judgmental process. For example,
under the preferred alternative for scrub alloy (plutonium separation),
only 61 drums of transuranic waste would be generated; whereas the
other action alternative for this material (calcination and
vitrification) would generate 2,809 drums of transuranic waste.
However, the plutonium separation would also result in generation of
200 kg of separated plutonium; whereas calcination and vitrification
would result in no separated plutonium. Comments received from members
of the public on the Draft EIS demonstrate that different individuals
would make different value judgments as to which of these product/waste
materials is of most concern. Furthermore, in addition to having no
indisputable means of identifying which waste or product stream would
be most important to minimize, there is no indisputable way to trade
off differences between the amounts of various types of waste and
separated plutonium against differences in levels of radiological risk
or chemical hazards; or between risks to workers versus risks to the
public (risks to the public would be lower than those to workers for
all technologies evaluated in the Final EIS).
In general, because of the small risks that would result from any
of the action alternatives (as demonstrated by Tables 2-9 through 2-26,
and 4-8 through 4-54 of the Final EIS) and the absence of any clear
basis for discerning an environmental preference, DOE concludes that no
one of the action alternatives is clearly environmentally preferable
over any other action alternative.
On the other hand, under the No Action alternative, the materials
would be left in storage at Rocky Flats with no defined disposal path.
There would be additional risk associated with both the indefinite
storage and whatever processing may ultimately be determined to be
necessary to prepare the material for ultimate disposition. There would
also be risks from potential degradation of storage facilities and
containers. Accordingly, in consideration of the long term risks that
would be associated with implementation of the No Action alternative,
DOE considers that all of the action alternatives are environmentally
preferable over the No Action alternative.
The processing technologies that DOE has decided to implement are
as follows for each material category addressed in this Record of
Decision:
VII.A. Sand, Slag and Crucible Residues
VII.A.1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to preprocess the sand, slag and crucible residues
at the Rocky Flats site and then transport them to the Savannah River
Site for stabilization in the F-Canyon. The Purex process will be used
to chemically separate the plutonium from the other residue
constituents (i.e., Alternative 3). The separated plutonium will then
be placed in storage at the Savannah River Site until it is
dispositioned as determined by DOE after completion of the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0283,
under preparation, draft issued in July 1998).
VII.A.2. Basis for the Decision
Transporting the residues and processing them at the Savannah River
Site was chosen as the technology to be implemented for this material
category because it provides the most expeditious approach for
stabilization of these residues. The Savannah River Site is now
processing in the canyons sand, slag, and crucible residues that were
produced at the Savannah River Site. Consideration of alternative
processing technologies that would result in sending the Rocky Flats
sand, slag and crucible residues directly to WIPP for disposal as
transuranic waste revealed that significant further characterization of
the material would be required to verify its suitability for disposal
in WIPP, due to the presence of reactive calcium in the residues.
Resolution of the issues raised by the reactive calcium would require
(1) Further testing to demonstrate that no more than 5 percent of the
residues contain enough reactive calcium to be pyrophoric, (2) approval
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a change to the WIPP TRUCON
Shipping Code to change the allowable passivated calcium metal content
from a trace (i.e., less than 1 percent) to a minor (i.e., 1 to 10
percent) constituent, and (3) obtaining WIPP certification of the
material. This strategy, if successful, would take about one year
longer to implement than processing at the Savannah River Site.
Therefore, in conformance with Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Recommendation 94-1 concerning expeditious stabilization of plutonium
bearing materials to resolve health and safety concerns, DOE has
decided to stabilize the sand, slag and crucible residues as quickly as
possible by transporting them to the Savannah River Site for
processing, even though this technology would cost $25 Million more
than the more technically uncertain calcination/vitrification
technology (see Section 4.17.7 of the Final EIS).
The Final EIS specified that any plutonium separated under any
alternative analyzed in this EIS would be disposed of using the
immobilization process. (Final EIS, page 2-2.) Upon further review, DOE
has decided for the following reasons not to make a determination at
this time on the disposition of any plutonium separated under the
decisions announced in this ROD. In December 1996, DOE published the
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0229, the PEIS).
That PEIS analyzed, among other things, the potential environmental
consequences of alternative strategies for the long term storage and
disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that has been or may be
declared surplus to national security needs. DOE announced the Record
of Decision for that PEIS in January 1997, which outlines an approach
to plutonium disposition that would allow for both the immobilization
of some of the surplus plutonium, and the use of some of the surplus
plutonium as MOX fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors (62 FR
3014).
As a follow-on analysis to that PEIS, DOE is in the process of
preparing the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact
Statement (DOE/EIS-0283, draft issued July 1998), which addresses the
extent to which each of the two surplus plutonium disposition
approaches (immobilization and MOX) would be implemented. Thus, at the
present time, DOE has not decided the extent to which either the
immobilization or the MOX approach to surplus plutonium disposition
would be implemented. Moreover, as noted above, even after completion
of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement,
DOE does not expect to make decisions about which, if any, of the
surplus plutonium would be used in MOX fuel until shortly before any
such material would be transferred to a MOX fabrication facility. Thus,
DOE believes at this time it is appropriate not to make any commitment
as to which
[[Page 66145]]
approach would be implemented for the disposition of any plutonium to
be separated under the decisions announced in this Record of Decision.
The plutonium declared to be surplus includes any weapons-useable
plutonium resulting from the stabilization (for health and safety
reasons) of the Rocky Flats plutonium residues and scrub alloy
discussed under this Record of Decision. As a result, weapons-useable
plutonium that is separated under actions from this Record of Decision
is a candidate for both of the surplus weapons-useable plutonium
disposition alternatives that have been identified by DOE (i.e., MOX
and immobilization).
VII. B. Direct Oxide Reduction Salt Residues (low plutonium
concentration)
VII. B. 1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to repackage the low plutonium concentration direct
oxide reduction salt residues to prepare them for disposal in WIPP
(Alternative 4). A portion of these residues may be pyro-oxidized, if
this additional processing is found to be necessary during examination
of the residues prior to repackaging. During the repackaging operation,
the residues may be mixed with other, lower plutonium concentration
residues from the same material category, or with an inert material.
VII. B. 2. Basis for the Decision
Repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the technology to be
implemented for this material category because it is the simplest and
least costly of all processing technologies considered, and the one
that will allow DOE to complete processing and ready the material for
disposal most expeditiously. This approach will also allow use of
resources that would otherwise be required to manage these residues to
speed up other activities required to close the site.
VII. C. Combustible Residues
VII. C. 1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to stabilize, if necessary, and repackage the
combustible residues to prepare them for disposal in WIPP (Alternative
4). Aqueous-contaminated combustible residues will be neutralized and
dried, with any fines stabilized by cementation or repackaging. Organic
contaminated combustible residues will be stabilized with a combination
of washing, low-temperature thermal desorption, stabilization of
plutonium fines, mixing with an absorbent material, and cementation.
Dry combustible residues will just be repackaged because they are in a
form that does not require stabilization. During the repackaging
operation, the residues may be mixed with other, lower plutonium
concentration residues from the same material category, or with an
inert material.
VII. C. 2. Basis for the Decision
Stabilizing and repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the
technology to be implemented for this material category because it is
the simplest of all processing technologies considered and the one that
will allow the site to complete processing and ready the material for
disposal most expeditiously. This approach will also allow use of the
resources that would otherwise be required to manage these residues to
speed up completion of other activities required to close the site.
Finally, selection of stabilization and repackaging avoids the
technical uncertainty (discussed in Section 4.17.7 of the Final EIS)
that would be associated with implementation of the $10 Million less
expensive blend down alternative.
VII. D. Plutonium Fluoride Residues
VII. D. 1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to transport the plutonium fluoride residues to the
Savannah River Site and use the F-Canyon to stabilize the material
(i.e., Alternative 3). The separated plutonium will then be placed in
storage at the Savannah River Site until it is dispositioned as
determined by DOE after completion of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Environmental Impact Statement (under preparation--see Section VII. A.
2. above). No decision concerning the final disposition of any
plutonium separated from the plutonium fluoride residues, however, is
expected in the near future, and not until after completion of the
plutonium separation operations at the Savannah River Site. Even after
completion of the Surplus Plutonium Deposition Environmental Impact
Statement, currently scheduled for early 1999, DOE expects to make
decisions about which, if any, of the plutonium would be used in MOX
fuel shortly before the material would be transferred to a MOX
fabrication facility. As a result, DOE does not expect to know soon
whether the separated plutonium will be used in MOX fuel and will keep
it in storage pending such a decision.
VII. D. 2. Basis for the Decision
Purex plutonium separation at the Savannah River Site was chosen as
the technology to be implemented for this material category because it
poses less technical risk and will cost less than would establishment
of a new acid dissolution/plutonium oxide recovery capability at Rocky
Flats. Blend down, while technically feasible, would result in a very
large increase in the amount of transuranic waste requiring disposal,
and would result in higher costs.
VII. E. Ful Flo Filter Media Residues
VII. E. 1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to shred and blend down the Ful Flo filter media
residues with an inert material to below the safeguards termination
limits, and to repackage the product for disposal in WIPP (Alternative
2).
VII. E. 2. Basis for the Decision
Shred and blend down at Rocky Flats was chosen as the technology to
be implemented for this material category because the other
alternatives are aqueous processes that would be more difficult and
more costly to implement. The increase in the amount of material to be
disposed of after blend down is much less of a concern because of the
relatively small amount of material in this category and the small
amount of plutonium it contains (about 800 kg of residues containing
about 20 kg of plutonium).
VII. F. Glass Residues
VII. F. 1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to stabilize (i.e., neutralize and dry) and
repackage the glass residues to prepare them for disposal in WIPP
(Alternative 4). During the repackaging operation, the glass residues
may be mixed with other, lower plutonium concentration residues from
the same material category, or with an inert material.
VII. F. 2. Basis for the Decision
Stabilizing and repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the
technology to be implemented for this material category because it is
the simplest and least costly of all processing technologies
considered, and the one that will allow the site to complete processing
and ready the material for disposal most expeditiously. This approach
will also allow use of the resources that would otherwise be required
to manage these residues to speed up other activities required to close
the site.
VII. G. Graphite Residues
VII. G. 1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to repackage the graphite residues to prepare them
for disposal in WIPP (Alternative 4). During
[[Page 66146]]
the repackaging operation, these residues may be mixed with other,
lower plutonium concentration residues from the same material category,
or with an inert material.
VII. G. 2. Basis for the Decision
Repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the preferred processing
technology for this material category because it is the simplest and
least costly of all processing technologies considered, and the one
that will allow the site to complete processing and ready the material
for disposal most expeditiously and at least cost. This approach will
also allow use of the resources that would otherwise be required to
manage these residues to speed up other activities required to close
the site.
VII. H. Inorganic (Metal and Other) Residues
VII. H. 1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to repackage the inorganic (metal and other)
residues to prepare them for disposal in WIPP (Alternative 4). During
the repackaging operation, these residues may be mixed with other,
lower plutonium concentration residues from the same material category,
or with an inert material.
VII. H. 2. Basis for the Decision
Repackaging at Rocky Flats was chosen as the preferred processing
technology for this material category because it is the simplest and
least costly of all processing technologies considered, and the one
that will allow the site to complete processing and ready the material
for disposal most expeditiously, and at the least cost. This approach
will also allow use of the resources that would otherwise be required
to manage these residues to speed up other activities required to close
the site.
VII. I. Scrub Alloy
VII. I. 1. Selected Alternative
DOE has decided to package the scrub alloy, transport it to the
Savannah River Site and use the F-Canyon to stabilize the material
(i.e., Alternative 3). The separated plutonium will then be placed in
storage at the Savannah River Site until it is dispositioned as
determined by DOE after completion of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Environmental Impact Statement (under preparation--see Section VII. A.
3. above).
VII. I. 2. Basis for the Decision
Purex plutonium separation at the Savannah River Site was chosen as
the preferred processing technology for this material category because
this alternative will allow the most expeditious and least expensive
removal of the scrub alloy from Rocky Flats. Furthermore, scrub alloy
has traditionally been processed at the Savannah River Site using the
Purex technology, and it is a well understood operation that has been
demonstrated to work. By comparison, the calcine and vitrify technology
(Alternative 2) would involve more technical risk because vitrification
operations have never been conducted at Rocky Flats on a production
basis.
VIII. Use of All Practical Means to Avoid or Minimize Harm
Implementation of this decision will result in low environmental
and health impacts. However, DOE will take the following steps to avoid
or minimize harm wherever possible:
VIII. A.
DOE will use current safety and health programs and practices to
reduce impacts by maintaining worker radiation exposure as low as
reasonably achievable and by meeting appropriate waste minimization and
pollution prevention objectives.
VIII. B.
DOE will provide a level of health and safety for DOE
transportation operations that is equivalent to or greater than that
provided by compliance with all applicable Federal, State, Tribal, and
local regulations. In addition to meeting applicable shipping
containment and confinement requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulations on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive
Material (10 CFR Part 71) and Department of Transportation regulations
at 49 CFR, all packaging for transportation of the material covered by
this Record of Decision will also be certified by DOE. DOE also
provides Federal, State, Tribal and local authorities with access to
training and technical assistance necessary to allow them to safely,
efficiently, and effectively respond to any incident involving
transportation of the materials covered by this Record of Decision.
Items A and B above will be accomplished under existing business
practices in the normal course of implementing this Record of Decision.
VIX. Conclusion
DOE has decided to implement the Preferred Alternative specified in
the Final EIS to prepare the plutonium residue categories and scrub
alloy specified in Sections I and VII. of this Record of Decision for
disposal or other disposition. This decision is effective upon being
made public, in accordance with DOE's NEPA implementation regulations
(10 CFR 1021.315). The goals of this decision are to prepare the
plutonium residues and scrub alloy for disposal or other disposition in
a manner that addresses immediate health and safety concerns associated
with storage of the materials and to support Rocky Flats' closure.
Disposal or other disposition of these materials will also eliminate
health and safety concerns and costs that would be associated with
indefinite storage of these materials.
Issued in Washington, D.C. this 25th day of November, 1998.
James M. Owendoff,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 98-32011 Filed 11-30-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
