[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 238 (Tuesday, December 10, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65085-65088]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-31323]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point, Unit 1; Order
Imposing a Civil Monetary Penalty
[Docket No. 50-220, License No. DPR-63, EA 96-079]
I.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (Licensee) is the holder of
Operating License No. DPR-63 (License), issued by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission). The License authorizes the
Licensee to operate the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 nuclear facility in
accordance with the conditions specified therein.
II.
An inspection of the Licensee's activities was conducted between
February 17 and March 11, 1996. The results of this inspection
indicated that the Licensee had not conducted its activities in full
compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the
Licensee by letter dated June 18, 1996. The Notice states the nature of
the violations, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that the
Licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for
the violations.
The Licensee responded to the Notice in a letter dated July 16,
1996. In its response, the Licensee admitted the two violations
assessed a civil penalty in Section I of the Notice, but requested that
the penalty be mitigated. In addition, the Licensee denied the two
violations in Section II of the Notice that were classified
individually at Severity Level IV and not assessed a civil penalty. The
Licensee provided a supplemental response, dated August 15, 1996, in
which the Licensee subsequently admitted one of the Severity Level IV
violations that it had denied in the July 16, 1996 response.
III.
After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements
of fact, explanation, and argument for mitigation contained therein,
the NRC staff has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this
Order, that the violations for which the civil penalty was proposed
occurred as stated in the Notice, and that an adequate basis was not
provided for mitigation of the civil penalty. Therefore, the penalty
proposed for the violations designated in Section I of the Notice
should be imposed.
IV.
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205,
It Is Hereby Ordered That:
The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 within 30
days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, money order, or
electronic transfer, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and
mailed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, One White Plant North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD
20852-2738.
V.
The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of
this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and include
a statement of good cause for the extension. A request for a hearing
should be clearly marked as a ``Request for an Enforcement Hearing''
and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to
the Commission's Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies
also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and
Enforcement at the same address and to the Regional Administrator, NRC
Region I, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of the hearing. If the Licensee fails to
request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, or if
written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing
has not been granted, the provisions of this Order shall be effective
without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time,
the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the Licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the
issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
whether, on the basis of the violations set forth in Section I of the
Notice that the Licensee admitted, this Order should be sustained.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day of December 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James L. Milhoan,
Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional
Operations and Research.
Appendix
Evaluation and Conclusion
On June 18, 1996, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of
Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $50,000 was issued to the
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (licensee) for violations of NRC
requirements. Two of the violations were classified in the aggregate at
Severity Level III, and a $50,000 civil penalty was proposed. Two other
violations were classified individually at Severity Level IV. The
licensee responded to the Notice on July 16, 1996, and admitted the two
violations for which a penalty was proposed, but requested that the
penalty
[[Page 65086]]
be mitigated. The licensee also denied the two violations that were not
assessed a penalty. In a supplemental response, dated August 15, 1996,
the licensee admitted one of the Severity Level IV violations that it
had denied in the July 16, 1996 response. The NRC's evaluation and
conclusion regarding the licensee's requests are as follows:
1. Restatement of Violations
A. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, (10 CFR
50), Appendix B, Criterion III, ``Design Control,'' requires that
measures be established to verify the adequacy of design, such as by
design reviews, alternate or simplified calculational methods, or
suitable testing.
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR), Sections VI.C.1.2 and III.A.1.2, state that the reactor and
turbine building pressure relief panels will blow out at 45 pounds per
square foot (psf) to prevent failure of the building superstructures at
an internal pressure in excess of 80 psf.
Contrary to the above, between October 1993 and March 1995,
measures established failed to verify the adequacy of design for Unit 1
reactor and turbine building pressure relief panels to blow out at the
specified pressures. Specifically, in October 1993, NMPC made an error
in the assumptions for calculations regarding the installed, oversized
bolts in the reactor and turbine building pressure relief panels. The
error was not identified, during the review process, by either the
independent engineering reviewer or approver. It was not recognized
until March 1995 that the relief pressures were in excess of the
designed blowout pressure of the superstructures. (01013)
B. 10 CFR 50.59(a)(1), allows, in part, the holder of a license to
make changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report
unless the proposed change involves an unreviewed safety question.
10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires, in part, the licensee to maintain
records of changes in the facility, to the extent that these changes
constitute changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis
report. The records must include a written safety evaluation which
provides the bases for the determination that the change does not
involve an unreviewed safety question.
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 UFSAR Sections VI.C.1.2 and III.A.1.2 state
that the reactor and turbine building pressure relief panels will blow
out at 45 psf to prevent failure of the building superstructure at an
internal pressure in excess of 80 psf.
Contrary to the above, from December 1969 to March 1995, the actual
design configuration of the reactor and turbine building pressure
relief panels was different from that described in the UFSAR, and
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) did not perform the required
written safety evaluation to provide the bases for a determination that
the deviation from the UFSAR description did not involve an unreviewed
safety question. Specifically, in October 1993, NMPC identified that
the wrong size bolts had been installed in the relief panels during
initial construction. Calculations revealed that the reactor and
turbine building pressure relief panels would not relieve until 53 and
60 psf, respectively. Subsequent calculations revealed that the panels
would not relieve until the pressure was in excess of the
superstructure design blowout pressure of 80 psf stated in the UFSAR,
and the licensee neither performed the evaluation required by 10 CFR
50.59, nor did it undertake adequate corrective action to restore the
facility to the licensing basis configuration as specified in the
UFSAR. (01023)
This is a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I). Civil
Penalty--$50,000
2. Summary of Licensee Response Requesting Mitigation of the Penalty
In its July 16, 1996 response, the licensee admitted the two
violations for which the civil penalty was proposed and stated its
belief that a civil penalty is not warranted. In support of this
belief, the licensee noted that the deficiencies in the blowout panel
construction do not represent a significant safety issue; the blowout
panels would have functioned as designed to prevent failure of the
building superstructures; and the panels would only function in the
event of a high energy line break outside containment, a scenario that
the licensee indicated is not considered a design basis event for NMP-
1.
The licensee also expressed concern that the violations and civil
penalty may be the result of applying a relatively recent regulatory
position and philosophy to actions that occurred over three years ago.
The licensee noted that it appears that the NRC is considering all
statements and commitments in the UFSAR as ``stand-alone'' regulatory
requirements, and has applied a new and restrictive interpretation to
the definition of ``margin of safety'' terminology in 10 CFR 50.59. The
licensee further notes that the plant condition was identified by its
staff as a result of a proactive evaluation to resolve a minor
discrepancy in the UFSAR.
The licensee further noted in support of its mitigation request
that it had not been assessed a penalty since 1992; that it has
demonstrated a proactive approach to safety; and, contrary to a
statement in the NOV transmittal letter, that it took immediate actions
to restore the pressure relief panels to a condition consistent with
the UFSAR once the calculational error was discovered, and the NRC did
not appear to give any credit for this.
3. NRC Evaluation of Licensee Response
The NRC has carefully considered the licensee's response and
concludes that the licensee has not provided an adequate basis for
mitigation of the civil penalty.
Although the licensee did not specifically contest the Severity
Level classification of the two violations in Section I of the Notice,
the licensee appears to take issue with that classification by
indicating that the deficiencies in the pressure relief panel
construction do not represent a significant safety issue. The NRC
concedes that the pressure relief panels likely would have functioned
as designed to prevent failure of the building superstructures,\1\ and
the panels function only in the event of a high energy line break
outside containment, which is not considered a design basis event for
NMP-1. However, the NRC notes that the full resolution of this issue is
still under the licensee's evaluation. Notwithstanding the result of
that resolution, the NRC maintains that the two violations represent a
significant regulatory concern and, therefore, were classified
appropriately in the aggregate at Severity Level III.
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\1\ This NRC position is based on more recent licensee reviews
performed after the enforcement conference, which determined that
both the reactor and turbine buildings would be capable of
withstanding internal pressures in excess of 100 psf without
superstructure failure.
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In making this determination, the NRC considered the fact that this
condition (the actual design configuration of the pressure relief
panels was different from that described in the UFSAR) existed for
approximately 26 years, without any written safety evaluation to
provide the basis for a determination that the deviation from the UFSAR
description did not involve an unreviewed safety question. A number of
facts are most noteworthy: (1) the licensee identified, in October
1993, that the wrong size bolts (\1/4\-inch diameter, as opposed to the
correct sized \3/16\-inch diameter bolts) had been installed in the
relief
[[Page 65087]]
panels during initial construction, (2) the licensee's October 1993
evaluation of the wrong bolts utilized assumptions inconsistent with
the assumptions described in the UFSAR \2\ and (3) a subsequent review,
in March 1995, of the evaluation performed in October 1993, revealed
that the assumptions were incorrect and that the panels would not
relieve until the pressure was in excess of the superstructure design
blowout pressure stated in the UFSAR (80 psf). Nonetheless, the
licensee neither performed the required evaluation, nor undertook
adequate corrective action to restore the facility to the licensing
basis configuration as specified in the UFSAR. Given the length of time
this condition existed, the inappropriate and inconsistent use of
assumptions not described in the UFSAR, and the failure to promptly
resolve and take appropriate action to address the issue of building
overpressure when indications of a problem surfaced in 1993, the NRC
contends that the violations represent a significant regulatory concern
and were classified appropriately at Severity Level III.
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\2\ The UFSAR description of the failure mode was the panel
bolts shearing (one-way process analysis resulting in calculated
failures of 94 psf and 92 psf for the reactor and turbine building,
respectively). However, the licensee chose to analyze the panel
relieving process by using a metal tearing failure mode (two-way
process analysis resulting in calculated failures of 53 psf and 60
psf for the reactor and turbine building, respectively).
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With regard to the licensee's concern that the violations and
imposition of a civil penalty may be the result of applying a
relatively recent regulatory position and philosophy to actions that
occurred over three year ago, Violations I.A and B involve the
licensee's original construction installation of incorrect-sized bolts
on the pressure relief panels, resulting in a change to the facility
from that described in the plant's UFSAR, without preparing a written
safety evaluation as required by 10 CFR 50.59. The NRC has always
regarded such a change as requiring a written safety evaluation in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Thus, there has been no change in the
NRC's interpretation of this requirement as it applies to the changes
addressed in Violations I.A and B.
The NRC also acknowledges that this plant condition was identified
by the licensee staff as a result of a proactive evaluation to resolve
a discrepancy in the UFSAR, and the licensee has not been assessed a
penalty since 1992. These factors were considered by the NRC as part of
the civil penalty assessment process set forth in the NRC Enforcement
Policy (NUREG-1600), as were the licensee's corrective actions. In
addition, although the NRC acknowledges that the licensee took
immediate actions to restore the pressure relief panels to a condition
consistent with the UFSAR once the calculational error was discovered,
the NRC maintains that no credit was warranted for these corrective
actions. In October 1993, the licensee identified that the wrong bolts
had been installed in 1969, and calculated the relief pressures to be
53 psf for the reactor building and 60 psf for the turbine building.
This calculation was in error, and the relief pressures were actually
in excess of 80 psf as the licensee identified in March 1995, at which
time the licensee removed every other bolt to place themselves in a
condition that the licensee believed was in compliance with the UFSAR.
It was not until after being questioned by the NRC prior to the
conference, that the licensee identified that the March 1995
calculations were also wrong. In addition, the calculations used to
support the removal of every other bolt were flawed, yet the licensee,
at the time of the enforcement conference, had not completed the
evaluation required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to change the UFSAR.
Therefore, the NRC maintains that credit is not warranted for the
licensee's corrective actions, which according to the Enforcement
Policy, results in a civil penalty of $50,000 being assessed. The NRC
concludes that the penalty for this Severity Level III problem should
not be mitigated.
4. Restatement of Violation II.B
10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B), requires, in part, that the licensee
shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within one
hour of the occurrence of any event or condition, during operation,
that results in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety
barriers, being seriously degraded or in a condition that is outside
the design basis of the plant.
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) requires that the licensee shall submit a
Licensee Event Report (LER) within 30 days of the discovery of any
event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power
plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded
or in a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant.
Contrary to the above, in October 1993, NMPC did not notify the NRC
within one hour of the discovery of a condition outside the design
basis of the plant, nor did NMPC submit a LER within 30 days of
discovery of a condition outside the design basis of the plant.
Specifically, with the plant operating, NMPC determined that the actual
blowout pressures of the reactor and turbine building pressure relief
panels were in excess of the buildings' design basis pressures
identified in the Unit 1 UFSAR, and NMPC failed to make and submit the
required reports in the required time periods. (02024)
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
5. Licensee Response Denying Violation II.B
The licensee, in disagreeing with this violation, noted that in
October of 1993, the calculations associated with the oversized bolts
in the blowout panels indicated that the reactor and turbine building
panels would relieve at internal pressures of 53 and 60 psf,
respectively, and the UFSAR indicated that the buildings' design basis
pressure was in excess of 80 psf. The licensee, therefore, concluded
that this situation was not reportable even though the calculated
blowout pressures did exceed the 45 psf nominal value for bolt failure
as indicated in the UFSAR.
The licensee stated that in reaching this conclusion, it considered
the guidance in NUREG-1022, ``Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72
and 50.73,'' and various statements in the Federal Register (FR)
related to the reportability rule. The licensee notes that NUREG-1022
provides an example where high energy line break restraints are not
installed, but indicates that this would not be considered reportable
if analysis shows that the particular missing restraints are not needed
for compliance with the design basis. The licensee further indicates
that the preamble to the final rule in the August 29, 1983, FR notes,
in regard to this section of the rule, that ``[i]t is not intended that
this paragraph apply to minor variations in individual parameters or to
problems concerning single pieces of equipment.'' The licensee also
noted that an April 8, 1993 FR states: ``Furthermore, the wording of
the criteria and the guidance in the preamble to the final rule imply
that this impact on plant safety should be at a fairly high level,''
and ``Therefore, failure, specification problems, and loss of safety
margins that apply to individual components are not reportable unless
they effect the ability to satisfy plant safety functions 3.''
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\3\ 58 FR 18167, 18174, April 8, 1993
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The licensee indicated that, based on the above guidance, it
concluded in October of 1993 that the calculated blowout pressures of
53 and 60 psf for the reactor and turbine buildings, respectively,
would still have the ability
[[Page 65088]]
to satisfy the plant design basis. Specifically, the blowout panels
would still protect the buildings' superstructure from failure, which
was considered the plant design basis. The licensee contended that the
45 psf value is not considered the plant design basis for reportability
considerations and none of the principle safety barriers was seriously
degraded. Therefore, the licensee does not consider that this condition
was reportable given the information available in October 1993, and
therefore disagrees with this violation.
The licensee also notes that the description of the violation in
the Notice of Violation, and particularly, the discussion of the
violation in the transmittal letter, suggests that the NRC is applying
a relatively recent regulatory position regarding the status of
numerical values within the UFSAR. Specifically, the licensee states
that it appears that the NRC is considering all statements and
commitments in the UFSAR as ``stand-alone'' requirements. The licensee
further notes that while stated in the second paragraph on page two of
the NOV transmittal letter, but not cited as such in any of the
violations, it appears that the NRC considers that the failure of the
blowout panels to function at the UFSAR stated pressure of 45 psf is,
in itself, a violation of regulatory requirements and a reportable
situation. The licensee disagrees with this interpretation of the legal
significance of the UFSAR, and is participating with the Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI) to initiate a dialogue with the NRC regarding the
resolution of this generic issue. The licensee further states that
notwithstanding its efforts to reach agreement on what the
interpretation of information in the UFSAR should be, the licensee
believes that it is clear that the NRC's regulatory interpretation is
inconsistent with the previously issued guidance on reportability as
referenced in the licensee's response.
6. NRC Evaluation of Licensee Response
The NRC agrees that the licensee, based on its erroneous
calculations in October 1993, concluded that the pressure relief panels
would provide relief at values below the reactor and turbine building
superstructure failure pressure of 80 psf. While the licensee clearly
should have been aware that the pressure relief panels would provide
relief at values above the 80 psf superstructure pressures if the
calculation had been adequately performed, it is also clear that the
licensee could not report a condition that it was not aware of, even
though it should have been aware of the condition. Nonetheless, the
licensee was aware that the panels' pressure relief values calculated
in 1993 were above the stated value of 45 psf stated in the UFSAR at
which the panels were supposed to provide relief. The NRC maintains
that the licensee was outside of its design basis and decreased the
margin to the pressure that would cause building failure and,
therefore, the deviation from the UFSAR should have been reported to
the NRC.
The NRC maintains this position, notwithstanding the licensee's
contention that the guidance in NUREG-1022 would suggest that the
condition was not reportable. The NRC believes that the licensee
misinterpreted the NUREG-1022 guidance and in so doing, failed to
report the subject condition to the NRC. Simply stated, the licensee's
analogy of a missing high energy line break restraint, which
subsequently is analyzed as not being required for compliance with the
design basis, is not applicable to the pressure relief panels, a single
component which provides a significant function in protecting the
building superstructure in the event of an overpressure transient of
the reactor or turbine buildings.
7. NRC Conclusion
The NRC concludes that the licensee has not provided an adequate
basis for mitigating the civil penalty. Accordingly, the NRC has
determined that a monetary civil penalty in the amount of $50,000
should be imposed for the violations in Section I of the June 18, 1996
Notice. In addition, the licensee has not provided an adequate basis
for the withdrawal of Violation II.B in the Notice.
[FR Doc. 96-31323 Filed 12-9-96; 8:45 am]
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