[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 241 (Friday, December 13, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 65510-65518]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-31747]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 571
RIN AG-38
[Docket No. 96-41, Notice 01]
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, Reflective Devices
and Associated Equipment
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice of request for comments.
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SUMMARY: This document seeks public comment on the value of several
signal lamp ideas which have been suggested to the agency, and on
whether NHTSA should permit auxiliary signal lamps in addition to those
required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. NHTSA also
seeks comment on a policy for the disposition of petitions for
rulemaking that request the agency to require or permit safety lighting
inventions and which are submitted without proof of their
effectiveness.
DATES: Comments are due March 13, 1997.
ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to Docket No. 96-41, Notice 1, and be
submitted to: Docket Section, room 5109, 400 Seventh Street S. W.,
Washington, DC 20590 (Docket hours are from 9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m.) It is
requested that 10 copies of the comments be provided.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For technical issues: Richard Van Iderstine, Office of Crash Avoidance
Standards, NPS-21, telephone (202) 366-5280, FAX (202) 366-4329.
For legal issues: Taylor Vinson, Office of Chief Counsel, NCC- 20,
(202) 366-5263, FAX (202) 366-3820.
Both may be reached at the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh St., S.W., Washington, D.C., 20590.
Comments should not be sent or FAXed to these persons, but should be
sent to the Docket Section.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Background
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 (``Standard No.
108''), Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment (49 CFR
571.108) includes requirements for specified types of signal lamps to
be installed on new motor vehicles, and regulates their performance in
terms of color, brightness, quantity, duty cycle (steady or flashing)
and details of activation (e.g., turned on with the headlamps). The
purpose of these specifications is to establish the presence of a
vehicle in the roadway, and to signal its driver's intentions to other
motorists and pedestrians. Communication via these signal lamps is best
accomplished with a degree of standardization in order to minimize
ambiguity. In drafting the signal lamp requirements, NHTSA has balanced
the need for standardization with its desire to allow as much design
freedom as possible for the location, shape, styling, and light source
design of the lamps. For example, the intensity ranges of taillamps and
stop lamps are regulated so that a person can distinguish a red stop
lamp from a red taillamp immediately at the initiation of braking,
without having to notice the transition. However, the size and shape of
stop lamps and taillamps are left to the designer of the device.
Likewise, stop lamps are required to be steady-burning to distinguish
them from the required flashing of turn signals and hazard warning
signal lamps of the same brightness and color. Paragraph S5.1.3 of
Standard No. 108 also allows for auxiliary lighting equipment beyond
the required equipment, provided that the auxiliary equipment does not
``impair the effectiveness'' of the required lamps and reflectors. (In
the case of auxiliary lamps of emergency vehicles and tow trucks, the
usual agency policy is to leave the specifications to the discretion of
State governments.)
Standard No. 108 is more flexible than the lighting regulations of
most
[[Page 65511]]
other countries and many of the States. For example, while many
countries require lamps to be located within specific dimensions, such
as ``not more than 3 inches from the edge of the vehicle'', Standard
No. 108 generally allows a manufacturer to locate lamps at such maximum
heights and widths as the manufacturer determines are ``practicable.''
Also, many States prohibit auxiliary lamps unless expressly permitted
by their lighting codes, even if they are permitted as optional
equipment under Standard No. 108 because they do not ``impair the
effectiveness'' of the lighting equipment required by the Federal
standard.
The agency is publishing this notice to obtain comment on four
signal lighting ideas which their proponents believe will improve
communication between drivers. The ideas are:
(1) The activation of stop lamps upon sudden release of the
accelerator pedal,
(2) The flashing of center high mounted stop lamps (CHMSLs) at one
or more rates to indicate heavy braking (or Anti-lock Braking System
activation),
(3) The flashing of one or more stop lamps to indicate a stopped
vehicle, and
(4) Stop lamps on the front of vehicles.
NHTSA is also seeking comments to aid in developing a general
policy that would maximize its consideration of potential safety
advances and suggestions by inventors while enabling it to carefully
screen new ideas to ensure that the public is not burdened with
unjustified cost or annoyance, or subjected to hazards. Despite the
relative degree of flexibility of Standard No. 108, inventors who have
developed new signal lamps or new ways of using existing lamps
nevertheless often find that their devices are in conflict with
Standard No. 108 and State regulations. In addition, inventors commonly
expect that NHTSA ought to require their inventions to be installed on
new motor vehicles. At the same time, these requests are often
accompanied by only very limited substantiation of the potential safety
benefits. Adoption of some requests would not only increase the cost of
new motor vehicles, but also in some cases reduce instead of increase
safety.
Idea No. 1: Stop Lamps Activated by Rapid Release of the
Accelerator Pedal
In a situation on the road when hard braking is required to avoid
an accident, it is an intuitively attractive idea to light the stop
lamps sooner than in normal braking. However, this is not permitted by
Standard No. 108, which requires that stop lamps be activated only upon
application of the service brakes (paragraph S5.5.4).
In 1994, Baran Advanced Technology Ltd. petitioned the agency to
permit activation of the stop lamps using its Advanced Brake Warning
System (ABWS). This system is designed to activate the stop lamps if
the accelerator pedal is lifted at a rate greater than 0.3 meter a
second, simulating the response of a driver in panic braking. Baran
claimed that this lights the stop lamps 0.25 second sooner and could
prevent a significant portion of rear end collisions. In support of its
petition, Baran presented a study of the stop lamp activations of a
small fleet of vehicles equipped with ABWS, operated over a period of
several months by drivers unaware of the ABWS equipment. In about one-
fourth of the instances in which the ABWS activated the stop lamps, the
driver did not touch the brake pedal, creating a ``false alarm''
lasting one second. However, the study also recorded a large number of
instances in which there were brake applications that lasted one second
or less. Baran concluded that the false alarms would increase, by only
a few percentage points, the total number of short stop lamp
indications and would not be noticeable as false alarms to the driving
public. It argued that the agency should not, therefore, be concerned
that the false alarms would dilute the effectiveness of the stop lamps
and cause motorists to begin to discount the significance of stop lamp
activation.
NHTSA was concerned that ABWS might decrease the public's
responsiveness to the message sent by the stop lamps. Today's stop
lamps, which are activated only by the service brake system, send an
unambiguous message to following drivers that the driver ahead is using
the brakes. The precise purpose of the brake application (panic stop,
ordinary stop, deceleration, disengagement of cruise control) requires
the following driver to be aware of the traffic environment ahead.
NHTSA believes that to the extent that the public would come to
associate stop lamp activation with movements of the accelerator pedal
rather than movements of the brake pedal, a dilution in the meaning of
the present signal will occur. The petitioner showed that ordinary
short brake applications would vastly outnumber ABWS false alarms and
argued that the public would not be sensitive to false alarms. However,
it is also possible that if the public were aware of the operation of
the ABWS, it would incorrectly attribute many of the short brake
applications to ABWS false alarms, creating an inappropriately high
level of skepticism of stop lamp signals. Also, the fact that drivers
experienced a large number of short inconsequential brake applications
makes it less likely that they would use to advantage an earlier
warning of only a fraction of a second, given the fact that so few
brake applications actually resulted in a rapid deceleration.
A related concern is the potential abuse of ABWS to create
intentional false alarms. An increasing level of aggression and lack of
courtesy on the part of drivers is now being reported. The safest way
to deal with tailgating drivers on multilane highways is to pull over
and allow them to pass. However, some drivers choose to return
discourtesy by tapping the brake pedal to startle the tailgater. It is
possible that the ease of lighting the stop lamps using the ABWS alone
would tempt more drivers to contribute to traffic aggression, and that
such behavior would dilute the message of stop lamp signals if a
tailgating driver suspected that the vehicle ahead was equipped with
ABWS.
There is the possibility of some small benefit of ABWS in the
following situation. Assuming that two vehicles are moving one behind
the other at the same speed and that the lead driver brakes extremely
hard and the trailing driver brakes equally hard at the first glimmer
of the lead vehicle's stop light, some collisions could be prevented
between vehicles with ordinarily insufficient headway provided that the
driver of the trailing vehicle brakes 0.25 second sooner than (s)he
would in response to current lighting systems. The benefits reported in
Baran's analysis under these assumptions were greatest for braking at 1
g under ideal pavement conditions because the assumed 0.25 second
advantage does not result in much speed reduction when the pavement is
slippery. It is not clear that these assumptions are realistic.
Baran cited studies reporting that over 20 percent of drivers
observed on a Michigan urban interstate highway maintained less than 1
second headway and that 4 to 5 percent maintained a headway of less
than half a second, supporting its point about the headway assumed to
demonstrate the effectiveness of its ABWS. However, NHTSA questions the
assumption that the trailing driver would react instinctively by
braking extremely hard at the instant (s)he perceived a stop lamp
illuminated by ABWS. If that driver knew the vehicle was equipped with
ABWS and that false alarms do occur, (s)he might not react
instinctively. At that instant, the lead car has not yet begun to
brake, and there
[[Page 65512]]
is no speed differential between the two vehicles. Until tire squeal or
extreme pitching motion of the lead car occurs, a trailing driver has
no reason to slam on his or her brakes. The trailing driver in this
analysis is a tailgater. It is possible that a tailgater who believes
that ABWS false alarms are a regular occurrence will be even less
likely to assume that hard braking is the required response upon
suddenly seeing a stop light. In short, it is easy to foresee a
situation in which the driver of a car being tailgated activates the
stop lamps by ABWS several times without braking and then is confronted
with an immediate need to brake fast, and the stop signal is initially
ignored by the driver of the tailgating car.
However, the typical rear-end crash does not involve a tailgating
pair of vehicles with drivers attentive enough to respond to a minutely
advanced stop signal. The agency's report Assessment of IVHS
Countermeasures for Collision Avoidance: Rear-End Crashes, DOT HS 807
995 May 1993, characterizes a rear-end crash as largely a dry/straight
road phenomenon associated with driver inattention. In three-fourths of
the rear-end crashes studied, the lead vehicle had been stopped,
usually for 2 to 6 seconds before it was struck. There was adequate
time to provide the following driver a warning with conventional stop
lamps and for the following driver to avoid the crash. Of the other
one-fourth of rear-end crashes, two-thirds did not involve following
too closely. And most of the crashes attributed to following too
closely also involved inattention on the part of the following driver.
The assumption that even an attentive driver receives a 0.25 second
sooner warning of panic braking of the car ahead may be optimistic. A
report by the Technical University of Darmstadt in Germany, titled
Efficiency of Advanced Brake Light Devices, FO57 May 1994, found that
responses by attentive test subjects improved as a result of ABWS by
only 0.10 to 0.15 second rather than by 0.25 second. The experiment
simulated a convoy of three closely spaced vehicles. The center vehicle
operated with and without ABWS. The time between the activation of the
stop lamp of the lead vehicle and the braking response of the driver of
the third vehicle was measured. With the vehicles stationary, the third
driver responded 0.15 second sooner when the second vehicle used ABWS
to active its stop lamps. This was approximately the same time taken by
the driver of the second vehicle to move his foot from the accelerator
to the brake pedal. When the experiment was replicated with the convoy
traveling on public roads, the advantage provided by the ABWS
diminished to 0.10 second as a result of the demands of the driving
task on even an attentive test driver.
The Darmstadt report also includes a study of the effect of a CHMSL
on the lead car of the same convoy. Cars in Germany are not yet
equipped with center high mounted stop lamps (CHMSLs). Under the same
conditions in which the ABWS produced a response 0.10 second earlier by
the third driver, the CHMSL produced a 0.45 second earlier response.
The CHMSL enabled the driver of the third car to respond to the lead
car before seeing the stop lamps of the second car. A similar effect
occurred in night tests without the CHMSL because the third driver was
able to see reflections of the lead car's stop lamps in the windshield
of the second car.
The most compelling argument for benefits is the implication that,
if there are a large number of tailgating rear-end accidents, some of
them must contain circumstances in which viewing a stop lamp 0.15 to
0.25 second earlier would make a positive difference. Even if following
drivers would not be willing to brake at the sight of a lamp (and many
may be too inattentive to notice it immediately), it could be argued
that the lamp may at least raise the state of expectancy of some
following drivers sooner.
In 1994, the agency denied Baran's petition to allow ABWS (59 FR
39522). In the agency's opinion, the perception among drivers that ABWS
allowed systematic and intentional false alarms would dilute the
unambiguous message of conventional stop lamps. NHTSA concluded that
the potential safety benefits of ABWS were not significant enough to
outweigh its potential disadvantages. However, the notice of denial
stated that NHTSA would consider the results of a fleet test of
effectiveness of ABWS being conducted in Israel at that time. The
objective of the Israeli study was to determine whether ABWS, already
permitted in Israel, should be made mandatory. Germany also permits
ABWS.
In 1995, Baran and its United States partner, Allied Signal, Inc.,
submitted another petition for an amendment to Standard No. 108 to
permit the optional use of ABWS. The petition bases its principal
argument on NHTSA's statement in the 1994 denial that ``a manufacturer
should not be precluded from offering its product, even if safety
benefits cannot be demonstrated, unless there are potential safety
disbenefits created by the product.'' The petition maintains that the
agency's concern that stop lamp signals would become more ambiguous to
the driving public is unfounded. Also, it disagrees that ABWS would be
abused to create intentionally false braking or stop signals. It also
reported that preliminary results from the ongoing Israeli fleet test
showed that vehicles equipped with ABWS had been involved in fewer
relevant collisions than ordinary vehicles, but that the numbers of
comparative accidents were too few to establish statistical
significance. The agency has granted that petition.
The disagreement between the agency and Baran rests to a large
degree on differences in assumptions of how ABWS would be used and
perceived by drivers in the United States. Thus, the agency is
particularly interested in comments from the driver's point of view,
whether the individual drives for pleasure or is a professional driver
of a commercial vehicle. The agency is interested in the views of
researchers as well. If commenters know of relevant research data, they
should provide the data.
The questions which NHTSA asks commenters to address are:
(1) How likely is it that an ABWS-type system would be abused to
create intentionally false braking signals? What is the likely
consequence of a false braking signal in a tailgating situation?
(2) To what extent would the knowledge that stop lamps could be
activated by rapid accelerator release change drivers' perceptions of
the meaning of the stop lamp message?
(3) If the answer to either question 1) or 2) is yes, would there
be any changes in driver behavior, and if so, what would these changes
likely be?
(4) Should NHTSA propose to amend Standard No. 108 to permit an
advance stop lamp warning system such as ABWS at the manufacturer's
option or should the agency retain the present requirement that
automobile stop lamps may only be activated by the purposeful
application of the brake pedal by the driver? Would drivers buy such a
system as an option, and if so, why?
(5) Should NHTSA propose to amend Standard No. 108 to require an
advance stop lamp warning system such as ABWS on new vehicles or should
the agency retain the present requirement that automobile stop lamps
may only be activated by the purposeful application of the brake pedal
by the driver?
(6) If an advance stop lamp warning system such as ABWS were
configured to activate the CHMSL but not the other required stop lamps,
would this reduce its potential for abuse to create intentionally false
braking signals? How would this modification affect the intended
purpose of a system such as
[[Page 65513]]
ABWS? How would this modification affect the intended purpose of the
CHMSL?
(7) Should NHTSA propose amending Standard No. 108 to (a) permit or
(b) require a system such as ABWS which would activate only CHMSLs and
not the other stop lamps?
(8) Are there other bases for concluding that a system such as
ABWS, either optional or mandatory, would degrade safety? If so, what
are those bases?
Idea No. 2: Flashing CHMSLs To Warn of Hard Braking
Many inventors have urged the agency to require CHMSLs to flash as
a signal of hard braking. The agency presumes that the inventors hold
design patents on specific devices which trigger and regulate a
flashing lamp because the general concept of a flashing stop lamp would
seem to be too much an obvious idea to be patentable. In addition, the
flashing CHMSL is an idea which has been disclosed in public literature
for at least 15 years.
In many instances, inventors who petition NHTSA seem to believe
that they can create a market for their patented products if they could
have them incorporated into the Federal motor vehicle safety standards.
This is an unrealistic expectation. A ``Motor vehicle safety standard''
is defined by 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9) as ``a minimum standard for motor
vehicle performance.'' Motor vehicle safety standards are required to
be ``practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated
in objective terms.'' (49 U.S.C. 30111(a)). This means that Standard
No. 108 must and does express its requirements in terms of performance
rather than design, leaving the individual manufacturer free to choose
the means most appropriate to that manufacturer for achieving the
stipulated performance. For example, if Standard No. 108 were to
require a flashing CHMSL for hard braking, it would specify the color,
brightness, flash rate and trigger condition (deceleration rate, ABS
activation or other appropriate condition), but the operating principle
of the device would be left to the manufacturer and not expressed in
Standard No. 108. Manufacturers would be free to devise ways of
satisfying a flashing CHMSL standard without infringing on existing
patents. No Federal motor vehicle safety standard requires the use of
patented designs. Of course, a manufacturer may decide that buying the
rights to use a patented device is the most advantageous way of
complying with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard.
The agency, has in fact, studied the possibility of flashing
CHMSLs, as was reported in the report Field Test Evaluation of Rear
Lighting Deceleration Signals, DOT HS-806-125 October 1981. Each of 600
taxis in a test fleet was equipped with one of three types of a CHMSL.
The fleet traveled a cumulative 40.7 million miles during the study.
The steady-burning CHMSL (the type adopted in Standard No. 108) was
compared with two types of flashing CHMSLs. One flashed at a rate of
2.5 Hz whenever the brake pedal was depressed. The other flashed at 1.5
Hz, 2.5 Hz, 4 Hz or 7 Hz to relate higher braking rates to faster CHMSL
flash rates. The highest flash rate occurred for all braking at greater
than 0.3 g. Some of the rear-end accidents experienced by the test
fleet did not involve braking by the struck vehicle. The remaining 129
accidents, in which stop lamp usage could be presumed, were placed into
three categories: vehicle stopped in traffic, vehicle stopping slowly,
and vehicle stopping quickly. Seventy-eight percent of the rear-end
accidents involved vehicles stopped in traffic. The other twenty-two
percent were divided about equally between the stopping-slowly and
stopping-quickly categories.
A CHMSL that flashes to warn of hard braking would be expected to
manifest its potential benefit by reducing accidents in which the
struck vehicle was stopping quickly. Of the 48 rear end crashes
experienced by the test vehicles equipped with ordinary steady-burning
CHMSLs, six occurred while the vehicles were stopping quickly. Of the
54 rear-end crashes experienced by the test vehicles equipped with
CHMSLs with a flash rate proportional to the deceleration rate, four
occurred while the vehicles were stopping quickly. That fewer vehicles
with the hard-braking warning were struck while stopping quickly is
suggestive of the expected desirable result, but the difference between
six and four rear-end accidents was not great enough to be
statistically significant. In other words, the apparent reduction from
six to four accidents (given the total number of accidents and test
vehicles) was not great enough to outweigh the possibility that the
reduction was due to chance rather than to the effectiveness of the
warning.
The remaining third of the test vehicles were equipped with CHMSLs
which flashed at same rate for all brake applications, regardless of
deceleration rate. Of the 55 rear-end crashes experienced by the test
vehicles equipped with constant-rate flashing CHMSLs, four occurred
while the vehicles were stopping quickly. The accident results were the
same for vehicles equipped with flashing CHMSLs with or without a
distinct signal for hard braking. This suggests that the flashing
action rather than the hard-braking warning (i.e., the increasing flash
rate) was the source of whatever benefits the enhanced CHMSLs could
provide over the performance of the ordinary steady-burning CHMSL.
However, this comparison also lacks statistical significance.
Speculation about these comparisons, which lack statistical
significance, leads to an inconsistency when one considers the crashes
into vehicles stopping slowly. It is a reasonable theory that flashing
signals could counteract to some degree the effect of inattention that
is an important cause of rear-end crashes. Under that theory, it is
logical that fewer rear-end crashes occurred during quick stopping with
either of the two flashing-CHMSL fleets than with the steady-burning
CHMSL fleet. It is also logical to assume that inattention is the
prevalent causal factor for rear-end crashes into vehicles stopping
slowly because even partially attentive drivers have an opportunity to
avoid such collisions. However, the fewest crashes into vehicles
stopping slowly occurred in the fleet having steady-burning CHMSLs. The
differences between fleets in crashes into vehicles stopping slowly
were also too small to be statistically significant, and thus it is not
surprising that the trends in performance of various types of CHMSLs
were inconsistent.
While the study provided no evidence that CHMSLs with flashing
deceleration signals would be more effective than steady-burning
CHMSLs, it did not rule out the possibility of an effectiveness benefit
too small for statistical significance within the scope of the study.
However, the study did conclude that any possible effectiveness would
be limited to a small proportion of rear-end crashes. It cited studies
conducted before 1981 to demonstrate that the large proportion of rear-
end crashes into stopped vehicles was not limited to studies of taxi
fleets, and the much more recent studies cited above support the
general finding that about three-fourths of the struck vehicles are
stopped. A flashing warning of hard braking also has the possible
disadvantage of an inherent time delay for the driver to see enough
cycles to decide that the lamp is indeed flashing, if that driver does
not brake on the first sight of red.
At the time of this study of possible CHMSL enhancements, the
agency had become convinced of the effectiveness of the steady-burning
CHMSL through previous studies with unambiguous
[[Page 65514]]
results. NHTSA decided that it would not be in the interest of safety
to delay a requirement for the basic steady-burning CHMSL while
pursuing variants that were proving insignificant. The resulting
requirement for CHMSLs permitted only steady burning CHMSLs despite the
contemporary study of flashing CHMSLs. The result is that inventors
regard the prohibition of flashing CHMSLs as unfair to their ideas.
Neither the research reports nor the CHMSL rulemaking notices
discussed the possibility of optional variants to the steady-burning
CHMSL that might enhance its message. A favorable cost effectiveness
was established for the steady-burning CHMSL, but no additional
benefits have been found for flashing as a warning of hard braking that
would justify the additional cost of requiring CHMSLs to flash. It is
self evident that simplicity and a minimum of ambiguity are essential
elements of signaling. Accordingly, NHTSA did not consider it necessary
to seek comment on the option of a flashing CHMSL for hard braking when
it proposed the requirement for a steady-burning CHMSL. The preamble to
the final rule adopting the CHMSL expressed the possibility of future
enhancements of brake signaling but in the context of requirements
justified by effectiveness rather than as options (48 FR 4823). The
CHMSL enhancement study theorized that the basic CHMSL was effective
because it was less likely than ordinary stop lamps to be confused with
other rear signals. The coexistence of more than one type of CHMSL
signal would seem to undermine the clarity gained by the required CHMSL
in comparison with conventional stop lamps.
NHTSA studied CHMSLs that flash to indicate deceleration through
hard braking as a potential requirement for a CHMSL but was not able to
prove added effectiveness over steady-burning CHMSLs. Further, the
agency believes that the lack of ambiguity or complexity of the
conventional CHMSL is partly responsible for its effectiveness.
With respect to this issue, NHTSA asks that commenters address the
following questions:
(1) Should NHTSA (a) permit, or (b) require CHMSLs to flash to
indicate deceleration rate?
(2) If flashing CHMSL deceleration signals were allowed but
installed on only a few vehicles, would drivers understand their
meaning?
(3) Would the coexistence of flashing and steady-burning CHMSLs on
the road create ambiguity? If the answer is yes, would the ambiguity be
such as to diminish the effectiveness of the present steady-burning
CHMSL?
(4) Are there better cues than flashing to signal deceleration,
e.g., an increase in lamp size or intensity?
Idea No. 3: Use of Flashing CHMSLs To Identify a Stopped Vehicle
Two general conclusions of the research reports cited above are
that most vehicles struck in rear-end crashes are stationary when they
are struck and that inattention on the part of the driver of the
striking vehicle is the prevailing cause of the crashes. These
conclusions suggest that an attention-getting signal denoting a stopped
vehicle has the potential to affect the conditions commonly involved in
rear-end crashes. The potential value of a stopped vehicle signal was
pointed out in the 1981 report, Field Test Evaluation of Rear Lighting
Deceleration Signals (DOT HS-806-125), and the more recent NHTSA study
of rear end crashes appears to support its reasoning.
At least two inventors have approached the agency with the idea
that a flashing CHMSL of one or more compartments could also be used as
a stopped-vehicle signal. The flashing lamp is intended to gain the
attention of approaching drivers better than a steady-burning lamp and
to present a signal distinct from the usual stop signal. One inventor
suggested several other embellishments to the CHMSL that flashes to
indicate a stopped vehicle. These included having the CHMSL
automatically flash whenever the vehicle speed is less than 22 mph,
regardless of braking; having the CHMSL automatically flash at a higher
intensity if the brakes are applied with the vehicle traveling at less
than 22 mph; having the CHMSL automatically flash at a still higher
intensity coupled with a faster flash rate to denote hard braking; and
having the CHMSL maintain the hard-braking signal for a duration of
several minutes after a crash.
Once again, the requirement of Standard No. 108 that stop lamp be
steady-burning is an impediment to allowing a flashing CHMSL signal for
stopped or slow-moving vehicles. Also, the requirement that the CHMSL
be activated only upon application of the service brakes prohibits any
type of activation without brake use. In its interpretations of
Standard No. 108 (e..g., letter to Ferguson, July 30, 1993), the agency
has also said that the Standard prohibits a flashing auxiliary lamp,
which was not intended to replace the standard CHMSL, because it could
draw attention away from the required lamps and confuse their meaning.
The inventors have urged the agency to change Standard No. 108 to allow
the optional use of their stopped-vehicle signal devices.
The idea of an attention-getting signal for stopped vehicles is
attractive because it is aimed at the large percentage of rear-end
accidents involving the combined factors of driver inattention and the
striking of a stopped vehicle. But it is far from certain that the idea
is practical and would actually prevent accidents. The idea seems
practical in light traffic on rural roads. A single vehicle with a
flashing CHMSL should attract attention and convey to the vehicles
behind that it has stopped, if their drivers understand the meaning of
the flashing lamp. But picture the situation if most of the vehicles in
a traffic jam on an urban interstate highway were equipped with a CHMSL
that automatically flashed when they were stopped or moving slowly. At
the very least, it would be extremely annoying to be confronted with
the flashing lamps of hundreds of vehicles, and it is likely that a
concentrated array of vehicles with flashing CHMSLs would make ordinary
brake, turn or hazard warning signals much less noticeable.
It is difficult to determine the effectiveness of a device which
may have different consequences if used universally by all vehicles on
the road rather than in a small test fleet that is dispersed among the
general vehicle population. Even a small test fleet study (which may
cost about $750,000) is beyond the means of most inventors, and a major
undertaking for the agency as well. In the case of the steady burning
CHMSL, there were no potential safety disadvantages to its widespread
use, but the level of benefits measured in fleet tests compared with
follow up studies of accidents involving production vehicles suggest a
novelty effect. Fleet tests of the CHMSL before it was required
recorded reductions in rear-end accidents of about 50 percent. A
follow-up evaluation by the agency after the CHMSL had been required
equipment for a few years reported a 17 percent effectiveness for only
those crashes that were police-reported, and a study by the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety reported only a 3 to 7 percent
effectiveness.
The lower effectiveness can be attributed in part, to a smaller
percentage of crashes being reported to police than are reported to
researchers during a fleet study. It may also be that drivers have
become accustomed to the CHMSL and no longer respond to it as quickly.
NHTSA is now measuring its long-term effectiveness. However, the
[[Page 65515]]
CHMSL experience suggests that the results of fleet studies are no
indication that the long term universal use of a safety device will
achieve the same degree of beneficial results.
The following hypothetical example illustrates issues concerning
the stopped-vehicle signal. The inventor and the research are
imaginary, as are the hypothetical decisions of the agency.
Assume that an inventor makes a large investment in testing a fleet
of vehicles with a flashing CHMSL stopped-vehicle signal and finds a
reduction in accidents. He expects the agency to permit or possibly
require his device. But the fleet study cannot address the issue of
widespread use. The agency believes that the experiment demonstrates
the potential of the signal, but does not address the annoyance factor
and signal masking in urban stop-and-go traffic. The agency decides not
to amend Standard No. 108 to permit the stopped-vehicle signal unless
the stop-and- go traffic problems are effectively addressed based on
its judgment that stop-and-go traffic problems would exist if the
device were in widespread use. However, it does not invest public money
in an attempt to show by special tests that the widespread use of the
device would cause a problem in stop-and-go traffic. The inventor views
the result as unjust because he believes that he has supplied
supportive facts at great cost and has been thwarted by what he regards
as opinion and conjecture on the part of the agency.
Taking the hypothetical example further, assume that the inventor
later devises a way of solving the disadvantages of the stopped-vehicle
signal in congested traffic, perhaps using rear-facing radar to turn
off the signal after the vehicle behind has stopped. However, the
improved device is too expensive relative to its probable benefits to
justify its adoption as required equipment for new vehicles. The agency
would remain interested in the idea in the hope that future technology
or other solutions to its disadvantages in congested traffic will
eventually lead to a practical and cost effective mandatory stopped-
vehicle signal.
Relative to the stopped-vehicle signal, NHTSA requests that
commenters address the following questions:
(1) Should NHTSA disregard the potential irritant and distraction
of automatically flashing stopped-vehicle CHMSL signals to permit their
optional use (a) on the basis of an intuitive expectation of benefits
in some circumstances? (b) on the basis of a fleet test demonstration
of benefits as discussed in the hypothetical example?
(2) Should the hypothetical improved, but not cost-effective
flashing CHMSL signal be permitted as optional equipment? Will drivers
understand the meaning of a CHMSL flashing under these circumstances
since it is not standard equipment?
(3) In the hypothetical example, based on its judgement of the
public interest, the agency declined to change a safety standard that
conflicted with an inventor's desire to sell products. Also, the agency
declined to perform costly research for the purpose of attempting to
confirm its judgment that the device had undesirable side effects. The
question is whether NHTSA should base decisions against the wishes of
petitioners on its judgement alone when no test data are available. In
short, should the agency spend public money on research solely in an
attempt to generate data to test a judgment decision about a seemingly
clear problem with a petitioner's invention?
Idea No. 4: Front ``Brake'' Lamp Systems
In its least costly form, a front ``brake'' lamp would use the
front turn signal filament as a steady burning light to denote braking
(but be overriden to indicate a turn, in the same manner as a combined
red rear turn signal and stop lamp can indicate braking until the turn
signal is activated). Thus, the front braking signal would be a bright
amber lamp. The implementation is less simple than it appears because
it would require wiring changes to present vehicles to prevent the
deactivation of front side marker lamps wired to operate when the turn
signals are activated (well nigh universal though not required by
Standard No. 108), and to prevent the activation of amber rear turn
signals during use of the front turn signal filaments as a steady
braking signal.
In a more costly form, presented by some proponents, front
``brake'' lamps would be an additional pair of lamps, mounted at the
front corners of the vehicle, and wired to operate with the red rear
stop lamps.
Standard No. 108 does not expressly address front ``brake'' lamps.
They would not be prohibited unless they interfered with the
effectiveness of required front lighting equipment (paragraph S5.1.3).
Unlike the other devices discussed, front ``brake'' lamps could be
offered as optional equipment on new vehicles without further
rulemaking. While the proponents of the other ideas are currently
seeking amendments to permit optional use of their devices, the
proponents of front ``brake'' lamps insist that they lamps be mandatory
on new vehicles. Such a request in the form of a petition for
rulemaking was recently denied (61 FR 10556).
The argument in favor of front ``brake'' lamps is that, by
identifying the braking actions of a driver (driver A) to the drivers
in front of him, oncoming drivers can better determine when driver A is
yielding the right of way to them and the driver immediately ahead and
going the same direction as driver A can better determine when driver A
is failing to stop when necessary. According to the proponents, in the
latter case, a driver stopped in traffic, seeing in the rear view
mirror an approaching vehicle without a front braking signal, would be
expected to sound the horn and vacate the lane.
The agency does not anticipate any benefit from the front ``brake''
lamp. Until every car in use is equipped with a front braking signal, a
stopped driver seeing in the rear view mirror an approaching vehicle
without the signal would not know with certainty what its absence meant
and whether a collision was imminent. Even after full implementation,
the agency does not expect any benefits. NHTSA believes that, while it
could be wise in some circumstances for a stopped driver to sound the
horn upon seeing a vehicle approaching from the rear without
illuminated front ``brake'' lamps, taking evasive action is likely to
lead to the higher risk of a side or head-on collision with another
driver who has the right-of-way.
The agency also believes that the signal's activation would cause a
dangerous disregard for State right-of-way laws at intersections by
oncoming drivers who misinterpret the front stop signal on vehicles
that have the right-of-way. Proponents of front ``brake'' lamps claim
that their use will ``confirm'' the validity of a flashing turn signal,
and thus allow drivers to determine at a distance whether a vehicle is
surrendering the right-of-way. However, the use of signals does not
cause a vehicle with the right-of-way to surrender it. The signaling
driver is free to change his or her intentions, or the signal may be
accidental. Consider the following scenario. A driver at a stop sign
sees an approaching vehicle with the right-of-way displaying a turn
signal and a front ``brake'' signal. The driver concludes that the
front ``brake'' signal confirms the intent to turn, and pulls into the
intersection. The operator of the other car, however, does not turn and
a collision results. Perhaps the operator was slowing to check the name
of the
[[Page 65516]]
street sign, with the intention of turning at a different street, or
perhaps the turn signal was accidental and the braking unrelated. The
likely result of widespread use of front braking lamps is not an
enhancement of safety but an increase in traffic accidents due to a
greater number of failures to yield the right of way. The only vehicles
with a possible use for braking information about approaching vehicles
are emergency vehicles which are allowed the right-of-way over all
other vehicles on emergency runs.
NHTSA asks commenters to address the following questions about
front ``brake'' lamp systems:
(1) Should NHTSA expressly prohibit front ``brake'' lamp systems?
(2) Should NHTSA take no action on the presumption that the public
would not choose to have front ``brake'' lamps, even if they were
offered?
NHTSA Policy Considerations About Vehicle Signal Lamps Suggested by
the Public
Inventors who ask NHTSA to mandate their signal lamps as new
vehicle equipment are often disappointed to learn that their idea is,
in fact, not even allowed even as optional equipment because of
restrictions in Standard No. 108 that either explicitly or implicitly
prohibit them. Many of these ideas appear to be new but have been
discussed for years, yet they have not been adopted because they are
not permissible under Standard No. 108. The agency is willing to remove
unintended impediments to the use of optional signal lamps if these are
called to its attention, but it believes that the restrictions are
necessary for motor vehicle safety. It is important that the integrity
of the required signal lamps be maintained, and that auxiliary signal
lamps not detract attention from the messages that the required signal
lamps are sending. A vehicle signaling system must be as simple and as
unambiguous as possible to others who share the roadway if traffic is
to proceed in a safe and orderly fashion. As noted earlier, in many
other countries, all auxiliary exterior lamps are expressly forbidden
unless there is a specific regulation allowing it.
Reasonable people may differ with NHTSA's views on the importance
of a standardized signaling system, and the agency's conclusion that
their auxiliary signal lamp design impairs the effectiveness of
lighting equipment required by Standard No. 108, not understanding why
the effectiveness of the required lamps should be favored over their
inventions.
Virtually all ideas suggested to NHTSA as safety improvements in
vehicle signaling are based upon the intuition of the inventor, without
any field data to support such intuition. NHTSA's prohibitive
conclusions may seem intuitive as well, but the agency's decisions are
based upon the criticality of maintaining standardization of vehicle
signaling systems, and it does not conduct research solely for the
purpose of verifying its intuition.
The value of standardization of signals is largely treated as
axiomatic in vehicle safety literature. The agency's survey of
literature, Analytic Assessment of Motor Vehicle Rear Signaling Systems
(1969), contains a typical discussion:
To be maximally distinctive, by definition, the pattern must be
unique; if maximum accuracy and speed of interpretation are to be
obtained, the pattern must be unambiguously informative. A variety
of patterns, even if some or all are more or less distinctive,
cannot be as effective as a single standard pattern. (p. 78)
Inventors must accept the fact that, when it is a question of the
effect on required signals by auxiliary signals, NHTSA, the arbiter of
the nation's traffic safety, is the proper party to make this judgment.
It must be recognized also that this judgment is difficult to make, and
must be made conservatively. The influence of many signaling ideas on
driving behavior and crash causation is sufficiently subtle and the
role of signaling systems in crash prevention and causation is
sufficiently intertwined with that of other vehicle, driver and
environmental factors that it is difficult to isolate and assess the
effects of those ideas. Even if there were large sums of money
available to the agency for conducting demonstration projects, the
merits of one system versus another at full implementation would
usually be hard to establish. Given the safety need to minimize the
ambiguity in communication between drivers and the difficulty in
establishing the ultimate net affect of changes in the signaling
systems, the agency must be very cautious in permitting any changes.
Another aspect of the agency's exercise of its rulemaking authority
is that EO 12866 requires that benefits exceed costs if that is not
inconsistent with the statute under which a regulation is issued. As
noted above, it is difficult to demonstrate the effectiveness of
signaling devices intended to avoid collisions. NHTSA has used large
scale fleet tests, at great expense, to demonstrate the effectiveness
of such items as the CHMSL and conspicuity treatment which have become
requirements of Standard No. 108. However, even fleet tests cannot
answer questions about the consequences of the use of a device on all
vehicles rather than on just a few. Even an inventor with a large test
budget may have to defer to the judgment of NHTSA on an issue which may
be unprovable.
Assuming that a suggested safety improvement is deemed cost
effective and the agency wished to issue a rule adopting it as a
requirement, 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9) dictates that the rule be expressed
in terms of performance rather than design. Further, as a matter of
policy, the agency is careful in its establishment of Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards not to adopt requirements for which compliance
is dependent upon a patent that is not freely made available to all
interested parties. These factors make it very unlikely that a patent
holder would benefit if the agency were to issue a rule based generally
upon an idea that the holder has suggested to the agency. Inventors who
petition NHTSA in the expectation that the agency will issue rules
creating a monopolistic market for their patents or devices, should be
aware of probable outcome of their petitions before approaching the
agency. In short, the rarity of cost-effective practical signal
lighting ideas, the formidable task of proving their effectiveness, the
existence of issues requiring NHTSA judgment, and the non-design nature
of Standard No. 108 make it unlikely that an inventor will ever profit
from a signal lamp suggestion.
Other issues are raised by petitions for rulemaking to amend
Standard No. 108 to permit specific auxiliary signaling systems at the
option of the vehicle manufacturer. One issue, as discussed above, is
whether a signal without universal application will be meaningful to
the motoring public or simply a source of confusion. NHTSA is also
reluctant to allow an optional system to operate through an existing
required lamp, (e.g., allowing a CHMSL to flash) because in the future
the agency may wish to use the mode of operation of the optional system
(e.g., flashing) for a cost-effective mandatory signal and find that
public experience and familiarity with the existing use of that mode
has the practical effect of precluding the use or at least making it
more difficult to use that mode for another purpose. Above all, there
is the importance that the agency ascribes to minimizing ambiguity
through standardization, and the diminution of standardization that may
result from the introduction of optional signaling systems.
[[Page 65517]]
The agency notes that it is not necessary for an inventor or
manufacturer to seek an amendment of Standard No. 108 in order to
perform a fleet test of a new signaling system. If a vehicle
manufacturer wishes to produce a test fleet of vehicles incorporating
lighting systems that may be prohibited by Standard No. 108, under 49
U.S.C. 30113(b)(3)(B)(ii) it may petition for a temporary exemption
from compliance with Standard No. 108 on the basis that ``the exemption
would make easier the development or field evaluation of a new motor
vehicle safety feature providing a safety level at least equal to the
safety level of the standard.'' Alternatively, if a fleet owner wishes
to install the equipment on a fleet of vehicles in service, the owner
may accomplish this modification in its own garage without violating
Federal law. The prohibition of 49 U.S.C. 30122 against making
inoperative safety equipment installed in compliance with a Federal
motor vehicle safety standard applies to manufacturers, distributors,
dealers, and motor vehicle repair businesses, but not to persons who
modify their own vehicles in self-owned repair facilities.
The agency wishes to continue to receive suggestions for safety
improvements from any source, even though few are likely to result in
the incorporation of new requirements in Standard No. 108. However,
petitioners should not have unrealistic expectations. They should
understand that a petition for rulemaking does not obligate the agency
to perform research on the effectiveness of the idea suggested. The
agency's research plans flow from an internal process of defining
priorities, formulating research plans, seeking appropriations,
allocating available funds among the priorities and awarding research
contracts. The effect of NHTSA's receipt of a petition for rulemaking
is to cause the agency to begin evaluating the probability of the
suggestion becoming a new requirement in a safety standard. This
evaluation is based on information provided by the petitioner and other
information the agency may have or obtain. Since few petitioners offer
little more than speculation or testimonials about the effectiveness of
their ideas, their petitions are unlikely to alter the agency's
research priorities. Thus, the petitions are usually denied unless they
relate to an existing agency research project.
Petitioners should also understand that the agency is statutorily
required to publish a notice when it denies a petition. In that notice,
the agency must explain the reasons for the denial, which may require a
discussion on the possible disadvantages of the system for which
rulemaking had been sought.
The agency believes that, in the long run, it would be more
productive, both for inventors and the agency, if suggestions were
presented to NHTSA's Office of Research and Development as candidates
for future agency research. If the suggestions have merit, they can
influence agency priorities and be included in research with the
possibility of rulemaking at the conclusion of the research project. A
petitioner who instead submits a petition is, more likely than not,
likely to be frustrated in its dealings with NHTSA. It is the agency's
hope that by explaining in this notice the factors that go into its
decisions on lighting safety ideas, the public will have a clearer
understanding of those factors and be guided thereby.
In summary, a petitioner seeking to persuade the agency to mandate
a lighting invention for new vehicles bears the initial burden of
establishing its safety value and cost effectiveness. The burden for
those inventors seeking to make an invention optional is to convince
the agency that the invention will not impair the effectiveness of
required lighting equipment through creating ambiguity or negatively
affecting standardization of signals.
The questions relating to these topics for which NHTSA seeks
answers from the public are:
(1) (a) Should NHTSA permit all auxiliary signals, regardless of
their nature, their effect on required signals (other than physical
interference), or their effect on signal standardization?
(b) Should the agency permit the required signals only? Should the
agency continue to prohibit auxiliary signals which, in its judgment,
diminish the value of required, standard signals?
(2) If an auxiliary signal can be demonstrated to have some
effectiveness, but not enough to support requiring it, should the
agency attempt to balance this limited benefit against the desirability
of standardized signals in determining whether to allow the auxiliary
signal as optional equipment?
(3) Should NHTSA establish a policy to treat all new signal
petitions as suggestions for future agency research if they do not
present scientific evidence of effectiveness?
Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This rulemaking document was not reviewed under E.O. 12866,
``Regulatory Planning and Review.'' NHTSA has analyzed the impact of
this rulemaking action and determined that it is not ``significant''
under the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and
procedures. NHTSA does not anticipate that new requirements would be
imposed on manufacturers as a result of this request for comments. The
main topic of the document is whether the agency should permit four
types of signal lamps which, except for front signal lamps, have been
suggested as optional rather than mandatory equipment.
Procedures for Filing Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written comments, and
answers to the questions posed above. Please submit comments in 10
copies to reduce duplicating costs to the government .
Comments must not exceed 15 pages in length (49 CFR 553.21). This
limitation is intended to encourage commenters to detail their primary
arguments in concise fashion. Necessary attachments, however, may be
appended to those comments without regard to the 15-page limit.
If a commenter wishes to submit certain information under a claim
of confidentiality, three copies of the complete submission including
the purportedly confidential business information should be submitted
to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA at the street address shown above, and
seven copies from which the purportedly confidential information has
been expunged should be submitted to the Docket Section. A request for
confidentiality should be accompanied by a cover letter setting forth
the information specified in 49 CFR 512, the agency's confidential
business information regulation.
All comments received on or before the close of business on the
comment closing date indicated above for the notice will be considered,
and will be available to the public for examination in the docket at
the above address both before and after the closing date. To the extent
possible, comments received after the closing date will be considered
by the agency in its decisions as to the issues raised in this notice.
Comments on the notice will be available for public inspection in the
docket. NHTSA will continue to file relevant information in the docket
after the closing date, and it is recommended that interested persons
continue to monitor the docket for new material.
Those persons desiring to be notified upon receipt of their
comments in the rules docket should enclose a self-addressed stamped
postcard in the envelope with their comments. Upon receiving the
comments the docket
[[Page 65518]]
supervisor will return the postcard by mail.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Issued on: December 10, 1996.
L. Robert Shelton,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 96-31747 Filed 12-10-96; 4:34 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
