[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 239 (Wednesday, December 14, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-30744]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: December 14, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Finding of No Significant Impact Proposed Tokamak Physics
Experiment; Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.
ACTION: Finding of no significant impact.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an Environmental
Assessment (EA), DOE/EA-0813, evaluating the environmental effects of
using the existing Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) systems and
accessory facilities in the proposed construction and operation of the
Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX) at the Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory, Princeton, New Jersey. The purpose of the TPX is to develop
fusion energy to compensate for dwindling supplies of fossil fuels and
the eventual depletion of fissionable uranium used in present-day
nuclear reactors. Proceeding with the TPX is contingent on use of
existing TFTR systems and appurtenant facilities. Decontamination and
decommissioning of the TFTR is an integral part of the scope of the
proposed TPX; therefore, both projects are evaluated in this EA.
Based on the analyses in the EA, the DOE has determined that the
proposed action does not constitute a major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the
meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42
U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement is not required. Thus, the DOE is issuing a FONSI pursuant to
the Council on Environmental Quality regulations implementing NEPA (40
CFR Parts 1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA implementing regulations (10 CFR
Part 1021).
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY: Copies of this EA (DOE/EA-0813) are available
from: Milton D. Johnson, Manager, Princeton Area Office, U.S.
Department of Energy, P.O. Box 102, Princeton, New Jersey 08542, (609)
243-3700.
For further information regarding the DOE NEPA review process,
contact: Dr. W.S. White, U.S. Department of Energy, 9800 South Cass
Avenue, Argonne, Illinois 60439, (708) 252-2101.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Description of the Proposed Action
The proposed action is to use the existing TFTR systems and
accessory facilities in the construction and operation of TPX, which
would be primarily located inside the existing TFTR Test Cell. The TPX
would require dismantlement and removal of all TFTR activated systems
within the TFTR Test Cell Complex. Dismantlement and removal of
nonradioactive and low activation components in areas such as the Test
Cell Basement and the Hot Cell, would start immediately after the
conclusion of the TFTR deuterium-tritium experiment, which is expected
to conclude in Fiscal Year 1995. Cool-down of the Tokamak in the test
cell will commence at that time.
The TPX is being proposed as a national facility for fusion energy
research at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL). Its primary
mission is to develop the scientific basis for an economical, more
compact, and continuously operating tokamak in support of the design of
a feasible demonstration fusion power plant.
Waste from decontamination and decommissioning would include
stainless steel and aluminum structures, piping, copper coils, graphite
tiles, solidified radioactive liquids, anti-contamination materials,
and concrete rubble. Waste would be packaged into Department of
Transportation (DOT) approved containers and transported to the DOE
Hanford site in Richland, Washington, as are current PPPL wastes.
Approximately 950 m3 (33,500 ft3) of waste weighing
approximately 2270 metric tonnes (2500 tons) would also be disposed.
Construction of a radioactive waste storage building for temporary
storage of radioactive waste and final preparation of some radioactive
waste shipments would be required. The size of the facility would be
approximately 560 m2 (6000 ft2), and would be constructed
within the existing TFTR facility fence. A second storm water detention
basin similar to and west of the existing detention basin would also be
constructed.
Decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR Test Cell could be
completed in approximately 1.5 years, after a 2-year cool-down period.
TPX construction would minimally overlap decontamination and
decommissioning of TFTR facilities. The TFTR Test Cell Complex would
then be available for the TPX approximately 3.5 years after termination
of TFTR deuterium-tritium experiments. The total cost for the
decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR is estimated to be $86
million.
The construction and operation of the TPX would take place within
the existing TFTR facility at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory
(PPPL), with construction scheduled to begin in early FY-1998. The TPX
conceptual design is based on the use of deuterium fuel, but does not
preclude the potential upgrade and use of tritium fuel in the final
year of operation. Existing TFTR facilities would be adapted and used
by the TPX, including TFTR Test Cell Complex; ventilation exhaust vent
and intake shafts; mockup building; tritium cleanup/waste handling
area; field coil power conversion building; neutral beam power
conversion building; radioactive waste systems space; office and
technical support space; and miscellaneous PPPL support facilities. In
addition to providing space for the TPX, the TFTR Test Cell Complex
would provide shielding (via concrete walls, roof, and floor), and
provide for confinement and handling of tritium-contaminated and/or
radioactive components.
The cost for construction of the TPX is estimated at $500M (FY-93),
with the construction period 1997 to 2000. New facilities to be
constructed include TFTR Test Cell building modifications, a new
Cryogenic Equipment building, tank yards for water cooling and
cryogenic tanks, and a new electrical substation. The Test Cell
building modifications would be internal and would not increase the
existing external dimensions of the building. The Cryogenic Equipment
building would be constructed as a standard industrial single-story
building, totaling about 1000 m2 (10,800 ft2). The tank yard
construction would include approximately 2,130 m2 (22,950
ft2) of new tank yard areas for new gaseous helium tanks, liquid
nitrogen storage tanks, water storage tanks, and truck-trailer access.
This construction would take place on existing open space. The
electrical substation construction would involve installation of a new
138 kV transmission line between the existing substation and the new
substation. The new substation would be for transforming 138 kV power
to 13.8 kV. A new electric power line would be constructed entirely on
PPPL property.
Machine assembly would be scheduled for 1998, with the first
operations during 2000. The TPX would be fueled with hydrogen and
deuterium plasmas for 10 years; radiation generation would not be
significant in terms of neutron activation of components or
radiological doses. In deuterium operation, the peak fusion power would
not exceed 140 kW. During long pulse deuterium operation, neutrons with
energies of 2.45 mega electron volts (MeV) would be the primary
neutrons produced, and annual production of these neutrons would be
limited to 6.0 x 1021 neutrons. A smaller number of 14.1 MeV
neutrons would be produced from deuterium-tritium fusion reactions with
tritium produced from the deuterium-deuterium fusion reactions. The
number of 14.1 MeV neutrons produced during deuterium operations would
be approximately 2% of the number of 2.45 MeV neutrons produced.
The TPX facility would be capable of operating with deuterium-
tritium plasmas during the last year of TPX operation. During
deuterium-tritium operation, a fully-formed deuterium plasma would be
developed (requiring up to roughly 1,000 seconds), into which tritium
would be injected. Once tritium has been injected, the device would
operate for 2 seconds with a peak fusion power of 15 MW, after which
the plasma would be terminated. During the 2 seconds of deuterium-
tritium operation, both 2.45 MeV neutrons and 14.1 MeV neutrons would
be produced, from deuterium-deuterium and deuterium-tritium fusion
reactions, respectively. Production of 2.45 MeV neutrons during
deuterium-tritium operation would be approximately 1% of the 14.1 MeV
neutron production rate. Operation of the tokamak would be controlled
to limit annual neutron production so that the site boundary dose
restriction adopted by the project would not be exceeded. The
deuterium-tritium phase (if used) would be limited to the last year of
TPX operation. Small amounts of tritium, and air activation products
would be released, and minor amounts of direct radiation would result
from fusion neutrons and activated structural components of TPX.
Low-level solid radioactive wastes generated during TPX operations
would consist of contaminated items (e.g., protective clothing) and
solidified liquid wastes (tritiated water absorbed on desiccant and
solidified liquid waste from the decontamination area). The volume of
waste would be similar to that generated by TFTR operations, which was
approximately 7.4 m3 per year for deuterium-deuterium operations,
and is projected to increase during deuterium-tritium operations to
28.3 m3 per year (1000 ft3 per year). Wastes generated during
TPX operations would be packaged to comply with applicable DOE and DOT
requirements and is expected to be shipped to the DOE Hanford
Reservation in Washington for disposal, as are current PPPL wastes.
Alternatives
Three alternatives were considered: (1) The proposed action, use of
the TFTR facilities for the proposed construction and operation of the
TPX at PPPL, (2) proposed construction and operation of the TPX at the
Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, and (3) no action. Location of the
TPX at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Knoxville,
Tennessee, would require construction of new support facilities
including a new test cell, hot cell, waste handling and storage areas,
field coil power conversion building, and cryogenic facilities. The
additional cost and time would jeopardize the U.S. fusion program and
make the TPX project infeasible. Under the no action alternative,
decontamination and decommission of TFTR facilities would occur under
current management practices, but may involve a longer delay between
safe shutdown activities and commencement of decontamination and
decommissioning activities. The longer delay would not fit within the
current schedule to meet the construction of the TPX. This delay may in
turn be followed by a 2-3 year period of delay, during which the TFTR
facility would be in a state of protective custody. The TPX would not
proceed under the no action alternative.
Environmental Impacts
The impacts of the TFTR decontamination and decommissioning and TPX
construction and operation on the environment and on the health and
safety of workers and the public were analyzed in the Environmental
Assessment. Both routine operations and off-normal or accident
scenarios were assessed. The Environmental Assessment considered
impacts to air quality, noise, water quality and quantity, aquatic and
terrestrial ecology, threatened and endangered species, the visual
environment, land use, historical and archaeological resources,
socioeconomic environment, radiological conditions, and impacts of
potential accidents. No significant environmental impacts associated
with the proposed action are anticipated.
Activities associated with decontamination and decommissioning of
the TFTR would not present any long-term or adverse nonradiological
impacts to the public or the environment. It would result in minor
impacts, consisting primarily of commitment of a small area of onsite
land for the radioactive waste storage building and the second storm
water detention basin. Construction of the radioactive waste storage
building and storm water detention basin may result in a temporary
small increase of effluent to Bee Brook, but would not exceed PPPL New
Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit or other State or
federal regulatory requirements.
Potential radiological impacts of TFTR decontamination and
decommissioning would not represent potential impacts greater than
those from current PPPL operations, which have had no significant
consequences. Decontamination and decommissioning activities would
result in a dose of less than the adopted design objective of 10 mrem
per year to any member of the public from all project sources. It would
result in minor releases of activated metal and tritium to the
atmosphere and sewer system. The maximum calculated individual public
dose would be 2.3 mrem per year, and the increased probability of
incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure from this
dose would be 1.1 chances in 1,000,000. This very low calculated effect
means insignificant risk to the public. Occupational doses would not
exceed the PPPL administrative limit of 1 rem per year, which is less
than the DOE limit of 5 rem per year.
Operational occurrences during decontamination and decommissioning
that could result in the accidental release of tritium, activated
gases, or solids consist primarily of component failures and human
error, and any releases would be limited by inventories within the
components. The largest calculated dose to the public from
decontamination and decommissioning accident scenarios, including
beyond design basis accidents, is 390 mrem to a maximally exposed
member of the public. The increased probability of incremental lifetime
cancer risk associated with exposure from this dose would be 195
chances in 1,000,000.
The TPX would not present long-term or adverse nonradiological
impacts to the public or the environment at the PPPL site. Other TPX
nonradiological impacts would be temporary, except for the commitment
of a small parcel of land for construction of new TPX facilities.
Construction impacts due to test cell modifications and construction of
the cryogenic equipment building, tank yards, and electric substation
would be minor. All construction would be built on land already
committed to DOE operations. This construction would all be within the
current land use restrictions governing PPPL site agreements with the
DOE. For a construction project of this scope, the potential exists for
2.5 lost workday cases (work related injuries that require time-off
from work) over the construction period. Also there would be a 10%
increase in the current amount of site traffic, which would increase
the potential for on-site vehicular accidents slightly.
Radiological impacts from the TPX would not exceed current impacts
from PPPL operations, which has not been shown to cause incremental
lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure. Potential environmental,
safety, and health radiological impacts were evaluated for both
deuterium and possible future tritium operations. Atmospheric releases
of tritium and activation products constitute the potential sources of
radiological exposure to members of the public. Maximum projected
atmospheric releases would result in annual effective dose equivalents
of 1.2 mrem and 4.6 mrem to a hypothetical maximally-exposed individual
at the site boundary during deuterium and tritium operations,
respectively, with a maximum increased probability of incremental
lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure of 2.3 chances in
1,000,000. These conservatively-calculated effective dose equivalents
are less than the most restrictive limit for public doses caused by
airborne releases (the EPA limit of 10 mrem per year). Direct radiation
from the TPX would be mitigated with shielding to keep the total
effective dose equivalent from all sources at the site boundary within
the project design objective of less than or equal to 10 mrem per year.
This design objective effective dose equivalent is well below the DOE
limit of 100 mrem per year to members of the public from routine DOE
operations.
Normal TPX deuterium-tritium operations would result in total
estimated collective effective dose equivalents of 7.5 person-rem per
year and 24 person-rem per year to the projected population within the
80 km (50 mi) radius area surrounding PPPL during deuterium and tritium
operations, respectively. These doses amount to an average effective
dose equivalent of less than 0.002 mrem per year to each individual in
the assessment area and would result in less than 1 health effect in
the exposed population. On the basis of the collective effective dose
equivalent, incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure
attributable to TPX operations are not expected to occur. A collective
effective dose equivalent of 24 person-rem per year represents
approximately .002% of the collective effective dose equivalent from
natural background radiation in the area (exclusive of radon).
Occupational doses to workers during TPX operations would result from
direct radiation and small releases of tritium and activated gases.
Operational procedures, administrative controls and monitoring would
ensure that occupational doses are kept below regulatory limits and as
low as reasonably achievable.
Accidental releases of radioactive material could hypothetically
result from (a) natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes), (b) accidents
with external origin (e.g., airplane crashes), (c) shipping accidents
(i.e., accidents involving the transportation of radioactive material),
and (d) operational occurrences (e.g., tritium leaks). All TPX
confinement boundaries would be capable of maintaining integrity for
design basis natural phenomenon, and therefore a release due to a
natural phenomena event is extremely unlikely.
Accidents with external origins and transportation accidents
involving small quantities of radioactive material would present little
risk to the public and the environment. Transportation accidents
involving larger quantities of radioactive material, for example
tritium, could occur; however, the accidental release of significant
quantities of radionuclides has a very low probability because of the
demonstrated integrity of the approved containers that would be used.
TPX operational occurrences that could result in the accidental
release of tritium, activated gases, or solids consist primarily of
component failures and human error. Releases associated with these
occurrences would be limited by component inventories. The maximum
calculated individual dose from accident scenarios is 390 mrem, which
is well below the DOE siting guideline limit of 25 rem. Incremental
lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure resulting from the
collective doses would represent a negligible increase in the total
number of such health effects in the exposed population from all
natural background radiation doses. The largest potential radiological
impacts to the public from TPX accidents, including beyond design basis
accidents, are below regulatory limits.
After TPX operation has ended, a proper NEPA review would be
conducted for the decontamination and decommissioning of the facility.
It is expected that the waste material resulting from decontamination
and decommissioning activities would qualify as low-level radioactive
waste and would be disposed of at an appropriate DOE waste disposal
facility.
TFTR operations would be discontinued prior to TFTR decontamination
and decommissioning. Cumulative effects would be minor and would
represent a continuation of, rather than a change in, any impacts
(negative and positive) associated with TFTR operations. Commitment of
560 m\2\ (6,000 ft\2\) of land for the construction of the radioactive
waste storage building and 1,300 m\2\ (14,000 ft\2\) for construction
of a second storm water detention basin would represent a long-term
commitment of land use. Environmental releases of small amounts of
residual tritium during decontamination and decommissioning would not
add measurably to current low levels.
Cumulative and Long Term Impacts
There are currently no measurable cumulative impacts occurring
between PPPL and other facilities in the region, and none would be
expected for the proposed TPX. Releases of radionuclides to the
atmosphere by commercial operations (such as hospitals and research
laboratories) near PPPL are not detectable in environmental samples
collected around PPPL; analyses show no radionuclide concentrations
above background levels. No adverse long-term environmental effects are
expected from normal operations of the TPX. Tritium releases during
normal operations would not constitute a measurable contribution to
background radiation levels, because of the small amount of tritium to
be released, its relatively short half-life (12.3 years), and rapid
dispersion in the environment.
Determination
Based on the analyses in the Environmental Assessment, the DOE has
determined that the proposed action at the PPPL is not a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
within the meaning of the NEPA, consequently, an environmental impact
statement is not required.
Issued in Argonne, Illinois, this 5th day of December, 1994.
Cherri J. Langenfeld,
Manager, Chicago Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 94-30744 Filed 12-13-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
