[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 239 (Monday, December 14, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 68800-68801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-33111]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. and Entergy Operations, Inc. (River
Bend Station, Unit 1); Exemption
[Docket No. 50-458]
I
Entergy Operations, Incorporated 1 (the Licensee), is
the holder of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47, which authorizes
operation of the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS) (the facility). The
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to
all the rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission now or hereafter in effect.
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\1\ Entergy Operations, Incorporated is authorized to act as
agent for Entergy Gulf States, Inc. and has exclusive responsibility
and control over the physical construction, operation and
maintenance of the facility.
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The RBS, is a boiling-water nuclear reactor located approximately 2
miles east of the Mississippi River in West Feliciana Parish,
Louisiana, approximately 2.7 miles southeast of St. Francisville,
Louisiana and approximately 18 miles northwest of the city limits of
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
II
Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee
authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a
criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material
is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR
70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these
monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires
licensees to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this
licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the
procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon
the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the
procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the
evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible
individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of
radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an
emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have
a means to identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10
rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to
maintain personnel decontamination
[[Page 68801]]
facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician and other medical
personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain
arrangements for the transportation of contaminated individuals to
treatment facilities outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR
70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b)
of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be used in the reactor. Paragraph
(d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is
good cause why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10
CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall
specify the reasons for the relief requested.
III
The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of
an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at River Bend Station
(RBS), and has determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an
accident to occur if the licensee meets the following seven criteria:
1. Plant procedures do not permit more than 3 BWR fuel assemblies
to be in storage or in transit between their associated shipping cask
and dry storage rack at one time.
2. The k-effective of the fresh fuel storage racks filled with fuel
of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water
does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level.
3. If optimum moderation of fuel in the fresh fuel storage racks
occurs when the fresh fuel storage racks are not flooded, the k-
effective corresponding to this optimum moderation does not exceed
0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level.
4. The k-effective of spent fuel storage racks filled with fuel of
the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water
does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level.
5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than
nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than
the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63,
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight
percent.
By letter dated May 15, 1997, Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI)
requested an exemption from the requirements of section 70.24(a) of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, ``Criticality Accident
Requirements,'' for the River Bend Station (RBS). On June 11, 1997, the
NRC requested that RBS address the seven criteria published in
Information Notice 97-77, ``Exemptions from the Requirements of Section
70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations' in order to
continue with the exemption process.
On August 12, 1998, EOI superseded its original May 15, 1997,
letter and requested an exemption from the criticality accident
monitoring requirements stipulated in 10 CFR 70.24(a) specifically for
the areas containing incore detectors (which are not in use) and
unirradiated fuel while it is handled, used, or stored on site.
In this request the licensee addressed the seven criteria given
above. The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's
submittal and has determined that, except for Criteria 1 and 3
discussed below, RBS meets the applicable criteria.
RBS does not restrict fuel movement and storage of fuel assemblies
that are out of their associated shipping cask to 3 assemblies.
However, based on the elevation and configuration of the area where the
assemblies are placed before storage into the new or spent fuel racks,
the possibility of flooding is highly improbable. In addition,
administrative controls are provided to restrict the fire-fighting
practices employed in the fuel building to prevent low-density optimum
moderation conditions. Fire-fighting foam is not permitted in the area
and hose stations are equipped with straight-stream nozzles while
handling fuel in the fuel building or storing fuel in the new fuel
vault so that the array will not be covered with mist. Therefore, the
staff concludes that any array of fuel assemblies in storage or in
transit while outside of their associated shipping cask will be safely
subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible, and
the exception to Criterion 1 is acceptable.
Although the RBS new fuel racks are designed to maintain k-
effective less than 0.95 when either dry or completely flooded with
water, the new fuel racks cannot meet the 0.98 k-effective limit under
accident conditions of low-density optimum moderation (e.g., foam or
mist). Therefore, solid, noncombustible, gasketed covers are provided
over the new fuel vault to preclude the entrance of optimum moderation
media. When these covers are removed for fuel handling, the fuel is
covered by a fire retardant material to ensure that the storage array
is not moderated by low-density moderation. As previously mentioned,
administrative controls are also provided to prevent optimum moderation
conditions in the new fuel vault so that the array will not be covered
with mist. Therefore, the staff concludes that a k-effective greater
than 0.98 will not be attained in the new fuel storage racks and the
exception to Criterion 3 is acceptable.
The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of
SNM personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate
action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that
such an accident could occur. The low probability of an inadvertent
criticality constitutes good cause for granting an exemption to the
requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a).
IV
The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for the RBS.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse
environmental impact (63 FR 63755).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of December 1998.
Roy P. Zimmerman,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-33111 Filed 12-11-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
