[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 240 (Wednesday, December 15, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69996-70003]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-32247]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Site-Wide Environmental
Impact Statement
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of Decision.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of
Decision on the continued operation of the Sandia National
Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) in the State of New Mexico. This
Record of Decision is based on the information and analysis contained
in the SNL/NM Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), DOE/EIS-
0281, and other factors, such as the mission responsibilities of DOE.
DOE has decided to implement the Expanded Operations Alternative
without the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex,
i.e., the Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS. Under the
Expanded Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency programs and
activities at SNL/NM could increase to the highest reasonable activity
levels, as set forth in the Site-Wide EIS, that could be supported by
current facilities and their potential expansion and construction of
new facilities for future actions specifically identified in the Site-
Wide EIS through 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Site-
Wide EIS or Record of Decision, or to receive a copy of the Site-Wide
EIS, contact: Julianne Levings, Document Manager, U.S. Department of
Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office, P.O. Box 5400, Albuquerque, NM
87185, (505) 845-6201.
For information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy
and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at
(800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
DOE prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to the regulations of
the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing NEPA (40 CFR
Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part
1021). This Record of Decision is based, in part, on DOE's SNL/NM Site-
Wide EIS (DOE/EIS-0281). The U.S. Air Force participated as a
cooperating agency in preparing the Site-Wide EIS.
SNL/NM is located on the Kirtland Air Force Base, approximately 7
miles southeast of downtown Albuquerque, in Bernalillo County, New
Mexico. SNL/NM comprises approximately 8,800 acres of Federal land on
the Kirtland Air Force Base. SNL/NM is one of several national
laboratories that support DOE's statutory responsibilities for nuclear
weapons research and design, development of other energy technologies,
and basic scientific research. Sandia National Laboratories is composed
of four geographically separate facilities: Albuquerque, New Mexico
(SNL/NM); Tonopah, Nevada; Kauai, Hawaii; and Livermore, California.
This Record of Decision covers the level of operation of SNL/NM only.
DOE has assigned elements of each of its four principal missions
(National Security, Energy Resources, Environmental Quality, and
Science and Technology) to SNL/NM, and has established and maintains
several capabilities in support of these mission elements, including
applications of science and technology to the nuclear weapons program.
These capabilities also support applications for other Federal agencies
and other organizations in accordance with national priorities and
policies.
Facility operations are conducted within five Technical Areas (TAs)
and outdoor test areas. These TAs comprise the basic geographic
configuration of SNL/NM. TA-I is the main administration and support
area and contains several research laboratories. TA-II consists
primarily of support service facilities and waste management
facilities. TA-III conducts primarily physical testing. TA-IV contains
primarily accelerator operations. TA-V contains primarily reactor
facilities.
The Site-Wide EIS considers the environmental impacts of ongoing
and proposed activities at SNL/NM through 2008. DOE expects that it
will continue to suggest new programs, projects, and facilities for
SNL/NM (or consider SNL/NM as an alternative site for such facilities
or activities). Such new proposals will be considered in programmatic
or project-specific NEPA reviews, as appropriate, as they become ripe
for analysis. Subsequent NEPA reviews for projects or activities at
SNL/NM will make reference to, and be tiered from, the Site-Wide EIS,
and subsequent DOE decisions on these proposals may result in
amendments of this Record of Decision.
Alternatives Considered
DOE analyzed three broad alternative levels of operation at SNL/NM.
Alternative 1--No Action
Under the No Action Alternative, ongoing DOE and interagency
programs and activities at SNL/NM would continue the status quo, that
is, operating at planned levels as reflected in current DOE management
plans. In some cases, these planned levels include increases over
today's operating levels. This alternative also includes any activities
that have already been approved by DOE and have existing NEPA
documentation.
Alternative 2--Expanded Operations
Under the Expanded Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency
programs and activities at SNL/NM would increase to the highest
reasonable activity levels, as analyzed in the Site-Wide EIS, that
could be supported by current facilities and their potential expansion
as well as construction of new facilities for future actions
specifically identified in the Site-Wide EIS.
In the Expanded Operations Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS,
DOE described two potential configurations for the Microelectronics
Development Laboratory facility. In the first configuration, the Site-
Wide EIS analyzed the expansion of operations in the existing
Microelectronics Development Laboratory (also analyzed in the Draft
Site-Wide EIS). In the second configuration, the Site-Wide EIS
presented the available information on the developing proposal for the
Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex, also known
as MESA, including impacts from the construction and operation of
additional buildings adjacent to the existing Microelectronics
Development Laboratory. DOE included in the second configuration of the
Expanded Operations Alternative all available programmatic and
environmental information on the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences
Applications Complex based on its approved Conceptual Design Plan.
DOE's Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS was Expanded
Operations in the first configuration (i.e., without the Microsystems
and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex).
The conceptual design for the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences
Applications Complex will be finalized in the January 2000 timeframe
with the issuance of the Conceptual Design Report currently under
preparation. The information on the Microsystems and Engineering
Sciences Applications Complex in the Site-Wide EIS is
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preliminary (based on the Conceptual Design Plan), and was added after
the Draft Site-Wide EIS was issued for public review and comment.
Therefore, DOE has determined that an additional NEPA review will be
conducted after the conceptual design is finalized to evaluate impacts
from the proposed construction and operation of the Microsystems and
Engineering Sciences Applications Complex. Based on the current
configuration for the proposed Microsystems and Engineering Sciences
Applications Complex, DOE is preparing an Environmental Assessment to
determine whether an EIS is required and will include an opportunity
for public participation.
Alternative 3--Reduced Operations
Under the Reduced Operations Alternative, DOE and interagency
programs and activities at SNL/NM would be reduced to the minimum
levels of operations needed to maintain SNL/NM facilities and equipment
in an operational readiness mode.
Preferred Alternative
DOE's Preferred Alternative is the Expanded Operations Alternative
(exclusive of the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications
Complex). DOE would expand operations at SNL/NM as the need arises,
subject to the availability of Congressional appropriations, to
increase the level of existing operations to the highest reasonable
foreseeable activity levels as analyzed in the Site-Wide EIS. DOE would
only implement expansion at the existing Microelectronics Development
Laboratory, without addition of the Microsystems and Engineering
Sciences Applications Complex.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), in its ``Forty Most
Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026,
February 23, 1981), with regard to 40 CFR 1505.2, defined the
``environmentally preferable alternative'' as the alternative ``that
will promote the national environmental policy as expressed in NEPA's
Section 101. Ordinarily, this means the alternative that causes the
least damage to the biological and physical environment; it also means
the alternative which best protects, preserves, and enhances historic,
cultural, and natural resources.''
After considering impacts to each resource area by alternative, DOE
has identified Alternative 3, the Reduced Operations Alternative, as
the environmentally preferable alternative. DOE identified Alternative
3 as having the fewest impacts to the physical environment and to
worker and public health and safety because all operations would be at
the lowest levels. Therefore, the Reduced Operations Alternative would
have the lowest impacts, and the Expanded Operations Alternative would
have the highest impacts among the alternatives analyzed in the Site-
Wide EIS. However, the analyses included in the Site-Wide EIS indicate
that there would be little difference in the environmental impacts
among the alternatives analyzed and also that any impacts would be
small.
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
DOE weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision
making. DOE analyzed existing environmental impacts and the potential
impacts that might occur for each alternative, including the
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources.
Land Use and Visual Resources
No adverse impacts to land resources are expected as a result of
the No Action, Expanded Operations, or Reduced Operations Alternatives.
There would be no adverse impacts to visual resources that change the
overall appearance of the existing landscape, obscure views, or alter
the visibility of SNL/NM structures under any of the alternatives
analyzed.
Infrastructure
Electrical consumption would range from 185,000 megawatt hours per
year (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 198,000 megawatt hours per
year (Preferred Alternative). Projected water usage would range from
416 million gallons (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 495 million
gallons per year (Preferred Alternative). Annual projected utility
demands for all alternatives would be well within system capacities.
Other infrastructure-related factors, including maintenance, roads,
communications, steam, natural gas, and facility decommissioning, would
be similar for each alternative and would not pose adverse impacts.
Geology and Soils
Under all alternatives, impacts due to soil contamination would be
minimal. Under the Preferred Alternative, however, there would be the
potential for increased deposition of soil contaminants in outdoor
testing areas. These areas are not accessible to the general public.
Potential contaminants would include depleted uranium fragments,
explosive residue, and metals contained in weapons that are used in the
tests. SNL/NM performs periodic sampling and radiation surveys in these
testing areas. Depleted uranium fragments are collected after tests and
additional measures are taken to remove any contamination from the
soil.
Soil contamination from past research practices is being cleaned up
through SNL/NM's Environmental Restoration Project, which is scheduled
for completion by 2004. This clean-up would occur at the same rate
under the three alternatives.
Water Resources and Hydrology
The impact resulting from SNL/NM's contribution to drawdown in the
aquifer derives from both past and present water usage and is
considered to be adverse. The estimated SNL/NM portion of local (in the
immediate vicinity of the Kirtland Air Force Base) aquifer drawdown
from 1998 to 2008 would range from 11 percent (No Action and Reduced
Operations Alternatives) to 12 percent (Preferred Alternative). Local
drawdown of the aquifer would range from less than 1 to 28 feet across
the Kirtland Air Force Base during this period. This drawdown would not
have an immediate effect on other water users, spring flow, or land
subsidence. Long-term effects would tend to be reduced by the city of
Albuquerque's conversion to surface water use, scheduled to begin in
2004. Water demand under each alternative would be within existing
Kirtland Air Force Base water rights. As discussed above, under
Infrastructure, water usage would range from 416 million gallons per
year (Reduced Operations Alternative) to 495 million gallons per year
(Preferred Alternative).
Groundwater contamination attributable to SNL/NM activities is
present at three sites at the Kirtland Air Force Base. The
contamination in the aquifer is due to past waste management practices
rather than current operations. Investigation and clean-up at locations
with groundwater contamination would continue at the same rate under
any of the three alternatives.
Biological and Ecological Resources
Long-term restricted access and limited planned development have
benefitted biological resources at the Kirtland Air Force Base. This
benefit would continue under all alternatives. Proposed activities
under all the alternatives could result in a local displacement of
wildlife; however, the impact would be minimal and temporary. In
addition, there would be slightly increased levels of noise and
activity under the Preferred Alternative.
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However, the impacts from these increases are expected to be negligible
to biological and ecological resources. There are no endangered and
threatened species issues at SNL/NM.
Cultural Resources
Cultural resources in the Region of Influence have benefitted from
restricted access, compliance with applicable regulations, and
established procedures for the protection and conservation of cultural
resources. This benefit would continue under all alternatives. There
are no known cultural resource sites at DOE-administered land at the
Kirtland Air Force Base. For all three alternatives, there would
continue to be a potential for impacts to prehistoric and historic
archaeological resources located on Kirtland Air Force Base lands
administered by other agencies and used by DOE. These impacts would
derive from explosive testing debris and shrapnel produced as a result
of outdoor explosions, off-road vehicle traffic, and unintended fires
and fire suppression. However, the potential for impacts due to these
factors would be minimal under all three alternatives.
DOE is involved in ongoing consultation with 15 Native American
tribes to discuss Traditional Cultural Properties at SNL/NM. To date,
no Traditional Cultural Properties have been specifically identified at
SNL/NM; however, several tribes have requested that they be consulted
under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act if
human remains are discovered within the Region of Influence. These
consultations will continue. If specific Traditional Cultural
Properties are identified, any impacts of SNL/NM activities on the
Traditional Cultural Properties and any impacts of restricting access
to the Traditional Cultural Properties would be determined in
consultation with Native American tribes, and further NEPA review would
be conducted, if appropriate.
Air Quality
Chemical emissions would be highest for the Preferred Alternative,
although emissions under all alternatives would be below levels that
would adversely affect public health. Air concentrations of criteria
and other chemical pollutants would be within regulatory standards and
human health guidelines. The impact from emissions of criteria and
other pollutants for the No Action and the Preferred alternatives would
be essentially the same.
The major source of criteria pollutants (other than mobile sources)
would be the steam plant, which supplies steam to the facilities for
heating. No increase in laboratory-wide floor space is anticipated
under the Preferred Alternative because any added floor space is
expected to be offset by facilities taken out of service; therefore, no
increase in steam production would be required. Among the three
alternatives, the Reduced Operations Alternative would require the
least steam, resulting in the lowest emissions from the steam plant.
Air quality impacts from mobile sources vary slightly among the
alternatives but are not considered adverse. The analysis indicates
carbon monoxide emissions from mobile sources as a percentage of the
Bernalillo County total would be 4.6 percent (No Action Alternative),
5.1 percent (Preferred Alternative), and 4.5 percent (Reduced
Operations Alternative).
The radiological dose impacts due to the annual air emissions from
SNL/NM facilities during normal operations under each of the
alternatives would be lower than the National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants limit of 10 millirem per year to a maximally
exposed individual. The calculated radiological dose to a maximally
exposed individual would be 0.15 millirem per year under the No Action
Alternative; 0.51 millirem per year under the Preferred Alternative;
and 0.02 millirem per year under the Reduced Operations Alternative.
The calculated collective dose to the population within a 50-mile
radius of SNL/NM for each alternative from the annual radiological air
emissions due to the SNL/NM operations would be 5.0 person-rem per year
under the No Action Alternative, 15.8 person-rem per year under the
Preferred Alternative, and 0.80 person-rem per year under the Reduced
Operations Alternative.
Human Health
The composite cancer health risk estimates and the cancer health
risk estimates for specific receptor locations are below levels that
regulators consider protective of public health. The small amounts of
chemical carcinogens and radiation released from SNL/NM facilities
would increase the maximally exposed individual lifetime risk of cancer
(assuming 30 years of exposure) by less than 1 chance in 434,000 under
the No Action Alternative and by less than a possible 1 chance in
126,000 under the Preferred Alternative. Noncancer health effects would
not be expected under any alternative based on hazard index values of
less than 1. No additional nonfatal cancers, genetic disorders, or
latent cancer fatalities would be expected in the population living
within a 50-mile radius of SNL/NM. The lifetime risk to the population
in the Region of Influence would be 0.012, 0.075, and 0.24 latent
cancer fatalities for the Reduced, No Action, and Preferred
alternatives, respectively. Thus, no adverse health effects would be
expected from any of the three alternatives for SNL/NM.
Transportation
The SNL/NM material and waste truck traffic offsite would be
projected to increase from 14.5 shipments per day (1996) to 24.6 and
34.4 shipments per day under the No Action and Preferred alternatives,
respectively. However, the SNL/NM truck traffic would comprise less
than 0.03 percent of the total traffic, including all types of vehicles
entering and leaving the Albuquerque area by way of interstate
highways. Therefore, the impact under any alternative would be minimal.
The total local traffic on roadways from SNL/NM activities could
increase by a maximum of 1.8 percent under the No Action Alternative
and 3.6 percent overall under the Preferred Alternative as compared to
1996.
The overall maximum lifetime fatalities from SNL/NM annual
shipments of all types of materials and wastes due to SNL/NM operations
were estimated to be 1.7 fatalities under the Preferred Alternative. Of
these estimates, 1.2 fatalities would be due to traffic accidents; 0.33
fatalities would be due to incident-free transport of radiological
materials and wastes; and 0.06 fatalities would be due to air pollution
from truck emissions.
The maximum latent cancer fatalities in the population within a 50-
mile radius of SNL/NM from the annual transport of radiological
materials and wastes were estimated, based on a population dose of 4.9
person-rem, to be 0.0025.
Waste Generation
Operations of low-level waste and low-level mixed waste are
expected to increase by a maximum of about 200 and 70 percent,
respectively, under the Preferred Alternative, as compared to 1996. One
new operation, the Medical Isotopes Production Project, would be the
major contributor to the low-level waste increase. Approximate total
radioactive waste generation would be up to 180 cubic meters under the
No Action Alternative, up to 290 cubic meters under the Preferred
Alternative, and 110 cubic meters under the Reduced Operations
Alternative. Total chemical waste generation would be up to
approximately 380,000 kilograms under the No Action Alternative, up to
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approximately 440,000 kilograms under the Preferred Alternative, and up
to approximately 310,000 kilograms under the Reduced Operations
Alternative. Capacity currently exists to manage the waste generated
from all operations at the Preferred Alternative level.
Noise and Vibration
Under the No Action Alternative, SNL/NM would operate at current
planned levels, which include background noise levels and short-term
noise impacts from SNL/NM test activities. By 2008, impulse noise-
producing test activities would increase an estimated 35 percent over
the 1996 level of 1,059 events. The projected frequency of impulse
noise events for the Reduced OperationsAlternative would be 65 percent
less than the 1996 levels.
Projections under the Preferred Alternative indicate a 250 percent
increase in the number of impulse noise tests over 1996 levels.
Only a small fraction of these tests would be loud enough to be
heard or felt beyond the site boundary. The vast majority of tests
would be below background noise levels for locations beyond the
Kirtland Air Force Base boundary and would be unnoticed in
neighborhoods bounding the site. Ground vibrations would remain
confined to the immediate test area.
Socioeconomics
Direct SNL/NM employment projections range from about 7,400
(Reduced Operations Alternative) to about 8,400 (Preferred
Alternative), in comparison to about 7,600 full-time SNL/NM employees
in the 1996 base year. These employment changes would change regional
population, employment, personal income, and other socioeconomic
measures in the region by less than 1 percent. Accordingly, no adverse
socioeconomic impacts would be expected to result from any of the
alternatives.
Environmental Justice
Based on the analyses of all resource areas and demographic
information on low-income and minority population, DOE does not expect
any environmental justice-related impacts from the continued operation
of SNL/NM under any of the alternatives.
Accidents
The accident scenarios discussed are those that bound, i.e.,
provide an upper limit to potential impacts or risks, the accidents at
SNL/NM. At SNL/NM, accidents could occur that would affect workers and
the public. Potential accidents with the largest impacts would involve
radioactive materials in TA-V facilities and hazardous chemicals in TA-
I facilities. In most instances, involved workers (those individuals
located in the immediate vicinity of an accident) would incur the
largest risk of serious injury or fatality, because, for most
accidents, the magnitude of the damaging effects are highest at the
point of the accident and diminish with increasing distance. This
result would apply, for example, to releases of radioactive and
chemical materials, explosions, fires, airplane crashes, earthquakes,
and similar events. In some situations, however, the mitigating effects
of structural barriers, personal protection equipment, and engineered
safety features could offer greater protection for close-in workers
than for others in the general vicinity of the accident.
In TA-I, under all three alternatives, there could be numerous
situations in laboratory rooms where workers could be accidentally
exposed to small amounts of potentially harmful chemicals. The
potential also exists in TA-I for a catastrophic accident, such as an
airplane crash into a facility or an earthquake, in which multiple
potentially harmful chemicals could be released and expose onsite
individuals to harmful or fatal chemical concentrations. Large
quantities of hydrogen stored in outside areas of TA-I could also
explode as a result of a catastrophic event and cause serious injury or
fatality to involved workers and other nearby onsite individuals. The
probability of a catastrophic chemical or explosive accident with
serious consequences is low (less than once in a thousand years).
Should such an accident occur, emergency procedures, mitigating
features, and administrative controls would minimize its adverse
impacts.
Under the Preferred Alternative, the Microelectronics Development
Laboratory and the Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory would
remain in their present configuration. In the event of a catastrophic
accident, such as an airplane crash into either facility (but not
both), the dominant chemical release would be as much as 106 pounds of
chlorine from the Microelectronics Development Laboratory or as much as
65 pounds of arsine from the Compound Semiconductor Research
Laboratory. If an accident that causes chemical releases were to occur,
about 141 persons in the vicinity of the Microelectronics Development
Laboratory or 409 persons in the vicinity of the Compound Semiconductor
Research Laboratory could be exposed to concentrations greater than
Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) Level 2. The ERPG-2 level
is the maximum airborne concentration below which individuals could be
exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing
irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their
ability to take protective action. In the event of an earthquake,
simultaneous release of chemicals is possible, and as many as 423
persons could be exposed in TA-I to concentrations greater than ERPG-2
levels.
The potential for accidents would exist in TA-V that would cause
the release of radioactive materials, causing injury to workers, onsite
individuals, and the public. For example, if an earthquake occurred,
the impacts would range from a 1 in 33 increase in probability of a
latent cancer fatality for a noninvolved worker on the site to 1 in
120,000 for a maximally exposed member of the public. For the entire
population residing within 50 miles of SNL/NM, one or two additional
latent cancer fatalities would be expected. Involved workers, as in the
case of chemical accidents, would incur the largest risk of injury or
fatality in the event of almost any accident because of their close
proximity to the hazardous conditions.
Comments on the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement
DOE distributed approximately 500 copies of the Final Site-Wide EIS
to appropriate Congressional members and committees, the State of New
Mexico, various American Indian Tribal governments and organizations,
local governments, other Federal agencies, and other interested
stakeholders. DOE did not receive any comments on the Final Site-Wide
EIS.
Other Decision Factors
As directed by the President and Congress, DOE has a comprehensive
stewardship program which is maintaining the safety, security and
reliability of the country's nuclear weapons stockpile. In addition,
DOE has national security, energy resources, environmental quality, and
science and technology mission lines, which it supports at a number of
facilities across the United States. DOE directs and funds SNL/NM
activities in support of its programs and missions. In turn, SNL/NM's
facilities and operations are designed to meet the requirements of the
programs, projects, and activities assigned to the Laboratory.
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DOE needs to continue to meet its responsibilities for national
security, energy resources, environmental quality, and science and
technology at SNL/NM. DOE needs to continue to fulfill its
responsibilities as mandated by statute, Presidential Decision
Directive, and Congressional authorization and appropriation, while
meeting this need in a manner that protects human health and the
environment.
As noted in the Site-Wide EIS, SNL/NM houses unique facilities and
expertise that have been developed over the past 50 years. These
capabilities have well served national security and other national
needs in the past. It is expected that, for the foreseeable future, the
U.S. will maintain a nuclear weapons stockpile and require advanced
science and manufacturing capabilities to address issues of national
importance for the maintenance of that stockpile and for other
purposes, including assuring the safety and reliability of that
stockpile. The unique facilities and expertise at SNL/NM are needed to
assist in finding solutions to these issues. These factors were also
considered (in addition to the human health and environmental impact
information discussed above) in reaching this Record of Decision.
Decision
DOE has decided to expand the scope and levels of its operations at
SNL/NM. DOE is implementing the Preferred Alternative, that is,
Alternative 2, Expanded Operations (exclusive of the Microsystems and
Engineering Sciences Applications Complex). This alternative reflects a
broad expansion of science and technology research and applications of
this research to a variety of issues of national importance. This
alternative also includes the continued maintenance of existing and
expanded capabilities, and continued support and infrastructure
activities. The following discussion describes the major actions to be
taken, with an emphasis on those areas that have had the most extensive
programmatic or public interest.
The decisions in this Record of Decision will be reflected in DOE
budget requests and management practices, consistent with mission
needs. However, implementation of these decisions depends on
Congressional funding levels.
Selected Facilities in Technical Areas I and II
The Neutron Generator Facility will continue to fabricate neutron
generators and neutron tubes. Support activities will include a wide
variety of manufacturing, testing, and product development techniques
and processes. The Neutron Generator Facility will increase
manufacturing to approximately 2,000 neutron generators per year and
associated neutron and switch tubes. An addition to an existing
building will be constructed to meet increased production needs. Also,
Building 870 will undergo extensive renovations.
The Microelectronic Development Laboratory will continue to conduct
research and development activities on microelectronic devices for
nuclear weapons. A broad range of microtechnology development and
engineering activities, including integrated circuit and wafer
production will continue. The Microelectronic Development Laboratory
will be expanded to operate in support of research and development and
production of silicon-based microelectronic devices; it will produce up
to 7,500 wafers per year. DOE anticipates that new technologies and
manufacturing processes will be required to meet expanded activities.
There will be no construction of new facilities to meet this expanded
wafer production, and the Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory
(Building 893) will remain in operation in its present location. This
Record of Decision only extends to the existing Microelectronic
Development Laboratory, without addition of the Microsystems and
Engineering Sciences Applications Complex. As discussed in the
Alternatives section of this Record of Decision, DOE is currently
preparing an Environmental Assessment for the proposed construction and
operation of the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications
Complex.
Advanced manufacturing techniques will continue to be developed and
applied at the Advanced Manufacturing Processes Laboratory. These
activities include hardware manufacturing, emergency and prototype
manufacturing, development of manufacturing processes, and design and
fabrication of production equipment. Operations at the Advanced
Manufacturing Processes Laboratory will increase up to a maximum of
347,000 hours per year.
Research on materials and advanced components will continue at the
Integrated Materials Research Laboratory. These activities will include
basic research in chemistry, physics, and energy technologies.
Operations at the Integrated Materials Research Laboratory will
continue at its current capacity of approximately 395,000 hours per
year.
The Explosive Components Facility will continue to support the work
performed at the Neutron Generator Facility and the research and
development performed on a variety of energetic components. Activities
include research, testing, development, and quality control activities
for neutron generators, explosives, chemicals, and batteries.
Operations at the Explosive Components Facility will be expanded to
complete up to 500 neutron generator tests, 900 explosive tests, 1,250
chemical analyses, and 100 battery tests annually.
Physical Testing and Simulation Facilities
Ballistic studies and solid-fuel rocket motor tests will continue
at the Terminal Ballistics Complex. Testing capabilities will include
research in areas of armor penetration, vulnerability, acceleration,
flight dynamics, and accuracy. Projectile impact tests will include all
calibers of projectiles. The operating level at the Terminal Ballistics
Complex will be increased up to a maximum of 350 projectile impact
tests and 100 propellant tests per year.
Tests designed for the validation of analytical modeling and
weapons system certification will continue at the Drop/Impact Complex.
Test activities will focus on water and underwater tests, design
verification, and performance assessments. The Drop/Impact Complex
tests will be expanded up to a maximum of 50 drop tests, 20 water
impact tests, 5 submersion tests, and 10 underwater blast tests per
year.
Tests that simulate high-speed impacts of weapon shapes,
substructures, and components to verify design integrity, performance,
and fusing functions will continue at the Sled Track Complex. These
capabilities will include testing of parachute systems, transportation
equipment, and reactor safety. Operating levels at the Sled Track
Complex will be increased up to a maximum of 80 rocket sled tests, 239
explosive tests, 24 rocket launches, and 150 free-flight launches per
year.
The Centrifuge Complex will continue to test objects weighing
several tons at over 100 times the force of gravity. The number of
tests for the Centrifuge Complex will increase up to a maximum of 120
centrifuge tests and 100 impact tests per year.
Accelerator Facilities
The SATURN accelerator will continue to produce X-rays to simulate
the radiation effect of nuclear bursts on electronic and material
components. Tests will include satellite systems,
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weapons materials and components, and reentry vehicle and missile
subsystems. The accelerator output for SATURN will increase up to a
maximum of 500 shots annually.
The High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III will
continue to provide gamma ray effects testing capabilities. Tests will
include electronic components and weapon systems and high-fidelity
simulation over large areas in near nuclear-explosion radiation
environments. The High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source III
operations will increase up to a maximum number of 1,450 shots per
year.
The Sandia Accelerator and Beam Research Experiment will continue
to provide X-ray and gamma ray effects testing capabilities.
Capabilities will include testing of pulsed-power technologies, fusion
systems, weapons systems, computer science, flight dynamics, satellite
systems, and robotics. Testing at the Sandia Accelerator and Beam
Research Experiment will increase up to a maximum of 400 shots per
year.
The Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-Radiator will continue
to produce high-voltage accelerations to measure X-ray-induced currents
in integrated circuits and detect response in materials. Testing will
include activities in radiation measurements for a variety of weapons
components. Operations at the Short-Pulse High Intensity Nanosecond X-
Radiator will increase up to a maximum of 6,000 shots per year.
The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I will continue the
development of pulsed-power technology, including high-power energy
tests. Activities will include basic scientific research, development,
and testing. The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power I operations will
increase to support up to a maximum of 10,000 tests per year in either
the single or repetitive pulse modes.
The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed Power II will continue to develop
radiation processing applications using powerful electron or X-ray
beams. Activities will include testing of high power magnetic switches
and specialty transmission lines. The Repetitive High Energy Pulsed
Power II capacity will be expanded up to a maximum of 20 tests per week
for 40 weeks per year (800 tests).
The Z-Machine will continue to produce extremely short and powerful
pulses at various targets to simulate special atmospheric conditions
and fusion reaction conditions. The Z-Machine capability will be
expanded up to a maximum of 350 firings per year. Approximately 78
percent could involve nuclear materials.
The Tera-Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator
will continue to test plasma opening switches for pulsed-power drivers.
Other activities include basic research in science, material
development, and material testing. The operating levels at the Tera-
Electron Volt Energy Superconductor Linear Accelerator will be
increased up to a maximum of 1,300 shots per year.
The Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module will continue to evaluate
the performance and reliability of components including next-generation
accelerators. Activities will include research and development in
pulsed-power technologies such as power storage, high-voltage
switching, and power flow. The Advanced Pulsed Power Research Module
operations will increase up to a maximum of 2,000 shots per year.
The Radiographic Integrated Test Stand accelerator will continue to
develop and demonstrate capabilities for future accelerator facility
design. Capabilities will focus on demonstrating inductive voltage
technology. The Radiographic Integrated Test Stand will increase
operations up to a maximum of 800 tests per year.
Reactor Facilities
The New Gamma Irradiation Facility will perform a wide variety of
gamma irradiation experiments under both dry and water-pool conditions.
Capabilities will include studies in thermal and radiation effects,
weapons component degradation, nuclear reactor material and components,
and other nonweapon applications. The New Gamma Irradiation Facility
will increase operations to irradiate test packages for a maximum of up
to 24,000 test hours per year.
The Gamma Irradiation Facility will supplement the capabilities of
the New Gamma Irradiation Facility. The Gamma Irradiation Facility will
continue to perform gamma irradiation experiments, and its operations
will be expanded to complete tests in two available cells.
Approximately 8,000 test hours will be performed.
The Sandia Pulsed Reactor will continue to provide multiple fast-
burst reactor, near-fusion spectrum radiation environments. Testing
activities will include a wide variety of technologies that support
both defense and nondefense projects. Modifications will be completed
to enhance and expand current capabilities. Operating levels at the
Sandia Pulsed Reactor will increase up to a maximum of 200 tests per
year.
DOE considered two possible configurations for use of a pulsed-
power reactor, the existing Annular Core Research Reactor reconfigured
for Defense Programs use, and a possible second reactor referred to as
the Annular Core Pulse Reactor II. However, a second reactor is not
ripe for decision at this time, and if this additional reactor facility
is proposed in the future, DOE will prepare a separate project-specific
NEPA review.
The existing Annular Core Research Reactor can be operated in two
ways: to produce medical isotopes or to support Defense Programs
activities. Under the Annular Core Research Reactor Defense Programs
configuration, the reactor will be reconfigured to pulse-mode operation
to conduct a short-term test series (i.e., up to about 18 months)
related to the certification of some weapons components. Once the
short-term testing is completed, the Annular Core Research Reactor will
be converted back to medical isotope production.
Under the medical isotopes production configuration, the Annular
Core Research Reactor will produce medical and research radioactive
isotopes. Under the medical isotopes production configuration, the
Annular Core Research Reactor will be operated for 24 hours per day, 7
days per week, at a maximum power level of 4 Megawatt (approximately
35,000 Megawatt-hours per year) to meet the entire U.S. demand for
molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and
iodine-125. This would require the irradiation of about 25 highly
enriched uranium targets per week (1,300 per year).
The Hot Cell Facility will primarily support medical isotopes,
including isotope extraction, isotope production purification, product
packaging, and quality control. Support to Defense Programs activities
will be provided as necessary for its short-term testing. The Hot Cell
Facility will continuously process 100 percent of the U.S. demand for
molybdenum-99 and other isotopes such as iodine-131, xenon-133, and
iodine-125. This will require the processing of about 25 irradiated,
highly enriched uranium targets per week (1,300 per year).
Outdoor Test Facilities
The Aerial Cable Facility will conduct a variety of impact tests
involving weapon systems and aircraft components. Capabilities include
free-fall drop, rocket pull-down, and captive flight tests, data
recording, and simulation technologies. The Aerial
[[Page 70002]]
Cable Facility will be expanded to include drop tests of joint test
assemblies that contain depleted uranium, enriched uranium, and
insensitive high explosives. These test articles will contain up to a
maximum of 45 pounds of depleted uranium, 120 pounds of enriched
uranium, and 104 pounds of insensitive high explosives (plastic-bonded
explosive [PBX]-9502 or press-moldable explosive [LX]-17). The number
of tests using this kind of test article (containing depleted uranium,
enriched uranium, and insensitive high explosives) will not exceed five
per year. The total number of drop/pull-down tests will increase up to
a maximum of 100 experiments per year. Aerial target tests will
increase up to a maximum of 30 tests per year. Up to two series of
scoring system tests will be conducted each year.
The Lurance Canyon Burn Site will continue to test, certify, and
validate material and system tolerances. Test objects will be burned
for short periods of time under controlled conditions. Up to a maximum
number of approximately 55 certification tests per year will be
conducted at the Lurance Canyon Burn Site. Model validation tests and
user tests will increase up to a maximum of 100 and 50 per year,
respectively.
The Containment Technology Test Facility--West will continue to
conduct a series of successive events leading up to ultimate failure of
test vessels. The Containment Technology Test Facility--West will
perform up to two survivability tests per year.
The Explosives Applications Laboratory will continue to design,
assemble, and test explosive materials, components, and equipment. Work
will involve arming, fusing, and firing of explosives and testing of
components. The number of explosive tests at the Explosives
Applications Laboratory will increase up to a maximum of 360 tests per
year.
The Thunder Range Complex will continue its activities ranging from
disassembly and evaluation to calibration and verification testing of
special nuclear and nonnuclear systems. Examination and testing of
objects will involve cleaning, physical examination, disassembly,
measurement, sampling, photography, and data collection. Operations at
the Thunder Range Complex will increase up to a maximum of 10 test
series per year in 2008. Equipment disassembly would increase up to 144
days per year.
Infrastructure Facilities
The Steam Plant will continue to produce and distribute steam to
SNL/NM and Kirtland Air Force Base facilities. Steam production will
remain at approximately 550 million pounds per year. The Steam Plant
will require upgrades of several boilers, steam distributors, and
natural gas supply systems. The boiler upgrade could include a
technology change to cogeneration units.
The Hazardous Waste Management Facility will continue to handle,
package, store, and ship hazardous, toxic, and nonhazardous chemical
wastes. The Hazardous Waste Management Facility will continue to
prepare wastes for offsite transportation for recycling, treatment, or
disposal at licensed facilities. Operations at the Hazardous Waste
Management Facility will increase from one to three shifts. Quantities
of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act hazardous waste managed will
be about 92,000 kilograms each year (well within the permitted
capacity).
The Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility will continue to
serve as a centralized facility for receipt, characterization,
compaction, treatment, repackaging, certification, and storage of low-
level waste, transuranic waste, low-level mixed waste, and mixed
transuranic waste. The Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility will
continue to prepare wastes for offsite treatment and disposal at
licensed facilities. Operations at the Radioactive Mixed Waste
Management Facility will be increased from one to two shifts. Annual
quantities of radioactive waste managed (including newly generated and
legacy waste) will be about 19,600 cubic feet for low-level waste.
Annually, for low-level mixed waste, transuranic waste, and mixed
transuranic waste, the quantities to be generated and managed are
approximately as follows: 260 cubic feet low-level mixed waste
generated, and 8,800 cubic feet managed; 26 cubic feet transuranic
generated, and 350 cubic feet managed; 37 cubic feet mixed transuranic
waste generated and managed. The infrastructure processing rate is 2.7
million pounds per year. A new prefabricated waste storage building
would be constructed to replace an existing building to improve
flexibility and operational efficiencies.
The Thermal Treatment Facility will continue to burn small
quantities of explosive materials and explosives-contaminated water.
The quantities of wastes treated at the Thermal Treatment Facility will
increase. Approximately 1,200 pounds of waste per year would be
thermally treated. This rate assumes that 60 burns are performed at 20
pounds of waste per burn. This rate will be implemented only if the
regulatory authority approves the changes required to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act permit for the Thermal Treatment
Facility.
Mitigation Measures
The Site-Wide EIS included a discussion of existing programs,
plans, and controls for operations at SNL/NM, including operating
within applicable regulations, DOE Orders, contractual requirements and
approved policies and procedures. No new mitigation measures were
identified. It is unnecessary to prepare a Mitigation Action Plan under
10 CFR 1021.331.
Conclusion
DOE has considered environmental impacts, stakeholder concerns, and
national policy in its decisions regarding the management and use of
SNL/NM. The analysis contained in the Site-Wide EIS is both
programmatic and site specific in detail. It is programmatic from the
perspective of broad, multi-use facility management and site-specific
in that it analyzes detailed project and program activity. The impacts
identified in the Site-Wide EIS were based on conservative estimates
and assumptions. In this regard, the analyses bound the impacts of the
alternatives evaluated in the Site-Wide EIS.
DOE has decided to implement the Expanded Operations Alternative
without the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications Complex,
i.e., the Preferred Alternative in the Final Site-Wide EIS. Thus, DOE
and interagency programs and activities could increase to the highest
reasonable activity levels, subject to mission need and Congressional
funding and as set forth in the Site-Wide EIS, that could be supported
by current facilities and their potential expansion and construction of
new facilities for future actions identified in the Site-Wide EIS.
In accordance with the provisions of NEPA, its implementing
procedures and regulations, and DOE's NEPA regulations, I have
considered the information contained within the Site-Wide EIS, public
comments received in response to the Site-Wide EIS, and other factors.
Being fully apprised of the environmental consequences of the
alternatives and other decision factors described above, I have decided
to expand, as the need arises, the use of SNL/NM and its resources as
described. This will enhance DOE's ability to meet its primary national
security mission responsibility and create an environment that fosters
technological innovation in both the public and private sectors.
[[Page 70003]]
Issued at Washington, DC, December 6, 1999.
Thomas F. Gioconda,
Brigadier General, USAF, Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense
Programs.
[FR Doc. 99-32247 Filed 12-14-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
