94-30914. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to a Three Month Extension of the Interim SOES Rules  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 241 (Friday, December 16, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
    [Page 0]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-30914]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: December 16, 1994]
    
    
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    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
    [Release No. 34-35077; File No. SR-NASD-94-68]
    
     
    
    Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Proposed Rule Change by 
    the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to a 
    Three Month Extension of the Interim SOES Rules
    
    December 9, 1994.
        Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
    (``Act''),\1\ notice is hereby given that on December 7, 1994,\2\ the 
    National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (``NASD'' or 
    ``Association'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
    (``Commission'' or ``SEC'') the proposed rule change as described in 
    Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the NASD. 
    The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the 
    proposed rule change from interested persons.
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        \1\15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1) (1988).
        \2\The NASD initially filed the proposed rule change on December 
    1, 1994. On December 7, 1994, the NASD filed Amendment No. 1 to 
    remove the short sale prohibition from its proposal to extend the 
    Interim SOES Rules.
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    I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
    of the Proposed Rule Change
    
        On December 23, 1993, the Commission approved on a one-year pilot 
    basis changes to The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.'s (``Nasdaq'') Small 
    Order Executive System (``SOES'') that: (1) Reduced the maximum size 
    order eligible for execution through SOES from 1,000 shares to 500 
    shares; (2) reduced the minimum exposure limit for ``unpreferenced'' 
    SOES orders from five times the maximum order size to two times the 
    maximum order size, and eliminated the exposure limits for 
    ``preferenced orders''; (3) implemented an automated function for 
    updating market maker quotations when the market maker's exposure limit 
    has been exhausted; and (4) prohibited short sales through SOES 
    (collectively referred to hereinafter as the ``Interim SOES 
    Rules'').\3\ Except for the short sale prohibition, the NASD proposes 
    to extend, until May 1, 1995, the effectiveness of the Interim SOES 
    Rules.
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        \3\See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33377 (Dec. 23, 
    1993), 58 FR 69419 (Dec. 30, 1993) (``Interim SOES Rules Approval 
    Order'').
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    II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
    Statutory Basis for, the Propoed Rule Change
    
        In its filing with the Commission, the NASD included statements 
    concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
    discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
    text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
    Item IV below. The NASD has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections 
    (A), (B), and (C) below, of the most significant aspects of such 
    statements.
    
    A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
    Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
    
        On December 23, 1993, the SEC issued an order that approved the 
    Interim SOES Rules on a one-year pilot basis effective January 7, 1994. 
    In response to two applications requesting a stay of the Interim SOES 
    Rules Approval Order, however, the SEC granted a partial stay of the 
    effective date of the order until January 25, 1995.\4\ Thus, since the 
    Commission approved the Interim SOES Rules for a one-year period and 
    this one-year period did not commence until the Commission's order 
    approving the rules became effective on January 25, 1994, it is the 
    NASD's understanding that the Interim SOES Rules will expire on January 
    25, 1995, absent further Commission action.
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        \4\See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33424 (Jan. 5, 1994).
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        As described in more detail below, because the NASD believes 
    implementation of these rule changes has been associated with positive 
    developments in the markets for Nasdaq securities and clearly has not 
    had any negative effect on market quality, the NASD believes it is 
    appropriate and consistent with the maintenance of fair and orderly 
    markets and the protection of investors to extend the effectiveness of 
    the interim SOES Rules (without the short sale prohibition) until the 
    rules governing the operation of The Nasdaq Primary Retail Order View 
    and Execution System (``NPROVE'') have been approved by the SEC 
    and implemented.\5\
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        \5\See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34145 (June 1, 1994), 
    59 FR 29649 (June 6, 1994) (notice of original filing and Amendment 
    No. 1), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34453 (July 28, 1994), 
    59 FR 39808 (Aug. 4, 1994) (notice of Amendment No. 2), and 
    Securities Exchange Act Release No. 35024 (Nov. 29, 1994), 59 FR 
    62755 (Dec. 6, 1994 (notice of Amendment No. 3).
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        NPROVE is a new Nasdaq system for the execution of small-
    sized customer orders that will provide individual investors with 
    enhanced limit order protection and important price improvement 
    opportunities, while at the same time affording market makers an 
    enhanced means to manage the risks associated with market making. The 
    NASD anticipates that NPROVE will be ready for implementation 
    by May 1, 1995 and is hopeful that the SEC will consider approval of 
    NPROVE well prior to that date. Accordingly, assuming the SEC 
    approves NPROVE by May 1, 1995, the NASD believes it is 
    necessary for the protection of investors and the preservation of the 
    quality of the markets for Nasdaq securities to extend the 
    effectiveness of the Interim SOES Rules for approximately three months 
    until May 1, 1995, so that there will be no lapse between the effective 
    date of NPROVE and termination of the Interim SOES Rules. By 
    preventing a lapse in the effectiveness of the Interim SOES Rules, the 
    NASD believes investors and the marketplace as a whole will continue to 
    receive the substantial benefits derived from the Interim SOES Rules.
        The Interim SOES Rules reflect a reasoned approach by the NASD to 
    address the adverse effects on market liquidity attributable to active 
    intra-day trading activity through SOES, while at the same time not 
    compromising the ability of small, retail investors to receive 
    immediate executions through SOES. Specifically, the Interim SOES Rules 
    are designed to address concerns that concentrated, aggressive use of 
    SOES by a growing number of order entry firms has resulted in increased 
    volatility in quotations and transaction prices, wider spreads, and the 
    loss of liquidity for individual and institutional investor orders. In 
    light of the SEC's approval of the NASD's proposed short sale rule in 
    June 1994,\6\ however, the NASD believes it is appropriate to permit 
    short sales to be entered in SOES. Accordingly, the NASD proposes to 
    allow the effectiveness of this particular SOES rule to lapse on 
    January 25, 1995.
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        \6\Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34277 (June 29, 1994), 59 
    FR 34885 (July 7, 1994).
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        The NASD believes that the same arguments and justifications made 
    by the NASD in support of approval of the Interim SOES Rules are just 
    as compelling today as they were when the SEC relied on them to approve 
    the rules. In sum, the NASD continues to believe that concentrated 
    bursts of SOES activity by active order-entry firms contribute to 
    increased short-term volatility, wider spreads, and less market 
    liquidity on Nasdaq and that the Interim SOES Rules are an effective 
    means to minimize these adverse market impacts.
        The NASD also notes that the SEC made specific findings in the 
    Interim SOES Rules Approval Order that the interim rules were 
    consistent with the Act. In particular, the SEC stated in its approval 
    order that:
    
        a. Because the benefits for market quality of restricting SOES 
    usage outweigh any potential decrease in pricing efficiency, the 
    Commission concludes that the net effect of the proposal is to 
    remove impediments to the mechanism of a free and open market and a 
    national market system, and to protect investors and the public 
    interest, and that the proposed rule changes are designed to produce 
    accurate quotations, consistent with Sections 15A(b)(6) and 
    15A(b)(11) of the Act. In addition, the Commission concludes that 
    the benefits of the proposal in terms of preserving market quality 
    and preserving the operational efficiencies of SOES for the 
    processing of small size retail orders outweigh any potential burden 
    on competition or costs to customers or broker-dealers affected 
    adversely by the proposal. Thus, the Commission concludes that the 
    proposal is consistent with Section 15A(b)(9) of the Act in that it 
    does not impose a burden on competition which is not necessary or 
    appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.\7\
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        \7\Interim SOES Rules Approval Order, supra note 1, 58 FR at 
    69423 (footnotes omitted).
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        b. The Commission also concludes that the proposal advances the 
    objectives of Section 11A of the Act. Section 11A provides that it 
    is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of 
    investors and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure 
    economically efficient execution of securities transactions, fair 
    competition among market participants, and the practicality of 
    brokers executing orders in the best market. The Commission 
    concludes that the proposal furthers these objectives by preserving 
    the operational efficiencies of SOES for the processing of small 
    orders from retail investors.\8\
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        \8\Id. (footnotes omitted).
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        c. The Commission believes that it is appropriate to restrict 
    trading practices through SOES that impose excessive risks and costs 
    on market makers and jeopardize market quality, and which do not 
    provide significant contributions to liquidity or pricing 
    efficiency. * * * The Commission believes that it is more important 
    to ensure that investors seeking to establish or liquidate an 
    inventory position have ready access to a liquid Nasdaq market and 
    SOES than to protect the ability of customers to use SOES for intra-
    day trading strategies.\9\
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        \9\Id. at 69424-25 (footnotes omitted).
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        d. The Commission believes that there are increased costs 
    associated with active intra-day trading activity through SOES that 
    undermine Nasdaq market quality * * * . Active intra-day trading 
    activity through SOES can also contribute to instability in the 
    market.\10\
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        \10\Id. (footnotes omitted).
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        e. In addition, these waves of executions can make it difficult 
    to maintain orderly markets. Given the increased volatility 
    associated with these waves of intra-day trading activity, market 
    makers are subject to increased risks that concentrated waves of 
    orders will cause the market to move away. As a result, individual 
    market makers may be unwilling to narrow the current spread and 
    commit additional capital to the market by raising the bid or 
    lowering the offer. When market makers commit less capital and quote 
    less competitive markets, prices can be expected to deteriorate more 
    rapidly. Accordingly, the Commission believes that it is appropriate 
    for the NASD to take measured steps to redress the economic 
    incentives for frequent intra-day trading inherent in SOES to 
    prevent SOES activity from having a negative effect on market prices 
    and volatility.\11\
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        \11\Id. at 69425-26 (footnotes omitted).
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        f. The Commission does not believe that intra-day trading 
    strategies through SOES contribute significantly to market 
    efficiency in the sense of causing prices to reflect information 
    more accurately.\12\
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        \12\Id.
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        g. The Commission has evaluated each of the proposed 
    modifications to SOES, and concludes that each of the modifications 
    reduces the adverse effects of active trading through SOES and 
    better enables market makers to manage risk while maintaining 
    continuous participation in SOES. In addition, the Commission does 
    not believe that any of the modifications will have a significant 
    negative effect on market quality. To the extent that any of the 
    modifications may result in a potential loss of liquidity for small 
    investor orders, the Commission believes that these reductions are 
    marginal and are outweighed by the benefits of preserving market 
    maker participation in SOES and increasing the quality of executions 
    for public and institutional orders as a result of the 
    modifications.\13\
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        \13\Id.
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        h. The Commission * * * has determined that the instant 
    modifications to SOES further the objectives of investor protection 
    and fair and orderly markets, and that these goals, on balance, 
    outweigh any marginal effects on liquidity for small retail orders, 
    and any anticompetitive effects on order entry firms and their 
    customers. The Commission concludes that the ability of active 
    traders to place trades through a system designed for retail 
    investors can impair market efficiency and jeopardize the level of 
    market making capital devoted to Nasdaq issues. The Commission 
    believes that the rule change is an appropriate response to active 
    trading through SOES, and that the modifications will reduce the 
    effects of concentrated intra-day DOES activity on the market.\14\
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        \14\Id. at 69429.
    
        The NASD believes these significant statutory findings by the SEC 
    regarding the Interim SOES Rules and the SEC's assessment of the likely 
    benefits to the marketplace that would result from the rules have been 
    confirmed and substantiated by an econometric study conducted by the 
    NASD's Economic Research Department on the effectiveness of the Interim 
    SOES Rules.\15\ When the SEC approved the Interim SOES Rules, it stated 
    that ``[a]ny further action the NASD seeks with respect to SOES--
    extension of these modifications upon expiration, or introduction of 
    other changes--will require independent consideration under Section 19 
    of the Act.''\16\ In addition, the SEC stated that, should the NASD 
    desire to extend these SOES changes or modify SOES, the Commission 
    would expect ``the NASD to monitor the quality of its markets and 
    assess the effects of these changes on market quality for Nasdaq 
    securities.'' Also, if feasible, the SEC instructed the NASD to provide 
    a quantitative and statistical assessment of the effects of the SOES 
    changes on market quality; or, if an assessment is not feasible, the 
    SEC stated that the NASD should provide a reasoned explanation 
    supporting that determination.
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        \15\Securities Exchange Act Release No. 35080 (Dec. 9, 1994) 
    (Commission notice of a letter from Gene Finn, Vice President & 
    Chief Economist, NASD, to Katherine England, Assistant Director, 
    National Market System & OTC Regulation, SEC, dated October 24, 
    1994, submitted in connection with the NASD's NPROVE filing, 
    File No. SR-NASD-94-13).
        \16\Interim SOES Rules Approval Order, supra note 1, 59 FR at 
    69429. Amendment No. 4 to the NASD's filing for the Interim SOES 
    Rules also states that the NASD ``understand[s] that because of 
    substantial negative comment on the modifications, the SEC may wish 
    to review the impact of the changes after they have been in effect 
    for a reasonable time frame. The NASD believes that a one-year pilot 
    will provide a reasonable period to observe the operation of the 
    modifications and confirm the absence of adverse impact on SOES 
    averred in the comments. The experience during the pilot period will 
    also permit the NASD to better evaluate the prudence of requesting 
    permanent approval of these interim changes. For these reasons, the 
    NASD hereby requests that the SEC approve the proposal for a one-
    year pilot.'' See letter from Robert E. Aber, Vice President & 
    General Counsel, Nasdaq, to Selwyn Notelovitz, Branch Chief, SEC, 
    dated November 29, 1993.
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        In sum, the NASD's study found that:
    
         Since the SOES changes went into effect in January 
    1994, the statistical evidence indicated that when average daily 
    volume, stock price, and stock price volatility are held constant 
    through regression techniques, quoted percentage spreads in Nasdaq 
    securities experienced a decline in the immediate period following 
    implementation of the changes and have continued to decline since 
    then. The statistical evidence also showed that the narrowing of 
    quoted percentage spreads became more pronounced and robust the 
    longer the Interim SOES Rules were in effect. In particular, quoted 
    spreads in cents per share for the 500 largest Nasdaq National 
    Market securities experienced a sharp decline from April 28 to May 
    12 and from June 23 to July 18 (footnote omitted);
         With the exception of a brief, market-wide period of 
    volatility experienced by stocks traded on Nasdaq, the New York 
    Stock Exchange, and the American Stock Exchange during the Spring, 
    the volatility of Nasdaq securities appears to be unchanged in the 
    period following implementation of the changes; and
         A smaller percentage of Nasdaq stocks experienced 
    extreme relative price volatility after implementation of the rules 
    and that these modifications, in turn, suggest a reduction in 
    relative volatilities since the rules were put into effect.
    
        The NASD also believes that its study of the effectiveness of the 
    Interim SOES Rules lends credence to another NASD study that was 
    submitted to the SEC in support of approval of the Interim SOES 
    Rules.\17\ In the May 1993 SOES Study, the NASD found that concentrated 
    waves of orders entered into SOES by active order-entry firms resulted 
    in discernible degradation to the quality of the Nasdaq market. 
    Specifically, the study found, among other things, that: (1) Bursts of 
    orders entered into SOES by active order entry firms frequently result 
    in a decline in the bid price and a widening of the bid-ask spread; (2) 
    that there is a significant positive relationship between increases in 
    spreads and volume attributable to active order-entry firms as it 
    related to total SOES volume per security; and (3) activity by active 
    order-entry firms resulted in higher price volatility and less 
    liquidity--higher price changes are associated with high active trading 
    firm volume, even after controlling for normal price fluctuations. 
    Given the positive market effects associated with the Interim SOES 
    Rules, the NASD believes the findings of the May 1993 SOES Study as 
    well as the economic assumptions, principles, and hypotheses underlying 
    the study should not be dismissed by the Commission as ``inconclusive'' 
    and that more weight should be given to the study.
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        \17\See NASD Department of Economic Research: Impact of SOES 
    Active Trading Firms on Nasdaq Market Quality (May 12, 1993) (``May 
    1993 SOES Study''). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
    32313 (May 17, 1993), 58 FR 29647 (publication of the study for 
    comment).
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        Therefore, in light of all the above-cited statutory findings made 
    by the SEC when it approved the Interim SOES Rules, coupled with the 
    NASD's findings that the interim rules have been associated with 
    positive market developments in terms of lower spreads on Nasdaq and 
    less stocks with extreme relative price volatility, the NASD believes 
    it would be consistent with the Act for the Commission to extend the 
    Interim SOES Rules for a brief three month period so that the interim 
    rules can continue on an uninterrupted basis until May 1, 1995, the 
    anticipated implementation date for NPROVE. In sum, the NASD 
    believes its study affirms the validity and correctness of the SEC's 
    prior statutory findings made in connection with the approval of the 
    interim rules. Moreover, even if the Commission is unwilling to find 
    positive significance in the NASD's statistical analyses, at the very 
    least, these studies indicate that the market has not been harmed by 
    implementation of the Interim SOES Rules. As a result, the Commission's 
    rationale for the approval of the Interim SOES Rules for one year is 
    equally compelling, if not more compelling given the apparent positive 
    effects of the rules, to justify approval of the NASD's proposal to 
    extend the rules for approximately three months. To do otherwise would 
    require the SEC to refute its prior findings that the Interim SOES 
    Rules are consistent with the Act. Given the absence of any evidence of 
    unanticipated harm associated with implementation of the interim rules, 
    the NASD believes the Commission would have no factual basis to justify 
    such a refutation.
        Moreover, even if the Commission concludes that the Interim SOES 
    Rules have had no impact on market quality, the NASD believes the 
    Commission's approval of New York Stock Exchange (``NYSE'') Rule 80A on 
    a permanent basis illustrates that the Commission would still have a 
    sufficient basis to approve an extension of the Interim SOES Rules for 
    a brief three month period.\18\ When NYSE Rule 80A was proposed, the 
    Commission received considerable adverse comment to the effect that 
    there was no causal relationship between index arbitrage and market 
    volatility and that activation of the rule during turbulent market 
    conditions could have disastrous effects on related options and futures 
    markets and actually exacerbate market volatility. Despite these 
    comments, the Commission approved the proposal on a one-year pilot 
    basis noting that ``the NYSE proposal represents a modest step, 
    proposed on a pilot basis, to attempt to address the issue of market 
    volatility.''\19\ After the one-year pilot, the NYSE prepared a report 
    that, in the SEC's words, found that ``the standard measures of NYSE 
    market quality appear largely unaffected by Rule 80A.'' Specifically, 
    the NYSE Report indicated that: (1) Quotes on the NYSE did not widen 
    after the 50 DJIA point trigger was reached; and (2) the imposition of 
    Rule 80A did not have any negative effect on price continuity and depth 
    in the market.\20\ In addition, in approving Rule 80A on a permanent 
    basis, the SEC noted that the rule ``represents a modest but useful 
    step by the NYSE to attempt to address the issue of market 
    volatility,''\21\ that the rule ``has not been disruptive to the 
    marketplace,''\22\ and that there was a ``lack of evidence of any 
    harmful effects of Rule 80A.''\23\ In sum, the SEC discussion of the 
    statutory basis for approval of NYSE Rule 80A focused in large part on 
    the fact that Rule 80A did not have any adverse impacts on market 
    quality on the NYSE and that, as a result, the NYSE should be given the 
    latitude to take reasonable steps to address excessive volatility in 
    its marketplace. Accordingly, the NASD believes the SEC should afford 
    the NASD the same regulatory flexibility that it afforded the NYSE to 
    implement rules reasonably designed to enhance the quality of Nasdaq 
    and minimize the effects of potentially disruptive trading practices.
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        \18\Rule 80A provides that when the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
    declines or advances by 50 points or more, all index arbitrage 
    orders to sell or buy must be executed in a market stabilizing 
    manner.
        \19\See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28282 (July 30, 
    1990), 55 FR 31468, 31472 (Order approving File Nos. SR-NYSE-90-5 
    and SR-NYSE-90-11).
        \20\See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 29854 (October 24, 
    1994), 56 FR 55963 (October 30, 1994) (order approving file SR-NYSE-
    91-21) (``Rule 80A Approval Order'').
        \21\Id. 56 FR at 55967.
        \22\Id.
        \23\Id. 56 FR at 55967-68.
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        The NASD believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with 
    Sections 15A(b)(6), 15A(b)(9), 15A(b)(11) and 11A(a)(1)(C) of the Act. 
    Among other things, Section 15A(b)(6) requires that the rules of a 
    national securities association be designed to prevent fraudulent and 
    manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable 
    principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with 
    persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing 
    information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in 
    securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a 
    free and open market and a national market system and in general to 
    protect investors and the public interest. Specifically, the NASD is 
    proposing to retain the Interim SOES Rules for three months because of 
    concerns that concentrated, aggressive use of SOES by a growing number 
    of order entry firms has resulted in increased volatility in quotations 
    and transaction prices, wider spreads, and the loss of liquidity for 
    individual and institutional investor orders, all to the detriment of 
    public investors and the public interest. The NASD believes the Interim 
    SOES Rules have operated to rectify this situation while continuing to 
    provide an effective opportunity for the prompt, reliable execution of 
    small orders received from the investing public. With respect to the 
    proposal to remove the short sale prohibition from SOES, by expanding 
    the spectrum of retail orders that will be eligible to receive 
    automatic executions through SOES, the NASD believes the proposal may 
    enhance investor protection. Nonetheless, the NASD is very concerned 
    that re-allowing the entry of short sales into SOES may contribute to 
    destabilizing short term trading through SOES that could have adverse 
    corollary effects throughout Nasdaq.\24\ Accordingly, in order to 
    protect investors and the public interest, the NASD believes the 
    Interim SOES Rules should be extended until May 1, 1995, so that small 
    investors' orders will continue to receive the fair and efficient 
    executions that SOES was designed to provide.
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        \24\The NASD will, therefore, review the volume and impact of 
    short sales effected through SOES on an on-going basis to determine 
    whether it is appropriate in the interests of maintaining fair and 
    orderly markets to continue to allow short-sales through SOES.
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        Section 15A(b)(9) provides that the rules of the Association may 
    not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
    furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The Interim SOES Rules apply 
    across the board and do not target any particular user or participant. 
    For instance, all SOES orders must be for 500 shares or less, according 
    to the tier size requirements, all dealers may set their exposure 
    limits at two times the tier size, and all dealers may elect to utilize 
    the automated quote update feature. Accordingly, the NASD believes that 
    these rule changes are not anti-competitive, as they are uniform in 
    application and they seek to preserve the ability of SOES to provide 
    fair and efficient automated executions for small investor orders, 
    while preserving market maker participation in SOES and market 
    liquidity.
        Section 15A(b)(11) empowers the NASD to adopt rules governing the 
    form and content of quotations relating to securities in the Nasdaq 
    market. Such rules must be designed to produce fair and informative 
    quotations, prevent fictitious and misleading quotations, and promote 
    orderly procedures for collecting and distributing quotations. The NASD 
    is seeking to continue the effectiveness of the Interim SOES Rules so 
    that SOES activity may not result in misleading quotations in the 
    Nasdaq market. Market makers place quotes in the Nasdaq system and 
    these quotes comprise the inside market and define the execution 
    parameters of SOES. When volatility in the SOES environment causes 
    market makers to widen spreads or to change quotes in anticipation of 
    waves of SOES orders, quotes in the Nasdaq market become more volatile 
    and may be misleading to the investing public. Accordingly, absent 
    continuation of the Interm SOES Rules, the quotations published by 
    Nasdaq may not reflect the true market in a security and, as a result, 
    there may be short-term volatility and loss of liquidity in Nasdaq 
    securities, to the detriment of the investing public. Further, the 
    continuation of the automated refresh feature will ensure that a market 
    maker's quotation is updated after an exposure limit is exhausted. 
    Uninterrupted use of this function will maintain continuous quotations 
    in Nasdaq as market makers exhausting their exposure limits in SOES 
    will not be subject to a ``closed quote'' condition or an unexcused 
    withdrawal from the market. Finally, the NASD notes that despite the 
    reduction in the maximum order size for SOES, market makers are still 
    obligated to adhere to minimum display size requirements for quotations 
    in Nasdaq National Market securities and Nasdaq SmallCap securities.
        Finally, the NASD believes that the proposed rule change is 
    consistent with significant national market system objectives contained 
    in Section 11A(a)(1)(C) of the Act. This provision states it is in the 
    public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the 
    maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure, among other things, 
    (i) economically efficient execution of securities transactions; (ii) 
    fair competition among brokers and dealers; and (iii) the practicality 
    of brokers executing investor orders in the best market. Specifically, 
    the Interim SOES Rules advance each of these objectives by preserving 
    the operational efficiencies of SOES for the processing of small 
    investors' orders, by maintaining current levels of market maker 
    participation through reduced financial exposure from unpreferenced 
    orders exceeding 500 shares, and by reducing price volatility and the 
    widening of market makers' spreads in response to the practices of 
    order entry firms active in SOES. With respect to the proposal to 
    remove the short sale prohibition from SOES, by expanding the spectrum 
    of retail orders that will be eligible to receive automatic executions 
    through SOES, the NASD believes the proposal may enhance investor 
    protection. Nonetheless, the NASD is very concerned that re-allowing 
    the entry of short sales into SOES may contribute to destabilizing 
    short term trading through SOES that could have adverse corollary 
    effects throughout Nasdaq.\25\
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        \25\As indicated above, the NASD will review the volume and 
    impact of short sales effected through SOES on an on-going basis.
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        In addition, for the same reasons provided by the SEC when it 
    approved the Interim SOES Rules that are cited above in the text 
    accompanying footnotes four through eleven, the NASD believes that the 
    proposed rule change is consistent with Sections 15A(b)(6), 15A(b)(9), 
    15A(b)(11), and 11A(a)(1)(C) of the Act.
    
    B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
    
        The NASD believes that the proposed rule change will not result in 
    any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in 
    furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
    
    C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments of the Proposed 
    Rule Change Received from Members, Participants, or Others
    
        Comments were neither solicited nor received.
    
    III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
    Commission Action
    
        Within 35 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
    Federal Register or within such longer period (i) as the Commission may 
    designate up to 90 days of such date if it finds such longer period to 
    be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
    which the NASD consent, the Commission will:
        A. By order approve such proposed rule change, or
        B. Institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
    change should be disapproved.
    
    IV. Solicitation of Comments
    
        Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
    arguments concerning the foregoing. Persons making written submissions 
    should file six copies thereof with the Secretary, Securities and 
    Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549. 
    Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
    statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
    the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
    rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
    that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
    of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for inspection and copying in the 
    Commission's Public Reference Room. Copies of such filing will also be 
    available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the 
    NASD. All submissions should refer to the file number SR-NASD-94-68 and 
    should be submitted by January 6, 1995.
    
    
        For the Commission, by the Division of Market Regulation, 
    pursuant to delegated authority.\26\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \26\17 CFR 200. 30-3(a)(12)(1994).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Margaret H. McFarland,
    Deputy Secretary.
    [FR Doc. 94-30914 Filed 12-15-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 8010-01-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
12/16/1994
Department:
Securities and Exchange Commission
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Document Number:
94-30914
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: December 16, 1994, Release No. 34-35077, File No. SR-NASD-94-68