98-33586. Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3); Exemption  

  • [Federal Register Volume 63, Number 243 (Friday, December 18, 1998)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 70167-70168]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 98-33586]
    
    
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    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    
    [Docket No. 50-286]
    
    
    Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point Nuclear 
    Generating Unit No. 3); Exemption
    
    I
    
        The Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) is the 
    holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64, which authorizes 
    operation of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). The 
    license provides that the licensee is subject to all rules, 
    regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
    Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
        The facility consists of a pressurized-water reactor at the 
    licensee's site located in Westchester County, New York.
    
    II
    
        The Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality 
    Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee authorized to 
    possess special nuclear material shall maintain a criticality accident 
    monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, used, or 
    stored. Subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specifies 
    detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. 
    Subsection a(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality 
    accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) 
    of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency procedures for 
    each area in which this licensed special nuclear material is handled, 
    used, or stored and provides (1) that the procedures ensure that all 
    personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a 
    criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) that the procedures must 
    include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and 
    (3) that the procedures designate responsible individuals for 
    determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey 
    instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. 
    Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to 
    identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. 
    Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain 
    personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a 
    physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation 
    emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of 
    contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site 
    boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from 
    the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for special nuclear 
    material used or to be used in the reactor. Subsection (d) of 10 CFR 
    70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause 
    why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 
    may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the 
    reasons for the relief requested.
    
    III
    
        The special nuclear material that could be assembled into a 
    critical mass at IP3 is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of 
    special nuclear material other than fuel that is stored on site is 
    small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. The Commission 
    technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent 
    criticality of the nuclear fuel at IP3 and has determined that such an 
    accident cannot occur if the licensee meets the following seven 
    criteria:
        1. Plant procedures permit only one new fuel assembly to be in 
    transit between the associated shipping cask and dry storage rack.
        2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
    confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are 
    filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
    flooded with pure water.
        3. If optimum moderation of fuel in the fresh fuel storage racks 
    occurs when the fresh fuel storage racks are not flooded, the k-
    effective corresponding to this optimum moderation does not exceed .98, 
    at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level.
        4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
    confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are 
    filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
    flooded with pure water.
        5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than 
    nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than 
    the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
        6. Radiation monitors are provided in fuel storage and handling 
    areas to detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate 
    safety actions.
        7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5 wt%.
        By letter dated September 24, 1998, the licensee requested an 
    exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this exemption request, the licensee 
    addressed the seven criteria given above. The Commission's technical 
    staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and has determined that IP3 
    meets the criteria for prevention of inadvertent criticality; 
    therefore, the staff has determined that there is no credible way in 
    which an inadvertent criticality could occur in special nuclear 
    materials handling or storage areas at IP3.
        The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
    to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
    special nuclear material personnel would be alerted to that fact and 
    would take appropriate action. The staff has determined that there is 
    no credible way in which such an accident could occur; furthermore, the 
    licensee has radiation monitors, as required by General Design 
    Criterion (GDC) 63, in fuel storage and handling areas. These monitors 
    will alert personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to 
    initiate appropriate safety actions. The low probability of an 
    inadvertent criticality together with the licensee's adherence to GDC 
    63 constitute good cause for granting an exemption to the requirements 
    of 10 CFR 70.24.
    
    IV
    
        The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
    exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
    the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
    interest; therefore, the Commission hereby grants the following 
    exemption:
    
    [[Page 70168]]
    
        The Power Authority of the State of New York is exempt from the 
    requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for Indian Point Unit No. 3.
        Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
    granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
    quality of the human environment [63 FR 68315].
        This exemption is effective upon issuance.
    
        Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of December 1998.
    
        For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Samuel J. Collins,
    Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
    [FR Doc. 98-33586 Filed 12-17-98; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
12/18/1998
Department:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
98-33586
Pages:
70167-70168 (2 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. 50-286
PDF File:
98-33586.pdf