[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 244 (Wednesday, December 20, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 65977-65986]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-30546]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Part 121
[Docket No. 27264]
RIN 2120-AF96
The Age 60 Rule
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Disposition of comments and notice of agency decisions.
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SUMMARY: This action announces FAA's decisions on a number of issues
regarding the FAA's ``Age 60 Rule''. The issues include: responding to
the comments requested in 1993 regarding various aspects of the Age 60
Rule, including the ``Age 60 Project, Consolidated Database
Experiments, Final Report'', and issues raised by pilots seeking
exemptions from the Age 60 Rule, issues raised by a petition for
rulemaking by the Professional Pilots Federation (PPF), requesting the
FAA to remove the Age 60 Rule.
After review of all comments, studies, and other pertinent
information, the FAA has determined not to initiate rulemaking to
change the Age 60 Rule at this time. The FAA also has decided not to
grant any of the pending petitions for exemption or rulemaking.
ADDRESSES: The complete docket containing recent comments on the Age 60
Rule, including copies of studies related to the Age 60 issue, may be
examined at the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief
Counsel (AGC-200), Rules Docket, Room 915-G, 800 Independence Avenue
SW., Washington, DC 20591, weekdays (except Federal holidays) between
8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
Availability of Disposition
Any person may obtain a copy of this Disposition by submitting a
request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Public
Affairs, Attention: Public Inquiry Center, APA-220, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-3484.
Requests should be identified by the docket number of this Disposition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Daniel V. Meier, Jr., AFS-240, Regulations Branch, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591,
Telephone (202) 267-3749 or (202) 267-8086.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Section 121.383(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) (14
CFR Sec. 121.383(c)) prohibits any air carrier from using the services
of any person as a pilot, and prohibits any person from serving as a
pilot, on an airplane engaged in operations under part 121 if that
person has reached his or her 60th birthday. The FAA adopted the ``Age
60 Rule'', as it has come to be known, in 1959 (24 FR 9767, December 5,
1959).
In late 1990, the FAA initiated a study aimed at consolidating
available accident data and correlating it with the amount of flying by
pilots as a function of their age. This resulted in a document entitled
``Age 60 Project, Consolidated Database Experiments, Final Report'',
dated March 1993 (the ``Hilton Study''). The FAA held a public meeting
and requested comments regarding various issues related to the Age 60
Rule, including the Hilton Study (58 FR 21336, April 20, 1993). The FAA
has reviewed the written comments received in the docket (Docket No.
27264) and to the comments presented at the public meeting. The FAA is
also responding to a number of pending petitions from pilots seeking an
exemption from the Age 60 Rule. Finally, the FAA is responding to a
petition for rulemaking submitted by the Professional Pilots Federation
(PPF).
This document describes the history and basis for the rule, the
major events during the history of the rule, the FAA's response to the
issues raised above, and the FAA's rationale for maintaining the Age 60
Rule.
I(a). Basis for the 1959 Rule
The FAA promulgated the Age 60 Rule in 1959 because of concerns
that a hazard to safety was presented by utilization of aging pilots in
air carrier operations. As noted in that rulemaking,
[[Page 65978]]
the agency found ``that there is a progressive deterioration of certain
important physiological and psychological functions with age, that
significant medical defects attributable to this degenerative process
occur at an increasing rate as age increases, and that sudden
incapacity due to such medical defects becomes more frequent in any
group reaching age 60.'' 24 FR 9767. It also found that ``[s]uch
incapacity, due primarily to heart attacks and strokes, cannot be
predicted accurately as to any specific individual on the basis of
presently available scientific tests and criteria.'' 24 FR 9767. The
FAA noted ``[o]ther factors, even less susceptible to precise
measurement as to their effect but which must be considered in
connection with safety in flight, result simply from aging alone and
are, with some variations, applicable to all individuals. These relate
to loss of ability to perform highly skilled tasks rapidly, to resist
fatigue, to maintain physical stamina, to perform effectively in a
complex and stressful environment, to apply experience, judgment and
reasoning rapidly in new, changing and emergency situations, and to
learn new techniques, skills and procedures.'' 24 FR 9767. While the
FAA recognized that such losses generally start well before age 60, the
agency determined that beyond age 59 the risks associated with these
losses become unacceptable for pilots in part 121 operations.
The agency noted that, due to seniority, older pilots tend to ``fly
the largest, highest-performance aircraft, carrying the greatest number
of passengers over the longest non-stop distances,'' in the highest
density traffic. 24 FR 9767. The FAA concluded that, because of the
high risks involved, persons should be precluded from piloting aircraft
in part 121 operations after reaching age 60.
While the Age 60 Rule prohibits pilots from operating aircraft
under part 121 after reaching their 60th birthdays, it does not impose
mandatory retirement for affected pilots. A pilot may work as a flight
engineer or flight instructor in operations conducted under part 121 or
may work as a pilot in operations outside of part 121. The pilot also
may function as an instructor or evaluator in simulators, an area that
has expanded over the years.
I(b). Subsequent Rulemaking Actions
In the early 1980's, the FAA explored possible changes to the Age
60 Rule, stemming from direction from Congress in 1979 that the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) study the desirability of mandatory
age retirement for certain pilots. (P.L. 96-171). The NIH assigned the
National Institute on Aging (NIA) the primary responsibility for
implementing the legislation. In the report from this study, ``Report
of the National Institute on Aging Panel on the Experienced Pilot
Study'' (August 1981) (NIH report), NIA recommended that the age 60
limit be retained. Among other things, the panel concluded that, while
no medical significance could be attached to age 60 as a mandatory
retirement age, age-related health changes endanger aviation safety and
no medical or performance appraisal system could be identified that
would single out pilots who would pose a hazard to safety. The
conclusions reached by the NIA panel and the supporting statements
contained in the report pointed to an inability to distinguish those
persons who, as a consequence of aging, present a threat to air safety
from those who do not. The following recommendations were made:
1. The age 60 limit should be retained for pilots in command and
first officers.
2. The FAA or some other appropriate Federal agency should be
requested to engage in a systematic program to collect the medical and
performance data necessary to consider relaxing the age 60 rule.
3. In view of the growing importance of commuter air carriers, the
age 60 limit should be extended to cover all pilots engaged in carrying
passengers for hire, specifically including operations under part 135
to provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided in part 121
operations.
As part of its study, NIA looked at information on functional
decline with age and the increased frequency of a number of medical
disorders (including cardiovascular disease, neurological and mental
disorders, and changes in perceptual, psychomotor and intellectual
functions) associated with aging. In addition, NIA looked at death and
disability rates in air carrier pilots and flight engineers, death
rates in the general population, and accident rates for pilots.
In response to the NIH recommendations, in 1982 the FAA published
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on the Age 60 Rule (47
FR 29782, July 8, 1982). The FAA was considering identifying a select
group of pilots who would continue flying in part 121 operations in
order to allow the FAA to collect data on selected pilots, age 60 and
over, flying in actual operations under part 121. The FAA was also
considering establishing age limits for flight engineers serving on
airplanes operated under part 121. The FAA withdrew the ANPRM in 1984
(49 FR 14692, April 12, 1984). The FAA found that valid tests did not
exist for selecting a group of pilots age 60 and over who could act as
the test group for collecting data. The FAA was concerned that without
valid selection tests these pilots would create an unacceptable safety
risk to part 121 operations. The FAA also stated that it was not
appropriate to establish an age limit for flight engineers at that
time.
I(c). 1993 Request for Comments on Age 60 Rule and Hilton Study
In late 1990 the FAA contracted for the Hilton Study, a 2-year
study to consolidate accident data and correlate it with flying
experience and age of pilots. This study analyzed accident data between
1976 and 1988. Although the focus of the study was on part 121 pilots,
the study analyzed the accident rates for pilots in part 91, 121, and
135 operations holding Class I, Class II, and Class III medical
certificates. The authors of the study found ``no hint of an increase
in accident rate for pilots of scheduled air carriers as they neared
their 60th birthday'' but noted that there were no data available on
scheduled air carrier pilots beyond age 60. Observing a ``hint, and a
hint only,'' of an increase in accident rates for Class III pilots
older than 63 years of age, they concluded that ``one could cautiously
increase the retirement age to age 63.''
In addition, on April 20, 1993, the FAA published a notice of
public meeting and request for comments regarding various aspects of
the Hilton Study. (58 FR 21336; April 20, 1993.) The public meeting was
held on September 29 and 30, 1993, and the comment period closed on
October 15, 1993. In response to the FAA's notice of public meeting and
request for comments, 46 members of the public made presentations at
the public meeting, and the FAA received approximately 1,200 written
comments on the Hilton Study and the Age 60 Rule in general before the
close of the comment period.
I(d). Commuter Rule
The FAA addressed the Age 60 Rule in a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (Notice 95-5, 60 FR 16230, March 29, 1995) that would
require certain commuter operators that now conduct operations under
part 135 to conduct those operations under part 121 (the ``Commuter
Rule''). In that notice, the FAA proposed to apply all part 121 rules,
including the Age 60 Rule, to those pilots currently employed in
certain part 135 scheduled operations who would be affected by the
Commuter Rule. In response to Notice 95-5 the FAA received many
comments dealing
[[Page 65979]]
with the question, not raised by Notice 95-5, of whether there should
be an age limitation for part 121 pilots and what that age should be.
To that extent those comments have been considered in this Disposition.
I(e). Public Comment
1993 Meeting and Request for Comments
In addition to the comments at the 1993 public meeting and received
during the comment period, the FAA received over 2,000 comments after
the comment period closed. The issues raised in the comments by both
sets of commenters are similar and will be discussed together. The
majority of the commenters at the public meeting and those submitting
written comments before the close of the comment period are in favor of
raising the age limit, while the majority of commenters submitting
written comments after the close of the comment period are against
raising the age limit. Commenters in favor of raising the age limit
offer several different alternatives, ranging from age 62 to no age
limit. Some commenters opposed to a rule change state that the age
limit should be decreased to age 55.
Commuter Rule
In addition to the above comments, over 2,000 comments on the age
60 issue (including about 1,000 postcards from members of an airline
pilot organization) were received in the docket established for the
Commuter Rule. The overwhelming majority of these comments support
maintaining the Age 60 Rule and do not express opinions that are
different from other comments received in response to the public
meeting and request for comments in Docket 27264.
The issues raised at the public meeting, the written comments, and
the Commuter Rule are discussed below.
I(f). Professional Pilots Federation Petition for Rulemaking To Repeal
the Age 60 Rule
The PPF, an organization whose membership is composed of pilots who
oppose the Age 60 Rule, filed a petition for rulemaking in July 1993
(Docket 27375; 58 FR 46585, September 2, 1993) that requests the
removal of Sec. 121.383(c). PPF believes that Federal law and policy,
operational and regulatory developments since promulgation of the rule,
and the results of the Hilton Study warrant the removal.
In its petition, the PPF states that the Age 60 Rule has no basis
in fact; refusal to repeal the rule would constitute arbitrary and
capricious action by the FAA, contrary to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act; refusal to repeal the rule without
evidence of a need to retain it in the interest of public safety is
inconsistent with Federal policy against age discrimination; and repeal
of the rule would have a positive economic impact on the U.S. air
carrier industry.
In addition, the PPF states that the FAA should exercise leadership
in the international community and repeal the Age 60 Rule; the Age 60
standard in ICAO Annex 1 is ready for change; and the JAA has proposed
increasing the maximum age limit for air transport pilots to 65. (The
FAA notes that JAA's proposal is to allow pilots to operate in multi-
pilot operations up to the age of 65, provided no more than one pilot
in the cockpit is over the age of 60.)
The major issues brought up in the PPF's petition for rulemaking
(such as age discrimination, the Hilton Study, economic impacts of the
Age 60 Rule, etc.) are discussed below in connection with the
disposition of comments in Docket No. 27264. Because the FAA has
determined that there is insufficient justification to change the Age
60 Rule at this time and that the rule is consistent with Federal law,
PPF's petition for rulemaking will be denied in a separate document.
I(g). Petitions for Exemption From the Age 60 Rule
Over the years the FAA has received numerous petitions for
exemption from the Age 60 Rule. The FAA consistently has denied these
petitions. Some petitioners have sought review in the United States
Courts of Appeals, and the Courts have upheld the denials. However, in
1992 when the Hilton Study was underway, the FAA delayed action on the
pending petitions for exemption and those newly received. Most of the
issues raised by the petitions were so intertwined with the underlying
Age 60 Rule issues, the FAA chose to defer action pending deliberation
of the broader issues involving the Age 60 Rule itself. There are
currently over 100 petitions for exemption pending. Summaries of the
petitions were published in the Federal Register, and comments were
received for some of the petitions. These comments expressed opinions
and did not provide the FAA with new information. The issues raised by
commenters are discussed in sections II, III, and V below.
Overall, the petitioners provide similar information and arguments
that they contend justify exemptions. Part of their assertions involve
their personal fitness (see section II(a)) and the ability of the FAA
to test them individually with simulators (see section III(a)). They
state that they hold or are qualified to hold first-class airman
medical certificates (see section III(b)). Some state that they have
extensive skill and experience as pilots (see section II(c)). They also
note that the FAA gives many exemptions to younger pilots for various
medical conditions (see section III(b)).
The petitioners also contend that the Age 60 Rule is discriminatory
(see section V(b)). In addition, the petitioners state that the Age 60
Rule is an arbitrary age and that the age of 60 has not scientifically
been shown to be an accurate predictor of health or ability (see
section II(a)). They state that studies used by the FAA in the past to
justify the rule are flawed, including the NIH Study and the reports
prepared by Richard Golaszewski (Acumenics Research and Technology,
Incorporated, The Influence of Total Flight Time, Recent Flight Time
and Age on Pilot Accident Rates, Final Report (1983) (First Golaszewski
Report); General Aviation Safety Studies: Preliminary Analysis of Pilot
Proficiency (1991) and his subsequent work, Additional Analysis of
General Aviation Pilot Proficiency (1993) (Second Golaszewski Report)
(section II(b)). They state that pilots at age 60 are in the safest age
group and that forcing them to retire results in individuals with less
experience serving as pilots, resulting in lower safety (sections II(c)
and V(f)). They state that sudden incapacitation is not a cause of
accidents in Part 121 operations (section II(a)). They state that the
rule was promulgated for economic reasons alone (section V(a)). They
state that the rule is contrary to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (section V(b)). They point out that other countries have higher
retirement ages for their pilots (section V(c)). They state that
deleting the rule would save the air carriers money (section IV(a)).
Under 49 U.S.C. 44701(e) the FAA, in its discretion, may grant
exemptions from the requirements of a regulation if it finds that such
an exemption is in the public interest. Section 11.25 (14 CFR
Sec. 11.25) provides procedures for petitioning for an exemption.
Section 11.25(b)(5) provides that such a petition must--
Contain any information, views, or arguments available to the
petitioner to support the action sought, the reasons why the
petition would be in the public interest and, * * * the reason why
the exemption would not adversely affect safety or the action to be
taken by the petitioner to provide a level of safety equal to that
provided by the rule from which the exemption is sought.
[[Page 65980]]
The petitioners have the burden of showing that the exemption is
justified.
The FAA does not doubt that the petitioners, in general, are well-
qualified, experienced, and safe pilots. However, no petitioner has
suggested or shown how he or she is unique compared to others who are
subject to the rule.
To the extent that petitioners' comments involve the justification
for the Age 60 Rule itself, these issues are discussed in sections II,
III, and V below.
As to individual petitioners' fitness to serve as pilots past the
age of 60, which petitioners assert can be demonstrated by
individualized testing or evaluation, no petitioner has submitted a
protocol, nor is the FAA aware of a protocol, that would permit the FAA
to adequately assess an aging individual's relative risks of
incapacitation, either sudden or subtle. They have not shown how their
circumstances are different in a significant way from others subject to
the rule. For instance, there is nothing unique in petitioners holding
first-class airman medical certificates; all pilots who exercise the
privileges of an Air Transport Pilot certificate are required to hold a
first-class airman medical certificate. Numerous pilots operating under
part 121, who are approaching age 60, have long, distinguished careers.
Indeed, the FAA considered these issues in response to the comments in
Docket 27264, and they are further responded to below.
The FAA has determined that the petitioners have not shown their
circumstances to be unique compared with those who comply with the
rule, and that the issues they raise are more appropriately considered
in connection with whether the FAA should propose to change the general
rule. The FAA will in separate documents deny the pending petitions for
exemption from the Age 60 Rule.
In addition, the FAA intends to handle future petitions for
exemptions for the Age 60 Rule differently. The normal procedures for
handling petitions for exemption are set forth in Secs. 11.25 and
11.26. They include publishing a summary of the petition, reviewing any
comments received, and issuing an individualized grant or denial of the
petition that recites the basis for the petition and the FAA's analysis
as to why it is granted or denied. This process can take a substantial
amount of time. It appears not to be necessary, however, to carry out
all these steps for future petitions for exemption from the Age 60 Rule
that are substantially similar to those discussed here. In the future,
the FAA will deny any petition for exemption from the Age 60 Rule
without first publishing it for comment unless it contains a proposed
technique, not discussed in this Disposition, to assess an individual
pilot's abilities and risks of subtle and sudden incapacitation.
Petitions that do not contain new information or a protocol that may
allow the FAA to accurately assess the individual will be summarily
denied. A copy of this disposition will be attached to the denial to
explain the basis for the FAA's denial. Any petition that does contain
such a proposal will be processed and evaluated as provided in
Secs. 11.25 and 11.26.
II. Concerns Regarding Aging Pilots
After considering all comments and known studies, FAA concludes
that concerns regarding aging pilots and underlying the original rule
have not been shown to be invalid or misplaced.
II(a). Physical Degradation with Age
As noted above, the Age 60 Rule was promulgated in 1959 to address
the progressive deterioration of physiological and psychological
functions with age and an increasing occurrence of significant medical
defects and sudden incapacitation associated with this degenerative
process. While emphasizing heart attacks and strokes, the agency also
noted ``other'' factors, less susceptible to precise measurement,
resulting from aging alone. Major emphasis was placed on the
difficulties in attempting to predict incapacity.
Several commenters state that the death rate in general and the
cardiovascular death rate in particular for men in the relevant age
groups declined dramatically between 1960 and 1989. The commenters
believe, therefore, that the age limit could be raised. Other
commenters, however, state that insurance statistics show a dramatic
rise in cardiovascular disease in people over age 50.
In the 35 years since the rule was introduced, there has been
remarkable progress in medicine, particularly in the ability to
evaluate cardiovascular fitness and in the diagnosis and treatment of
cardiac and cerebrovascular illness. For example, cardiovascular
disease rises with age, steeply, beginning between ages 55 and 65, and,
though mortality has dropped since 1960, cardiovascular disease remains
the most frequent cause of death in pilots and the general population.
With this increased incidence of cardiovascular disease in the older
population, the risk for unexpected threatening events is raised.
Cardiac events (e.g., heart attacks, sudden death) during flight have
continued to occur in low but fairly consistent numbers over the years
and have caused general aviation accidents.
Other conditions are known to increase in incidence or to become
more complicated with aging. Many present greater difficulties of
detection and risk assessment than does cardiovascular disease. Among
these are cerebrovascular disease; malignancies; endocrine dysfunction;
neurological disorders; psychiatric diagnoses including depression; and
decline in sensory and motor capabilities. There has been an increasing
awareness of the more subtle adverse conditions affecting performance,
those related to cognitive functioning.
The concepts of ``age-related cognitive decline'' or ``age-
associated memory impairment'' describe objective impairment of
cognitive function (e.g., attention; language; some visuospatial
skills; and, particularly, memory), as a result of aging. These
concepts are applied to describe a longitudinal decline in performance
that is age appropriate, i.e., a normal outcome of aging (Petersen, RC;
Normal Aging, Mild Cognitive Impairment, and Early Alzheimer's Disease;
The Neurologist; 1:000-000, 1995 [in press]). Since there now is
general agreement that a functional decline occurs with normal aging,
on-going research seeks tools for its identification and quantification
and to determine its significance for individuals. A condition of
``mild cognitive impairment'' also is recognized and appears to be the
herald of degenerative disease or dementia. Again, research looks for
diagnostic tools and for predictor variables of the ultimate outcome
for the individual.
Dementia in the adult population is a major and growing medical and
social problem. It occurs at all ages, but its incidence increases with
advancing age so that the largest group of demented patients is in the
older age groups (Differential Diagnosis of Dementing Diseases;
National Institutes of Health Consensus Conference Statement; Volume 6,
Number 11; July 6-8, 1987). One in 10 persons over age 65 and nearly
half of those over 85 have Alzheimer's disease alone, and increasingly
it is found in people in their 40's and 50's.
Many of the dementing diseases can be confirmed or denied with
certainty only at autopsy. The history includes a decline from the
individual's previously attained intellectual level and usually
involves defects in memory, other cognitive capacities, and adaptive
behavior. Usually, it is marked by significant deterioration of memory
and
[[Page 65981]]
of one or more other intellectual functions such as language, spatial
or temporal orientation, judgment, and abstract thought. Onset is
usually but not always insidious, and the patient may or may not be
aware of the dementia. Deterioration may vary from subtle changes that
are overlooked by coworkers, family, and friends, to totally
incapacitating.
Is there a level of cognitive dysfunction acceptable in a part 121
pilot? On a particular basis, can pilots be screened for mild cognitive
deficits or for the ``normal'' age-related cognitive decline? Can early
dementia be identified before the affected pilot becomes a risk? How do
we know when the pilot becomes a risk? How specifically are the
deficits identified through currently available neuropsychological
testing related to performance and to the real requirements of
piloting? What is an acceptable level of risk in aviation? When does
the incidence of cognitive deficit become unacceptable? Are current
proficiency evaluations adequate for determination of a pilot's ability
to perform adequately under every reasonably anticipated circumstance
regardless of age? At present, adequate answers to these questions have
not been provided.
In its 1981 report, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National
Academy of Science (on which the NIH report is based) noted that in
addition to the increased incidence of cardiovascular disease and
degradation in cognitive functions associated with aging, other effects
of aging become more prevalent. For example, diabetes, thyroid disease,
pulmonary dysfunction, and gastrointestinal malignancy are more common
with advancing age.
There is other deterioration with age. For instance, research
points to a decline with age in the speed and/or quality of many
aspects of perceptual and motor functioning. In the general population,
the ability to see fine details declines slightly in adulthood until
about 60, and more markedly thereafter. With age, there is typically
some loss in ability to hear effectively; the higher the frequency
beyond about 1,000 hertz, the greater the loss.
Clearly, there is progressive anatomic, physiological, and
cognitive decline associated with aging, albeit variable in severity
and onset among individuals. Physicians, psychologists, physiologists,
and scientists of other disciplines have identified many age-associated
variables, some easily measurable, some not, that may be important to
human function. There may be other variables, not yet identified, that
play an equally significant role. We know that, at some age, everyone
reaches a level of infirmity or unreliability that is unacceptable in a
pilot in air transportation. That age will vary from person to person
but cannot yet be predicted in a specific individual. Because it is
unacceptable for these pilots to work until failure or until there is
obvious impairment, the age of 60 has served well as a regulatory limit
since 1959. Many commenters state that the Age 60 Rule is arbitrary and
there is no scientific basis for it. Others would choose a different
arbitrary age. For instance, the Acting Chief, Adult Psychological
Development, Behavioral and Social Research Program, NIA, submitted a
comment in 1993 on behalf of the NIA. He states the view that the age
limit could be increased ``to an age closer to the mid-sixties.''
However, the studies he cites do not point to an age closer to the mid-
sixties any more definitively than they point to the age of 60 as an
appropriate age limit.
While science does not dictate the age of 60, that age is within
the age range during which sharp increases in disease mortality and
morbidity occur.
II(b). Hilton Study and Other Accident Rate Studies
Over the years, several reports have examined the rate of accidents
as they relate to age in various populations groups, in an effort to
better understand how aging may affect safety. As discussed above, the
Hilton Study was initiated by the FAA to look at accident rates in
pilots. Many commenters state that the report provides justification
for a rule change. They point out that the report shows the same
accident rate for pilots who are 50 and pilots who are 65. They state
that the report finds that accident rates of part 121 pilots decrease
with age. Some other commenters, however, state that the report does
not provide justification for a rule change. They state that the report
is not meaningful since correlating accident rates solely with total
flying hours and recent flying hours is not a valid measurement. They
also state that it is not meaningful to compare private pilots who fly
beyond age 60 with pilots who fly a lot of hours per year in part 121
operations.
David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Associate Professor of Epidemiology,
The City University of New York Medical School, submitted comments on
the Hilton Study. He points out that accident rates are a very crude
tool to examine the relationship between pilot age, health, and
performance. The IOM, he notes, ``recognized the existence of a
fundamental problem: since there are no Class I pilots flying Part 121
flights beyond age 60, there are no medical, performance or even
accident data on the group of greatest interest. Needed are data on
vision, reaction time, judgment, circadian rhythm and many other
neurobehavioral and physiological measures.'' This problem led to the
IOM's recommendation that extensive additional data be collected and
analyzed to better understand the relationship of aging and pilot
performance. Dr. Michaels notes that the Hilton Study did not take the
approach recommended by the IOM. Rather than examining the
neurobehavioral and physiological measures detailed by the IOM, the
authors of the Hilton Study examined only accident rates. (However, the
authors of the Hilton Report fully carried out the work statement of
their research contract with the agency which asked only that accidents
be studied.)
Dr. Michaels further noted that numerous studies have demonstrated
that, among various groups of pilots examined, increasing accident risk
is associated with increasing age. He includes papers by Golaszewski
(1983); Mortimer (1991); and an analysis by the Office of Technology
Assessment (1990) which support this finding. He also invites attention
to the citation by the NIA Report of studies by Harper (1964);
Lategola, et al (1970); Rohde and Ross (1966); and Booze (1977), all
demonstrating increasing risk with increasing age. Dr. Michaels warns
that it would be contrary to customary epidemiologic practice to accept
unconditionally and definitively findings from a single study that are
substantially different from those of previous studies.
There is contention regarding the Hilton Study's grouping of pilots
for comparison purposes. Richard Golaszewski, the author of two papers
on the relationship between pilot age and accident rates, belives that
the Hilton Study's conclusions are based on the use of a group of
pilots (holders of Class III medical certificates who have more than
500 hours of total flight time and 50 hours of flight time in the last
year), inappropriate for inferences about the likely accident rate
performance of airline pilots of age 60 and above. He believes this
group is least like airline pilots and suggests his own alternative:
Professional pilots who did not fly for airlines but who held Class I
or II medical certificates. Mr. Golaszewski cites the Second
Golaszewski Report for conclusions opposite to the Hilton Study--
increases in accident rates with age for professional pilots.
[[Page 65982]]
The Hilton Study provides a discussion of the First Golaszewski
Report, noting those researchers' disagreement with Mr. Golaszewski's
methodology and questioning his conclusions. The study also notes
methodological concerns regarding the cited works by the Office of
Technology Assessment; Mortimer; and Guide and Gibson (1991).
Dr. Michaels concludes that (1) the Hilton Study does not present
convincing evidence that pilots holding Class I medical certificates
past the age of 60 are not at increased risk of accidents, and (2) that
the study is a methodologically invalid foundation for rulemaking. He
suggests that the analyses performed are not valid because of the small
size of the study (very few accidents and a very large number of flight
hours), because the study is insensitive to the real concerns (whether
aging is associated with increased risk for incapacitation), and
because the study does not have well-documented exposure data. The
later refers the fact that the Hilton Study calculated accident rates
by comparing the total hours flown. However, because most accidents
occur during take offs and landings, Dr. Michaels states that hours
flown is not a useful measure in calculating the risk of accidents. He
believes that the methods used in the Hilton Study would obscure any
increased rate of accidents among older pilots in the analyses
presented.
The First Golaszewski Report concluded that pilots with Class I
medical certificates (required for part 121 air carrier pilots in
command) and Class II medical certificates (required for other
commercial pilots) had a substantially higher accident rate after age
60 than at younger ages. This report was cited by the FAA in denying a
petition for exemption from Sec. 121.383(c) submitted by Courtney Y.
Bennett et al., and John H. Baker, et al., in 1986. Golaszewski, in the
study report itself, noted and resolved to the FAA's satisfaction
various sources of potential error and provided rationale for the
choices made. Because the study viewed the accident experience of
holders of Class III medical certificates (required for non-commercial
operations) and of all classes of medical certificate combined rather
than that of identified airline pilots, however, and because of
disagreement with Golaszewski's selection of numerators and
denominators for calculating accident rates, the study findings and
methodology were disputed by the petitioners in their later legal
action in a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Although the court
identified limitations in the study, it upheld the FAA's denial of the
petition. Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990).
The Second Golaszewski Report indicated similar findings. These
studies were based on data contained in the National Transportation
Safety Board Accident Records Database and the FAA Comprehensive Airman
Information System medical database.
It should be noted that increasing accident rates with age is not
found just in aviation. The National Research Council (NRC) has found
increasing car accident rates with increasing driver age. In a report
published in 1988, the NRC concluded that ``older drivers show an
involvement in crashes that is more extensive than that of middle-age
drivers, * * *'' Transportation in an Aging Society, Transportation
Research Board, National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 1988. While
safely piloting an airplane is more complex than driving an automobile,
both require knowledge, quick reflex actions, good judgment, long-and
short-term recall, and many other skills and abilities. Accident rate
data represent a quantitative compilation of occurrences where skills
and abilities were, for one reason or another, inadequate to cope with
a specific situation.
Because statistical analysis of over-age-60 pilots in part 121
operations cannot be done (because there are no such pilots) studies
must use surrogate data. As has been the case in both the Hilton Study
and the Golaszewski reports, such analyses are subject to the criticism
that the data used do not reflect reality and, therefore, are flawed.
This is even truer with the consideration of accident rate data in car
crashes. Unfortunately, accurate counts of all pilots flying in
scheduled air carrier operations during a given time period and their
age, current and total flight time, and accident experience are not
available. Accidents in air carrier operations are, fortunately, rare,
and there are other factors (e.g., seniority bidding for routes) that
compound the difficulties encountered in developing meaningful
statistics regarding the effects of aging. Further, flying by non-part
121 pilots generally involves aircraft, equipment, airports,
operational conditions, and operating procedures that are quite
different than part 121 operations. Nevertheless, these studies and the
efforts of earlier researchers provide a foundation for this current
consideration of the issue.
The Hilton Study, the First Golaszewski Report, and the Second
Golaszewski Report sought to define the effects of aging on older
pilots in terms of accident rates. While conclusions may differ as to
the effect of aging on pilots, the studies are similarly limited by the
rule itself since data cannot be gathered on pilots over age 60
operating in part 121 operations. Factors that may have contributed to
the contradictory conclusions are that the accident rates for pilots
over age 60 can be determined only in operations outside of part 121
and, therefore, may not be fully useful in drawing conclusions about
pilot performance in operations conducted under part 121; and grouping
the data differently may lead to different conclusions. While we
believe the studies all tend to support a regulatory age limit, they
provide no consensus as to precisely what that age limit should be.
In the NIH Study, the most comprehensive study yet performed of the
issues involved in age-related retirement of airline pilots, the Panel
found that ``age-related changes in health and performance influence
adversely the ability of increasing numbers of individuals to perform
as pilots with the highest level of safety and, consequently, endanger
the safety of the aviation system as a whole.'' In response to the
question, ``What is the effect of aging on the ability of individuals
to perform the duties of pilots with the highest level of safety?'',
the Panel responded, in part, that--
Undoubtedly, the number of individuals experiencing substantial
decline in performance does increase with advancing age * * *
Variability in performance appears to increase, and average
performance to decrease, with increasing age * * * the risk of an
accident increases in the later life of a pilot, and * * * such risk
probably accelerates with advancing age * * * The duties of pilots
embrace not only maneuvering skill but also decision-making, crew
coordination and resource management. Decline in cognitive and
psychomotor performance, as well as in physiological performance,
occurs with increasing age and will affect how these duties are
executed. The health status of the pilot is apt to affect his/her
flying performance. In this regard, subtle decrements in performance
due to aging processes or subclinical functional impairment are more
likely to pose a problem than is complete failure of performance due
to sudden incapacitation.
The Hilton Study has not provided answers to these basic concerns.
After careful deliberation, the FAA has determined that the Hilton
Study does not provide an acceptable basis warranting proposing to
change the Age 60 Rule. Supporters of both the Hilton Study and the
First and Second Golaszewski Reports have good points. The subgroups
studied by each is to some extent limited, in that they necessarily do
not mirror the subgroup
[[Page 65983]]
of part 121 pilots to which the Age 60 Rule applies. The studies do not
look at pilot performance, indeed, they count all accidents regardless
of cause (not just those caused by pilot error), and do not count
incidents of pilot incapacitation that did not result in accidents.
Debate surrounding the reliance to be placed on these studies
illustrates the difficulty of the task. The changes in accident rates
identified in the Hilton Study were small, and its conclusions,
therefore, were appropriately cautious. In view of the lack of
consensus among the best experts who have looked at this matter, the
FAA considers caution appropriate in declining to consider the Hilton
Study warranting a change to the Age 60 Rule at this time.
II(c). Performance
Many commenters assert that older pilots have more experience and
better performance capability than younger pilots, while other
commenters state that older pilots lose performance ability. First, age
does not necessarily imply quantity or quality of experience.
Experience is valuable, but it does not offset all risks or decrements
associated with aging. Also, at some point, the law of diminishing
returns comes into play. Once a pilot achieves a certain level of
expertise, additional flight time will not significantly improve pilot
performance.
It must also be pointed out that reference to ``younger'' pilots
may be misleading in this context. It is the FAA's experience in the
industry that retiring age 60 pilots (who generally are captains) are
not replaced by very young and inexperienced pilots. Rather, they are
replaced by pilots who have substantial experience as pilots in the
first officer position, and often as flight engineers before that.
In addition, some commenters state that pilots near age 60 have
performed heroically, proving that performance does not degrade with
age and experience, while other commenters state that courageous
performances by pilots who were near age 60 are not reasons for
abandoning the rule. While the FAA recognizes that certain older pilots
have performed heroically in specific circumstances, the decision to
change the Age 60 Rule cannot be based on isolated commendable acts.
The FAA must make a decision on whether change to the rule is called
for based on the totality of evidence available on the safety
implications of aging.
II(d). Health and Technology
Many commenters state that since the rule was issued medical
technology has advanced and life expectancy has increased; hence, they
conclude, the rule is obsolete. In addition, they reference that
medical technology is now more capable of screening out pilots with
medical risks and that fatigue is no longer an issue due to more modern
aircraft that reduce workload and stress levels. Many commenters also
state that the aging process can vary markedly among individuals and
that some individuals are in worse physical or mental condition at age
40 than others are at age 60. Hence, these commenters do not believe
that age should be a means for determining capability. Many other
commenters, however, state that older pilots are not in good physical
shape and improvements in medical screening do not detect the subtle
impairments with age that can undermine the margin of safety.
As noted earlier, the incidence of cardiovascular disease rises
with age, and it remains that most frequent cause of death in pilots
and the general population. Though the FAA relies on sophisticated
medical assessment and monitoring to permit the certification of
carefully selected pilots with known heart disease, the need for the
highest level of safety in air carrier operations has required that the
increasing, unpredictable danger associated with aging be limited.
In addition, there has been an increasing awareness of the more
subtle adverse conditions affecting performance, those related to
cognitive functioning. Current medical certification procedures
identify those individuals who are at most risk and are adequate for
assessing many medical problems in pilots. The significance of the
known as well as the potential unknown or unmeasurable adverse factors
increases with aging, however, and reduces confidence in the
sensitivity of the medical certification process. The Age 60 Rule
recognizes this reduction of sensitivity in the context of the
statutory recognition that the highest possible degree of safety is
required in air carrier operations. As both the incidence of
incapacitation risk factors and other adverse effects increase with
age, the Age 60 Rule provides additional confidence in air
transportation safety.
II(e). Multicrew Concept
Some commenters point out that operations under part 121 use 2-
pilot crews, and some also have a flight engineer on board. They state
that if one pilot becomes incapacitated, the other crew member(s) can
take over. The FAA agrees that the multicrew concept provides an
additional measure of safety. Indeed, redundancy in safety features is
an important part of the overall safety benefits in part 121
operations, including not only pilots but also other personnel,
aircraft structures, and procedures. The safety benefits of redundancy
would be reduced, however, if the level of safety of any of the
elements were to degrade. The sudden incapacitation of a pilot is not
without risk even in a multiple-member crew and is to be avoided. Of
equal concern is the prospect of subtle degradation in the judgment,
cognitive function, and crew coordination that may accompany advancing
age. Unlike the case of sudden incapacitation, such degradation may not
be readily apparent to the other crew, and it may be difficult for the
crew to deal with the results.
The FAA does not consider the fact that part 121 operations have
multiple pilots to be a basis for permitting one (or both) of those
pilots to be at unacceptable risk for age-related problems.
III. Alternatives to an Age Limitation
III(a). Performance Checks
Some commenters suggested that the FAA can do performance checks
for pilots past age 60 in simulators to ensure that they meet the
performance standards. Periodic proficiency and competency checks are
intended to detect a pilot's performance deficiency and to correct
those deficiencies before the pilot is returned to flight operations.
These checks only verify the state of a pilot's performance at the time
of the checks. They are not useful for detection of early or
subclinical cognitive defects that may subtly degrade performance or
which, in time, may progress to risks for errors in judgment or other
actions that may jeopardize safety. The checks do not predict whether
an individual pilot's performance will degrade at any time in the
future as a result of age. In addition, in its 1981 report, NIA noted
that proficiency checks and simulator checks usually are designed to
train pilots to meet standards of proficiency under optimal testing
conditions using known routines and maneuvers. Although the proficiency
checks suffice for pilot performance purposes, they are not suitable
for testing complex cognitive functions under actual conditions, such
as fatigue and stress; nor are they used to determine at what rate the
skills learned in the training sessions decline between two consecutive
checks. Standard maneuvers used in proficiency tests are inappropriate
for measuring any but obvious decrements in pilot performance. Their
inadequacy stems
[[Page 65984]]
from the fact that the maneuvers are well-known in advance; they may be
well-practiced and over-learned by experienced pilots; and they may
give no indication of the pilot's ability to perform them under
particular levels of stress, fatigue, or unexpected decision-making
requirements. Furthermore, the pass/fail nature of the testing program;
the probable wide variability among testers; and the train-to-
proficiency nature of these tests make them inadequate as a screening
mechanism.
III(b). Class I Medical Certificates and Special Issuance Certificates
Some commenters state that part 121 pilots are required to hold FAA
medical certificates, and that the medical certification process tests
their medical fitness. Commenters also point out that the FAA issues
waivers to pilots and permits them to fly with various medical
conditions, including cardiovascular problems. They state that if such
pilots can be evaluated, older pilots can too.
The question of operational privileges for aging pilots is not
comparable to the question of assessment of younger airmen with
specific medical conditions. Although individuals with known medical
conditions have been returned to air carrier duties, their
circumstances are not comparable with those of an individual who has
reached an advanced age. For the person with known disease, the
prognosis for the disease can normally be assessed and specific tests
or evaluations identified to monitor the condition. Special issuance
medical certificates are granted to airmen who have certain known
medical conditions or static defects that are disqualifying under the
established standards of the Federal Aviation Regulations. This
practice does not compromise safety and does not demand similar
consideration with respect to the Age 60 Rule. When a special issuance
medical certificate is granted, the condition in question has been
clearly identified, and the agency has been able to develop a means of
assessment and surveillance specially designed to demonstrate the
individual's capabilities and to identify any adverse changes. If that
is not possible, certification is not granted. Such is not the case in
aging, since there are no generally applicable medical tests that can,
at this time, adequately determine which individual pilots are subject
to incapacitation secondary to either acute cardiovascular or
neurological events or to more subtle adverse conditions related to
decline of cognitive functioning.
III(c). Suggested Protocol for Gathering Additional Data
One commenter states that data from actual part 121 pilots under 60
and over 60 are needed. The commenter suggested that a pilot group
should be established that can fly over age 60. He believes that a
cohort of over age 60 pilots can be identified with a quantifiable five
year cardiovascular risk that is lower than the risk in the 50 to 59
year age group. Also this group can be tested by serial performance
testing to ensure that there has not been subtle incapacitation. The
kind of data that is needed to change the rule could then be collected
and analyzed.
The commenter recommends that a consensus working group of experts,
appointed by the Federal Air Surgeon, deliver a document that describes
a battery of state-of-the-art testing to identify a group of age 60 or
older pilots who have the attributes for continued safe flying. A
second group of non-flying crew age 60 or older would also be
considered. The document would include all testing, follow up,
methodology, etc. The Federal Air Surgeon would then review the
protocol, obtain additional expert help as needed, and produce the
final protocol. Finally, the FAA would choose the sites for
participants in the long term surveillance program.
FAA Response: While the FAA appreciates the proposed protocol that
the commenter submitted, the FAA does not find it an acceptable basis
for initiating a rule change at this time. The FAA's ANPRM in 1982
proposed identification of a select group of aged 60 and over pilots
who would continue flying in part 121 operations to permit FAA to
collect data. The FAA withdrew the ANPRM in 1984 because valid
selection tests for the group did not exist. The FAA was concerned
that, without valid selection tests, these pilots would create an
unacceptable safety risk in part 121 operations. The commenter does not
suggest any data that indicates that a group described would be able to
identify any such tests. The FAA has the same concerns today.
IV. Financial Impact of the Age 60 Rule
IV(a). Costs
Some commenters stated that raising the age limit will reduce
costs, while other commenters stated that raising the age limit will
increase costs.
FAA Response: For the reasons discussed in this Disposition, the
FAA has determined that an amendment to the Age 60 Rule should not be
proposed at this time. Therefore, the FAA has not evaluated the
economic impact of a proposed change.
IV(b). Hiring of Pilots
Some commenters state that increasing the age limit would result in
the hiring of fewer new pilots, while others state that there would be
no change in hiring and no increase in furloughs because economic
success rather than retirements determines hiring and furloughs.
Commenters estimate that between 10 and 50 percent of pilots would
continue to fly if the age limit is extended.
FAA Response: The FAA believes that the primary determinant of new
pilot hiring and furlough is general economic conditions rather than
retirements. The effects of increasing the age of mandatory retirement
would depend on the number of pilots opting to delay their retirement,
which may vary considerably among air carriers. Pilots with long
tenures at a single carrier would be less inclined to delay their
retirement than pilots who began their service at a relatively late age
and may not have sufficient years of service at their present employer
to qualify for full vesting in pension plans. In addition, the hiring
and furlough plans of those air carriers that permit pilots over age 60
to serve as flight engineers would be less affected. Any effects on
furlough and new hires would be temporary as retirements would not be
delayed by more than the difference between the existing and the
amended mandatory retirement age.
V. Other Comments
V(a). Original Promulgation of Age 60 Rule
Several commenters contend that the Age 60 Rule was promulgated for
economic reasons in response to an improper personal request from the
chairman of American Airlines to the Administrator of the FAA and
question the FAA's recent actions in reviewing the rule.
FAA Response: When the Age 60 Rule was first promulgated in 1959,
the FAA followed standard rulemaking procedures. Notices were published
in the Federal Register (draft releases 59-4, 5, and 6, 24 FR 5249,
5248, and 5247, June 27, 1959), the public was given an opportunity to
comment on the proposal, and then the final rule was issued. The rule
was not issued to facilitate the operations of any air carrier. The
rule was promulgated in order to maintain a high level of safety in
part 121 operations, and that remains the FAA objective at the present
time.
[[Page 65985]]
V(b). Age Discrimination
Many commenters state that the current rule discriminates against
pilots 60 years of age or older and that the Age 60 Rule is not in
compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In addition,
many commenters state that the original establishment of the age 60
limit discriminated against people 60 years and older. However, many
commenters who are opposed to changing the rule state that since pilots
knew about the age 60 limit when they were hired, it is not
discriminatory.
FAA Response: The FAA agrees that limitations based on age are to
be avoided if possible. However, safety in air transportation is
paramount. As discussed above, the FAA has not found a way to
acceptably evaluate the inevitable deterioration that occurs with age.
Considering that the consequences of a pilot's subtle or sudden
incapacitation potentially are so severe, the FAA has determined that
at this time safety requires the Age 60 Rule to remain unchanged.
The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission suggests that the FAA
use special testing or screening to identify those pilots over age 60
who should be required to stop serving in part 121 operations. They
note that some employers of pilots in non-part 121 operations have
resolved age discrimination litigation by agreeing to use such
additional testing to develop data about pilots' health. However, the
FAA has not been apprised of the testing protocols or of the results of
any such testing, has not seen them discussed in the medical
literature, and has not been party to the agreements. Accordingly,
these are not a basis to determine that such testing can be used
instead of an age limitation.
V(c). Foreign Pilots Over Age 60
Many commenters reference ICAO standards, the JAA proposal, and the
foreign countries that permit pilots to be over age 60, with varying
restrictions. In addition, many commenters point out that the FAA
allows foreign carriers to operate in U.S. airspace and airports with
over age 60 pilots and questioned why U.S. pilots over 60 can't operate
in U.S. airspace and airports.
FAA Response: Following the FAA's promulgation of the Age 60 Rule,
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted changes to
international safety standards that established an age limit of 60 for
the pilot in command of large transport aircraft operating in
international air transport service. ICAO standards do not limit the
age of the second in command, although an age limit of 60 is
recommended. In October 1994, a working group of ICAO's Air Navigation
Commission prepared a working paper on the upper age limits for flight
crewmembers. The group, acknowledging the lack of medical statistical
information, recommended that the age limit not be changed. Some
countries such as France and Germany have an Age 60 Rule similar to the
United States, while other countries such as the United Kingdom and
Switzerland have adopted rules that allow pilots to fly after their
60th birthdays. If foreign airlines operate in the U.S., the FAA
requires that the carrier adhere to the ICAO standard. In addition, the
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) in Europe has proposed to harmonize
the European rule to allow pilots who have not reached the age of 65 to
operate in multi-pilot operations, provided no more than one pilot in
the cockpit is over the age of 60. (JAR-FCL 2-1.11.)
Accordingly, not all countries have dealt with the issue of age
limitations in the same manner, and for the reasons discussed elsewhere
in this Disposition, the FAA has determined that the Age 60 Rule should
be maintained in the United States.
V(d). Inconsistency With Other Regulations
Many commenters point out that pilots who operate under other than
part 121 can fly after reaching age 60. They believe, therefore, that
there should not be an age limit in part 121 operations.
FAA Response: The Age 60 Rule, like many other safety rules that
apply to part 121 operations and not others, provides an increased
level of safety appropriate to the operations conducted under part 121.
The Commuter Rule proposal, as discussed above, looked at enhancing the
level of safety for certain operations now under part 135. The FAA
proposed one age limit on all pilots employed in part 121 operations,
including those pilots currently employed in the part 135 operations
covered by the proposal (60 FR 16230; March 29, 1995). The final
Commuter Rule is being issued concurrently with this Disposition.
The FAA's statute requires the Administrator to give consideration
to the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their services with
the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest and to
make rules appropriate to the differences between air transportation
and other air commerce. The Age 60 Rule is responsive to this mandate.
V(e). Pilot Union Membership
Many commenters state that pilot unions and employers may favor
retirement at age 60 and write this into their labor contracts, but
pilots who do not belong to those unions should not be penalized by
actions that benefit union members. In addition, commenters state that
some union members disagree with their union's position and they
question their union's motivation for changing their position on the
question of raising the age limit.
FAA Response: The Age 60 Rule is a safety rule that must apply to
all pilots, regardless of union membership or labor contracts. The FAA
cannot speculate as to the basis for union or management positions.
V(f). Experienced Pilot Shortages
Many commenters state that new pilots have a shorter time for
gaining experience as second and first officer because of the rapid
expansion of the major carriers and the increasing numbers of two-
person cockpits. The commenters state that carriers that allow rapid
promotion to Captain have poor safety records. Commenters also point
out that industry forecasts project a shortage of pilots between 1995
and 2010 due to sharply reduced military pilot training, thus the
airlines' most experienced pilots should be retained.
FAA Response: The FAA has not been apprised of data that shows that
the Age 60 Rule will create a shortage of experienced pilots and
thereby compromise safety.
VI. Conclusion
While the FAA considered each comment in its evaluation of the Age
60 Rule, for the most part the comments made assertions and expressed
opinions but did not provide the FAA with additional facts or analysis
sufficient to support changing the rule. The FAA's overriding
regulatory concern is safety. Before issuing a regulation, the FAA must
be satisfied that it will maintain or raise the current level of
safety.
The Civil Aviation Medical Association's (CAMA) comments are
particularly relevant. CAMA noted that medical conditions are degraded
by age and that the aging process accelerates with time. It took a
neutral position as to the Age 60 Rule, however, stating that the basic
question is one of public policy and determining how much risk is
acceptable.
The only things that are clear from review of all of the comments
and relevant literature is that there is no one obviously ``right
answer'' discovered through scientific or medical studies,
[[Page 65986]]
and, as CAMA states, the basic question is one of public policy and
determining how much risk is acceptable. The FAA must evaluate all the
varied evidence that indicates what those risks are, and determine
where the public interest lies. At this time, the FAA cannot be assured
that raising the age 60 limit will maintain or raise the level of
safety that the Age 60 Rule offers.
Although the Hilton Study provides useful information on accident
rates for pilots as a function of their age, it does not provide a
satisfactory basis for changing the Age 60 Rule.
Therefore, after carefully considering the written comments
submitted to the docket, the comments presented at the public meeting,
and analysis of the Hilton Study, the FAA has determined for the
reasons stated above that no change to the Age 60 Rule should be
proposed at this time.
Issued in Washington, DC on December 11, 1995.
William J. White,
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service.
[FR Doc. 95-30546 Filed 12-14-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
