96-32288. Complaint of Coalition Against Unfair USPS Competition; Declaratory Order Finding Complaint to be Justified and Providing For Further Proceedings  

  • [Federal Register Volume 61, Number 246 (Friday, December 20, 1996)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 67356-67363]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 96-32288]
    
    
    =======================================================================
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    POSTAL RATE COMMISSION
    
    [Order No. 1145; Docket No. C96-1]
    
    
    Complaint of Coalition Against Unfair USPS Competition; 
    Declaratory Order Finding Complaint to be Justified and Providing For 
    Further Proceedings
    
        Before Commissioners: Edward J. Gleiman, Chairman; H. Edward 
    Quick, Jr., Vice-
    
    [[Page 67357]]
    
    Chairman; George W. Haley; and W.H. ``Trey'' LeBlanc III
    December 16, 1996.
    
    I. Introduction and Procedural History
    
        This somewhat unusual proceeding concerns a complaint lodged by 
    private-sector competitors of the Postal Service against the Service's 
    provision of a packaging service which it is offering under the name 
    ``Pack & Send.'' This service, which is performed by Postal Service 
    personnel for postal customers according to a variable schedule of 
    fees, has never been submitted for the Commission's consideration and 
    possible recommendation in a mail classification or rate change 
    proceeding. Thus, it is not a service recognized within the 
    comprehensive Domestic Mail Classification Schedule which officially 
    codifies all services provided in the Nation's postal system, and the 
    fees charged by the Postal Service have never been reviewed or 
    recommended. On this basis alone, the Complainant asks the Commission 
    to find that the Postal Service is charging rates which do not conform 
    to the policies and requirements set out in Title 39 of the United 
    States Code.
        This docket was initiated by a Complaint filed by the Coalition 
    Against Unfair USPS Competition (CAUUC) on May 23, 1996. Complainant 
    identifies itself as a coalition consisting of organizations and 
    individuals doing business in the Commercial Mail Receiving Agency 
    (``CMRA'') industry, and states that ``[e]ach of the individual stores 
    offer pack and send services as part of the overall retail value-added 
    services provided in these stores.'' Complaint at 2. Inasmuch as the 
    Postal Service is rendering a packaging service without first having 
    requested a recommended decision on the service and its rates from the 
    Commission, Complainant alleges that the Postal Service is charging 
    rates which do not conform to the policies of the Postal Reorganization 
    Act. Additionally, the Complaint alleges, by offering the Pack & Send 
    service the Postal Service ``is in effect going into direct competition 
    with the CMRA industry * * *.'' Ibid.
        Accompanying the Complaint are several attachments intended to 
    document particulars of the Pack & Send service, its competitive 
    purpose, and the terms under which it is being offered. Complaint, 
    Attachments 2-3, 5. Also included is an affidavit reporting the 
    experience of an individual customer who purchased Pack & Send service 
    in a Postal Service retail store in Anchorage, Alaska. Id., Attachment 
    4.
        The Postal Service responded to the Complaint in an Answer filed on 
    June 24, 1996. The Answer denies most of the Complaint's allegations, 
    but concedes that the Service ``has begun to offer packaging on an 
    experimental basis at a few selected retail outlets.'' Answer at 2. The 
    Service also denies that Pack & Send is a ``bundled'' service that 
    necessarily entails mailing, but admits that the packaging service has 
    not been the subject of a rate or classification proceeding pursuant to 
    39 U.S.C. 3622 or 3623 respectively, and that the Domestic Mail 
    Classification Schedule does not include a separate classification for 
    packaging. Id. at 2, 5 and 7. However, the Postal Service also takes 
    the position that the Complaint is not properly before the Commission, 
    on the grounds that Pack & Send is no more than a ``limited parcel 
    packaging trial,'' (id. at 8), and that it ``is not a postal service, 
    within previous interpretations of the term.'' Id. at 9.
        Three days after filing its Answer, the Postal Service submitted a 
    motion to dismiss the proceeding with prejudice ``on the grounds that 
    the subject matter of this proceeding does not fall within the scope of 
    39 U.S.C. 3662.'' Motion of the United States Postal Service to Dismiss 
    Proceeding, June 27, 1996, at 1. The Service argues that Pack & Send is 
    a service that properly belongs in the category of ``non-postal'' 
    services, over which the Commission exercises no jurisdiction, and 
    relies on Commission precedent and judicial authority for support.
        In Order No. 1128, issued July 30, 1996, the Commission denied the 
    Service's motion to dismiss, finding that some of the information 
    proffered by Complainant would tend to support an inference that Pack & 
    Send is a postal service. In light of its tentative conclusion that 
    available facts did not warrant a summary determination, and that the 
    Complaint might be justified, the Commission decided to conduct formal 
    proceedings in conformity with 39 U.S.C. 3624, established a deadline 
    for filing notices of intervention, and appointed W. Gail Willette, 
    Director of the Commission's Office of the Consumer Advocate, to 
    represent the general public in the proceeding. Complainant was also 
    directed to provide a statement estimating the amount of time it would 
    require to develop and file a direct case. PRC Order No. 1128 at 13. On 
    the same date, the Chairman issued a notice designating Commissioner 
    George W. Haley to serve as Presiding Officer in the docket.
        On September 13, the Complainant proffered its direct case, 
    accompanied by a Motion for Summary Judgment,1 and a supporting 
    memorandum. Recognizing that disposition of Complainant's motion could 
    ``involve a final determination of the proceeding[,]'' (39 C.F.R. 
    3001.27(a)(7)), the Presiding Officer certified it to the full 
    Commission on the same date. P.O. Ruling C96-1/2 at 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \1\ Complainant Coalition Against Unfair USPS Competition's 
    Direct Case; Motion of Complainant for Summary Judgment, September 
    13, 1996. On September 16, Complainant filed a related motion which 
    sought to compel additional responses by the Postal Service to 
    Complainant's discovery requests in the event its Motion for Summary 
    Judgment was denied. Complainant Coalition Against Unfair USPS 
    Competition's Alternative Motion to Compel Discovery, September 16, 
    1996.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        In Order No. 1135, issued October 4, 1996, the Commission noted the 
    parties' consensus that only one issue--namely, the ``postal'' 
    character of Pack & Send--requires resolution by the Commission, and 
    that this consensus greatly simplifies the case. However, the 
    Commission found that it would not be appropriate to conclude the 
    proceeding by granting Complainant's motion, in light of the existence 
    of genuine issues of material fact and the requirements of procedural 
    fairness. Consequently, the Commission declined to curtail the 
    opportunities of the Postal Service or any other interested party to 
    develop further relevant and material information for inclusion in the 
    record of the proceeding, but appropriately limited that evidence to 
    factual matters that bear directly on the ``postal'' or ``non-postal'' 
    character of the Pack & Send service. Although the Commission found 
    that the procedural status of CAUUC's complaint made it inappropriate 
    to reach the merits on the CAUUC Motion for Summary Judgment, it stated 
    an expectation that the Presiding Officer would expedite the initial 
    phase of Docket No. C96-1 in light of the urgent considerations of 
    competitive harm cited by Complainant. PRC Order No. 1135 at 4-7.
        A prehearing conference was held in this docket on October 8, 
    1996.2 In accordance with the procedural schedule established in 
    P.O. Ruling C96-1/6, an opportunity was provided for a hearing on 
    Complainant's direct case. However, the Postal Service and all other 
    parties declined the opportunity to conduct oral cross-examination. The 
    Presiding Officer extended the deadline for filing rebuttal testimony 
    to November 1, 1996, in granting a Postal Service motion in part. P.O. 
    Ruling C96-1/7. The deadline was further extended as requested in a 
    second Postal Service motion. P.O. Ruling C96-1/8. A hearing was
    
    [[Page 67358]]
    
    conducted on the rebuttal testimony of Postal Service witness Patricia 
    M. Gibert on November 12, 1996.3
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \2\ See Transcript Volume 1.
        \3\ See Transcript Volume 2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Initial briefs were filed by the Complainant, the Postal Service, 
    and OCA on November 22, 1996. The same parties submitted reply briefs 
    on November 27, 1996.
        In light of the foregoing proceedings, the central issue posed by 
    the Complaint is now ripe for determination.
    
    II. Criteria for Distinguishing ``Postal'' From ``Non-Postal'' 
    Services
    
        As all parties to this proceeding recognize, a determination of the 
    merits of the instant Complaint depends upon applying legal criteria 
    for distinguishing ``postal'' from ``non-postal'' service to the facts 
    contained in record evidence. Thus, it is appropriate to begin with a 
    review of these criteria and the history of their application in prior 
    proceedings.
    
    A. Early Institutional History
    
        In the first and second omnibus rate proceedings before the 
    Commission, the Postal Service did not include any proposed changes in 
    fees for special services in its requests.4 Shortly after filing 
    its request in Docket No. R76-1, the Postal Service gave separate 
    notice of its intention to increase fees for 11 special services after 
    a period for submission of written comments, and provided details of 
    these changes to the Commission for informational purposes only. A 
    mailer organization, Associated Third Class Mail Users (ATCMU), filed a 
    suit in U.S. District Court to enjoin implementation of the changes in 
    special service fees, arguing that fees could not be changed without 
    submitting a request to the Commission. The District Court agreed with 
    ATCMU, finding with respect to the 11 special services at issue:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \4\ See PRC Op. R71-1, June 5, 1972; PRC Op. R74-1, August 28, 
    1975.
    
        It is clear that nearly all of these other services are very 
    closely related to the delivery of mail. The single possible 
    exception is the selling of money orders, since they can be used 
    equally as well without being delivered by mail. But it does seem 
    that the vast majority of money orders sold at post offices are 
    actually sent by mail. Therefore, it appears safe to say that all of 
    these services would be considered ``postal services'' in ordinary 
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    parlance.
    
    Associated Third Class Mail Users v. Postal Service, 405 F.Supp. 1109, 
    1115 (D.D.C. 1975). The court also observed that ``the fees set for 
    these services have substantial public effect[,]'' (ibid.), which 
    apparently reinforced its conclusion that the services were ``postal'' 
    in nature. It then went on to reject the Postal Service's claim of 
    unilateral authority to change fees applicable to the special services, 
    concluding from its analysis of the Reorganization Act, ``that the 
    Postal Rate Commission has jurisdiction over changes in the fees for 
    the services at issue here. Therefore, * * * the Postal Service cannot 
    increase its fees for these services until it has complied with the 
    [formal rate-change procedures] of Chapter 36 of the Act.'' Id. at 
    1118.
        On review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's 
    judgment, without adopting all of its reasoning. The court said:
    
        Giving ``postal services'' a plain meaning, all of the services 
    here at issue may reasonably be so classified. With one possible 
    exception, each clearly involves an aspect in the posting, handling 
    and delivery of mail matter. (citation omitted) * * * As for the one 
    possible exception--money orders--it is undisputed that the great 
    majority of these are sent through the mail and that therefore the 
    provision of money orders may itself reasonably be viewed as 
    intimately a part of postal services * * *
    * * * * *
        In sum, we agree with the district court that a plain reading is 
    the proper reading of section 3622: ``postal services'' as used 
    there is a generic term and was meant to include all the special 
    services here at issue.
    
    National Association of Greeting Card Publishers v. Postal Service, 569 
    F.2d 570, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 434 U.S. 
    884 (1977) (commonly known as ``NAGCP I''). (Emphasis added.)
        In Docket No. R76-1, after the Postal Service had supplemented its 
    initial rate request to include special services in response to the 
    District Court's decision in ATCMU, the Commission addressed the 
    question of which services are within its jurisdiction for ratesetting 
    purposes, and which are not. In the Commission's view, a number of the 
    services furnished by the Postal Service in addition to the actual 
    collection, transmission, and delivery of mail ``are clearly nonpostal 
    in character.'' PRC Op. R76-1, Vol. 1, at 266. The Commission discussed 
    the principles governing its determinations of ratesetting jurisdiction 
    for individual special services in an appendix to its opinion,5 
    but also stated as its general conclusion:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \5\ See PRC Op. R76-1, Vol. 2, Appendix F.
    
        Special postal services--that is, those which fall within the 
    ambit of section 3622--are services other than the actual carriage 
    of mail but supportive or auxiliary thereto. They enhance the value 
    of service rendered under one of the substantive mail classes by 
    providing such features as added security, added convenience or 
    speed, indemnity against loss, correct information as to the current 
    address of a recipient, etc. We believe that this standard is 
    consistent with the decision in Associated Third Class Mail Users, 
    supra, that special postal fees are within the jurisdiction of the 
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Commission.
    
    Id. at 266-67. (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
    
    B. Subsequent Developments
    
        There have been few subsequent disputes regarding the ``postal'' or 
    ``non-postal'' character of service innovations adopted by the Postal 
    Service.6 However, one area in which a ``postal'' versus ``non-
    postal'' dispute has been litigated recently concerns the Postal 
    Service's provision of philatelic services.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \6\ More commonly, litigation has involved claims that a service 
    change contemplated or implemented by the Postal Service is a 
    ``change in the nature of postal services'' requiring the submission 
    of a proposal to the Commission under section 3661; the ``postal'' 
    quality of the service has not been in controversy. The first 
    dispute of this type was litigated in Buchanan v. United States 
    Postal Service, 375 F.Supp. 1014 (N.D. Ala. 1974), affirmed in part, 
    508 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), in which a Postal Service nationwide 
    plan to reconfigure retail facilities was found to be a ``change in 
    the nature of postal services,'' thus requiring a request and 
    proceedings under section 3661. The Postal Service subsequently 
    filed a complying request, and proceedings were held in Docket No. 
    N75-1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The Postal Service is explicitly authorized ``to provide philatelic 
    services'' in a provision that is separate from the grant of power to 
    provide all aspects of mail service. 39 U.S.C. 404(a)(1), (a)(5). 
    Courts presented with controversies regarding philatelic services have 
    generally interpreted these portions of the Reorganization Act to mean 
    that the Postal Service has authority to exercise broad and unilateral 
    discretion over philatelic operations.7 They have also found that 
    the rights and procedural safeguards provided for users of the mail in 
    the Reorganization Act do not extend to users of philatelic 
    services.8 On these grounds, courts have found that philatelic 
    customers have no enforceable right of action against the Postal 
    Service for allegedly improper philatelic activities.9
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \7\ Morris et al. v. Runyon et al., 870 F.Supp. 362, 368-69 
    (D.D.C. 1994), appeal dismissed, No. 94-5344 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
        \8\ Unicover et al. v. United States Postal Service, 859 F.Supp. 
    1437, 1446 (D. Wyo. 1994), appeal dismissed, No. 94-8085 (10th Cir. 
    1994). See also Morris, supra, at 368-69.
        \9\ Morris, supra, at 370-71; Unicover, supra, at 1446.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        In the single Commission complaint proceeding that has involved 
    philatelic services, the disposition is consistent with the judicial 
    treatment described above. In Docket No. C95-1,
    
    [[Page 67359]]
    
    complainant David B. Popkin challenged planned increases in the 
    shipping and handling charges for orders placed with the Postal Service 
    Philatelic Fulfillment Service (PFSC) catalog sales program. The Postal 
    Service moved to dismiss the proceeding, primarily on the ground that, 
    ``the subject matter * * * concerns philatelic services which are not 
    within the scope of 39 U.S.C. 3662.'' Motion of the United States 
    Postal Service to Dismiss Proceeding, April 13, 1995, at 2. (Footnote 
    omitted.) The Service also claimed that the absence of the word ``fee'' 
    from section 3662 should be construed to preclude adjudication of 
    complaints concerning fees for postal services, as distinguished from 
    rates. Id. at 3, n. 3.
        In Order No. 1075, the Commission rejected the latter argument, 
    concluding that, ``complaints concerning fees for postal services do 
    fall within the scope of section 3662[.]'' PRC Order No. 1075, 
    September 11, 1995, at 5. However, the Commission concurred with the 
    Postal Service's primary jurisdictional argument, based on an 
    application of the District Court's standard in the ATCMU decision:
    
        Applying the rationale of the District Court to the facts 
    involved in the present complaint, the Commission finds that the 
    services involved--the handling and shipping of catalog orders 
    placed with the Philatelic Fulfillment Service Center--are not 
    closely related to the delivery of mail and, therefore, the charges 
    for such services do not constitute ``fees for postal services'' 
    within the scope of section 3662 of title 39, United States Code.
    
    Ibid. Having reached this conclusion, the Commission dismissed the 
    complaint.10
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \10\ Complainant subsequently petitioned for reconsideration of 
    the Commission's determination to dismiss the Complaint. The 
    Commission denied his motion in Order No. 1088, issued November 15, 
    1995.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    III. Applying the Criteria to the Facts
    
    A. Which Test or Tests Should Apply?
    
        Determining whether the Pack & Send service is ``postal'' or ``non-
    postal'' in character is complicated by a disagreement among the 
    parties in this case regarding which legal standard or standards should 
    govern that determination. Among other arguments they present, both 
    Complainant and the OCA claim that the Pack & Send service should be 
    deemed ``postal'' on the same basis on which the ATCMU and NAGCP courts 
    found money orders to constitute a postal service: the ``great 
    likelihood'' that use of the service will be coupled with mailing of 
    the parcel so prepared. OCA Initial Brief at 6; CAUUC Brief at 12-13. 
    The Postal Service argues against use of this so-called ``statistical'' 
    test, citing misgivings expressed in the R76-1 opinion regarding its 
    application to money orders, and stating that it would be ``unwise for 
    the Commission now to rely on allegations concerning the proportion of 
    postal-packaged parcels that are also mailed in determining whether 
    packaging service is a postal service.'' Postal Service Initial Brief 
    at 16. The Postal Service argues for application of a ``structural'' 
    analysis of the Pack & Send service, which it claims the Commission 
    applied to certain special services in the R76-1 opinion, and under 
    which the Service argues that Pack & Send is ``non-postal'' in 
    character. Id. at 9-17; Postal Service Reply Brief at 3-5. Both 
    Complainant and the OCA challenge the validity of the Postal Service's 
    ``structural'' standard.
        It is understandable that each party would advance the standard 
    which it considers to provide the strongest support of its position on 
    the ``postal'' or ``non-postal'' nature of Pack & Send. However, from 
    the Commission's perspective, it is neither necessary nor productive to 
    canonize any one particular test in preference to, or to the exclusion 
    of, every other potentially applicable criterion. The courts have 
    stated that the fundamental inquiry to be made is whether the service 
    under scrutiny is a ``postal service'' in ordinary parlance, the 
    ``plain meaning'' of which is established by reference to the routine 
    postal functions of accepting, handling and delivering mail matter. 
    ATCMU, supra, at 1115; NAGCP, supra, at 596-97. It is also appropriate 
    to consider the extent to which fees set for the service have 
    ``substantial public effect,'' as suggested in the ATCMU opinion. As 
    the Commission has recognized in prior proceedings, most notably Docket 
    No. R76-1, there are a variety of analytical lenses through which 
    potential relationships to customary postal functions may be usefully 
    viewed. PRC Op. R76-1, Appendix F, passim.11 Accordingly, in 
    considering the ``postal'' or ``non-postal'' character of the Pack & 
    Send service, the Commission will assess the utility and persuasive 
    force of all the theories and interpretations of the factual record 
    advanced by the parties to this proceeding.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \11\ The Postal Service summarizes some of these considerations 
    in its Initial Brief at 10-12.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    B. Relationship to Non-Postal Statutory Functions of the Postal Service
    
        As was noted in the earlier review of criteria for distinguishing 
    ``postal'' from ``non-postal'' services, one conclusive basis on which 
    a service can be found to be ``non-postal'' applies where the service 
    pertains exclusively to performance of a statutory function of the 
    Postal Service that is distinct from the carriage of mail. Philatelic 
    sales and services, performed pursuant to the separate grant of 
    authority in 39 U.S.C. 404(a)(5), exemplify such statutorily non-postal 
    services.
        The Postal Service makes no such claim regarding the Pack & Send 
    service. Instead, the Service characterizes the service as ``an 
    enhancement to the retail sale of packaging materials[,]'' which is 
    intended ``to provide a higher level of service that our existing 
    customers have requested.'' Rebuttal Testimony of Patricia M. Gibert, 
    USPS-RT-1, at 3. Consequently, as Complainant has argued, the Pack & 
    Send service is unlike the Postal Service's sale of migratory waterfowl 
    stamps or distribution of information pertaining to civil service 
    examinations, which fulfill a distinctly governmental, non-postal 
    function. Therefore, the Pack & Send service cannot be found ``non-
    postal'' on this particular ground.
    
    C. Intrinsic and ``Structural'' Features of the Pack & Send Service
    
        Although there appears to be little disagreement regarding the 
    basic factual details of the Pack & Send service, the parties 
    characterize the service, and portray its relationship to mailing, very 
    differently. The Service espouses what might be called a ``free-
    standing'' view of Pack & Send: a mere extension of the sale of 
    packaging materials, with no relation to any aspect of mail service nor 
    to any operational objective or benefit of the Postal Service. USPS-RT-
    1 at 3-4; Initial Brief at 5-7, 11-17. By contrast, Complainant and the 
    OCA present a perspective in which the Pack & Send service transaction 
    is intertwined with mailing. OCA argues that the service is postal in 
    character because ``packing'' and ``sending'' are integrated in a 
    ``seamless'' operation that intermingles packaging and mailing 
    activities, in a transaction throughout which the Postal Service 
    retains custody of the item tendered by the customer for service. OCA 
    Initial Brief at 1-4.
        In the Commission's opinion, the Postal Service's characterization 
    of the Pack & Send service is seriously flawed in several respects. 
    Moreover, it is fundamentally at odds with the significance of adding a 
    parcel
    
    [[Page 67360]]
    
    packaging service to the current array of services offered at postal 
    facilities.
        First, the Commission rejects the Postal Service's blanket 
    assertion that Pack & Send service ``is not an aspect of the 
    acceptance, handling, or delivery of the mail[.]'' Postal Service 
    Initial Brief at 6. The record clearly establishes that Pack & Send 
    service is an optional aspect of the acceptance of parcels for mailing. 
    A postal customer may either tender a finished parcel to a window clerk 
    for mailing, or purchase the Pack & Send service for packaging the 
    contents. In either case, the criterion of mailability applies; the 
    Postal Service will not provide Pack & Send service for non-mailable 
    contents. USPS-RT-1 at 6, n. 2; Exhibit USPS-1B. In response to a 
    question from Chairman Gleiman, witness Gibert testified: ``The first 
    question [Postal Service employees] are trained to ask is, is the item 
    mailable?'' Tr. 2/204. When asked why this determination is important, 
    the witness stated, in part, ``[b]ecause a significant number of the 
    pieces that will be packed will also be sent via Postal Service[.]'' 
    Id. at 205. Thus, acceptability for mailing applies equally to finished 
    parcels and materials tendered for Pack & Send service.
        Second, the Commission finds no persuasive force in the Postal 
    Service's arguments that Pack & Send service does not achieve any 
    operational objective of, or confer any operational benefit upon, the 
    Postal Service. As an initial matter, these assertions are unproven on 
    the record and far from self-evident. For example, by complying with 
    packaging requirements prescribed in a Postal Service Training Manual, 
    see Tr. 2/72, a parcel prepared in a Pack & Send transaction would be 
    unlikely to suffer damage to the contents or cause damage to postal 
    equipment,12 and thereby confer an operational benefit to the 
    Service. More importantly, operational objectives and benefits would 
    not appear to be particularly useful reference criteria for 
    establishing that a given service is non-postal. By restricting 
    scrutiny to considerations internal to the Postal Service, employing 
    these criteria would neglect the needs of, and potential benefits to, 
    postal customers. Moreover, it is unlikely that several current special 
    services subject to the Commission's mail classification and rate 
    jurisdiction would pass muster as ``postal'' under such criteria. As 
    witness Gibert confirmed in response to a question from Chairman 
    Gleiman, ``[i]n the case of certificate of mailing [service], it 
    appears that the benefit is to the customer.'' Id. at 233.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \12\ As witness Gibert illustrated this point, in ``follow[ing] 
    our own packaging requirements'' a Postal Service employee 
    ``wouldn't use string'' in securing the parcel, because ``[i]t could 
    get hung up in machinery.'' Tr. 2/239.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Finally, the Commission is in fundamental disagreement with the 
    Postal Service's characterization of the Pack & Send service and its 
    significance in the universe of postal and non-postal services. 
    Contrary to the Service's formalistic insistence on brief that 
    packaging ``cannot properly be called `mail preparation' '' because the 
    latter is a term of art ``not applied to the non-technical activities 
    that every mailer must undertake to enter an item into the mail,'' 
    Postal Service Initial Brief at 5, n. 1, the Commission concludes that, 
    in ordinary parlance, Pack & Send service constitutes mail preparation 
    for a fee. It also constitutes an entirely new form of access to the 
    parcel services offered by the Postal Service, which allows a potential 
    parcel mailer to tender the items they wish to send, rather than 
    finished packages. For this reason, Pack & Send can properly be viewed 
    as a value-added special service for parcels; the added value results 
    from the alternative form of acceptance it makes possible.
        For these reasons, the Commission concludes that the Pack & Send 
    service is both structurally related to mailing in the acceptance 
    function, and intrinsically postal. The ability of Pack & Send 
    customers, who are so disposed, to purchase the packaging service 
    without also purchasing a category of parcel delivery service does not 
    alter these conclusions.
    
    D. Correlation Between Use of Pack & Send Service and Use of the Mail
    
        Both the Complainant and OCA argue that the Pack & Send service 
    should be found to be ``postal'' on the same ground that the ATCMU and 
    NAGCP courts found the sale of money orders to be ``postal'': that the 
    vast majority of transactions lead to actual use of the mail. 
    Complainant cites the Postal Service's rebuttal testimony as 
    establishing that a typical Pack & Send transaction involves the 
    purchase of postage. CAUUC Brief at 9. CAUUC also presents the 
    affidavits of Michael L. Phillips and Edward N. Frye, both of whom 
    testify that only a very small percentage--1 percent or less--of the 
    parcels packed by their stores will not be mailed or shipped by those 
    stores. Tr. 2/82, 88; CAUUC Initial Brief at 5. Citing the same 
    affidavits and witness Gibert's concession that ``the likelihood of 
    [Pack & Send customers] mailing is fairly high[,]'' OCA argues that the 
    ``great likelihood that Pack and Send will be coupled with mailing 
    would constitute a dispositive tendency * * *'' toward a finding that 
    the Service is ``postal'' under the ATCMU court's standard. OCA Initial 
    Brief at 5-6.
        The Postal Service argues that CAUUC's and OCA's invocation of the 
    test it labels ``statistical'' is both inconsistent with the 
    ``structural'' standard it espouses and flawed. The first flaw in the 
    approach, the Service argues, ``is that the record is devoid of this 
    statistic.'' Postal Service Reply Brief at 5. The Service characterizes 
    the Phillips and Frye affidavits as ``an attempt to fabricate an ersatz 
    statistic'' because the record is devoid of evidence that would support 
    an analogy between the packaging operations in affiants'' stores and 
    the Postal Service's implementation of Pack & Send service. Id. at 5-6. 
    Additionally, the Service argues that the record rebuts CAUUC's and 
    OCA's conclusion that the sale of Pack & Send is combined with the sale 
    of postage for accounting purposes, because a separate Account 
    Identifier Code (AIC) has been established for Pack & Send 
    transactions. Id. at 6-7.
        Notwithstanding the Postal Service's arguments against application 
    of what it calls the ``statistical'' standard, the Commission agrees 
    with Complainant and the OCA that the available information regarding 
    Pack & Send service indicates a high correlation between purchase of 
    the Pack & Send service and use of the mail for the parcel so prepared. 
    The Postal Service concedes it has no records that would indicate how 
    many Pack & Send transactions to date have culminated in a parcel 
    mailing, Reply Brief at 6, but witness Gibert's best ``judgmental 
    answer'' is that ``a fairly high proportion are shipped.'' Tr. 2/189. 
    Furthermore, while the Phillips and Frye affidavits submitted by 
    Complainant report experience in private stores, not Postal Service 
    operations, they serve to confirm the common-sense expectation that a 
    customer who brings an unpackaged item into a facility that offers both 
    packing and shipping services is likely to use both. Therefore, in the 
    Commission's view, the available facts justify a reasonable degree of 
    certainty that the Pack & Send service would satisfy the standard 
    applied by the ATCMU court to money orders. The Commission agrees with 
    OCA that the likely coupling of the service with parcel mailing 
    establishes a ``dispositive tendency'' toward a finding that the 
    Service is ``postal.''
    
    E. Public Representations and Public Effect
    
        The record of this proceeding is replete with public declarations 
    of the Postal Service, and inducements to
    
    [[Page 67361]]
    
    potential customers, that present Pack & Send service conjunctively 
    with the mailing of parcels, or in the context of the parcel mailing 
    services it offers. The Report of the Postmaster General for 1995 
    describes Pack & Send as ``a value-added service designed to strengthen 
    the Postal Service's retail parcel service while adding an important 
    convenience to customers.'' Tr. 3/264. See also Tr. 2/38, 2/227. Part 
    of a written response of the Postmaster General to Chairman McHugh of 
    the Subcommittee on the Postal Service of the House Committee on 
    Government Reform and Oversight describes Pack & Send as ``[a] value 
    added service that allows customers to bring items to selected post 
    offices and have them packaged and mailed.'' Tr. 3/271. Internal 
    communications of the Postal Service have contained similar 
    characterizations. Tr. 2/36, 43, 49, 51-52. Advertising has urged 
    potential customers to ``Let Us Box, Pack and Ship Your Gifts,'' and 
    offered the inducement of discount coupons applicable to the cost of 
    packing material and labor. Tr. 2/45, 42, 55, 59-60.
        All these materials would lead an objective observer to conclude 
    that the Pack & Send service is a new feature and an enhancement of the 
    Postal Service's pre-existing parcel delivery services, and that in 
    offering Pack & Send the Postal Service is pursuing both potential 
    users of the service and additional use of parcel services. The Postal 
    Service does not dispute the authenticity of any of these 
    materials.13
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \13\ However, witness Gibert did testify that, ``we have 
    subsequently said no promotional materials may be produced in this 
    regard unless they get cleared by my organization, because of some 
    of the issues around wording in the coupons.'' Tr. 2/228.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The public effect of offering the Pack & Send service appears to be 
    minor to date, as witness Gibert testifies that the ``current sales 
    average is about one parcel packaging transaction per business day per 
    Pack & Send site.'' USPS-RT-1 at 4. However, should the Postal Service 
    decide to expand the availability of the service significantly, the 
    potential competitive injury anticipated by CAUUC could occur, 
    depending on the Service's success in attracting Pack & Send customers. 
    The Phillips and Frye affidavits establish that a customer for a 
    store's packaging service will almost certainly purchase shipping in 
    the same transaction. Therefore, diversion of a potential packaging 
    customer from a store to the Postal Service would represent not only 
    the loss of the packaging business, but also whatever revenue would be 
    associated with the shipping transaction. This being the case, the 
    levels of fees charged for Pack & Send service are likely to have a 
    significant public effect, particularly on stores in the Commercial 
    Mail Receiving Agency industry.
    
    F. General Conclusion
    
        Application of the legal standards that have been employed in prior 
    decisions to distinguish ``postal'' from ``non-postal'' services leads 
    the Commission to conclude that the Pack & Send service is definitely 
    ``postal'' in character. By offering postal customers a parcel 
    preparation service for items they bring to retail facilities, the 
    Postal Service has introduced a wholly new method of accepting mailable 
    items for ultimate delivery as parcels. Thus, Pack & Send service has a 
    direct structural relationship to the provision of postal services. 
    Intrinsically, it is a value-added service available for the categories 
    of parcel service provided by the Postal Service; the locus of the 
    added value is the alternative form of acceptance it provides. For this 
    reason, Pack & Send is a service ``other than the actual carriage of 
    mail but supportive or auxiliary thereto[,]'' which ``enhance[s] the 
    value of service rendered under * * * substantive mail classes[,]'' and 
    thus satisfies the general criterion for ``postal'' services formulated 
    by the Commission in Docket No. R76-1. PRC Op. R76-1 at 267. In common 
    parlance, as well as under these more analytical legal tests, it is a 
    postal service.
        In addition, as might reasonably be expected, there is a high 
    correlation between a postal customer's use of the Pack & Send service 
    and mailing of the finished parcels it produces. This is the very 
    response that the Postal Service's public representations outside this 
    proceeding anticipate, and that the Service's advertising to the public 
    seeks to produce. Furthermore, because of this effective linkage 
    between parcel preparation and mailing, the availability of the Pack & 
    Send service and the level of its fees have the potential for causing a 
    significant impact on competing stores in the private sector that offer 
    packaging service and access to alternative means of shipping parcels.
        For all these reasons, the Commission finds that the Pack & Send 
    service is ``postal'' in character, and that establishment of the 
    service and recommendations concerning its fees are functions that the 
    Postal Reorganization Act contemplates to be within the jurisdiction of 
    the Postal Rate Commission.
    
    IV. Allegations Regarding Pack & Send Costs and Pricing
    
        While the parties apparently concur that the costs of providing the 
    Pack & Send service and the levels of the fees set for it by the Postal 
    Service are matters of secondary importance in this proceeding, in 
    comparison with a determination of the service's postal or non-postal 
    character, they have been subjects of controversy. CAUUC's Complaint 
    alleges that, ``the Postal Service is not pricing this service based on 
    any attribution of costs[,]'' but instead on ``what our competitors 
    charge.'' Complaint at 3. In her rebuttal testimony, witness Gibert 
    testifies that the price set for the Pack & Send service is based on 
    the cost of packaging material, together with the cost of the labor 
    time involved in performing the packaging service, plus a markup of 
    approximately 60 percent. USPS-RT-1 at 2; Tr. 2/133-34. Regarding the 
    prices charged for the service, which are not uniform for all locations 
    that offer it, witness Gibert testifies that the Service selects 
    ``prices in the upper end of the local market'' for privately-offered 
    packaging services. USPS-RT-1 at 2-3. On brief, the Postal Service 
    claims that it ``has applied appropriate, generous markups in 
    calculating the prices for its packaging service,'' and also ``has 
    affirmatively priced its packaging service * * * to avoid underpricing 
    with respect to alternative sources.'' Postal Service Initial Brief at 
    17. (Footnote omitted.)
        Both Complainant and the OCA argue, to the contrary, that the 
    Postal Service has set the prices for Pack & Send service at levels 
    that are unlikely to recover the average costs of providing the 
    service. Both parties argue that, at the reported average labor cost of 
    $3.24 per Pack & Send transaction, a labor rate of $29.04 per hour, and 
    a 60 percent markup of the labor cost, the average Pack & Send 
    transaction would have to be accomplished in 4.2--minutes which CAUUC 
    characterizes as ``unbelievable'' (Initial Brief at 14) and OCA as 
    ``preposterous'' (Initial Brief at 9). Based on the reported costs of 
    administering the service (Tr. 3/271), CAUUC also calculates an average 
    of $7.22 per transaction, which would also require that labor time be 
    ``minimal.'' Initial Brief at 14.
        Finally, both Complainant and the OCA argue that Pack & Send prices 
    are likely to be set too low in their respective markets in light of 
    the higher wage rates paid by the Postal Service to its unionized work 
    force. CAUUC Initial Brief at 14-15; OCA Initial Brief 10-13. On the 
    basis of these analyses and
    
    [[Page 67362]]
    
    considerations, OCA claims ``that the Postal Service is offering Pack 
    and Send at predatory prices.'' Id. at 7.
        In its reply brief, the Postal Service denies the claims of 
    predatory pricing and cross-subsidization, and challenges the 
    calculations on which CAUUC and OCA base their arguments that Pack & 
    Send prices are not likely to be compensatory. The Service notes that 
    the parties' calculations used the retail prices of packaging material, 
    rather than their costs to the Postal Service, and that substituting 
    the latter would leave enough labor cost to allow for almost 7 minutes 
    of clerk time per transaction. Postal Service Reply Brief at 9-10. 
    Additionally, the Service argues that the parties' calculations fail to 
    take into account that the average hourly rate for labor used in Pack & 
    Send transactions is likely to be lower than the average hourly rate 
    for window and window distribution clerks, who are generally senior 
    employees, because in some instances the packaging service is performed 
    by part-time or lower-wage postal employees. Id. at 10-11. To 
    illustrate these points, the Service appends a table which purports to 
    demonstrate that the average Pack & Send charge could cover costs and 
    bear some markup with varying amounts of labor per transaction. Id., 
    Table 1.
        After examining the scant record evidence available on these 
    issues, the Commission concludes that it is simply impossible to reach 
    any informed conclusion regarding the costs of providing the Pack & 
    Send service, or whether the fees charged by the Postal Service are 
    compensatory. Apparently the prices charged for the service have not 
    been uniform across all areas where Pack & Send has been 
    offered,14 and comprehensive volume and revenue information is 
    unavailable. While the Postal Service purportedly begins with labor 
    cost in arriving at Pack & Send prices, that figure (or range of 
    figures) has not been quantified on the record of this 
    proceeding.15 As CAUUC and OCA point out, costs recovery would 
    depend on the duration of the transaction, and data on this critical 
    operational question are likewise unavailable. Finally, there is no 
    information concerning price levels that prevail in the Commercial Mail 
    Receiving Industry for competing packaging services. These are all 
    matters that would either require or warrant exploration should the 
    Pack & Send service be considered on its merits in a proceeding 
    conducted pursuant to sections 3622 and 3623.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \14\ In response to a question posed by Commissioner LeBlanc, 
    witness Gibert testified that ``different prices have been tested in 
    different markets.'' Tr. 2/213.
        \15\ The Postal Service states that Pack & Send prices are 
    intended to recover a variety of associated costs in addition to 
    window transaction labor cost, but that: ``Our analysis has not yet 
    extended to determining the associated cost segments and 
    components.'' Tr. 3/273.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    V. Disposition of the Complaint and Provision For Further 
    Proceedings
    
        Having found that the Complaint of CAUUC is justified, the 
    Commission must decide on an appropriate course of action. Complainant 
    asks the Commission to declare its finding that Pack & Send is a postal 
    service being offered in violation of the Reorganization Act, and to 
    commence a second phase of this docket which would consider the Pack & 
    Send service on its merits pursuant to sections 3622 and 3623. CAUUC 
    Initial Brief at 16. Similarly, OCA argues that the Commission should 
    issue a threshold jurisdictional order now, and simultaneously initiate 
    a second stage of this proceeding to establish classification 
    provisions and rate levels for the Pack & Send service. OCA Initial 
    Brief at 14-16. However, the Postal Service argues that the procedures 
    suggested by OCA would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme of the 
    Reorganization Act, the terms of section 3662, and section 3001.87 of 
    the Commission's rules of practice. Postal Service Reply Brief at 16-
    18. Should the Commission find the Complaint to be justified, the 
    Postal Service argues that the Commission ``should only issue a 
    recommended decision to the Governors to that effect.'' Id. at 17.
        In a typical proceeding under section 3662 concerning rates or fees 
    charged by the Postal Service, the Commission would issue a substantive 
    recommended decision pursuant to section 3662 and section 87 of the 
    rules of practice. For example, if the Commission found justified a 
    Complaint that the rates for a subclass of mail were no longer 
    compensatory, the Commission would recommend appropriate adjustments in 
    those rates after a proceeding conducted pursuant to section 3624. 
    Similarly, if the Commission found justified a Complaint that the 
    Postal Service was applying rates in a preferential or unduly 
    discriminatory manner, the Commission would issue a decision 
    recommending appropriate changes in Postal Service rate application 
    practices.
        However, in this case there is no substantive recommendation for 
    the Commission to make under section 3622 or section 3623. The Postal 
    Service contends that as it has never requested that a rate be set for 
    the Pack & Send service, the Commission is not authorized to make a 
    substantive recommendation pursuant to section 3622.16 Even if it 
    were, for reasons presented above the Commission would lack an 
    evidentiary basis on which to make findings concerning costs, volumes 
    and revenues for Pack & Send service. There is a similar dearth of 
    evidence on which the Commission could base substantive findings on the 
    merits of Pack & Send service as a potential mail classification, in 
    response to the criteria of section 3623(c). Furthermore, a recommended 
    decision simply declaring that Pack & Send is a postal service, and 
    thus subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, would be a hollow vessel 
    lacking any recommendation of substance upon which the Governors could 
    act under section 3625.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \16\ ``Congress made the deliberate decision to confer rate 
    origination authority solely upon the Postal Service.'' Dow Jones & 
    Co. v. United States Postal Service, 656 F.2d 786, 790 (D.C. Cir. 
    1981).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        For this reason, the Commission will issue a declaratory order, as 
    suggested by Complainant and the OCA. However, the Commission will not 
    initiate a second stage of this proceeding sua sponte, as these parties 
    request, in order to accommodate the considerations cited by the Postal 
    Service:
    
        In this regard, if only as a practical matter, but also as a 
    matter related to the relative responsibilities of the Commission 
    and the Postal Service, if the Commission concludes that Pack & Send 
    is a postal service, it should defer to the Postal Service's 
    determination as to whether it should seek authorization to continue 
    the service by filing a request for a recommendation from the 
    Commission.
    
    In the footnote to this sentence, the Service states:
    
        As an additional practical matter, until such time as the Postal 
    Service has developed and documented the data needed to support a 
    rate or fee, it would be unwise and inefficient for a proceeding to 
    go forward.
    
    Postal Service Reply Brief at 17-18 (footnote omitted) and 18, n. 16. 
    Therefore, further proceedings in this docket shall be held in abeyance 
    pending the filing of a Request of the Governors of the United States 
    Postal Service for establishment of Pack & Send service as a mail 
    classification and for the recommendation of rates for that service, or 
    the filing of a notice by the United States Postal Service to the 
    effect that Pack & Send service has been discontinued. The Commission 
    expects that postal management will devote its prompt attention to 
    reaching a decision on this matter, and will collaborate with the 
    Governors to achieve an expeditious resolution.
    
    [[Page 67363]]
    
        It is ordered: 1. Having conducted hearings pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 
    Sec. 3662 for the purpose of considering the Complaint of the Coalition 
    Against Unfair USPS Competition, filed May 23, 1996, the Commission 
    finds that Complaint to be justified.
        2. For the reasons set out at length in the body of this Order, the 
    Commission finds the Pack & Send service currently offered on a limited 
    basis by the United States Postal Service to be a postal service 
    subject to the Commission's ratemaking jurisdiction pursuant to 39 
    U.S.C. 3622 and its mail classification jurisdiction pursuant to 39 
    U.S.C. 3623.
        3. Further proceedings in this docket shall be held in abeyance 
    pending the filing of a Request of the Governors of the United States 
    Postal Service for establishment of Pack & Send service as a mail 
    classification and for the recommendation of rates for that service, or 
    the filing of a notice by the United States Postal Service to the 
    effect that Pack & Send service has been discontinued.
        4. The Secretary of the Commission shall notify the Complainant, 
    the Postal Service, and all other parties to this proceeding of the 
    actions taken in this Order, as well as the Governors of the United 
    States Postal Service, and shall submit it for publication in the 
    Federal Register.
    
        By the Commission.
    Margaret P. Crenshaw,
    Secretary.
    [FR Doc. 96-32288 Filed 12-19-96; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7710-FW-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
12/20/1996
Department:
Postal Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
96-32288
Pages:
67356-67363 (8 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Order No. 1145, Docket No. C96-1
PDF File:
96-32288.pdf