[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 21, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71514-71516]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-33023]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-400]
Carolina Power & Light Company; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit 1, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant
Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-63, issued to Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L, the licensee),
for operation of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, (HNP)
located in Wake and Chatham Counties, North Carolina.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action would support a modification to HNP to increase
the spent fuel storage capacity by adding rack modules to spent fuel
pools (SFPs) `C' and `D' and placing the pools in service. The proposed
action consists of: (1) A revision to Technical Specification (TS) 5.6
to identify pressurized water reactor (PWR) burnup restrictions,
boiling water reactor (BWR) enrichment limits, pool capacities, heat
load limitations and nominal center-to-center distances between fuel
assemblies in the racks to be installed in SFPs `C' and `D'; (2) an
alternative plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a
to demonstrate an acceptable level of quality and safety in completion
of the component cooling water (CCW) and SFPs `C' and `D' cooling and
cleanup system piping; and (3) an unreviewed safety question for
additional heat load on the CCW system.
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's
application for amendment dated December 23, 1998, as supplemented by
letters dated April 30, June 14, July 23, September 3, October 15, and
October 29, 1999.
The Need for the Proposed Action
The proposed action is needed for the licensee to provide spent
fuel storage capacity for all four CP&L nuclear units (Harris,
Brunswick 1 and 2, and Robinson) through the end of their current
licenses.
HNP was originally planned as a four nuclear unit site and the fuel
handling building (FHB) was designed and constructed with four separate
pools capable of storing spent fuel. HNP Units 3 and 4 were canceled in
late 1981 and HNP Unit 2 was canceled in late 1983. The FHB, all four
pools (including liners), and the cooling and cleanup system to support
SFPs `A' and `B' were completed. However, construction on SFPs `C' and
`D' was discontinued after Unit 2 was canceled and the system was not
completed. HNP, Unit 1 began operation in 1987 with SFPs `A' and `B' in
service.
As permitted by the HNP operating license issued on January 12,
1987, CP&L has implemented a spent fuel shipping program. Spent fuel
from Brunswick (2 BWR units) and Robinson (1 PWR unit) is shipped to
HNP for storage in the HNP SFPs. CP&L ships fuel to HNP in order to
maintain full core offload capability at Brunswick and Robinson. As a
result of the operation of HNP, shipping program requirements, and the
unavailability of a Department of Energy (DOE) storage facility, it
will be necessary to activate SFPs `C' and `D' and the associated
cooling and cleanup system by early in the year 2000. Activation of
these pools will provide spent fuel storage capacity for all four CP&L
units through the end of their current operating licenses.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action
and concludes there are no significant environmental impacts. The
factors considered in this determination are discussed below.
Radioactive Waste Treatment
HNP uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process
gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems are discussed in
the Final Environmental Statement (FES, NUREG-0972) dated October 1983,
and evaluated in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER, NUREG-1083) dated
November 1983. The proposal to increase the spent fuel storage capacity
at HNP will not involve any change in the waste treatment systems
described in the FES or SER.
Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
Gaseous releases from the fuel storage area are combined with other
plant exhausts. Normally, the contribution from the fuel storage area
is negligible compared to the other releases and no significant
increases are expected as a result of the expanded storage capacity.
Storing spent fuel in four pools (instead of the previous two pools)
will result in an increase in the SFP evaporation rate. The licensee
has determined that the increased evaporation will increase the
relative humidity of the fuel building atmosphere by less than 10%.
This increase is within the capacity of both the normal and the
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) ventilation systems. The net result of
the increased heat loss and water vapor emission to the environment
will be negligible.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through
the SFP purification system. These spent resins are disposed of as
solid radioactive waste. The necessity for pool filtration resin
replacement is determined primarily by the requirement for water
clarity, and the resin is normally expected to be changed about once a
year. The licensee does not expect the resin change-out frequency of
the SFP purification system to be permanently increased as a result of
the expanded storage capacity. During racking operations, a small
amount of additional resins may be generated by the pool cleanup system
on a one-time basis.
Radiological Impact Assessment
For this modification the licensee plans to install region 2 (non-
flux trap style) rack modules in pools `C' and `D' in incremental
phases, on an as-needed basis. The licensee estimates that the
collective dose associated with the proposed fuel rack installation is
in the range of 2-3 person-rem.
All of the operations involved in racking will use detailed
procedures prepared with full consideration of ALARA (as low as
reasonably achievable) principles. The HNP racking
[[Page 71515]]
project represents low radiological risk because the pools currently
contain no spent fuel. The Radiation Protection Department will prepare
Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) for the various jobs associated with the
SFP rack installation operation. These RWPs will instruct the project
personnel in the areas of protective clothing, general dose rates,
contamination levels and dosimetry requirements. Personnel will wear
protective clothing and will be required to wear personnel monitoring
equipment including alarming dosimeters.
Since the proposed license amendment does not involve the removal
of any spent fuel racks, the licensee does not plan on using divers for
this project. However, if it becomes necessary to use divers to remove
any interferences which may impede the installation of the new spent
fuel racks, the licensee will equip each diver with the appropriate
monitoring equipment. The licensee will monitor and control work,
personnel traffic, and equipment movement in the SFP area to minimize
contamination and to assure that exposure is maintained ALARA.
On the basis of its review of the HNP proposal, the staff concludes
that the increase in spent fuel storage capacity at HNP can be
accomplished in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers will be
maintained ALARA.
Accident Considerations
In its application, the licensee evaluated the possible
consequences of fuel handling accidents to determine offsite doses. The
proposed SFP rack installation at HNP will not affect any of the
assumptions or inputs used in evaluating the dose consequences of a
fuel handling accident and, therefore, will not result in an increase
in the doses from a postulated fuel handling accident. The proposed
action will not change the procedures or equipment used for, or the
frequency of, fuel moves at HNP or fuel shipments from the Brunswick
and Robinson plants. Therefore, the probability of a postulated fuel
handling accident will not increase from that previously evaluated.
The staff has previously considered accidents whose consequences
might exceed a fuel handling accident; that is, beyond design basis
events. One such accident evaluated by the staff involves a structural
failure of the SFP, resulting in loss of all contained cooling water
followed by heatup and a zirconium cladding fire. The details of this
severe accident are discussed in NUREG/CR-4982, entitled ``Severe
Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Issue 82.'' The
staff also issued NUREG/CR-5176, entitled ``Seismic Failure and Cask
Drop Analysis of the Spent Fuel Pools at Two Representative Nuclear
Power Plants.'' This report considers the structural integrity of the
SFP and the pool response to the circumstances considered.
Subsequently, the staff issued NUREG/CR-5281, ``Value/Impact Analysis
of Accident Preventative and Mitigative Options for Spent Fuel Pools,''
and NUREG-1353, ``Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic
Issue 82: Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools.'' In
NUREG-1353, the staff determined that no new regulatory requirements
were warranted in relation to Generic Issue 82.
The staff believes that the probability of severe structural damage
occurring at HNP is extremely low. This belief is based upon the
Commission's requirements for the design and construction of SFPs and
their contents and on the licensee's adherence to approved industry
codes and standards. For example, in the HNP case, the pools are an
integral part of the fuel building. The SFPs and the spent fuel storage
racks are Seismic Category 1, and thus, are required to remain
functional during and after a safe shutdown earthquake. In the unlikely
event of a total loss of the cooling system, makeup water sources are
available to replace coolant lost through evaporation or boiling.
Therefore, the staff concludes that the potential for environmental
impact from severe accidents is negligible.
The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of
any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant
increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Therefore, there
are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with
the proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact.
Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental
impacts associated with the proposed action.
Accordingly, the staff concludes that there are no significant
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
A ``Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (FGEIS) on
Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel,'' NUREG-
0575, Volumes 1-3, was issued by the Commission in August 1979. The
finding of the FGEIS is that the environmental costs of interim storage
are essentially negligible, regardless of where such spent fuel is
stored. The storage of spent fuel, as evaluated in NUREG-0575, is
considered to be an interim action, not a final solution to permanent
disposal. One spent fuel storage alternative considered in detail in
the FGEIS is the expansion of the onsite fuel storage capacity by
modification of the existing SFPs. The Commission has approved numerous
applications for SFP expansion. The finding in each has been that the
environmental impact of such increased storage capacity is negligible.
However, since there are variations in storage design and limitations
caused by spent fuel already stored in the pools, the FGEIS recommended
that licensing reviews be done on a case-by-case basis, to resolve
plant-specific concerns.
Specific alternatives to the proposed action are discussed below.
Shipment of Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.
However, DOE's high-level radioactive waste repository is not expected
to begin receiving spent fuel until approximately 2010, at the
earliest. In October 1996, the Administration did commit DOE to begin
storing wastes at a centralized location by January 31, 1998. However,
no location has been identified and an interim federal storage facility
has yet to be identified in advance of a decision on a permanent
repository. Therefore, shipping spent fuel to the DOE repository is not
considered an alternative to increased onsite spent fuel storage
capacity at this time.
Shipment of Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
Reprocessing of spent fuel from HNP is not a viable alternative
since there are no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the
United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be shipped to an
overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this approach has never
been used and it would require approval by the Department of State as
well as other entities. Additionally, the cost of spent fuel
reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the residual
uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost. Therefore, this
alternative is considered unacceptable.
[[Page 71516]]
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
Improved usage of fuel and/or operation at a reduced power level
would decrease the amount of fuel being stored in the pool and thus
increase the amount of time before full core off-load capability is
lost. With extended burnup of fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be
extended and fewer offloads would be necessary. The licensee has
already increased its fuel enrichment to 5 percent and is currently
operating on 18-month refueling cycles. Operating the plant at a
reduced power level would not make effective use of available
resources, and would cause unnecessary economic hardship on CP&L and
its customers. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent fuel generated
by increasing burnup further or reducing power is not considered a
practical alternative.
Alternative Creation of Additional Storage Capacity
Alternative technologies that would create additional storage
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, and modular vault
dry storage. Rod consolidation involves disassembling the spent fuel
assemblies and storing the fuel rods from two or more assemblies in a
stainless steel canister that can be stored in the spent fuel racks.
Industry experience with rod consolidation is currently limited,
primarily due to concerns for potential gap activity release due to rod
breakage, the potential for increased fuel cladding corrosion due to
some of the protective oxide layer being scraped off, and because the
prolonged consolidation activity could interfere with ongoing plant
operations. Dry cask storage is a method of transferring spent fuel,
after storage in the pool for several years, to high capacity casks
with passive heat dissipation features. After loading, the casks are
stored outdoors on a seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for
dry cask storage include the potential for fuel or cask handling
accidents, potential fuel clad rupture due to high temperatures,
increased land use, construction impacts, the need for additional
security provisions, and high costs. Vault storage consists of storing
spent fuel in shielded stainless steel cylinders in a horizontal
configuration in a reinforced concrete vault. The concrete vault
provides missile and earthquake protection and radiation shielding.
Concerns for vault dry storage include the need for additional security
provisions, increased land use, construction impacts, eventual
decommissioning of the new vault, the potential for fuel or clad
rupture due to high temperatures, and high cost.
The environmental impacts of the alternative technologies discussed
above and the proposed action are similar.
The No-Action Alternative
As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff also considered
denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative).
Denial of the application would result in no change in current
environmental impacts.
Alternative Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for HNP.
Agencies and Persons Consulted
In accordance with its stated policy, on December 2 and 3, 1999,
the staff consulted with North Carolina State officials, Mr. Richard M.
Fry and Mr. Johnny James of the North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, regarding the environmental impact
of the proposed action. The State officials stated that they had no
objection to the finding. However, they requested that the staff hold a
public meeting in Raleigh, North Carolina to discuss the license
amendment review process, the results of the review for HNP's proposed
amendment, and the analysis that led to this environmental assessment
finding.
Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated December 23, 1998, as supplemented by letters
dated April 30, June 14, July 23, September 3, October 15, and October
29, 1999, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's
Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,
Washington, DC.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of December 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Richard P. Correia,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-33023 Filed 12-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
